JUDGMENT - T.D. SUGLA, J.:---Besides two common question of law involved in all these three references, there is an additional question raised in Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986. The reference cover in all a period of 8 years from 1-4-1964 to 31-3-1972. Sales Tax Reference No. 20 of 1986 covers a period of three years from 1-4-1969 to 31-3-1972, Sales Tax Reference No. 81 of 1980 of two years from 1-4-1967 to 31-3-1969 and Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986 of three years from 1-3-1964 to 31-3-1967. Common questions of law are : "(1) Whether on a true and proper interpretation of rule 3 of the, Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959, the process of converting raw-hides into finished tanned goods amounts to manufacture as far as the tanning materials viz., chemicals, oils, lime etc. are concerned, so as to entitle the applicant to set off under Rule 41-A of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959, in respect of such, materials ? (2) If the answer to the aforesaid question is against the applicant,' whether the tanning materials, lime, chemicals, oils used in the process of conversion of raw-hides into tanned hides and skins and which are sold thereafter can be said to have been resold within the meaning of the term under the Act so as to entitle the applicant set-off under rules 42 and 43 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959?" Additional question in Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986 is: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, was the Tribunal justified in holding that the Sales Tax Officer had jurisdiction to rectify the order under section 62 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 ?'' 2. The assessee carries on business. It purchases raw hide and skins and also tanning material like oil, chemicals, Hards, lime. The raw hide and skins are converted into dressed hide and skins by a process of cleaning and tanning. While cleaning the sheep skin, the assessee gets raw wool as a subsidiary or by-product. The dressed hide and skins as well as raw wool are sold to the registered dealers and/or exported out of the State and/or our of India. The assessee has inter alia to pay tax on its purchases of tanning material. While cleaning the sheep skin, the assessee gets raw wool as a subsidiary or by-product. The dressed hide and skins as well as raw wool are sold to the registered dealers and/or exported out of the State and/or our of India. The assessee has inter alia to pay tax on its purchases of tanning material. It claims set off of the tax so paid under Rule 41-A of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959 (for short the Rules). The basis of the claim is that it is manufacturing dressed hides and skins and the material is used in the manufacturing process. Alternatively it claims the set-off in respect of tax so paid under Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules. The claim has been rejected by the Sales Tax authorities as well as the sales tax Tribunal. The argument inter alia before the Tribunal was that assuming the assessee was not entitled to the set off under Rule 41-A on the ground that it was not manufacturing hides and skins as such, it was entitled to the set off under Rule 41-A on it was selling raw wool as a subsidiary/by-product. This contention was also rejected by the Tribunal. 3. However, in its reference applications the assessee raised only two questions of law. The questions do not even raise the controversy relating to sale of raw wool. The questions referred to this Court by the Tribunal also do not raise the question of the set-off of tax on account of sale by the assessee of raw-wool which comes as a subsidiary or by product in the process of cleaning and converting sheep skin into dressed skin. The assessee did not take out notice of motion which might or might not have enabled it to raise such a question of law. In the circumstances, as rightly contended by Shri Jetley, learned Counsel for the department we will have to proceed on the basis, that the questions raised herein are limited to the assessee's claim on the ground of its manufacturing of hides and skins. 4. In the circumstances, as rightly contended by Shri Jetley, learned Counsel for the department we will have to proceed on the basis, that the questions raised herein are limited to the assessee's claim on the ground of its manufacturing of hides and skins. 4. It is true that in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of (C.I.T. v. Scindia Steam Co Ltd.)1, 42 I.T.R. 589 and this Court's judgment in (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Burmah Shell)2, 41 S.T.C. 337 a point of law proposed to be argued is implicit in or covered by the referred question of law and can be decided on the basis of facts already on record. The point of law ought to be adjudicated. However, the point of law Shri Joshi proposes to argue relates to the question of set off on account of sale of raw wool a by-product in the process of cleaning and dressing sheep skin. This point is neither implicit in nor covered by the questions of law referred to this Court. The facts necessary for adjudication of such a point are also not on record Accordingly, we do not think that Shri Joshi can be allowed to argue this aspect of the matter in these references. 5. As regards the first common question what requires consideration is whether the assesses is or can be said to be a manufacturer of hides and skins. In other words, whether the process of converting raw hide and skins into finished and dressed hide and skins amounts to 'manufacture' withing the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (for short the Act) which defines the word 'manufacture' thus :--- "manufacture', with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extract, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating, or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed." Apparently the definition is broad enough to include the treating or adopting any goods as ''manufacture". The process of converting raw hides and skins into tanned or dressed hides and skins will thus, be covered" by the word 'manufacture'. However, the definition itself provides that such manufacture or manufacturing process as maybe prescribed will not be included in the word 'manufacture'. The word 'prescribed', it is common ground, means as prescribed under the rules. The process of converting raw hides and skins into tanned or dressed hides and skins will thus, be covered" by the word 'manufacture'. However, the definition itself provides that such manufacture or manufacturing process as maybe prescribed will not be included in the word 'manufacture'. The word 'prescribed', it is common ground, means as prescribed under the rules. Rule 3 provides that for the purposes of clause 17 of section 2' manufacture' shall not include certain types of manufactures or manufacturing processes specified in that rule Sub-rule (xviii) thereof reads 'subjecting the goods specified in any entry in schedule B to any process or doing anything to them, which does not take them out of the description thereof in that entry'. Hides and skins find place in Part II of Schedule B at entry No. 4. The narration given therein is hides and skins whether in a raw or dressed state'. In the circumstances it will have to be held and has been rightly, held by the Tribunal that the process of converting raw hides and skins into dressed hide and skins is not 'manufacture' as the process does not take raw hides and skins out of the description given in that entry. Thus even though in common parlance and/or broadly speaking the assessee may be said to manufacture dressed hides and skins, it will have to be held that the assessee is not a manufacturer in view of the exception provided in sub-rule (xviii) of Rule 3 of the Rules road with clause 17 of section 2 of the Act. Admittedly set-off under Rule 41-A can be claimed by registered dealers who manufacture taxable goods for sale or export. In view of our conclusion that the assessee is not a manufacturer of hides and skins because of the provisions of sub-rule (xviii) of Rule 3 read with section 2(17) of the Act, it will have to be held that the assessee is not entitled to set off under Rule 41-A. The first common question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. 6. 6. It is pertinent to mention that Shri Joshi had referred to the provisions of Article 286-C of the Constitution for the proposition that the provisions regarding the set-off were beneficial provisions for the purpose of promoting manufacture and export and relied on the following observations of the Court in the case of (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jai Hind Oils Mills Co.)3, 40 S.T.C 60 page 65: "According to us, the whole object of rule 41 of the said rules was to grant relief to a manufacturing dealer with the aim of seeing that the cost of manufacture in this State did not bear too heavy an incidence of taxation. But for such provisions for a set-off, refund, etc., the ultimate cost of the finished product would have to bear the cost of purchase tax or the amounts collected by way of tax from the manufacturing dealer in respect of raw-materials, even semi-finished products and containers and packing materials for the manufactured goods, thus increasing the ultimate cost of the goods. The State intended to give thin benefit to its own industries not only in respect of local sales or inside State sales made by them but also in respect of outside state sales made by them so that the goods manufactured in this State might not suffer in competition with goods manufactured in other States." He had also referred to another decision of this Court in the case of (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Automatic Engineering Works)4, 47 S.T.C. 343 Kerala High Court decision in the case of (Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kerala industrial Works)5, 66 S.T.C. 415 and Gujarat High Court decision in the case of (The State of Gujarat v. Wood Polymer Ltd.)6, 50 S.T.C. 229 for the proposition that similar provisions are to be liberally interpreted so as to advance the purpose for which they are enacted. Since however, it has been found that the assessee is not a manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, the question of liberal interpretation would not arise, in all these case it may be stated, the assessees were found to be manufacturers and entitled to set-off. 7. As regard the second question of law, it is necessary to refer to Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules. 7. As regard the second question of law, it is necessary to refer to Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules. Both the rules contemplate granting of draw-back, set off or refunds of general sales tax recovered from the assessee on the sale of the goods resold by him. While in the case of Rule 42 the condition is that the goods so purchased are sold by the dealer otherwise then in the course of a inter-State trade or commerce or of export out of the territory of India, the condition in Rule 43 is that the goods are resold by the dealer in the course of inter State trade or commerce or of export out of the territory of India. In other words, the condition that the goods are resolved by the dealer is common both to Rule 42 and Rule 43. It was faintly argued by Shri Joshi that the tanning material which was used in the process of converting raw hides and skins into dressed hides and skins could also be said to have been resold along with hides and skins. Apart from the fact that the argument is not tenable, on the face of it, the words "re-sale and 'sale' have been defined in section 2(26) and 2(28) of the Act respectively. The word 're-sale' from which the word 're-sold' is used in Rules 42 and 43 provides as per the definition that the goods re sold should be in the same form in which they were purchased or without doing anything to them which amounts to or results, in a manufacture. Therefore, the argument that the tanning material used in the process of converting raw hide and skins into finished and dressed ones is re-sold so as to entitle the assesses to relief under rules 42 and 43 is too good to be accepted. Reference in this context may be made to an attractive but untenable argument advanced by Shri Joshi. According to him under the Sales Tax Act raw material purchased is either sold or used in the manufacture of some other item and then sold. The asseesee could, therefore, either resell or manufacture but it cannot do something in the vacuum. Moreover the low in this regard is clear. According to him under the Sales Tax Act raw material purchased is either sold or used in the manufacture of some other item and then sold. The asseesee could, therefore, either resell or manufacture but it cannot do something in the vacuum. Moreover the low in this regard is clear. Though in common parlance or even under the definition of the word -manufacture' without taking into account the exception provided therein the assessee is a manufacturer, the exception requires that it should not be treated as a manufacturer, Merely because the assessee is not a manufacturer in law though as a matter of fact it is, it cannot automatically mean that it resells the goods. There is, in our judgment, no legal contradiction. The second common question of law is also, thus, answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. 8. This takes us to the additional question raised in Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986. For the three years involved herein covering the period from 1-4-1964 to 31-3-1967, the set-off was granted to the assessee while completing the assessments originally. Subsequently, it was felt that the set-off was wrongly allowed to the asseesee. Accordingly after allowing the assessee an opportunity of being heard as contemplated under section 62 the Sales Tax Officer started rectification proceedings, rectified the relevant assessments and withdrew the set-off granted originally. The question is whether the provisions of section 62 of the Act are applicable in this case. It is the submission of Shri Joshi that section 62 provides for rectification of orders which Buffer from a mistake or mistakes apparent, from the record. The expression "apparent from the record" means an obvious and/ or a glaring mistake and not a mistake which is to be discovered after going through a long drawn process of enquiry on facts or on law. In the present case the question whether the assesses is a manufacturer and whether it is entitled to set-off under Rules 41 -A, 42 and 43 of the Rules is under the consideration of this Court. It cannot, therefore, he held that there was any mistake in the order far less a mistake apparent from the record. In support Shri Joshi placed reliance on this Court's decision in the case of (Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Jain Truck Stores)7, 41 S.T.C. 274. It cannot, therefore, he held that there was any mistake in the order far less a mistake apparent from the record. In support Shri Joshi placed reliance on this Court's decision in the case of (Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Jain Truck Stores)7, 41 S.T.C. 274. Shri Jetley, on the other hand, stated that the mistake was apparent from the record. When one examines the provisions of section 2(17) along with rule 3(xviii), it will be obvious that the assesses is not a manufacturer. Originally set-off wax wrongly granted to the asesee treating it to be a manufacturer. In fact treating the assesses as a manufacturer originally was a mistake apparent from the record. According to Shri Jetley every argument about a mistake does not make an apparent mistake non-apparent or debatable. It should be debatable to the judicial mind in the sense that the view taken earlier was at possible one. 9. In our opinion the submissions made on behalf of the assessee are sound. There is no serious dispute about the legal propositions stated by Shri Joshi or Shri Jetley. The question is whether treating the assesses as a manufacturer while completing the assessment originally was a mistake apparent from the record. There has been a long standing dispute about the question whether the assesee is a manufacturer or not. The Tribunal has considered the question and decided the same against the assessee. But, on the application by the assessee, the question of law has been framed and referred to this Court for opinion. Apart there-from, this Court has heard this matter for about 2 days to decide whether the assessee is a manufacturer or not. In the circumstances, it is not possible to say that the error if any is obvious or glaring so that it could be a subject matter of rectification under section 62 of the Act. Shri, Jetley, had alternatively contended that in case the rectification under section 62 of the Act was held to be not justified, the order of rectification should be treated as an order of re-assessment under section 35, it was pointed out that section 35 was amended by the Amending Act No. 37 of 1972 with effect from 1-1-1960 to provide for reopening of the assessment on the ground of wrong allowance or set off. We do not think that Shri Jetley is justified in making the submission inasmuch as the rule requires the Sales Tax Officer to record a finding that he had reason to believe that it was so and to issue a notice before making reassessment. This was certainly not done. In fact this could not have been done at the material time as the provision itself was not then in existence, having come into existence only in the year 1972 though with retrospective effect from 1-1-1960. In the circumstances the submission of Shri Jetley in this regards to be rejected. The additional question i.e. question No. 1 in Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986 is, accordingly, answered in the negative and in favour of the assesses. No order as to costs. Order accordingly -----