JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur in Revenue Case Nos. 270, 271, 272 and 273/A-65 of 1971-72, dated 25-1-1984 rejecting the application of the owners for abandoning the said acquisition and the consequential notice issued on 6-1-1984 directing them to give vacant possession of the properties covered by the acquisition is sought to be challenged. A prohibitory injunction is sought restraining the respondents 1 and 2 and their servants from disturbing the possession of the petitioner Company in respect of Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 to the extent of its area 25, 346 squares feet, situate at Ajani, Wardha Road, Nagpur. A mandate also is sought against the Nagpur Improvement Trust directing them to execute the agreement in favour of the petitioner-company allotting the land admeasuring 25, 346 sq. feet as per the terms and conditions agreed between the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner-company. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows: The lands comprising of Khgasra Nos. 58 and 64 of Ajani, along with some other lands belonged to the interveners. They leased out the land to the petitioner (Diamond Glass Works Private Limited, Nagpur) by a lease deed dated 15-6-1970 with effect from 1-7-1970. The lease deed is still continuing. The petitioner, on execution of the lease deed, applied to the respondent No. 1-Nagpur Improvement Trust-for permission to start the glass factory on the leased land, this application came to be rejected by the respondent No. 1 on 13th July, 1970-Annexure-2. The petitioner again applied for necessary permission to raise a structure on that land on 22-7-1970 and the Nagpur Improvement Trust sanctioned that proposal. 3. This land along with some other lands were already under acquisition and these acquisition proceedings were initiated sometimes in 1969. The first application maked by the petitioner for permission to start the glass factory was rejected by the respondent No. 1 on 13th July, 1970 on the ground that the land was situated in "residential Zone" and not in 'industrial zone'. However, when the petitioner applied again for permission to raise a structure and when that permission was granted, it meant that the land was dropped from acquisition and it was allotted by the Nagpur Improvement Trust for starting the glass factory. In pursuance of this sanction, the petitioner raised the structure spending Rs. However, when the petitioner applied again for permission to raise a structure and when that permission was granted, it meant that the land was dropped from acquisition and it was allotted by the Nagpur Improvement Trust for starting the glass factory. In pursuance of this sanction, the petitioner raised the structure spending Rs. 80,000/- in 1972. These structures are standing on the land for more than 12 years. On or about 4-10-1971, an agreement came to be prepared whereunder the land was agreed to be leased out to the petitioner-company by the respondent No. 1. The land admeasuring 29,166 sq. ft. from Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 was under acquisition. As per the terms of the agreement, the petitioner company was required to pay the amount equal compensation to be fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, plus 50 percent of that amount to the respondent-Trust and the respondent-Trust was to grant the lease of the said land admeasuring 25,346 sq. ft. on usual ground-rent at 2 percent. The petitioner-company was always willing to abide by all the terms of the contract and is still ready and willing to abide by the terms. From time to time there was a correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 and the latter showed its willingness to lease out this piece of land to the petitioner-company. Since there was a delay in execution of the agreement, the petitioner wrote to the Government of Maharashtra and the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, by his letter dated 13-10-1972 informed the petitioner-company that the respondent No. 1 consented to lease out 25,346 sq. ft. of land in Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 for glass factory. 4. Inspite of the agreement, the respondent No. 1 continued the land acquisition proceedings including this land (which was the subject-matter of lease for the purpose of starting the glass factory). The Special Land Acquisition Officer ultimately sent a letter dated 6-1-1984 directing the land owners to delivery the possession of the land. In fact, this acquisition came to be challenged by one of the owners Smt. Chandraklabai Bagan in Special Civil Application No. 546 of 1973, but it was dismissed in motion hearing on 6-8-1973. 5. The Special Land Acquisition Officer ultimately sent a letter dated 6-1-1984 directing the land owners to delivery the possession of the land. In fact, this acquisition came to be challenged by one of the owners Smt. Chandraklabai Bagan in Special Civil Application No. 546 of 1973, but it was dismissed in motion hearing on 6-8-1973. 5. In pursuance of the notice dated 6-1-1984, the landladies appeared before the Special Land Acquisition Officer and objected to the proceedings of delivery of possession in view of the agreement reached between the petitioner-company and the respondent No. 1-Trust. This objection came to be overruled. The petitioner, therefore, claims that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are bound by the promissory estoppel and they cannot dispossess the petitioner of the land. Hence this petition is filed. 6. The respondent No. 4 has been joined because they want the land to be allotted for the purposes of housing. It is the contention of the petitioner that this land cannot be allotted to the respondent No. 4 as it is already agreed to be leased out to the petitioner. The Interveners have sought an intervention which has been allowed by this Court. Their main contention is that the land under acquisition has already been abandoned and, therefore, the possession cannot be taken. 7. The respondent No. 1-Trust has filed its return. The Trust denied the alleged lease by the original owners in favour of the petitioner. That time (when the lease is alleged to have been granted) the company was not even registered under the Companies Act. Even assuming that the lease was granted by the original land owners, it was a lease for 10 years and hence it expired on 1-7-1980. There is no fresh lease. Thus the petitioner-company has no locus standi to file the present petition. The Trust admits that the petitioner had applied for permission to start the glass factory on the leased land. This application, however, was rejected by the Nagpur Improvement Trust on the ground that the land was situated in the "residential Zone" and not in the "industrial Zone". It further admits that the petitioner again sought permission to raise a structure on that land and that permission was granted. But this permission was subjected to the final agreement. However, no such agreement has been executed and, therefore, the petitioner does not get any right. It further admits that the petitioner again sought permission to raise a structure on that land and that permission was granted. But this permission was subjected to the final agreement. However, no such agreement has been executed and, therefore, the petitioner does not get any right. It denies that the Nagpur Improvement Trust ever dropped the proposal of acquiring the suit land for the Ajani Street Scheme. The structure, which was permitted, was purely a temporary structure. The Nagpur Improvement Trust had no powers to permit the petitioner to start the glass factory in the "residential zone" according to the law that prevailed. It is also suggested that the permission so granted for raising the structure was irregular. The structure, according to the Trust, if at all, is unauthorised. The land (including the disputed land) was already under acquisition and a notification was issued on 16-9-1969 under section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. The total land comprising Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 was 1.10 acres. The land admeasuring 29,166 sq. ft. (out of these two fields) was the subject-matter of acquisition and the land admeasuring 4000 S.F. odd was already released for betterment. The Award was finally passed in favour of Sushilabai wife of Namdeorao Warwatkar (Intervener No. 1), Anusayabai Moreshwar Bansod (Intervener No. 2) Chandrakalabai Mohanlal Baga and Manjulabai Namdeorao Dande (Intervener No. 3). Chandrakalabai had challenged this acquisition in 1973, but her petition was dismissed by this Court. The present petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. It admits that the Improvement Trust has agreed to allot some land out of the acquired land for the purpose of housing to respondent No. 4. On these grounds the petition is opposed. 8. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3, the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the State of Maharashtra have filed their returns. They admit that 29,166 sq. ft. of land out of these two Khasra numbers was acquired and the remaining land was not acquired. According to them lease by the land-owners to the petitioner was executed during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings and hence the lease is not binding on the respondents. 9. The respondent No. 4 put in their appearance, but they have not filed any return. They stand or fall with the success or otherwise of the respondent No. 1-Trust. 10. Mr. 9. The respondent No. 4 put in their appearance, but they have not filed any return. They stand or fall with the success or otherwise of the respondent No. 1-Trust. 10. Mr. Vaidya, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, has taken us extensively through the record. He restricted his argument to the point of promissory estoppel only and the main thrust of his argument was that the land in dispute was leased out to the petitioner by the original land owners for 10 years. Thereafter the petitioner applied for permission to raise the structure. The structure was accordingly raised with the permission of the Nagpur Improvement Trust. An application was to the Nagpur Improvement Trust for leasing the same land to the petitioner and there was a long correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1-Trust. He invited our attention to lease deed (Annexure-1). Mr. Badar, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, invited our attention to the fact that inspite of this agreement, the land was never leased. On the other hand, according to him this agreement does not specifically mention the land which was the subject-matter of the lease. It appears that the respondent No. 1 wants us to be dragged purely in technicalities. Suffice it to point out that after the execution of this lease, the respondent No. 1 addressed a letter dated 13th July, 1970 (Annexure-2) to the petitioner. By this letter the Nagpur Improvement Trust has informed the petitioner that the land is already under acquisition and it cannot be allotted or leased out to the petitioner because it falls within a "Residential Zone" and as such no permission for a glass factory can be granted. However, we have the permission granted by the Nagpur Improvement Trust on 4-10-1971 whereunder sanction has been accorded to the petitioner for raising the structure in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned therein. This sanction was definitely for erecting a structure for the purpose of glass factory. We do not know why the Nagpur Improvement Trust has landed into an anomalous situation within a period of 2-3 months, we have another letter dated 28th December 1971 (Annexure-4) addressed by the Nagpur Improvement Trust to the petitioner. By this letter the Nagpur Improvement Trust asked the petitioner to attend their office along with the documents to show as to who would sign the agreement. By this letter the Nagpur Improvement Trust asked the petitioner to attend their office along with the documents to show as to who would sign the agreement. The subject of this letter is "proposed agreement between the Nagpur Improvement Trust and the Diamond Glass Works Private Limited, Nagpur". There is another letter dated 29th November, 1971 (Annexure-5) addressed by the Nagpur Improvement Trust to the petitioner. The latter has been directed to produce the copy of the document showing the authority to execute the agreement on behalf of the Diamond Glass Works, Private Limited, Nagpur. The original document was called for the purposes of verification. There another letter dated 4-1-1972 (Annexure-6). This letter has been addressed by the petitioner to the Building Engineer, Nagpur Improvement Trust, Nagpur. The subject of this letter is "Agreement regarding the plan sanctioned for the construction for the factory of the Diamond Glass Works Private Limited." As there was a doubt regarding some terms of the agreement, a fresh draft agreement was sought. We have another letter dated 13th October, 1972 addressed by the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra in urban Development Public Health and Housing Department addressed to the petitioner, wherein it has been specifically stated that the Nagpur Improvement Trust has now decided to lease out the land about 25,166 sq. ft. in Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 to M/s Diamond Glass Private Limited for the purpose of glass factory. 11. Mr. Badar, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, urged before us that the sanction which was granted for raising the structure was subject to the final agreement, which was never executed. Thus, according to him, this sanction is irregular and it cannot operate against the acquisition. Secondly, according to him, the letter-(Annexure-6) pertains to the agreement not of the said lease, but to an agreement regarding the sanction to raise the structure for Diamond Glass Factory. Thus, according to him, these two documents are completely different agreements. What Mr. M.L. Vaidya urged before us, and quite strenuously, is that the main thrust of this correspondence is to show that the land was agreed to be leased out to the petitioner for the purpose of glass factory. According to him, whether the structure was temporary or whether the Improvement Trust has granted sanction only for temporary structure is not very material and relevant fact. According to him, whether the structure was temporary or whether the Improvement Trust has granted sanction only for temporary structure is not very material and relevant fact. The relevant fact, according to him, is that the Improvement Trust agreed to lease out this land to the petitioner. There appears to be considerable force in what Mr. Vaidya says. At one stage during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings, the Nagpur Improvement Trust had agreed to lease out the land to the petitioner. Now what exactly was this land is a different question altogether which we shall take up at appropriate stage. But what was agreed to be leased was land from Khasra Nos. 58 and 64. This is certain and there can be no doubt about it. It is also clear from the record that the land was agreed to be leased out to the petitioner not for the residential purpose, but for starting a glass factory only. Whether the lease for the purposes of starting a glass factory in the residential zone is a valid act or not is a different question, which we shall take up at appropriate stage. Enough to point out at this stage that while acquisition proceedings were going on the Nagpur Improvement Trust agreed to lease out 25,346 sq. ft. of land to the petitioner for the purposes of glass factory. There was no hitch about this soul of agreement. The only hitch was as to who would sign the agreement on behalf of the company. Thus, if at all, there was a hitch, it was only of small details and not regarding the lease. It is therefore, difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Badar that there was no agreement of lease. In fact, the letter addressed by the Government to the petitioner (Annexure-7) clinches the issue when the Government informed the petitioner that the Nagpur Improvement Trust has decided to lease out 25,346 sq. ft. in Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 to M/s Diamond Glass Works Limited. The Government could not have written to the petitioner unless there was a concurrence of the Nagpur Improvement Trust. It can, therefore, be definitely held that the land admeasuring 25,346 sq. ft. out of Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 was agreed to be leased out by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner and that too for the purpose of a glass factory. 12. It can, therefore, be definitely held that the land admeasuring 25,346 sq. ft. out of Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 was agreed to be leased out by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner and that too for the purpose of a glass factory. 12. Relying upon this promise, which has been substantiated by the documentary evidence of impregnable character, Mr. Vaidya strenuously urged before us that the Nagpur Improvement Trust, a body created by the Statute, had made a promise to the petitioner that the land would be leased and in pursuance of that promise the petitioner has invested Rs. 80,000/- and odd in raising the structure on that land so that the factory could be started. Thus, according to him, there was a promise by the respondent No. 1. The petitioner acted on this promise by spending about Rs. 80,000/- is raising the structure and in view of these circumstances, falling back by the Nagpur Improvement Trust it allowed, would definitely prejudice the petitioner. These three circumstances, according to him, clinch the issue inasmuch as there is a promissory estoppel against the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 1 now cannot refuse to lease out this land to the petitioner. This was the only controversy raised before us by Mr. Vaidya. No other point has been raised. 13. It will, therefore, be necessary to examine this point in details. Before proceeding to the legal aspect, it will be necessary to look to the factual aspects of the case. Admittedly the land which was covered by the acquisition in 1969 was Khasra Nos. 58 and 64. Khasra No. 58 admeasured 1 acre whereas Khasra No. 64 admeasured 0.10 acre. Thus the total land comprising these two fields was 1.10 acres. It was near about 45,000/- sq. ft. When have the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer at (Annexure-8). In paragraph 2 of the Award it has been mentioned that out of 1.10 acres (from Khasra Nos. 58 and 64) only 29,166 sq. ft. area was acquired. Out of this acquisition, area 4356 sq. ft. was from Khasra No. 64 and 24810 sq. ft. was out of Khasra No. 58. This can be found in paragraph 4 of the Award. There is no dispute regarding this. Thus out of the total area of 1.10 acres, 29,166 sq. ft. ft. area was acquired. Out of this acquisition, area 4356 sq. ft. was from Khasra No. 64 and 24810 sq. ft. was out of Khasra No. 58. This can be found in paragraph 4 of the Award. There is no dispute regarding this. Thus out of the total area of 1.10 acres, 29,166 sq. ft. was the subject-matter of acquisition, which means that the remaining area in these two fields has not been acquired. It did not fall within the purview of the acquisition. That land is either not acquired or it has been released from acquisition. Paragraph 2 of the Award gives some details about this. It knows that only 29,166 sq. ft. land is acquired and the rest is left out for betterment. The contents of paragraph 2 further show that there is a big building and a well under the area which is left out, steel girdle posts embedded in R.C.C. pillars and G.I. Sheet roof on steel terraces and open sides. This structure is on the land left out from acquisition. This land which is left out is not the subject-matter of acquisition. Thus whatever structure is there is standing on the land which is not covered by the acquisition. Then the Special Land Acquisition Officer proceeds further. He found that there were 10 Neem trees, 13 country mango trees, 3 Babul Trees, 2 Hiwar trees, and 4 other trees on the land which was the subject matter of acquisition. He does not make any mention of any structure in the acquired land. The price of this land is fixed at 0.25 paise per square foot, treating it as inferior building site. It is on this basis that the learned Special Land Acquisition Officer valued this at Rs. 7292/-, whereas the trees came to valued at Rs. 610/-. A solatium at 15 percent was granted and the total award for this land was for Rs. 9,087/-. The fencing was not valued and the land owners were given liberty to remove the fencing at their costs. 14. It is interesting to note at this stage that this award has never been challenged so that it has become final. Thus what we find from the award is that the land under acquisition did not contain any building. On the other hand, whatever structure was raised was on the land which was left out of the acquisition. 14. It is interesting to note at this stage that this award has never been challenged so that it has become final. Thus what we find from the award is that the land under acquisition did not contain any building. On the other hand, whatever structure was raised was on the land which was left out of the acquisition. The whole trend of the petition shows that the structure was standing on the land which was the subject matter of acquisition. But when a pointed query was made to Mr. Vaidya as to whether his so called structure is on the acquired land or on the unacquired land, he was unable to satisfy us that the structure was standing on the acquired land only. Enough to point out at this stage that there is a prima facie material before us which shows that there was no structure on the land which was the subject-matter of acquisition. On the other hand which is excluded from this acquisition and that structure is still there. 15. This circumstance itself weakens the case of the petitioner to a considerable extent, because the petitioner is now coming before the Court with a case there was a promise to lease out the land on which a structure was raised, with the permission of the Nagpur Improvement Trust and that land has been acquired. The factual position, as we have discussed above, shows that the structure falls outside the purview of acquisition and that land was never touched during the acquisition proceedings. 16. Thus, the very base of the case pleaded by the petitioner has melted down considerably. Let us assume that the land, which was acquired, was promised to be let out by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. For establishing promissory estoppel, Mr. Badar, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 urged before us that at the relevant time i.e. in between 1971 and 1972, there were two agreements. One agreement was in respect of the lease of the land for running the factory and another agreement was regarding the permission to raise the structure for starting a glass factory. The permission was granted on 4-10-1971. According to Mr. Badar-Annexure- 4 pertains to permission to raise a structure inasmuch as an agreement was to be executed by the petitioner in favour of the Nagpur Improvement Trust. The permission was granted on 4-10-1971. According to Mr. Badar-Annexure- 4 pertains to permission to raise a structure inasmuch as an agreement was to be executed by the petitioner in favour of the Nagpur Improvement Trust. Similarly, according to him Annexure- 5 also pertained to the same. Annexure- 6 also pertained to the same. In fact Annexure- 6 was a letter addressed by the Managing Director of the petitioner to the Building Engineer of the Nagpur Improvement Trust and the very opening paragraph of this letter makes a mention of sanctioning a building plan vide application dated 9th September 1971. It can be reasonably held that this correspondence was relating to the sanction. However, Annexure- 7 leaves no doubt in our mind that it was regarding the lease. The letter dated 13th October 1972 was addressed by the Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra to the Managing Director of the petitioner and in that letter the Government has informed the petitioner that the Nagpur Improvement Trust has decided to lease out 25,346 sq. ft. land out of Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 to M/s Diamond Glass Works Private Limited. Thus leaving other correspondence aside, there is prima facie evidence before us, which shows that the Nagpur Improvement Trust has agreed to lease out 25,346 sq. ft. area out of Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 to M/s. Diamond Glass Works Private Limited. 17. Relying upon this circumstance, Mr. M.L. Vaidya strenuously urged before us that this creates a promissory estoppel against the Improvement Trust and now the Improvement Trust cannot legitimately refuse to lease out this land. The other circumstance which are relevant for the purposes of this adjudication are that the whole land comprising Khasra Nos. 58 and 64 were included in the Ajani Street Scheme. Secondly, it is an undisputed position that the whole area fell in the "residential zone" and not in "industrial zone". This was the factual aspect. The zonal system came into existence after 1966 and this particular area was earmarked for a residential zone and not for industrial zone. There is no dispute regarding this factual position. 18. The question that arises for decision at this stage is whether a promissory estoppel can operate against the Nagpur Improvement Trust, particularly when the law does not permit any land in residential zone or a part thereof to be converted into the industrial zone. Mr. There is no dispute regarding this factual position. 18. The question that arises for decision at this stage is whether a promissory estoppel can operate against the Nagpur Improvement Trust, particularly when the law does not permit any land in residential zone or a part thereof to be converted into the industrial zone. Mr. Badar, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 strenuously urged before us that this land was declared to be a residential zone even prior to 1969, when the acquisition was commenced. It continued to remain a part of residential zone even thereafter. According to him, a development plan for Nagpur zone was already sanctioned by the State Government when the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 came on the statute book and under section 35 of the statute itself, this development plan is deemed to be a final development plan, sanctioned under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. Section 37 of the said act permits a modification of a minor nature. It requires some procedure to be followed. But it is an undisputed position that no modifications ever came to be suggested, nor was the Government moved for modification of the plan. It is not the case of the petitioner that he at any time sought any modification of the plan. It is not the case of the petitioner that he at any time sought any modification to the plan after coming into force of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. He knew that the land is under the residential zone and law does not permit any industry to be started in this zone. Suffice it to say at this stage that the land in dispute fell in the residential zone and there being no modification suggested, no part of the land could be put to use for any other purpose except the residential purpose. There appears to be a considerable force in the arguments of Mr. Badar-that even assuming that the Improvement Trust agreed to lease out the part of this land to the petitioner for starting the glass factory, still this agreement would be in contravention of section 23 of the Contract Act inasmuch as the agreement is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of the law. Such an agreement, according to Mr. Such an agreement, according to Mr. Badar, does not give rise to any estoppel, because there cannot be any estoppel which has a tendency to infringe the statutory provisions. 19. The doctrine of statutory estoppel has now been well recognised by our jurisprudence. This aspect has been comprehensively dealt with the Supreme Court in (M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P.)1, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 621. After taking the review of the whole case law on the point, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 8 as follows: "The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party had by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to raise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and it would not be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. Thus the initial concept that promissory estoppel had its origin in the contract between the parties has been departed from and we have now come to a stage that promissory estoppel would operate even when there is no contractual relationship between the parties at the initial stage. 20. The question whether the promissory estoppel furnishes only the defensive shield and it cannot furnish a cause of action was also debated. The English doctrine propounded by Buckley, J., in (Beesly v. Hallwood Estoates Ltd.)2, 1960(2) All.E.R. 314 was in the following terms: "The doctrine may afford a defence against the enforcement or otherwise of enforceable rights; it cannot create a cause of action". The Supreme Court observed at the end of para 10 : "There is no qualitative difference between the two. Both are the off-springs of equity and if equity is flexible enough to permit proprietary estoppel to be used as a cause of action, there is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity." 21. Both are the off-springs of equity and if equity is flexible enough to permit proprietary estoppel to be used as a cause of action, there is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity." 21. There was a considerable debate whether this doctrine would apply against the Government in its Governmental or sovereign capacity. A majority decision in (Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill)3, 1947(332) US 380 took the view. "It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant for purposes for charging it with liability, whenever it takes over a business thereto fore conducted by private ventures..... Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he with purports to act for the Government stays within the Bonds of his authority.......... And this is so even though as here, agent himself may have been unaware of the limitation upon his authority......'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government, does not reflect a callous outlook. It merely expresses the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury." 22. The Supreme Court did scrutinise those report and it observed in paragraph 19. "When we turn to the Indian law on the subject it is heartening to find that in India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been case gorically negatived." 23. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been case gorically negatived." 23. At the end of paragraph 23, the Supreme Court observed : "It was thus laid down that a party who has, acting in reliance on a promise made by the Government, altered his position, is entitled to enforce the promise against the Government even though the promise is not in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 and that article does not militate against the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government." 24. Taking the review of the case law on the point so far, the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 observed : "The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision (Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay)4, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 469 that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever, high a or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever, high a or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned : the former is equally bound as the later." Accepting the principles laid down in (Indo-Afghan Agencie's case)5, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 718, it was observed : "It was laid down by this Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter the position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual." 25. Thus the position as it obtains today is very clear. The principle of promissory estoppel is well recognised. It is not only a shield but it can be a weapon-has also been well-recognised. It can furnish an appropriate cause of action. It has also been well-establish by now that this doctrine is applied even against the Government and its scope is not-restricted only against the private parties litigating. These principles are well-established. 26. This doctrine, however, has its own limitations. These limitations are well spelt out by the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 of its judgment, where it is observed : "But it is necessary to appoint out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so required. These principles are well-established. 26. This doctrine, however, has its own limitations. These limitations are well spelt out by the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 of its judgment, where it is observed : "But it is necessary to appoint out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so required. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudice if the to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out, the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J., pointed out in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise "on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency", nor can the Government claim to be the side Judge of its liability and repudiated if "on an ex-parte apportionment of the circumstances". If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability, the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so the Court can Judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise, but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status qsuo ante." 27. This is, in short, the position of law. The Government can claim no immunity in residing from the promise it made to the citizen. The general principle is that the Government is equally bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. However, this doctrine has its own limitations which have been enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs. 28. There is another exemption to this rule. The Government can claim no immunity in residing from the promise it made to the citizen. The general principle is that the Government is equally bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. However, this doctrine has its own limitations which have been enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs. 28. There is another exemption to this rule. This exception, stated in short, is that the doctrine or promissory estoppel cannot be enforced against the Government when the Government shows that it owes a duty to the public and it was acting in pursuance of that duty. The Supreme Court at the end of paragraph 27 of the judgment observed : "This propositions is unexceptionable, because where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, and her obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine or promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law." At the end of paragraph 28, the Supreme Court observed : "It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even a private party to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power. The Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel." 29. The facts we are confronted with, in the present case, are that it is not a promise made by the Government, but it is a promise made by the respondent No. 1, which is the creation of the statute. Its powers and functions are defined by the statute itself. It is not a sovereign body which can do or undo anything it likes. It has to act only within the compass provided by the statute. It cannot make promises which the law does not permit it to fulfil. In short, it has to confine itself within the four corners of law. It is within this compass that we are required to examine and scrutinise the present case. 30. "Zoning" is prescribed by the statute. Once the zones are created for a specific purpose, it is not permissible to change the user of these zones. In short, it has to confine itself within the four corners of law. It is within this compass that we are required to examine and scrutinise the present case. 30. "Zoning" is prescribed by the statute. Once the zones are created for a specific purpose, it is not permissible to change the user of these zones. It is not necessary for us to find out the reasons for not permitting the change of user. It is an undisputed position that when the residential zone is delimited, no user other than for residential can be permitted. Admittedly, the land in dispute comes within a residential zone. The petitioner wants the disputed land not for residential purpose, but for starting a glass factory. It is their case that the improvement Trust has agreed to lease out the disputed land for starting a glass factory in the residential zone. Even assuming for the time being that the respondent No. 1 has made any promise, the question that arises at this stage is whether the respondent Trust should be forced to honour its promise even though the promise results in converting the residential zone into an industrial zone. For this, different situations are to be considered. First of all, the Nagpur Improvement Trust, though a planning authority, within the meaning of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, is only advisory body. It advises the Government in the matter of development of the city. For purposes of this development, different zones are earmarked. Some zones are purely residential and some zones are purely in Industrial. Some zones are commercial. The improvement Trust, as a planning authority, has advised to the Government to a division in these specified zones. It is the Government which, under the statute, has to finalise the scheme. Once the scheme is finalised, then it is not within the powers of the planning authority to change the zones. What the petitioner wants now is that though the disputed land is situated in the residential zone, still the improvement Trust should be forced to fulfil its promise of leasing out the land for industrial purposes. Once the scheme is finalised, then it is not within the powers of the planning authority to change the zones. What the petitioner wants now is that though the disputed land is situated in the residential zone, still the improvement Trust should be forced to fulfil its promise of leasing out the land for industrial purposes. The question that arises at this stage is whether such promise which has a potentiality of infringing the statute can be enforced only because of the doctrine of promissory estoppel Even assuming for the time being that the Improvement Trust has agreed to lease out this land for industrial purpose, the question that arises at this stage is whether this promise can be enforced, only on the ground of promissory estoppel knowing full well that this enforcement would result in the infringement of the law that is in force. According to us, the Improvement Trust now has come with a clear-cut case before this Court. According to them, the land is situated in the residential zone and, therefore, no industry can be started in that zone. The petitioner wants the land only for industrial purpose and not for residential purpose. We have now to consider whether it is permissible. 31. This would now take us back to the limitation which have been enumerated by the Supreme Court on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. After the finalisation of the scheme, it has become the public duty of the Nagpur Improvement Trust to see that the land in residential zone is used only for residential purpose and for no other purpose. It is a public obligation on the Improvement Trust to see that the land is used only for residential purpose. There is thus a conflict between the contractual obligations and the public duties enjoined upon the Nagpur Improvement Trust by the statute and the Court now has to find out whether in this conflict the equitable doctrine can be enforced. In our opinion, inasmuch as the Nagpur Improvement Trust owes a public obligation to maintain the sanctity of zoning, it cannot be forced to contravene the legal obligations. Even though there is a promise, that promise cannot be forced to be performed, particularly when the performance thereof results in contravention of the obligation. Where the Court has to strike the equilibrium between the obligation and the promise. Even though there is a promise, that promise cannot be forced to be performed, particularly when the performance thereof results in contravention of the obligation. Where the Court has to strike the equilibrium between the obligation and the promise. The present case, as it stands, would show that the promise has to yield before the legal obligations. The petitioner cannot, therefore, justifiably ask this Court to issue a mandate to the Improvement Trust to lease out the land to them for industrial purpose in the residential zone. 32. Similar ratio has been laid down by this Court in (Tapti Oil Industries v. State of Maharashtra)6, A.I.R. 1984 Bom.16 where this Court observed : "If the petitioners acting on the representations made in the scheme incur expenditure, set up a manufacturing unit in the hope that the State Government will abide by its word and act according to its representations, we fail to see why even while acting in its executive capacity and not under any legislative powers, the State Government cannot be compelled to abide by the representations made by it. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not restricted only to review of the actions of the State Government under statutory enactments. With the everwidening field of judicial review of administrative actions and executive decisions of the State and in the light of the extended applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, of which the whole object is to see that the Government sticks to its promise and abides by it, it is now too late in the day to contend that such a scheme does not vest any right in a person who acted upon those representations and changed his position. The mere fact that the scheme is of an executive nature is by itself not conclusive of the determination as to whether a right is created in favour of a person who acts upon the representations made by the State. It will be too broad a principle to lay down that no executive action of the State Government confers any right on an individual. It will be too broad a principle to lay down that no executive action of the State Government confers any right on an individual. We are, therefore, unable to concur with the view taken by the Division Bench that the scheme being executive in nature, the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even assuming that the petitioners are entitled to invoke the principle of promissory estoppel." 33. In both the cases the dispute arose out of the incentive scheme declared by the Government. However, the principle remains the same and is applicable on all fours even to the present case. 34. Mr. Badar then invited our attention to the fact that long back in 1973, one of the four co-owners of this land had challenged the acquisition proceedings in this very Court and that petition has been dismissed in limine. According to him the dismissal of that petition in limine bars the present petition on the principle of constructive res judicata. This argument cannot be accepted. Because, what was challenged in that petition was the acquisition proceedings. The cause of action in this petition is the promise alleged to have been made by respondent No. 1. The causes being different, the reliefs being different and the parties being also different, there is no question of res judicata, and the consequent bar. 35. It was next contended by Mr. Badar that the petitioner has no locus standi to present and pursue this petition, inasmuch as its lease was only for 10 years commencing from 1-7-1970, it has expired by efflux of time on 31-6-1980 and there is no fresh lease. If fact this question assumes very little importance inasmuch as there is no dispute about the lease. Even at one stage, the respondent No. 1 had promised to lease out the land. Lessee he has acquired an interest in the land. In his petition he has specifically stated that he is possession of that land even today. There can be no question of locus standi in these circumstances. As he has interest in the land, he is entitled to present this petition and pursuer it. His case may be rejected on the merits. But it cannot be rejected on the ground of locus standi. 36. There can be no question of locus standi in these circumstances. As he has interest in the land, he is entitled to present this petition and pursuer it. His case may be rejected on the merits. But it cannot be rejected on the ground of locus standi. 36. It was next contended on behalf of the interveners that the disputed land (comprising of 29, 166 sq. feet) was abandoned by the Nagpur Improvement Trust during the pendency of the acquisition proceedings. In the application for intervention and in another application for seeking directions from the Court, the interveners have specifically stated that the acquisition proceedings in respect of this particular land, have been dropped. There is, however, no material to show that the proceedings have been dropped. On the other hand, we have the award before us which shows that the proceedings continued in respect of this very land and they culminated into the award. At the instance of Mr. Palshikar, we had called the records of the Nagpur Improvement Trust pertaining to the Ajani Street Scheme. Mr. Palshikar, went through all these records, but he did not find any material to show that this land has been dropped from the acquisition proceedings. It is true that some lands have been dropped. Mr. Palshikar at the stage of the arguments has filed one resolution passed by the Nagpur Improvement Trust in the meeting of the Board of Trustees on 13-3-1987. In that resolution, the lands S. Nos. 54/5, 54/6, 54/3 and 54/5 have been dropped. But there is absolutely nothing to show that the lands comprising Survey Nos. 58 and 64 have been dropped. Thus on facts, there is no material to substantial this plea of Mr. Palshikar. 37. The sum and substance of all that we have discussed so far as that there is a dispute as to whether the structure has been raised on the land which is the subject-matter of acquisition or on the land which has not been acquired. The material shows that the structure is standing on that piece of land which is not the subject-matter of acquisition. The material shows that the structure is standing on that piece of land which is not the subject-matter of acquisition. But even assuming that the Nagpur Improvement Trust has agreed to lease out this acquired land, we find ourselves unable to enforce the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the respondent No. 1 on the ground that in infringes the legal obligations enjoined upon the respondent No. 1 by the statute. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be enforced, in the teeth of such circumstances. An individual cannot equitably claim the benefit of promissory estoppel particularly when after-effects of that estoppel result in the breach of obligations enjoined by law. 38. In the result, the petition has no merits and it deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. The rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to cots. Petition dismissed. -----