JUDGMENT Ahmed, J.: 1. An appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act was preferred against an Order dated 20.8.90 passed in C.O. No. 1614/87 by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court. In the said appeal an application for stay of the order impugned was filed. By order dated 21.8.90 we stayed the order impugned for a period of one week, Opposite Party No.1 had entered appearance. Subsequently Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 6 have also entered appearance. The application for stay is now taken up for consideration and disposal. 2. To appreciate the point raised herein a brief resume of the facts leading to this appeal may be made. The petitioners filed a suit being title suit No. 169 of 83 in the court of the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Howrah against opposite party No.1 Sailendra Mukherjee and others for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing or interfering with the running of a cinema business named and styled as' Aloka'. The petitioner filed an application for appointment of a receiver and a receiver was appointed by the learned trial Court. Against that appointment of receiver a revisional application under Section 115 of the C.P.C. was filed before this court. The learned Single Judge of this court on 27th September, 1989 heard both the parties modified the order appointing receiver and disposed of the application. By the said order Gouri Sankar Mukherjee was directed to act as a Manager till the disposal of the suit on certain conditions mentioned therein. The suit in question was decreed on 10.8.90. On 11.8.90 opposite party No. 1 filed an application for stay of the operation of the judgment. The same was rejected by the learned Munsif. On the next day the petitioner went to the disputed cinema house but found that the Opposite Parties had created obstruction. They filed an application under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. and obtained an order against opp. party No. 1 and others restraining them not to interfere or disturb in running the cinema business named Aloka and its management by the petitioner. On these facts, the opposite party moved the learned Single, Judge for drawing up a proceeding under the contempt of courts Act. party No. 1 and others restraining them not to interfere or disturb in running the cinema business named Aloka and its management by the petitioner. On these facts, the opposite party moved the learned Single, Judge for drawing up a proceeding under the contempt of courts Act. On 20.8.90 alleging that the suit was still pending and inspite of it the petitioner herein has interfered with the possession of the disputed property in violation of the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge. The learned Single Judge heard the matter in presence of the learned Advocates for both the parties. After hearing both the parties the order impugned was passed. 3. The learned Munsif decreed the suit on the following terms - That the suit be and the same is decreed on contest with all costs. Defendants are restrained permanently from disturbing or interfering with the Plaintiff running the' Aloka Cinema' business. The defendants are directed to render full and proper accounts from 17.10.82 till 10.8.90 within six months. Damages in the form of mesne profit are to be paid by the defendants to the Plaintiff @ 12% per annum on the profits of the firm Aloka after accounts are finalised in a separate proceedings. Direction for accounts was also given. 4. By order impugned dated 20.8.90 the Hon'ble Single Judge passed the following order-"hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties I direct opposite party No.1 and all other opposite parties to make over administrative and managerial possession to Gouri Sankar Mukherjee by tomorrow 21st August, 1990 at 11 A.M. Gouri Sankar Mukherjee, petitioner is entitled to administer the affairs of the cinema hall in terms of the order passed by the court on 27th September, 1989 in C.O. No. of 87 till disposal of this contempt application. Petitioner will 'act as manager under supervision of the Special Officers viz., Amarendra Mohan Basak and Saibalendra Bhowmick, learned Advocates of this Court. Gouri Sankar Mukherjee will administer the affairs of the cinema hall under supervision of the learned Special Officers. This will be effective from 21st August, 1990. The Special Officers shall be paid 100 G.Ms. each per month at the first instance and Gouri Sankar Mukherjee will be entitled to draw managerial remuneration not exceeding Rs. 1,700/- per month till disposal of the application. Directions for affidavits were also given". 5. This will be effective from 21st August, 1990. The Special Officers shall be paid 100 G.Ms. each per month at the first instance and Gouri Sankar Mukherjee will be entitled to draw managerial remuneration not exceeding Rs. 1,700/- per month till disposal of the application. Directions for affidavits were also given". 5. In their application for stay an interim order has already been passed. The application for stay is being heard now. 6. Mr. Dutt appearing for the Opposite party No.1 has raised preliminary objections. Mr. Dutt submitted that the appeal is not competent inasmuch as it is not accompanied by a certified copy of the order impugned as required under the Appellate Side Rules. He also urged that the notice of the appeal as well as the application was not served on the other opposite parties and there are discrepancies with regard to the opposite parties in the memo of appeal and the application for stay. On this basis Mr. Dutt submitted that the application for stay should be rejected as there is no competent appeal pending before the court. 7. With regard to filing of the appeal without the certified copy of the order Impugned Mr. Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has drawn our attention to Rule 35 of the Rules under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 of this court. It provides that in respect of appeals from the orders of any Judge or Bench of the Original Side the Rules of the Original Side relating to appeals and in respect of appeals from the order of any Judge or Bench of the appellate Side the rules of the Appellate Side shall apply mutatis mutandis. Rule 6 of Chapter V of the High Court Appellate Side Rules provides that a memorandum of appeal to the High Court against the decree or order passed in appeal by any court subordinate to it shall be accompanies by copies of the judgment and decree or order of both the lower Courts and if filed by an advocate of the High Court shall bear a certificate provided therein. Mr. Dutt, submitted that this rule is attracted in an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Though this rule provides for filing an appeal against a decree or order passed in appeal by any court subordinate to it, According to Mr. Mr. Dutt, submitted that this rule is attracted in an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Though this rule provides for filing an appeal against a decree or order passed in appeal by any court subordinate to it, According to Mr. Dutt the appeal being an appeal in terms of Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act and there being no other provision in the Appellate Side Rules, the provisions of this rule is attracted; and unless the memorandum is accompanied with a certified copy of the order the appeal will be incompetent. Mr. Mukherjee on the other hand referred to provisions of Rule 3 of Chapter VIII of the appellate sloe rules relating to appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Rule provided has the memo of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the Judgment appealed from. According to Mr. Mukherjee the appeal in question is similar in nature that an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Appeal under Section 19(1) and appeal under the Letters Patent are preferred generally against an order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court to a Bench consisting of at least two Judges. Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act appeal being similar in nature to that of a Letters Patent appeal Rule 3 is attracted. Mr. Mukherjee also relied on a decision reported in (1) AIR 1963 Cal 627. The Court decided that an appeal under the Letters Patent will lie against an order passed in exercise of Jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Since then in respect of civil contempt an appeal under the Letters Patent has been filed and has been entertained in this Court even after the 1971 Act incorporation or the provisions of Section 19(1) in the said Act, the appeals are being regulated under the rules applicable to Letters Patent and as such no certified copies of the order have been annexed in the memo of appeal. Though according to Mr. Mukherjee the appeal will be maintainable without the certified copy of the order impugned even then they have filed an application for leave of the court to file the certified copy as soon as it is received by them. Though according to Mr. Mukherjee the appeal will be maintainable without the certified copy of the order impugned even then they have filed an application for leave of the court to file the certified copy as soon as it is received by them. The contention raised by the learned Advocates on this court can only be resolved by coming to a finding which of the rule of the appellate side will apply in case of appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. If we consider that Rule 6 of Appellate Side Rules is attracted we are confronted with the position that it is not an appeal against the order of a subordinate court. It is an appeal under the Letters Patent but under a statutory provisions being Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Our of these two rules one has to be applied in cases of the contempt of court appeals. Having regard to the fact that the procedure applicable to Letters Patent appeals are being applied to the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act for a long time and we have also noted that a very large number of appeals pending before us under the Contempt of Courts Act are not accompanied by any certified copy of the order impugned we are inclined to accept the view of Mr. Mukherjee that the Letters Patent appeal rules are applicable to the contempt appeals. Accordingly, we do not find this appeal incompetent as no certified copy of the order has been filed. 8. The other objection raised by Mr. Dutt is that the parties noted in the memorandum of appeal and in the application for stay are different Mr. Mukherjee admits that there are differences and this has been done since these are to be prepared in a hurry having filed an application for leave to correct these anomalies between memo of appeal and the application for stay. It will appear that in a contempt proceeding the necessary party to the proceeding is only the alleged contemner. It is not necessary that the persons at whose instance a proceeding of contempt has been initiated by the court is to be made a party. It will appear that in a contempt proceeding the necessary party to the proceeding is only the alleged contemner. It is not necessary that the persons at whose instance a proceeding of contempt has been initiated by the court is to be made a party. Even then in this case there is no dispute that opposite party at whose instance proceeding commenced in both memo of appeal and the stay application has been duly impleaded. He is the person who moved the court for initiating a proceeding for contempt of the court. Accordingly, mistake made in describing the other parties who are parties in the suit in question is of little significance. Accordingly, we grant leave to the Learned Advocate to correct the memo of appeal and the application for stay accordingly. 9. Mr. G.S. Sarkar who has appeared for opposite party Nos. 2 to 6 described in the stay application has submitted that they have been unnecessarily harassed. It will appear that they were not served with any notice. Inspite of it Mr. Sarkar had entered appearance. As according to him he ascertained that they have been made a party in the application. Since the mistake made by the appellant in preparing the application for stay has caused the appearance of Mr. Sarkar on behalf of the Opposite parties No.2 to 6 in the stay application the petitioner is directed to pay a cost of 10 G. Ms. to the learned Advocate for his appearance on behalf of the opposite parties No.2 to 6 described in the application for stay. 10. The appellant has filed another application for leave to take, steps against the Special officers who was appointed by the learned Judge of the Single Bench. This application was not moved and we do not pass any order on the same. 11. Mr. Dutt appearing for opposite party No. 1 contended that no appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 lies against an order passed by the learned Single Judge which imposes punishment on the alleged contemner. Since the order impugned is not an order punishing the contemner the appeal under Section 19(1) is not maintainable. In making this contention Mr. Dutt has relied on a decision reported in (2) 1988(3) SCC 26 (D. N. Taneja v, Bhajanlal). Since the order impugned is not an order punishing the contemner the appeal under Section 19(1) is not maintainable. In making this contention Mr. Dutt has relied on a decision reported in (2) 1988(3) SCC 26 (D. N. Taneja v, Bhajanlal). The court observed that the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the constitution of India conferred to this court the power to punish for contempt. The Jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish when no punishment is imposed by the court it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its Jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the constitution. Accordingly, Mr. Dutt submits that since no punishment has been imposed for committing contempt of the court the appeal is not maintainable. Mr. Mukherjee has drawn our attention to para 6 of this decision which clearly stated that it is apparent from the facts stated above that the allegation made by the appellant if proved would constitute a criminal contempt. It is also not disputed by the parties that it was a case for criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act. The scope and ambit of this judgment will, therefore, he confined to the criminal contempt. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee contends that the view expressed herein is not applicable in this case as the contempt allegedly committed here is a civil contempt. To understand the ratio of this decision it is necessary to come to the question which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. It appears that the appellant alleged that one Davindra Sharma was a Forest Minister in the Council of Ministers headed by, Bhajanlal. He was defeated in the assembly election. Mr. Bhajanlal was keen to give to Mr. Davindra Sharma an office of profit and accordingly an ordinance was promulgated in 1982. A Board was to be constituted under that ordinance and Mr. Bhajanlal wanted to appoint Mr. Davindra Sharma as its Chairman. This ordinance was challenged by the 12 Indian Forest officers including the appellant. It was alleged that Mr. Bhajanlal pressurised the writ petitioners through Superintendent of police and 11 officers to withdraw from the petition. It was only the appellant who continued to prosecute the writ petition and as a result he was transferred. It was alleged further that the appellant was called to the office of Mr. It was alleged that Mr. Bhajanlal pressurised the writ petitioners through Superintendent of police and 11 officers to withdraw from the petition. It was only the appellant who continued to prosecute the writ petition and as a result he was transferred. It was alleged further that the appellant was called to the office of Mr. Bhajanlal and was criminally intimidated to withdraw the writ petition. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application for contempt against the respondents. The application was admitted and a rule Nisi was issued. The learned Single Judge of the High Court took the view, that there were circumstances to indicate that it was not a fit case in which the court should exercise its Jurisdiction under the Act. On these facts the competence of the appellant to prefer the appeal under Sec. 19(1) of the Act fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. The observations made in the judgment is in the background of these facts. The court only decided that the person at whose instance a contempt rule is issued cannot maintain an appeal unless he is a person who has been punished for contempt. The question if an order passed by the learned Single Judge after initiation of a proceeding under the Contempt of Court Act is appealable was not for consideration in the court of the said judgment. Mr. Dutt has also referred to a Division Bench Judgment of this court reported in (3) 1976 CHN 1: 1976(1) Cal LJ 56 (Purna Ch. Sarkar and Ors. V. Nilratan Biswas and Ors.). The court held that unless in a rule Nisi issued by the court the contemner appears to show cause and the High Court passes an order declining to exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt no question of any appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act arise. Hence the application under Section 19(2) of the Act is misconceived. The purport of this decision is that no appeal lies at the instance of the person who had moved the Court for initiating a proceeding to punish for contempt. This decision has no bearing on the facts of this case as in the instant case before us proceedings had also been initiated and in the said proceedings the impugned order has been passed. Mr. Dutt also referred to a decision reported in (4) AIR 1976 SC 1206 (Baroda Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court). This decision has no bearing on the facts of this case as in the instant case before us proceedings had also been initiated and in the said proceedings the impugned order has been passed. Mr. Dutt also referred to a decision reported in (4) AIR 1976 SC 1206 (Baroda Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court). The court held that only those orders or decisions in which some point is decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt are appealable. The order in question is not such an order or decision it is an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure of the court. All that the order in question says is that all the points arising in the case including the one of maintainability of the proceedings would be heard together and accordingly the appeal was dismissed. It will appear that the court only decided that an order in respect of the procedure to be adopted in a contempt proceeding cannot be challenged in appeal under U/s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. This decision in not an authority on the proposition advanced by Mr. Dutt that no appeal will lie unless the contemner is punished in a proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act. Mr. Dutt has drawn our attention to another decision reported in (5) 1975(3) SCC 535 (Baroda Kanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrishuna Mishra). In the said decision the court held that so far as a criminal contempt is concerned it is a matter entirely between the court and the alleged contemner. No one has a statutory or any law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for commital because the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the court to the contempt which has been committed he does not become a part of the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the court. On a reading of Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the act the court held that the court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo moto or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on a reference made by a subordinate Court. On a reading of Sections 15, 17 and 20 of the act the court held that the court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo moto or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or on a reference made by a subordinate Court. Where a court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo moto it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and take the first step in exercise of it. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of the proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. Accordingly, the court held that when court rejects a motion or declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt it refuses to assume jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. This decision according to us does not substantiate Mr. Dutt's contention. It only says that the refusal to initiate a proceeding at the instance of the somebody does not give that person a right to prefer an appeal under Section 19. Mr. Mukherjee on the contrary has referred to a decision reported in (6) 1981(2) CHN 97 (Ranjlt Chatterjee & Anr. v. Ramband Chouboy). A Division Bench of the court held that there is no prohibition in Section 19 of the Act from preferring an appeal against an interlocutory order. Section 19(1) very clearly states that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its Jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The order impugned in that case was passed while exercising Jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this case the learned Single Judge directed the appellant to return to the respondent some amount of coal and other machineries seized in connection with criminal cases. This order was passed after initiation of the proceedings. A Division Bench of this court held that under these circumstances an appeal lies under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. After considering of the decisions placed before us and having heard Mr. Dutt and Mr. Mukherjee learned Senior Advocates appearing for the parties we are of the view that on the facts of this case an appeal under Section 19(1) is maintainable. 12. After considering of the decisions placed before us and having heard Mr. Dutt and Mr. Mukherjee learned Senior Advocates appearing for the parties we are of the view that on the facts of this case an appeal under Section 19(1) is maintainable. 12. Now we will come to the merit of the order impugned. It appears that we have already pointed out that the learned Judge disposed of the Civil revisional application that some directions and that order was to continue till disposal of the suit. It will appear that the appellant’s suit was decreed but no formal decree was drawn up. By the laid decree Opposite party No.1 and others restrained from interfering with the running of the cinema hall. As according to the appellant they were obstructing even after the said judgment was delivered by the civil court they initiated a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr. P.C. and obtained an order restraining the Opposite parties from interfering with his management of the cinema and in this process he took over possession of the property. The Opposite party No. 1 contended that since no decree has been drawn up it must be assumed that the proceeding was pending in the civil Court. Therefore, by taking recourse to the criminal Count and initiating a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. and in the process taking over possession of the property is a violation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, he filed the application. Mr. Mukherjee has drawn our attention to the provisions of Rule 7 of Order 20 of the C.P.C. which provides that decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced. Accordingly, he submits that whenever a decree is drawn up it refers back to the date of the judgment. According to him the decree only incorporates the terms of the judgment in a particular from provided by the code itself. It is really the directions of the judgment which will incorporate in the decree it does not create or decide a right between the parties. According to him the decree only incorporates the terms of the judgment in a particular from provided by the code itself. It is really the directions of the judgment which will incorporate in the decree it does not create or decide a right between the parties. According to Rule 7 or Order 20 a decree takes effect from the date of the judgment as in the instant case the judgment was already delivered restraining the opposite party it has immediately taken effect and he is competent to get the opposite party restrained by an order under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. and get back the possession of the property. The provisions of Rule 6A Sub-rule 2(a) provides that an appeal may be preferred against the decree without filing copy of the decree and in such a case the last paragraph of the judgment shall for the purpose of Rule 1 of Order XLI be treated as the decree. In clause (b) of the said rules it is further provided that so long as the decree is not drawn up the last paragraph of the judgment shall be deemed to be the decree for the purpose of execution. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the learned Judge has made an error in law in entertaining the application for contempt and has also made an error in passing the order impugned. 13. Mr. Dutt placed a decision reported in (7) 1990(1) SCC 259 (Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Sheety and Ors.). A Division Bench of the court held that the breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith or which the court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt. The remedy in such circumstances may be in the form of a direction to the contemner to purge the contempt or a sentence of imprisonment or fine or all of them. On the facts of that particular case the court held that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the ends of Justice there will have to be an order to purge the content by directing the respondent contemner to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing the same. Mr. On the facts of that particular case the court held that mere imposition of imprisonment or fine will not meet the ends of Justice there will have to be an order to purge the content by directing the respondent contemner to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing the same. Mr. Dutt submits on the strength of its decision that a court exercising jurisdiction to punish for contempt has the power to make necessary orders to purge the contempt. Accordingly, he submits that the order impugned is aimed at that end. Therefore, it is competent for the Judge to pass such an order. If this contention of Mr. Dutt is accepted it will appear that the learned Judge by the impugned order has wanted to purge the contempt allegedly made by the appellant by passing the order impugned. In this view also She appeal will be maintainable. 14. On the facts of this case it will appear that by the order impugned the learned Judge has extended the scope of the order passed by him disposing or the civil revisional application. The learned Judge in our view is no competent to do so. The order disposing of the civil revisional application was to remain in force till disposed of the suit. The suit has now been determined by a judgment and only the formal decree is to be drawn up. By the order impugned he has extended the management of the property by the person authorised by the court till disposal or the rule. In our view, the learned Judge is not competent to pass such an order. Accordingly, we allow the application and stay operation of the order impugned till disposal of the appeal and also direction the opposite party No.1 and the Special Officers appointed by this Court to deliver up possession to the petitioner immediately if taken over by them. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merit of the contempt application which is pending before the Hon’ble Judge. He is directed to dispose or the same as early as possible. Bhattacharji, J.: I agree