JUDGMENT - D.J. MOHARIR, J.:---Both these criminal applications will stand disposed of by the present common judgment. These criminal applications arise out of one and the same proceedings viz. Misc. Cr. Case No. 47(86) on the file of J.M.F.C., Washim and decided on 21-2-87. That was application under section 125 Cr.P.C. made by Indrayani wife of Dnyanba and Bhagirathi as their minor daughter. Maintenance was claimed by Indrayani as the wife and Bhagirathi as the minor daughter. This application was partly allowed by the learned Magistrate. He held that the marriage between the present applicant Dnyanba and Indrayani was not strictly proved in accordance with law and also strictly valid in law as such. He did held that some form of marriage had been gone through; that Dnyanba and Indrayani had lived as man and wife and it was by reason of this living together, as man and wife that the said Bhagirathi had been born to them. The learned Magistrate, therefore, held that though Indrayani could not be said to have been proved as legally wedded wife of Dnyanba, Bhagirathi was all the same proved to be the child, may be illegitimate born to Dnyanba and Indrayani. Therefore, the learned Magistrate found the minor daughter Bhagirathi entitled to maintenance allowance and granted Rs. 50/- per month to her as maintenance. The application, so far as Indrayani as the wife was concerned, the same was dismissed. 2. Dnyanba, therefore, filed criminal revision application No. 11/89, challenging the order of the learned Magistrate granting maintenance allowance in favour of Bhagirathi, the contention being that he had absolutely no concern whatsoever with Indrayani. That Bhagirathi was not, even an illegitimate child of his, for whose maintenance, he was responsible. Therefore, that order deserved, according to him, to be quashed. Indrayani filed Cr. Revision Application No. 12/89 contending that the finding of the learned Magistrate that she was not the legally wedded wife of Dnyanba and hence not entitled to claim maintenance allowance from him was squarely wrong. Both these criminal revisions were, therefore, heard together. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Washim by his order dated 23-11-89 held that the challenge to the order passed in favour of minor Bhagirathi must fail. Criminal Revision No. 11/89 was, therefore, dismissed. In regard to Cr. Both these criminal revisions were, therefore, heard together. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Washim by his order dated 23-11-89 held that the challenge to the order passed in favour of minor Bhagirathi must fail. Criminal Revision No. 11/89 was, therefore, dismissed. In regard to Cr. Revision No. 12/89 preferred by Indrayani, he held that Indrayani was entitled to be held as the legally wedded wife of Dnyanba and, therefore, on satisfying the requirements of section 125 Cr.P.C. she also was entitled to claim a monthly maintenance allowance from him. Dnyanba has, therefore, come up in revision once again before this Court, resorting to section 482 Cr.P.C., invoking inherent powers of this court and contending that reconsideration of the claim of both Indrayani and Bhagirathi is in the interest of Justice absolutely essential that the ends of justice could not be otherwise secured. 3. At the hearing of this application, the two opponents Indrayani in Cr. Application No. 196/90 and Bhagirathi in Cr. Application No. 197/90 both remained absent though duly served. I have heard counsel Shri Kankale and Shri Patil on behalf of the applicant. The main question and the main thread of arguments as advanced by the learned counsel remained confined to one single and very material fact and that fact is whether on the date of the marriage between the applicant and Indrayani, in whatever or such form in which it had been gone through admittedly, was a valid marriage in view of his submission that at the date of such marriage between the applicant-Dnyanba and Indrayani the earlier marriage between Dnyanba and Laxmi a girl from village Chiwara was subsisting. The entire compass of the contention is, therefore, confined to this one and single material fact. There can be no question that if it is once found and required to be held as proved that having married Laxmi in the year 1977, Dnyanba had during the subsistence of such marriage with Laxmi had also taken Indrayani as his second wife in the year 1981, then this marriage with Indrayani is not valid, in that case Indrayani would not be called a legally wedded wife. She would not be entitled to claim maintenance allowance under section 125 Cr.P.C. Even if she were to satisfy the other requirements of section 125 Cr.P.C. So far as the claim made by Bhagirathi as the minor daughter is concerned, the learned counsel Shri Patil fairly submits that in the present circumstance and having regard to the fact that the evidence on record does establish beyond reasonable doubt that Bhagirathi was born to Dnyanba and Indrayani, whatever the nature of their relationship, that she was therefore, the offspring of Dnyanba, who was liable to provide maintenance to her. The order accordingly made in her favour is not intended to be challenged now, This submission came to be only impliedly in dictated after Shri Patil had made his submission even in regard to the absence of any liability incurred by Dnyanba in respect of this minor child also. However, a perusal of the judgment of the learned Magistrate as the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the criminal revision application amply justifying that the findings about Bhagirathi being at any rate an illegitimate child born to Dnyanba is entirely irreversible. It is, therefore, that an observation has to be made that the Cr. Application No. 197/90 against Bhagirathi did not appear to have been that bitterly canvassed. 4. Coming back, therefore, to the question of valid marriage between the applicant Dnyanba as the husband and Indrayani, the respondent in Cr. Application No. 196/ 90, a brief resume of the entire evidence has also been endeavoured by the learned counsel Shri Patil. The net result of this resume can not in my opinion change the complexion of the finding that in the year 1981 Dnyanba and Indrayani went through a certain form of marriage and that upon this marriage they had lived together as man and wife. The validity of this marriage was challenged without much enthusiasm according to me. On the first point that the religious ceremonies and rites to be performed for accepting a marriage as valid in law did not appear to have been gone through, this contention, which was also advanced in the revisional court below has been dealt with at length by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. On the first point that the religious ceremonies and rites to be performed for accepting a marriage as valid in law did not appear to have been gone through, this contention, which was also advanced in the revisional court below has been dealt with at length by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. He referred to the evidence of Indrayani that the marriage was performed as per the customs between the parties; that so far as she was herself concerned, it was her first marriage; that she was not aware whether so far as Dnyanba was concerned, it was a second marriage. The witness from the place Tondgaon where the marriage was performed viz. Sitaram also testified to the details of rites and ceremonies performed at that marriage; that Mangalastakas were recited; Akshtas were showered on the couple to be wedded etc. A specific contention was raised about the absence of Saptapadis at that time. This was also dealt with by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge holding that Saptapadas as such was not necessary in as much as this was a second marriage, which was being performed by Dnyanba, the first having been with Laxmi. He also observed that in Maratha community to which the parties belong, in the case where the marriage is a second one, either for bride or bride-groom, Saptapada is not required to be performed. Therefore, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge found in favour of a valid marriage, in the first instance with reference to the ceremonies and rites which were performed. The acceptance of this as being a valid marriage was, according to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and as much appear to me also manifested by two further events, the first one is of the conception of Indrayani and the birth of the child Bhagirathi. The fact of this birth of the child Bhagirathi was reported to the village authorities who made an entry that Bhagirathi was born to Indrayani and the birth of the child Bhagirathi. The fact of this birth of the child Bhagirathi was reported to the village authorities who made an entry that Bhagirathi was born to Indrayani from Dnyanba as her husband. The second circumstantial piece of evidence is even more glaringly bright for proving the existence of marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani as a valid one. The fact of this birth of the child Bhagirathi was reported to the village authorities who made an entry that Bhagirathi was born to Indrayani from Dnyanba as her husband. The second circumstantial piece of evidence is even more glaringly bright for proving the existence of marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani as a valid one. It appears that Dnyanba's father Tulshiran was the owner of certain parcel of land, which he had sold away to one Sopan. The transaction of sale was in fact a transaction of money lending or for that matter a security for loan which Tulshiram had taken from Sopan. The loan was repaid in full and therefore, occasion arose for reconveyance of the said parcel of land by Sopna to Tulshiram. At that time, it is significant to note Tulshiram directed that the reconveyance be executed not in his name but in the name of Indrayani, being his daughter-in-law. The acceptance of Indrayani as a full fledged wife is, therefore, more than manifested both by Dnyanba and Tulshiram as Indrayani's father-in-law. On that count, therefore, it would no more be open to challenge the marriage as invalid. 5. The validity of the marriage between Dayanba and Indrayani, however, now stands to be assailed only for the first time in the course of this application (Sic) on the premise that on the date of the marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani in the year 2981, Dnyanba's marriage with Laxmi, which had been performed in the year 1977 was still a subsisting one. Therefore, Indrayani being taken as a wife during the life time of the first spouse Laxmi, could not claim to be a legally wedded wife, entitled to apply and claim maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. A few clear positions need to be appreciated in this behalf. In fact, these are admitted also. The first is that at the time when the application under section 125 Cr.P.C. was in the first instance made before the J.M.F.C., Washim, in the reply to that application filed by Dnyanba, he did not admittedly plead the fact that he had a first wife by name Laxmi or that the marriage was subsisting one nor did he raise a contention that the subsisting marriage with Laxmi had come to an end by reason of a divorce granted by him to Laxmi sometime only after his marriage with Indrayani. That premise was also not raised by way of contention of fact. Therefore, quite clearly the challenge to the validity of the marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani was not in the first instance and in the Trial Court of J.M.F.C., founded upon the fact of- if it was so a subsisting marriage between Dnyanba and Laxmi. This was also not made the subject matter and ground of attack when revisional application made by Dnyanba against the order of maintenance passed in favour of Bhagirathi was heard or the same was heard alongwith Indrayani's own application under section 397 Cr.P.C. against the learned Magistrate's rejection of her prayer for grant of maintenance on the ground that the learned Magistrate held that marriage in 1981 to be an invalid one, for the reason that necessary religious sacraments had not been gone through, the essential religious rites had not been performed. Even at that stage, the subsistence of the marriage between Dnyanba and laxmi as the basis for invalidating the marriage of Dnyanba with Indrayani was not raised, by way of a challenge. 6. That attempt is made, now for the first time in this revision application. The one premise on which this may not be countenance is, therefore, that his applicant Dnyanba had never contended and it had never been brought to the notice of Indrayani as a fact that he already had a first wife by name Laxmi living when he went through the form of marriage with her in the year 1981. This was in my opinion a matter of knowledge absolutely being personal to him and was therefore, required to be established by him as a fact, the burden being on him under section 105 of the Evidence Act. On the other hand, the submission of the learned counsel, Shri Patil has been that in as much as Indrayani has made an application claiming maintenance from her husband, it is essential for her to prove that the marriage performed with her in 1981 was a valid marriage, the validity of that marriage would therefore, be confined only to the extent of her proving that a proper marriage in the required form had been gone through between them and the liability to prove that the marriage between Dnyanba and Laxmi had come to be dissolved at an earlier point of time be also fastened upon Indrayani. She would not be called upon to establish that and it would never be a matter of knowledge to her until she came into the household of Dnyanba and entered his house as a wife. At any rate, if, therefore, one has to assume that the pleading about the subsistence of marriage between Dnyanba and laxmi was not necessarily required to be categorically made, that a finding had then be arrived at on the basis of such evidence as came on record, then it has still to be seen whether as argued by the learned counsel Shri Patil himself, the evidence finding as has come on record is a clear cut one establish that the the marriage between Dnyanba and Laxmi was subsisting in the year 1981. What at the best, the applicant here would appear to succeed in showing is that the marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani was a second marriage. Undisputedly, it, therefore, was but the mere description of it as being a second marriage does not necessarily connote to prove that is was a second marriage performed during the subsistence of first one. A presumption can not be drawn, much less can a conjecture be made that when it was admitted that this was a second marriage, the first one must have been known and accepted as a subsisting one. The subsistence of that marriage has to be independently established. Here again the learned counsel Shri Patil endeavoured to bring to my notice, one admission, which has been made by Indrayani's father Malhari P.W. 2 that divorce between Dnyanba and Laxmi had taken place sometime in the year 1983. It is difficult in the peculiar circumstances of the case that if this was so, nobody uttered a single word about the presence of Laxmi in Dnyanba's household at the time when Indrayani entered in that household as a second wife. Not even a suggestion was made to either Indrayani or her father Malhari or any other witness for that matter that on the date of this marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani, the former first wife was living in the household of Dnyanba. No such a suggestion was made to Indrayani and it is, therefore, that this contention must be found to have been now raised as a matter of surprise that the marriage between Indrayani and Dnyanba could not be termed as a valid one. No such a suggestion was made to Indrayani and it is, therefore, that this contention must be found to have been now raised as a matter of surprise that the marriage between Indrayani and Dnyanba could not be termed as a valid one. Upon the admission of Malhari that this was a case of a second marriage, it would be only so far as Dnyanba was concerned and not Indrayani. For Indrayani it was the first marriage; the change from maidenhood to a married life. Even taking an over-all view of the entire evidence as it is, it is difficult for me to accept that the applicant had his first wife living Laxmi with him as a spouse in the year 1981 when he married Indrayani. In fact, it has also to be appreciated that it would be the applicant himself, who would be in a rightful and correct position to make a statement to the Court as to the year when the divorce between himself and Laxmi took place. If he could not specifically state the date, month and the calendar year he was atleast in a position to make a statement that whether divorce had taken place after or before his marriage with Indrayani. That he has not stated in his deposition. It needs to be noted that he has in fact concended that he is not in a position to state the year in which he divorced Laxmi. But then he does not also state and assert that the divorce to Laxmi was given after he had taken Indrayani as his wife by a second marriage. Basically and for referring to the original position, it was for the applicant Dnyanba to establish the fact in order to escape liability as otherwise would cast on him under section 125 Cr.P.C. to plead in the first instance and then establish the fact of time when he had divorced Laxmi. If resume of the evidence is to be taken then it must appear that divorce, had taken place before Dnyanba and Indrayani were married in the year 1981. This will also be clear from the fact that land conveyed to Sopan by Tulshiram i.e. father of Dnyanba, was reconvened by Tulshiram in the name of Indrayani. If resume of the evidence is to be taken then it must appear that divorce, had taken place before Dnyanba and Indrayani were married in the year 1981. This will also be clear from the fact that land conveyed to Sopan by Tulshiram i.e. father of Dnyanba, was reconvened by Tulshiram in the name of Indrayani. This would not have happened if Laxmi were living with Dnyanba and her marriage with Dnyanba was subsisting; in that case, she would be the wife of Dnyanba in whose name ordinarily Tulshiram would be inclined to take the sale-deed, if not in his own name. The force of facts and circumstances, therefore, point that the marriage between Dnyanba and Laxmi had stood dissolved before he married Indrayani. 7. Yet another contention, which was, at this stage, even more thereby advanced was that the claim for maintenance made by Indrayani and Bhagirathi was the result of instigation given to them by some persons. The investigation, it was suggested came for Indrayani's father Malhari and Malhari harboured an animous towards the in-laws of Dnyanba's brother. As the learned Addl. Sessions Judge observed, this explanation was much too far fetched for acceptance and there can be no doubt that it is so. 8. That ground was, therefore, rightly rejected by the Trial Court as also the learned Addl. Sessions Judge hearing, the revision under section 397 Cr.P.C. For these reasons, therefore, it can not be said that the findings arrived at by the learned Magistrate and then the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction that Bhagirathi was the offspring of Dnyanba and Indrayani and then the finding arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions judge that the marriage between Dnyanba and Indrayani, in such form as it had been gone through was a valid one and that it was also accepted as such by the subsequent conduct of Dnyanba and his father, these findings under any circumstance be found as illegal or incorrect upon perusal of the entire record. Hence both the criminal applications must in the circumstances fail and be dismissed. Applications dismissed. -----