Judgment G.C. Bharuka, J. This writ application has been filed by the two petitioners, inter alia, for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Respondent-Bank to provide reemployment to the petitioners as per Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' only) since they are retrenched workmen within the meaning of Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(s) of the Act. 2. Admittedly the petitioners have been working as casual workers on daily wages as peon-cum-Farrash with the Respondent-Bank for certain length of time. The services of the petitioners along with some others, who are similarly situated, had been terminated by the Bank pursuant to some policy decision the Central Government pursuant to its power under Section 10(1) (b) of the Act referred the question of validity of this termination and other consequential relief to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal by its Award dated 9th February, 1989, (Annexure 2 to the writ application), inter alia, held that retrenchment of the workmen including the petitioners was not illegal in view of the provisions contained in Rule 76 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Rule' only) since they had not worked for more than 240 day. But on the second issue i.e. to what other relief’s these workmen are entitled to, the direction of the Tribunal, inter alia, was that, “.. ... to hold the test for the appointment of peon-cum-Farrash within two months from the date of publication of the Award in the Official Gazette and consider the case of the concerned workmen under Section 25-H of the I.D. Act. If any peon-cum-Farrash has been appointed in the mean time the concerned workmen selected in the test should be given seniority as held by the Hon'ble Judges of Hon'ble Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 5909 of 1988.” 3. It is necessary to mention here that apart from raising the aforesaid dispute under the provisions of the Act, the Bihar State Allababad Bank Employees Union also filed a writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 5909 of 1988 raising the very issue which had been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. In this view of the matter, this Court by its order dated 26.9.88 passed in the aforesaid writ petition. In this view of the matter, this Court by its order dated 26.9.88 passed in the aforesaid writ petition. Instead of entering into the merit of the case, found it more proper to direct the Tribunal to decide the dispute within four months and while disposing of the said writ petition this Court also observed that: "However, we make it clear that if outsiders are appointed against these posts then they shall not be made permanent till the reference case aforesaid is disposed of and their appointments shall be subject to the result in the aforesaid Reference case." 4. It is a matter of record that on 22.6.88 by 8 Notification No. BZ/Admn/CL/40A the Bank had made an advertisement for recruitment of peon-cum-Farrash inviting applications for written test, interview etc. The petitioners have not stated that they had made any application pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement seeking employment through written test, interview etc. but their claim is that since at some point of time they were working as casual workers with the Bank, therefore, they have acquired a legal right of reemployment under Section 25-H of the Act, which has been illegally and malafidely denied by the Respondents. It has been also claimed by the petitioners that they had made applications for appointment on preferential basis under Section 25-H of the Act on the ground that they had worked for more than 90 days in the Bank. These applications are Annexures 3 and 3/1. 5. In the writ application the petitioners have nowhere stated as to the length of period for which they had worked as casual workers in the Bank. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners had not filed any application for their appointment through regular mode as per the advertisement made by the Bank. Therefore, the sole question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioners have acquired any legal right of reemployment under Section 25-H of the Act. 6. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners had not filed any application for their appointment through regular mode as per the advertisement made by the Bank. Therefore, the sole question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioners have acquired any legal right of reemployment under Section 25-H of the Act. 6. For appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it will be necessary to examine Section 25-H of the Act, which reads as under: "25-H, Reemployment of retrenched workmen - Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for reemployment and such retrenched workmen who offer themselves for reemployment shall have preference over other persons." A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions demonstrates that for seeking aright of reemployment under the said provisions of Section 25-H of the Act, it is at least essential to establish that such person is a "retrenched workman". Both the words 'retrenchment' as well as 'workman' have been given statutory meaning under the Act itself, which are as under: 2(oo) "retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and, the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of its contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health. 2(s) "Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, for whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 or 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 7. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that even a casual worker is a workman within the meaning of the Act and, as such, he is entitled to the benefits as contemplated under Section 25-H of the Act. Without delving deep into the matter, I will accept this proposition in view of the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh Sharma and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (1983 (31) B.L.J.R., 207). But the more important aspect involved in this case is whether in view of the existing definition of 'retrenchment' it, can be said that the petitioners are retrenched workmen. I may indicate here that sub-clause (bb) to Clause 2(oo) of the Act, which have been quoted above, have been inserted by the Indusial Disputes Amendment Act 1984 (Act 49 of 1984) with effect from 18-8-84. There are catena of decisions including that of the Supreme Court, which has considered the scope and ambit of the statutory definition of the expression 'retrenchment' as contained in Section 2(oo) of the Act prior to its amendment in 1984. In the case of L. Robert D'Souza Vs. There are catena of decisions including that of the Supreme Court, which has considered the scope and ambit of the statutory definition of the expression 'retrenchment' as contained in Section 2(oo) of the Act prior to its amendment in 1984. In the case of L. Robert D'Souza Vs. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and another, (AIR 1982 Supreme Court 854) it has been held that: "The definition of expression 'retrenchment' in S. 2(oo) is so clear and unambiguous that no external aids are necessary for its proper construction. Therefore, we adopt as binding the well settled position in law that if termination of service of a workman is brought about for any reason whatsoever, it would be retrenchment except if the case falls within any of the excepted categories, i.e., (i) termination by way of punishment inflicted pursuant to disciplinary action;(ii) voluntary retirement of the workman; (iii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; (iv) or termination of the service on the ground of continued ill-health. Once the case does not fall in any of the excepted-categories the termination of service even if it be according to automtic discharge from service under agreement would nonetheless be retrenchment within the meaning of expression in S.2(oo)." Subsequent to the aforesaid decision, the Parliament stepped in and inserted sub-clause (bb) providing therein that termination of service of the workman as a result of non-renewal of the contract between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or on such contract being terminated under the stipulation in that behalf contained therein will not be treated as retrenchment within the meaning of the Act and thus creating one more clause of exception. 8. Now coming to the present case, admittedly the petitioners at some point of time in 1981-82 had been working as casual workers on daily wages. The concept of casual workers on daily basis is that the persons are employed for some specified period or some specified work and on completion of this specified period or specified work, the employment automatically comes to an end resulting in termination simpliciter. This is always as a result of the contract between the employer and the workman concerned. The concept of casual workers on daily basis is that the persons are employed for some specified period or some specified work and on completion of this specified period or specified work, the employment automatically comes to an end resulting in termination simpliciter. This is always as a result of the contract between the employer and the workman concerned. Consequently such casual workers can not be treated as retrenched workmen for the purposes of the Act including sections 25-F and 25-H thereof. In this view of the matter, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief based on their claims in terms of section 25-H of the Act. 9. The view taken above, which is based on statutory construction, also finds ample support from the point of public policy as also the requirements enshrined in the equality clauses contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Public employment is the national wealth and every citizen seeking to participate in such employment must have a reasonable opportunity as known to taw. The nationalised banks being the instrumentalities of the Government are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Their actions and activities are also subject to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Article 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in the matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. One of the means of assuring this right to all the citizens is to provide opportunity of employment or appointment to public offices by inviting persons to such employment through public advertisement or through other mode of public recruitment like Employment Exchange etc., as may be permissible under the law. In the case of Kamal Kr. Sinha v. I.G.I.M.S.; (1990) 2 PLJR 465 a Bench of this Court while dealing with the similar question has held that : "So far as permanent absorption of casual employees in the State Service is concerned, in our opinion, the same: is impermissible in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in absence of statutory provision or a policy decision of the State." 10. The persons who are employed on casual basis or as daily workers do not usually acquire the employment through legal mode as indicated above. The persons who are employed on casual basis or as daily workers do not usually acquire the employment through legal mode as indicated above. They are employed either just as a stop gap arrangement to meet the immediate need of the institution or may be as it many times transpires employment on casual basis, is afforded to accommodate kitns and kins for extraneous reasons. Such recruitment can not provide the basis for claiming any right of regular employment. A view taken otherwise will be contrary to the equality clauses under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the same will provide denial of equal opportunity to the other aspirants, who may be otherwise eligible for the employment concerned. With respect I feel tempted to quote a passage from the judgment in the case of Mahender Ram v. Dy. Commissioner, Palamau, reported in 1989 B.L.T., 27 wherein B.P. Singh. J. was constrained to hold : "It is our judicial experience that Article 16 in this State is observed mare in its breach. Appointments are made initially for a temporary period but, thereafter continued sometimes under specific orders and sometimes without any order being passed. After sometime the appointee claims that by reason of his continuous officiation against a post he should be regularised. It appears that even the authorities do not realise that regularisation does not mean permanence since very often it has been urged before us that a person whose appointment has been regularised becomes a permanent employee under the State. Article 16 is breached with such impunity that one can not possibly ignore the phenomenon. I respectfully endorse my agreement with the views expressed above. 10. Notwithstanding the 'legal positions as indicated above, to be fair to the persons, who have served for a considerable period as casual workers against certain assignments, are entitled to some preference keeping in view the experience acquired by them during the period of their casual employment in case they are otherwise found equally qualified as compared to the other aspirants to such employment. 11. 11. In any view of the matter since the Tribunal has held that the Bank should hold a test for appointment of the petitioners and in case they are selected in the test they may be treated to be senior to the persons, who had been appointed during the period of adjudication, I hereby direct the Respondents to abide by the said direction. By an order dated 19-8-89 passed in this case, it was directed that two posts of peons-cum-Farrash shall be kept vacant during the pendency of this writ petition. In view of the directions as above, the Respondent Bank will now take appropriate steps for giving an opportunity to the petitioners by extending offer to them for their employment on the vacant posts after observing all the legal requirements. 12. The writ application is, accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.