Judgment 1. This appeal has been filed under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is directed against the Judgment dated 12-2-1988 and the award dated 10-3-1988 passed by Sri Ravinandan Sahai, District Judge, Patna acting as Motor Vehicles Tribunal in claim case No. 6 of 1988, according to which the learned Judge had awarded a sum of Rs. 1,53,000.00 as compensation to the respondents. 2. It appears that originally Smt. Manju Bhushan Sinha (respondent No. 1), the wife of the deceased Shashi Bhushan Prasad and Smt. Savitri Devi, the mother of the deceased had filed accident claim case No. 6 of 1984 in the Court of Motor Vehicles Tribunal (District Judge, Patna). In this accident claim case, the claim of the applicants was that, on 27-3-1984 Shashi Bhushan Prasad was acting as an Accounts Assistant in the Bihar State Electricity Board (Pay-slip section), Vidut Bhawan, Patna. Sri Uma Shankar Prasad (P.W. 1) an accountant of the same section of the Board was travelling with the deceased on a rickshaw going from north to south at about 10.30 a.m. on the eastern side of the Gandhi Maidan to go to their office in Vidut Bhawan. When their Rickshaw had reached the southeast corner of Gandhi Maidan 200 yards south west from the traffic police station, Rajya Transport Bus No. BRP-5799 came from behind the Rickshaw. It was being driven rashly and negligently and was at high speed. It was coming from north. It dashed against two Rickshaws, one after the other going towards south throwing away their occupants on the road. The speed of the vehicle was so great that after traversing the right side of the road, it broke the cemented fencing of the Gandhi Maidan and drove inside the maidan. The fencing was broken and 21 feet wide breach was created in it. As a result of dashing of the Rickshaw, two occupants, namely, the deceased Sri Shashi Bhushan Prasad and Sri Uma Shankar Prasad (A.W.-1) were thrown out from the Rickshaw. The deceased suffered grievous injuries while A.W. 1 and the Rickshaw puller suffered simple injuries. The injured were removed to the Emergency ward of Patna Medical College Hospital. As a result of dashing of the Rickshaw, two occupants, namely, the deceased Sri Shashi Bhushan Prasad and Sri Uma Shankar Prasad (A.W.-1) were thrown out from the Rickshaw. The deceased suffered grievous injuries while A.W. 1 and the Rickshaw puller suffered simple injuries. The injured were removed to the Emergency ward of Patna Medical College Hospital. On the same day at about 12.50 p.m. the deceased succumbed to his injuries in the Emergency ward of P.M.C.H. on the same day, at about 3 p.m. the postmortem examination of the deceased was held by A.W. 5 Doctor R. P. Shrivastava, who found as many as six injuries on the person of the deceased. He submitted his postmortem examination report, (Ext.-3). According to him, the cause of death was injuries on the vital organs of brain and liver and the time that elapsed after the death was within 12 hours. The dead body was taken to Munger, the home town of the deceased where it was cremated on 28-8-1984. 3. In this application it was contended that the deceased was robust young man of 45 years of age and was expected to live long as the family had a very good record of longevity. The great grandfather of the deceased died at the age of 84 years and his grandfather died at the age of 81 years. The father of the deceased, namely, Sri Raghunandan Prasad (respondent No. 3) is running 71 years. The Bus B.R.P. 5799 was being driven very rashly and very negligently and the occurrence could have been easily avoided, if the Bus was driven carefully and cautiously. The accident was so ugly and horrible and had drawn so much public attention that in the issues of 28-3-1984 in the three newspapers published from Patna, the news about it was flashed. In two of them, the photographs of the place of accident was also given. The manner and circumstances of this accident speak for themselves and proved the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver in driving this Bus. The petitioner, therefore, had sought the aid of the doctrine of "Res Ipsa Loquitur". The deceased had left behind his widow (respondent No. 1), his blind and ailing mother (original petitioner No. 2) and his father Sri Raghunandan Prasad (Respondent No. 3). He was the bread earner and the very prop of the family. The petitioner, therefore, had sought the aid of the doctrine of "Res Ipsa Loquitur". The deceased had left behind his widow (respondent No. 1), his blind and ailing mother (original petitioner No. 2) and his father Sri Raghunandan Prasad (Respondent No. 3). He was the bread earner and the very prop of the family. The father and the mother were of the age of 71 years and 66 years respectively, while his widow was aged about 34/35 years. The entire family was left without a shelter and without any means to support it. 4. The deceased was a promising Accounts Assistant of the Electricity Board and was expected to be promoted to the highest post to which he was entitled. He had still 15 years of service left and he would have retired on 7-3-1999. At the time of his death, he was getting monthly emoluments of Rs. 1214.00. Only after three years, after completion of 14 years of service, he would have been placed in the scale of Rs. 670.00 to 1275.00 and in a few years his total emoluments would have been Rs. 1990.00. Apart from it, he would have got Rs. 750.00 per years as Bonus for 15 years, if he had not died prematurely. Also he was entitled to get gratuity and the Boards contribution towards the contributory provident fund for 15 years. The applicant No. 1 has submitted that he sustained a loss of association and happy family life and applicant No. 2 has sustained loss of care and service from her only son. Accordingly, the damages for a sum of Rs. 40000.00 and 25,000.00 respectively were claimed. Apart from this, the applicants suffered mental and physical torture for this premature death for which they claimed Rs. 25,000.00 each. They have further claimed a sum of Rs. 2,000.00 for the expenses over the funeral and Rs. 5,000.00for the expenses over the Sardh ceremony. They have also claimed a sum of Rs. 2,000.00for the transportation of the dead body from Patna to Munger. Thus, the total claim of Rs. 4,60,429.00 was made in this claim case. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the present appellant. In it, it was denied that the driver of the Bus No. B.P. 5799 was driving it rashly and negligently on the date and time of the alleged occurrence. Thus, the total claim of Rs. 4,60,429.00 was made in this claim case. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the present appellant. In it, it was denied that the driver of the Bus No. B.P. 5799 was driving it rashly and negligently on the date and time of the alleged occurrence. On the other hand, the Rickshaw pullers were driving the Rickshaws carelessly and negligently, as a result of which, the alleged occurrence took place. The driver of the Bus was driving the vehicle at the most normal speed and as such, any injury suffered by the deceased, A.W.-1 and the Rickshaw puller was on account of the negligence of the Rickshaw pullers. The deceased spent major portion of his earning over himself. The allegation of further increment and other speculations were denied. The claim of the applicant with respect to emoluments, gratuity, contributions etc. were also denied. The present appellant further denied the other allegations made in the petition of the applicants. 6. Evidence was adduced on behalf of both the parties. as many as, nine A.Ws. were examined on behalf of the applicants. The opposite party also examined 3 O.P.Ws. It may be relevant tt to the State here, during the pendency of this claim case, the applicant No. 2 Smt. Savitri Devi had died and in her place Smt. Prabha Sinha, the sister of the deceased and Sri Raghunandan Prasad, the father of the deceased were added as the applicants. After hearing the parties, the learned claimed Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,53,000.00 only as a compensation to the applicants. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 1,13,000.00 was to go to the widow (applicant No. 1). A sum of Rs. 30,000.00 was to be paid to the father of the deceased (newly substituted applicant No. 3) and a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 was to be paid to the newly substituted applicant No. 2. The applicants were also found entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of institution of the claim case till the payment. There was no order as to cost. 5,000.00 was to be paid to the newly substituted applicant No. 2. The applicants were also found entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of institution of the claim case till the payment. There was no order as to cost. It was further ordered that the amounts as mentioned above were to be paid within two months from the date of the order failing which the applicants will be entitled to the interest at the rate of 24% over the amount of compensation awarded. 7. In this appeal, the sole opposite party has contended that the judgment and the award of the Courts below were bad in law and wrong of facts. The learned, court below did not properly appreciate the witnesses examined on behalf of both the parties. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, the learned Court below had itself come to the conclusion that the eye-witnesses of the accident examined on behalf of the applicants had not been able to state as to how the accident had taken place. It accordingly, wrongly applied the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur. The learned lower Court failed to consider the evidence of O.P.Ws. from which it would appear that the driver of the Bus tried his best to avoid the accident. Since however, there were two rickshaws in front of the Bus and each of them was trying to overtake the other, though the driver turned the Bus, but the accident could not be avoided. At the time of the accident, the Bus was at the maximum speed of 14 to 16 miles per hour. There was no negligence on the part of the driver. Since in the claim case No. 7 of 1984, the learned Court below awarded a sum of only Rs. 2,000.00 to the co-occupants of the Rickshaw (A.W.-1), this itself will show that it was on account of the negligence of the Rickshaw puller that the accident had taken place. There is no evidence on record to show that the Rickshaw was damaged. No claim was made by the Rickshaw puller for damages of his rickshaw or injuries to his person, as such, the applicants were not entitled to any claim. The Rickshaw puller who could have been a competent witness has not been examined. There is no evidence on record to show that the Rickshaw was damaged. No claim was made by the Rickshaw puller for damages of his rickshaw or injuries to his person, as such, the applicants were not entitled to any claim. The Rickshaw puller who could have been a competent witness has not been examined. Even the driver of the Bus who was not at fault was acquitted in the criminal case. The learned court below did not take into account the compensation paid by the Board in the shape of group Insurance. This amount should have been deducted from the compensation awarded to the applicants. Since, at the time of the accident, the deceased was drawing only Rs. 800.00 per month as his salary, a sum of Rs. 80,000.00 is sufficient to be yield this amount per month by way of interest at the rate of 12% per annum. On these grounds, it was contended that the judgment of the claims Tribunals may be set aside. 8. At the time of hearing, at the out set, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the allegation of rash and negligent act on the part of the driver of the Bus has not been proved. He has further contended that no eye-witness was examined to speak about this accident and no evidence has been adduced to show that the driver of the Bus was driving it rashly and negligently. In this connection, firstly I would like to make a reference to the evidence of A.W.-1. Uma Shankar Prasad. According to the case of the applicants, he was also travelling with the deceased on the same Rickshaw at the time when the accident had taken place. From his evidence, it would appear that at about 10.30 A.M. On 27-3-1984 when he along with the deceased was going on the Rickshaw, a Rajya Transport Bus dashed the Rickshaw from behind. Due to this Sudden impact, both of them were thrown out of the Rickshaw. For a moment, he became unconscious. When he regained his consciousness, he found the deceased bleeding profusely and lying 10 feet ahead of him. They were removed to the hospital and were admitted in the Emergency ward of Rajendra Surgical Block. He has further stated that the bus had entered into the Gandhi Maidan after breaking its boundary. For a moment, he became unconscious. When he regained his consciousness, he found the deceased bleeding profusely and lying 10 feet ahead of him. They were removed to the hospital and were admitted in the Emergency ward of Rajendra Surgical Block. He has further stated that the bus had entered into the Gandhi Maidan after breaking its boundary. It would thus appear that it would not be correct to say that no eye-witness of the alleged occurrence has been examined. 9. Moreover, on behalf of the applicants, it has submitted that it is not always necessary in the case of every accident to examine eyewitnesses. An accident takes place suddenly and without any notice. After the accident, the passer-by are more concerned with saving the life of the injured. Under this circumstance, it is not surprising that no other eye-witness could be examined in this case. It was, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the manner in which the accident had taken place clearly goes to establish that it was on account of rash and negligent driving of the Bus. In this connection, my attention has been drawn to the evidence of the Investigating officer, Bhirgunath Singh (A.W.-6) He has submitted that at the place of occurrence on the road there was a divider in the middle. He has further stated that a portion of the Bus had entered inside the Gandhi Maidan after breaking its boundary wall. According to him, the boundary wall to the length of 21 feet was found to be broken. The learned counsel for the applicants before the lower Court had sought the aid of the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR. This doctrine has been explained by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Bai Puroshottam Udesha V/s. M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Company, Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1977 SC 1735 . The true import of this doctrine, as well as the circumstances in which it can be applied has very clearly been laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in this decision. It was also a case under the Motor Vehicles Act where it was alleged that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving. The question that had arisen before the Hon ble Supreme Court was that, how the rash and negligent driving could be proved by the application of the principle of this doctrine. It was also a case under the Motor Vehicles Act where it was alleged that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving. The question that had arisen before the Hon ble Supreme Court was that, how the rash and negligent driving could be proved by the application of the principle of this doctrine. It was observed as follows "Normally it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself" or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might mare probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the Car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care. From the description of the accident given by plaintiff which stood unchallenged the car had proceeded to the right extremity of the road which was the wrong side and dashed against a tree uprooting it about 9 inches from the ground. The Car was broken on the front side and the vehicle struck the tree so heavily that the engine of the car was displaced from its original position one foot on the back and the steering wheel and the engine of the car had receded back on the drivers side. The Car was broken on the front side and the vehicle struck the tree so heavily that the engine of the car was displaced from its original position one foot on the back and the steering wheel and the engine of the car had receded back on the drivers side. Held that on the facts made out the Tribunal was justified in applying the doctrine and that it was for the opponents to prove that the incident did not take place due to their negligence. Held further that the submission that the road was a very narrow road of the width of about 15 feet on either side of which were fields and that it was quite probable that cattle might have strayed into the road suddenly causing the accident was not acceptable plea for in a country road with a width of about 15 feet with fields on eighter side ordinary care required that the car should be driven at a speed in which it could be controlled if some stray cattle happened to come into the road. The car could not have gone to the right extremity and dashed with such violence on the tree if the driver had exercised reasonable care and caution." 10. The learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that at the spot where the accident had taken place, the road was very wide. This fact finds support from the evidence of Investigating Officer (P.W.-6), who has stated that there was a divider in the middle of the road. This itself will go to show that the road was very wide. From the prosecution case, it would appear that the rickshaw on which the deceased and A.W.-1 were travelling was going from north to sough. It also appears that the offending Bus had come from behind and had dashed against Rickshaw. The impact was so great that the deceased was thrown away to a distance of more than 10 feet as will appear from the evidence of A.W.-1. Under this circumstance, since the Bus had dashed from behind it would be difficult for the surviving occupant of the Rickshaw to state whether it was being driven rashly and negligently or not. However, the manner in which this accident had taken place will clearly go to show that it was driven rashly and negligently. Under this circumstance, since the Bus had dashed from behind it would be difficult for the surviving occupant of the Rickshaw to state whether it was being driven rashly and negligently or not. However, the manner in which this accident had taken place will clearly go to show that it was driven rashly and negligently. On behalf of the appellant an attempt has been made to show that since the two Rickshaws that were going ahead of the offending Bus were trying to over take each other, this accident had taken place. This plea, however, is of no consequence. Even if it be assumed for a moment that one of the two RICKSHAWS TRIED TO OVER TAKE THE OTHER ? THIS WILL NOT GIVE A LICENCE TO THE Bus driver to cause the accident. As it well known, the Rickshaws are the, slow moving vehicles and finding Rickshaws ahead of the Bus, it was the duty of the driver to be cautious and to slow down the speed. Simply because a Rickshaw was trying to over take the other, the driver of the Bus cannot be said to be entitled to dash against one of the Rickshaws. However, this fact also could not be established in the case on the basis of evidence on record. 11. The principle of RES IPSA LOQUITUR means that the accident tells its own story or speaks for itself. In such a situation, as held by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Bai (supra), it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that at the relevant time, the Bus was being driven at the speed of 12 to 14 miles per hour. Whatever may be the speed, it is clear from the manner in which the accident had taken place that the Bus was being driven negligently and also rashly. A vehicle may be driven at high speed, but if it is being driven with due care and caution, it cannot be said that it is being driven rashly and negligently. Whatever may be the speed, it is clear from the manner in which the accident had taken place that the Bus was being driven negligently and also rashly. A vehicle may be driven at high speed, but if it is being driven with due care and caution, it cannot be said that it is being driven rashly and negligently. If, however, a vehicle is driven at comparatively lower speed, still it can be said to be driven rashly and negligently, all depending on the facts and the circumstances of a particular case. In the present case, the accident speaks for itself and tells its own story. The Bus not only hit the Rickshaw from behind but it also threw down the occupants on the road. So far as the deceased was concerned, he was thrown away to a distance of more than 10 feet from the Rickshaw resulting in multiple injuries on his person. This is not all. Even then the Bus could not be stopped. It swerved towards right, hit the boundary wall of the Gandhi Maidan and broke it to the length of 21 feet. These circumstances are sufficient to show that the Bus was being driven rashly and negligently and the principle of RES IPSA LOQUITUR would be very much applicable to the facts of this case. From this it would appear that the learned Court below has rightly applied this principle. 12. In this connection, it is important to mention that the appellant has not examined the driver of the Bus as a witness. It is not the case of the appellant that the said driver of the offending bus is not available with them. Under this circumstance, it was necessary for the appellant to examine him, in as much as, he would have been the fittest person to say the manner in which he was driving the Bus. He could have denied the allegations that he was driving this Bus rashly and negligently. The failure of the appellant to examine him leads to adverse inference. 13. It may be mentioned in this connection that as many as 3 witnesses were examined on behalf of the sole opposite party, O.P. W. 1 is a driver working with the appellant. He has claimed that at the relevant time he was passing through the road on foot, and that he saw the accident. 13. It may be mentioned in this connection that as many as 3 witnesses were examined on behalf of the sole opposite party, O.P. W. 1 is a driver working with the appellant. He has claimed that at the relevant time he was passing through the road on foot, and that he saw the accident. He has further stated that the driver of the offending Bus had tried to avoid the accident. However, in his cross-examination he has admitted that he did not give any report to this effect in writing to the authorities of the appellant. As such, his evidence cannot be accepted. So as O.P.W. No. 2 is concerned he has claimed to be a time keeper of the appellant. He has stated that he was near the alleged place of occurrence at the relevant time. He has also stated that at the time of the accident, the offending Bus was at high speed and that it was not being driven slowly. He has denied the fact that this Bus had entered into the Gandhi Maidan after breaking the boundary wall. The evidence of P.W.-6, however, clearly gods to establish that the Bus had dashed against and had broken the boundary wall of the Gandhi Maidan and entered inside it. As such, this statement of O.P.W.-2 on this point cannot be accepted O.P.W.-3 has simply stated that the driver of this Bus has been acquitted in the criminal case. This, however, will not go to make any difference. It is, however, surprising to note that when the appellant could examine three witnesses it is not clear, what prevented the appellant from examining the driver of the offending Bus. This is a circumstance which is clearly goes against the case of the appellant. 14. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Sayad Akbar V/s. The State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 , which is equivalent to (1980) 1 SCC 30 . This was a case under Sec. 30A of the Indian Penal Code. The question for determination was whether the maxim of RES IPSA LOQUITUR would be applicable in a criminal case when on facts it appeared that the accident was caused due to misjudgment of the driver and not by his negligence. This was a case under Sec. 30A of the Indian Penal Code. The question for determination was whether the maxim of RES IPSA LOQUITUR would be applicable in a criminal case when on facts it appeared that the accident was caused due to misjudgment of the driver and not by his negligence. It was observed as follows "As a rule, mere proof that an event has happened or an accident has occurred, the cause of which is unknown, is not evidence of negligence. But the peculiar circumstances constituting the event or Accident, in a particular case, may themselves proclaim in concordant, clear and unambiguous voices the negligence of some body as the cause of the event or accident. It is to such cases that maxim res ipsa loquitur may apply, if the cause of the accident is unknown and no reasonable explanation as to the cause is coming forth from the defendant. To emphasise the point, it may be reiterated that in such cases the event or accident must be of a kind which does not happen in the ordinary course of things if those who have the management and control use due care. But according to some decisions, satisfaction of this condition alone is not sufficient for res ipsa to come into play and it has to be further satisfied that the event which caused the accident was within the defendants control. The reason for this second requirement is that where the defendant has control of the thing which caused the injury he is in a better position than the plaintiff to explain how the accident occurred. Instances of such special kind of accidents which "tell their own story" of being off springs of negligence, are furnished by cases, such as where a motor vehicle mounts or projects over a pavement and hurts somebody there or travelling in the vehicle; one car ramming another from behind, or even a head-on collision on the wrong side of the road." In the present case as will appear from the facts and circumstances, this accident cannot be said to be caused due to misjudgment because no such defence has been taken by the present appellant. As against it, it has been specifically alleged by the respondent that this was on account of rash and negligent driving of the Bus by the driver of the appellant. As against it, it has been specifically alleged by the respondent that this was on account of rash and negligent driving of the Bus by the driver of the appellant. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the appellant cannot seek the aid of this decision to show that the maxim of "res ipsa loquitur" will not apply in the present case. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the case of Minu Bi Mehta V/s. Bal Krishna, AIR 1977 SC 1248 . According to him this case will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. As against it, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the ratio of the decision in this case will apply to the present case also. 16. From the facts of the said case, it would appear that respondents Dr. Bal Krishna Ram Krishna Nayan, practising in Bombay, was driving his car towards fort side on Dr. Annie Besant Road. The road had stone divider in the middle of the road. When the car approached Lotus Cinema, the truck owned by the appellant and insured with the insurance Company, came from the opposite direction at a high speed and dashed against the right side of the Car. This resulted in injury to Dr. Nayan and another occupant of the Car. A claim case was filed before the claims Tribunal, in which witnesses were examined on both the sides. The doctrine of Res Ipsa loquitur was applied by the claims Tribunal, which found that the respondents had established rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the Lorry. It also rejected the contentions of the appellant that the accident had taken place on account of some mechanical defect in the vehicle which had suddenly appeared. Accordingly, the claims Tribunal fixed the amount of compensation at Rs. 1,43,400.00 together with interest at 6% per annum and also held the owner liable to compensate the victim. The matter was taken to the High Court which found itself in complete agreement with the Claims Tribunal with respect to the negligence on the part of the driver and observed that it was for the Lorry driver and the owners to establish as to how the lorry crossed to road divider, went on the wrong side and mounted on the Fiat Car coming from the opposite direction. Accordingly, it agreed with the findings of the Claims Tribunal that the driver was negligent. It also held that under the circumstances of this case, the principle of Res Ipsa loquitur applied. The Hon ble Supreme Court also confirmed this findings of the High Court. It further held that the liability of the owner of the Lorry to compensate the victim for the car accident due to the negligent driving of his servant is based on the law of Tort. Regarding the negligence of the servant of the owner is made liable on the basis of vicarious liability. Before, however, the master could be liable, it was necessary to prove that the servant was acting during the course of his employment and that he was negligent. Since in the above noted case it was held to be so, the master was held liable by the Hon ble Supreme Court. In the present case also there are similar facts and therefore, the appellant cannot escape from the liability. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that this decision was not applicable to the present case since there was no eye-witnesses of the alleged occurrence. As stated above, at least one eye-witness (A.W.-1) has already been examined and from the facts of the said case it would appear that they are similar to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, it was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents that this decision could be fully applicable to the present case. In this connection my attention has been drawn to paragraph 20 of the judgment of the learned claims Tribunal, in which it was held that the facts of the present case were similar to the facts of the above noted case. Also a notice has been taken in this paragraph that the respondent had not examined the driver of the offending Bus, who could have been the most competent witness to depose about the manner of the accident. It was therefore, held that adverse inference was liable to be drawn against the present appellant for not examining the driver. Under these circumstances, it is clear that this decision also in the case of Minu Bi Mehta (supra) would be applicable to the present case. 18. Both the parties have been heard on the quantum of compensation to be paid to the respondents. Under these circumstances, it is clear that this decision also in the case of Minu Bi Mehta (supra) would be applicable to the present case. 18. Both the parties have been heard on the quantum of compensation to be paid to the respondents. The applicants in the Claim case had annexed schedule-I along with their petition according to which they have claimed a sum of Rs. 4,60,429.00. From the Judgment of the learned Claims Tribunal, it appears that a sum of Rs. 1,48,000.00 was awarded by way of compensation to the applicants. This amount was calculated on the basis of the salary drawn by the deceased and the multiple system. Apart from it, the bonus as also the G.P.F. contributions were also included. Further a sum of Rs. 5000.00 was awarded to them on account of loss of association. The other claims made by the applicants were disallowed. The total amount of compensation awarded was Rs. 1,53,000.00. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that a sum of Rs. 75,000.00 has already been deposited and it will yield the interest at the rate of more than Rs. 800.00 per month, the amount that the deceased was drawing as a salary on the date of accident. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on a unreported decision of this Court dated 31-9-1986 in appeal from original order No. 53 of 1979. This is a Division Bench decision of this Court, in which Rs. 24,000.00 being the amount of award was held to be excessive and was reduced to Rs. 12,500. This is not a decision on the point that the amount of interest payable on the sum so deposited would be equivalent to the salary that was being drawn by the deceased at the relevant time. 19. It is well settled that in the matter of determination of compensation, there cannot be any hard and fast rule. The amount of compensation to be awarded in the estimation of the Court must be a reasonable one. While allowing the compensation to a widow, having a minor child one must not forget that a money compensation is never a real substitute for the calamity that has befallen the family. The amount of compensation to be awarded in the estimation of the Court must be a reasonable one. While allowing the compensation to a widow, having a minor child one must not forget that a money compensation is never a real substitute for the calamity that has befallen the family. Further it may be pointed out that while determining the compensation, a tribunal must take into consideration not only the expectancy of life, but also the future prospect, chances of promotion and other relevant factors. In my view, the tribunal should also have taken into consideration the monetary inflation resulting in the fall of buying power of the citizen. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to the case of Jyotsna Dey, (1987) 1 ACC 173. This is a decision by the Hon ble Supreme Court, in which it was held that in India normal span of life of a person should be computed to be 70 years. In the present case, it appears that at the time of the accident the deceased was aged about 45 years and at that time he was drawing Rs. 1214.05 p. towards his payment allowances. He was shortly expecting his promotion in about 3 years time, and he was to get the total emoluments of Rs. 1990.00. Apart from it also he would have got Rs. 750.00 per year as Bonus for 15 years and would also have earned 7 1/2 months salary payable to him at the time of his retirement as his gratuity. Apart from these, he was entitled to get contributory provident fund for 15 years. All these, amounts have been disclosed in the claim petition. Ext. 2 is the certificate granted by the Deputy Director of Accounts of the Bihar State Electricity Board according to which the maximum allowances of an Accountant (S.G.) of the Electricity Board was Rs. 1900.00. Apart from these, Bonus at the rate of 8.33. was payable to the Accountant. Ext. 2/A is the another certificate from the Deputy Director of Accounts, showing that the total emoluments of the deceased at the time of his death was Rs. 1214.05 paise. Hence, it cannot be said that at that time he was drawing only Rs. 800.00 per month. was payable to the Accountant. Ext. 2/A is the another certificate from the Deputy Director of Accounts, showing that the total emoluments of the deceased at the time of his death was Rs. 1214.05 paise. Hence, it cannot be said that at that time he was drawing only Rs. 800.00 per month. In any view of the matter, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this point as noticed above, it is clear that the Hon ble Supreme Court has also given a go-by to the multiplier system. 21. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of M/s. Hindustan Concrete Pipe V/s. Smt. Anjuli Devi, 1989 Pat LJR (HC) 245. Though, this is a single Bench decision of this Court, in it reliance has been placed on the case of Jyotsna Dey, (supra) decided by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurance company, has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Bihar State Rajya Transport Corporation V/s. Chandreshwar Mishra, 1983 Pat LJR 373 also. In this case, it was held that the Claims Tribunal will be justified in taking into account the salary of the deceased which he would have reached while reaching the maximum of the grade as also the age at which he would have reached the maximum. Though this was a case of a temporary employee, it was held that this circumstance should not weigh with the Claims Tribunal in making the assessment. However, in this decision it was further held that the Claims Tribunal could not have allowed the claim for the loss of association to the wife or care and caution of the minor son in a motor accident cases. Also it was observed that there is absolutely no scope for awarding this claim in the multiplier system. A reference in this decision has been made to the case of Manju Shri Raha V/s. B.L. Gupta, AIR 1977 SC 1158 . In this decision, the Hon ble Supreme Court held that the Claims Tribunal had to take into account the salary of the deceased which he would have reached while reaching the maximum of the grade as also the age at which he could have reached the maximum. In this decision, the Hon ble Supreme Court held that the Claims Tribunal had to take into account the salary of the deceased which he would have reached while reaching the maximum of the grade as also the age at which he could have reached the maximum. In the said case, the claim was being resisted on the ground that the deceased was a temporary employee. The Hon ble Supreme Court observed as follows : "This is however not a consideration which could have weighed with the Claims Tribunal in making the assessment, because it was purely contingent. On the other hand, with the rise in the price index it would well have been expected that there would be several revisions in grade by the time the deceased Raha had attained the age of superannuation, which, if taken into account would further enhance the amount." It may be mentioned here that in the judgment passed on 30-1-1986 in the appeal from original No. 53 of 1977 a Bench of this Court had not taken into consideration this reported Division Bench decision of the year 1983. Also no notice was taken of the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Manju Shri Raha (supra). However, in this connection, a reference may be made to paragraph 59 of a Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd. V/s. Bimla Gupta, AIR 1985 All 147 . In this case also it was held by the Division Bench that the additional compensation for the loss of consortium or marriage expenses was not payable. 22 The principles governing the determination of the amount of compensation to the claimants in the case of death by Motor accident had come up for consideration in the case of Brij Kali Devi V/s. Ram Chand, reported in AIR 1979 All 49 . It was held that the normal rule for its determination was to ascertain the future pecuniary benefits which the claimant would have gained had the deceased not died, and thereafter, to adjust there from any pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources comes to the claimants by reason of death. In the present case, as will appear from Annexure-2/A a deceased at the time of his death was drawing more than Rs. In the present case, as will appear from Annexure-2/A a deceased at the time of his death was drawing more than Rs. 1200.00 and under this circumstances, it can safely be said that he must be sparing about Rs. 600.00 for his family. In the case of Jyotsna Dey (1987) (1) ACC 173 (supra), the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that a sum of Rs. 60,000.00 would be fair amount of compensation for the death of the deceased who war expected to contribute a sum of Rs. 250.00 per month for his family. Under the circumstances mentioned above, it becomes clear that the amount of compensation as awarded by the learned court below cannot be said to be excessive. 23. From the discussions made above, it becomes clear that but for the award of compensation to the extent of Rs. 5000.00 on account of loss of association, the rest of the claim of the respondents cannot be negatived. 24. In the result, this appeal is dismissed on contest with proportionate cost with the only modification that the respondents would not be entitled to get Rs. 5000.00 towards the compensation for the loss of association. In other words, they shall be entitled to get a total sum of Rs. 1,48,000.00 as compensation along with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of institution of the case till the amount is realised, as ordered by the Claims Tribunal. The amount of compensation must be paid within two months from today failing which the respondents shall be entitled to get interest at the rate of 18% (eight) (sic) per annum on the amount of the compensation awarded. The judgments and the decrees of the two courts below will stand modified to this extent only. With this observation, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.