B. S. KAPADIA, S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-detenu has filed this habeas corps petition with a prayer that the detention order (Annexure A to the petition) passed against him by the detaining authority be set aside and that the respondents be directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith. ( 2 ) THE short facts of the case can be stated as under : ( 3 ) THE petitioner is detained by the order dt. 16-3-1389 passed by the Commissioner of Police Baroda City which has been passed on his being satisfied that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Baroda City it is necessary to do so. Said order is passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the detaining authority under sub- sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Gujarat prevention of Anti-Social Activities Acts 1985. The petitioner is ordered to be detained in Special Jail Bhuj as a class-II detenu as per order (Annex B to the petition ). The petitioner is also served With the grounds of detention It. 16-3-1989 along with the documents running into 21 pages. ( 4 ) ON perusal of the grounds of detention it appears that the petitioner was residing in the Navapura Police Station area of Vadodara City; that he is connected with business of spirit since last ten years; that he was obtaining large quantity of spirit in the guise of requirements for the factory situated in Sheds No. 98/5 and 98/6 of G. I. D. C. Indus- trial-Estate Nandesari and that he was also storing said spirit in the said factory and that he was supplying denatured spirit to Jaiswal families in Baroda City. The petitioner was also using different vehicles for transporting the goods. Said activity of the petitioner was going on since last ten years. Often cases have been registered against him by the Police. He was running factory for manufacturing Sodium Alginate in the bogus name and keeping spirit in the said factory. The first case is C. R. No. 195 of 1987 filed for the offences under Secs. Said activity of the petitioner was going on since last ten years. Often cases have been registered against him by the Police. He was running factory for manufacturing Sodium Alginate in the bogus name and keeping spirit in the said factory. The first case is C. R. No. 195 of 1987 filed for the offences under Secs. 119 120 177 193 197 198 199 200 417 419 420 465 416 468 471 477 of I P. C. and the second case is C. R. No. 167 of 1989 in which petitioner was arrested on 13-3-1989 and denatured spirit of 800 ltrs. worth Rs. 5 600 was also seized from the aforesaid factory. ( 5 ) THE second ground of detention is with regard to petitioners activity relating to transportation and supplying of denatured spirit. The said activity is affecting the health and lives of the public and that on account of the said activity people of the area have feeling of danger and insecurity. On account of his activity lives of the people are affected and five persons have given their voluntary statements but as their requests their names and addresses are kept confidential after holding the opinion that it is proper in the public interest to keep the names and addresses of the said witnesses secret. ( 6 ) THE first witness has inter alia stated in his statement dt. 13 that he knows the petitioner and that he is owning Mayoor Transport Company near Khanderao Market near the temple of Bahucharaji Mata; that petitioner is obtaining spirit in the names of different bogus persons in the guise of requirement of his factory and that he is storing the spirit and after converting it into denatured spirit directly or indirectly he is supplying the same to Jaiswals of Baroda City who are engaged in latha business. It is also Inter alia stated in the grounds that he is supplying denatured spirit to Narma- daben widow of Manubhai Jaiswal who is popularly known as Manu Kapadia and he is also supplying denatured spirit to one Chiman Dhadi and Manu Ganti. It is also mentioned in the statement that before three years some persons died on account of drinking latha of Jaiswals and some persons have lost their eye-sight. It is also mentioned in the statement that before three years some persons died on account of drinking latha of Jaiswals and some persons have lost their eye-sight. It is also mentioned in the statement of the witness that on 4-3-1989 as there was festival of Mahashivratri some persons had died and some persons were admitted in the hospital on account of their consuming latha purchased from Jaiswals of Wadi area. It in also mentioned that on 5-3-1989 at about 9 a. m. he had gone to Bakriwadi area to the house of one of his relatives and that he went there with his friend. When they went there entire atmosphere was full of sorrow people were feeling insecurity many people were running there helter shelter and they were thinking as to what would happen now and how many more persons would die. When he came to the hospital with his friend they found that there was a crowd of many persons and he could see fright and harassment on their-faces. Many people were weeping on account of death of their relatives and on account of mast deaths of human beings people were excited. He along with his friend have moved in the area to see the plight of the people. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY there is Statement of another witness recorded on the same day. He also spoke almost similarly as that stated by the first witness. According to this witness mass death occurred on account of talking latha. ( 8 ) THIRD statement is of a person whose son bad died on account of taking latha. His version is also similar to that of the earlier two Witnesses. ( 9 ) THE next statement is of a person whose maternal uncles son had expired on 5-3-1989 due to consumption of latha. He has also given the statement on 13-3-1989. His version is also almost similar to the versions of the earlier witnesses. ( 10 ) THE last statement is of a person whose elder brother had also given statement on 13-3-1989. His version is also almost on the same lines as that of earlier witnesses. ( 11 ) AFTER referring to the aforesaid statements the detaining authority has also considered the steps that can be taken under Sec. 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act or under Secs. His version is also almost on the same lines as that of earlier witnesses. ( 11 ) AFTER referring to the aforesaid statements the detaining authority has also considered the steps that can be taken under Sec. 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act or under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code as also steps under Sec. 56 of the Bombay police Act. He ultimately came to the conclusion that none of them should be effective steps. ( 12 ) IN para 5 of the grounds of detention the detaining authority has mentioned that the petitioner was a known bootlegger and that be was keeping spirit in the guise of the need for the factory in the names of bogus persons and that he was storing the same and was selling the same to Jaiswals of Baroda City. He has further mentioned that the petitioner by doing so was putting the lives and health of the public irs danger. He further mentioned that order of bail was granted to the petitioner. However proceedings for setting aside the said order of bail could not have been taken in view of the provisions of Sec. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thereafter on his being satisfied for detaining him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order the aforesaid order was passed. ( 13 ) IN this case it is pointed out in the petition that the petitioner had made representations to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 through Jail on 25-3-1989 but according to him the same were not considered and there was great delay in considering his representations. ( 14 ) THE petitioner has raised various points in the petition. However at the time of hearing Mr. H. L. Patel learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has pressed the following three points: (1) There is no material to show that the petitioner was supplied the denatured spirit. (2) There is no evidence to show that the petitioner had supplied denatured spirit to Jaiswals of Baroda City. (3) According to newly added ground it was submitted by the petitioner that he was supplied documents running from pages 1 to 21 while the index page supplied to him referred to pages upto 33. That he was not supplied the papers at pages 22 to 26 of item Nos. 9 ant 10. (3) According to newly added ground it was submitted by the petitioner that he was supplied documents running from pages 1 to 21 while the index page supplied to him referred to pages upto 33. That he was not supplied the papers at pages 22 to 26 of item Nos. 9 ant 10. The copy of the said index is annexed to the petition at page 31/4 and the said papers referred to in the index which according to him were taken into consideration by the detaining authority were not given to him and hence he could not make effective representation against the order of detention and therefore the order of detention is viola- tive of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India and therefore continued detention is bad and illegal. ( 15 ) IT would be desirable to deal with the last point first. It may be mentioned that this point was raised by adding port 174 to the petition and affidavit-in-reply to that added paragraph s filed by the detaining authority i. e. the Commissioner of Police Baroda City. The detaining authority has dealt with the allegations made in para 17a ant stated in his reply dated 7-9-1989 that the contention is after- thought and not tenable on facts and law and that it is not well-founded. He has also stated that the petitioner was supplied the impugned order of detention committal order grounds of detention and supporting documents to totalling pages 1 to 21. He has further pointed out that endorsement to that effect was made by the petitioner below the impugned order of detention. He has further stated that aforesaid documents were supplied to the detenu by Shri J. R. Sharma Police Inspector P. C. B. Baroda City and the said documents were supplied to the detenu along with the index of pages 1 to 21 and the said index was signed by him i. e the detaining authority. He further stated that disputed copy of index of documents bearing page Nos. 1 to 33 from Police Inspector P. C. B. Baroda City was not supplied to the detenu under the circumstances it is submitted that question of detenu being not afforded opportunity of making effective representation as contended in newly added para 17a does not arise No affidavit-in-rejoinder was filed on behalf of She petitioner. We have also found on verification of org. We have also found on verification of org. file that there is on endorsement made by the petitioner. We have also perused She proposal made by the Sponsoring Authority as also the notings made by the detaining authority. No new material is added or referred to in any of the aforesaid two documents ( 16 ) IT may be stated that on pages 22 to 26 there are two item i. e. items No. 9 and 10 one of them is proposal of the Police Inspector P. C. B and the other is the notings of the Police Commis- sioner. These two documents as stated above do not refer to any other material than the material supplied to the detenu ant therefore the said proposal as well as the notings of the Commissioner were not required to be supplied to the detenu. The notings of the Commissioner would only show as to how he has applied his mind to the proposal and how he has satisfied himself on the material for the purpose of detaining the petitioner. Therefore even otherwise these two documents cannot be said to be documents relied on by the detaining authority for the purpose of detaining him. Under the circumstances we do not find any substance in this point raised on behalf of the petitioner. ( 17 ) REVERTING to the first point that there was no material to show the supply of denatured spirit to the petitioner it may be stated that Mr. Patel has streneously argued this point and has relied on certain documents annexed by the petitioner with the petition namely Annexures D and E. Annexure D appears to be some endorsements made about the visists to the factory by officials of Excise Department while Annexure E is a letter dt. 16-10-1987 written to the Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise Department Narmada Bhuvan Baroda on the subject of sealed barrel of denatured spirit. The quantity which is found and which has been referred to in the C. R. No. 167 of 1989 is 800 ltrs. of denatured spirit. It was seized on 9-3-1989. It is submitted that the last endorsement made on Exh. D which is a xerox copy of the Visit Book is of 9-5-1986. The first entry refers to five barrels having 1000 ltrs. of spirit and thereof as they could not produce particulars about the material. of denatured spirit. It was seized on 9-3-1989. It is submitted that the last endorsement made on Exh. D which is a xerox copy of the Visit Book is of 9-5-1986. The first entry refers to five barrels having 1000 ltrs. of spirit and thereof as they could not produce particulars about the material. While the other entry also speaks about the work of pulverising sodium in progress It also states that four barrels which are sealed are highly rusted and there was possibility of holes in future and therefore it was requested to Mr. Dani to chance the same in other barrels but Mr. Dani told that other barrels were not available and therefore they were kept in the same position as they were. ( 18 ) IT is interesting to note that they speak about the spirit and therefore in the year 1986 when they visited there sere five barrels of spirit having 1000 ltrs. The endorsement is made by the officer of the Prohibition and Excise Department. He cannot be said to be unknown about spirit and denatured spirit. But there is only reference of spirit and not denatured spirit. However in the letter of 16-10-1987 gr. Dani who was power of attorney bolder has used the words sealed barrels of special denatured spirit and asked them to remove the said good from their godown or to pay Rs. 1000. 00 as godown charges. ( 19 ) IT may be mentioned that so far as C. R. No. 167 of 1989 is concerned copy of the FIR is also given to the petitioner. In the said FIR it is mentioned that illegal spirit (denatured spirit) was stored by him in the barrels At the time when they raided the factory they found there were two persons named Mansingh Jita Bhuria Bhil and Rambhau Marutirao Bhosle. Said two persons were asked to produce pass and/or permit in respect of the same but they have said that they were not having the same and they also told that key of the lock of godown was with their boss Chandulal Jethalal Jaiswal. The lock on the godown was broken open in the presence of panchas and in the presence of panchas said four barrels which were full of liquid were found while one of them was empty but smell of denatured spirit was coming out from the said empty barrel. The lock on the godown was broken open in the presence of panchas and in the presence of panchas said four barrels which were full of liquid were found while one of them was empty but smell of denatured spirit was coming out from the said empty barrel. Each container contained 200 ltrs. totalling 800 ltrs. and thereafter samples were taken. It is clear from the FIR that on 9-3-1989 800 ltrs. of denatured spirit were found without pass and/or permit from the factory of the petitioner. When actually said spirit was found no further evidence would be necessary on the point as to from which source the petitioner obtained the same. The fact remains that he had this stock in his factory without pass or permit. Mr. H. L. Patel tried to connect the said stock of five barrels with the present stock. It may be mentioned that this stock is different from the earlier stock of five barrels inasmuch as the five barrels of 1986 were already sealed while 800 ltrs. of denatured spirit found in four barrels in 1989 were not in sealed condition. If they were sealed they would have referred to the same in the FIR and necessary panch- nama would have been drawn but in absence of that it cannot be said that the spirit which was found on 9-3-1989 was the same as was found in 1986. ( 20 ) HOWEVER it may be stated that the jurisdiction of the Police Commissioner under the PASA Act is a suspecion jurisdiction and therefore it cannot be said that in absence of the material to show source of the supply of denatured spirit what is found in FIR of C. R. No. 167 of 1989 cannot be relied upon for showing the - activity of the petitioner of storing denatured spirit illegally in the sheds of his factory. Thus the argument of Mr. Patel on this point that the detaining Authority has passed the order without any material on record to show the supply of denatured spirit to the petitioner cannot be accepted. . Thus the argument of Mr. Patel on this point that the detaining Authority has passed the order without any material on record to show the supply of denatured spirit to the petitioner cannot be accepted. . ( 21 ) REFERRING to the second contention with regard to the point that there is no evidence to show that petitioner has supplied denatured spirit to Jaiswals of Baroda it may be stated that statements of the witness have been summerised earlier in the judgment and it is clear from the statements of the first witness that he has referred to the names of persons namely Nirmalaben widow of Manubhai Jaiswal popularly known as Manu Kapadia Chiman Dhadi and Manu Ganti to whom the present petitioner has supplied denatured spirit. Similar is the version of the other witnesses on the point. Mr. Patel has challenged the said statements on the ground of witnesses. According to him statements of said witnesses are vague in absence of particulars. It may be mentioned that the names of the persons to whom the material was supplied are given and the Wadi area in which they are residing is also given and as the petitioner was regularly supplying denatured spirit to the persons of his community no further particulars would be necessary looking to the special facts and circumstances of the present case. It is to be considered as to whether the statements ar vague in the light of the background and the context of the fasts. On this point Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shafiq Ahmad v. District Magistrate Meerut 1989 (4) SCC 556 wherein the last contention that was raised as referred to in para 8 of the judgment is as under:. . . The grounds mentioned were vague and unintelligible. It was not stated it was urged that as to what the petitioner said to whom the rumour was spread as mentioned in ground No. 1 and what other provoking things the petitioner is alleged to have said as alleged in the grounds mentioned before. It was urged it is further not clear as to whom the petitioner wanted to teach a lesson. It was urged it is further not clear as to whom the petitioner wanted to teach a lesson. It has to be borne tn mind that if more than one ground are stated in the grounds then the fact that one of the grounds is tad would not alter order of detention after the amendment of the Act in 1984 provided the other grounds are valid. But quite apart from the same it appears to us that none of the grounds were vague. The grounds must be understood in the light of the back ground and the contest of the facts. It was quite clear what the detaining authorities were trying to convey as that the petitioner stated things of the nature and it was to teach Hindus lesson. Hence It was meant to create communal tension. We find no irrelevancy or vagueness in the grounds. On this ground the challenge cannot be sustained. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court it is clear that the grounds must be understood in the light of the background and the context of the facts. If we read the statements of the witnesses in the light of the background and the context it is clear that the petitioner was continuously connected with the business of denatured spirit since last more than ten years. The names of the Persons to whom he had supplied the goods are supplied along with the area in which they are residing. As he was regularly doing the business of supplying denatured spirit it is not necessary to give actual timings at which he had supplied the goods to the said named persons. In that view of the matter statements of the witnesses cannot be said to be vague Therefore the contention raised by Mr. Patel on the point that there 18 no evidence to show that petitioner has supplied denatured spirit to Jaiswals of Baroda cannot be accepted. ( 22 ) IN view of the aforesaid findings on all the three conventions as stated above there was sufficient material with the detaining authority for forming subjective satisfaction for detaining the present petitioner with 8 view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public orders 85 required under Sec. 3 (1) of the PASA Act. ( 23 ) ASSUMING for the sale of argument that there is some substance on the second contention raised by Mr. Patel that there is no positive specific evidence to show that the petitioner had supplied denatured spirit to Jaiswals of Baroda. the question would be whether the entire subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of the material relating to other grounds would also be vitiated ? With a view to properly appreciate this point it is necessary to consider the provisions of the PASA Act. Section 6 of the PASA Act provides that when a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Sec. 3 which has been made on two or more grounds such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each grounds and accordingly such order shall not be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague non-existent; not relevant not connected or not proximately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Said Section further provides that the Government or the officer making the order of detention under the said Section after being satisfied as provided in that Section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. The language of Sec. 6 is clear and simple and it does not have any ambiguity. It is on the line of Sec. 5 (A) of the COFEPOSA Act and therefore even it the second ground as stated above is taken out of consideration on the ground of vagueness still the order deemed to have been made by the detaining authority on the remaining grounds No authority is needed on this point and no other view is possible on this point. Still however if any authority is needed that is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commis- sioner and Secretary Government of Kerala and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 687 wherein the Supreme Court held that the expression ground includes not only conclusions of fact but also all the basic facts on which those conclusions were founded they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of the basic facts. AIR 1986 SC 687 wherein the Supreme Court held that the expression ground includes not only conclusions of fact but also all the basic facts on which those conclusions were founded they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of the basic facts. In the said case the question was with regard to confession and whether that confession was made by the detenu knowing full well the language in which it was made or whether he was ignorant of English language and the retraction of the said confession. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner in the said case was feigning ignorance of English. Still however on this point considering the other evidence on record the Supreme Court has observed in para 74 as under:this satisfaction was arrived at as Inferences from several factors These have been separately mentioned. On of them is the contention (confession) but this ground was taken into consideration without taking note of the retraction made thereafter. But the Inference of the satisfaction was drawn from several factors which have been enumerated before. We have to examine whether even if the facts stated in the confection are completely ignored then the inferences can still be drawn from other Independent and objective facts mentioned in this case namely the fact of seizure after search of 60 gold biscuits from the suitcase of the daughters in the presence of the father which indubitably belonged to the father and admitted by him in belong to him for which no explanation has been given and secondly the seizure of the papers connected with other groups and organisations. Pratap Sait and others to whom gold has been sold by the father are relevant grounds from which an inference can reasonably he drawn for the satisfaction of the detaining authority for detaining the detenu for the purpose of sec. 3 (1) (iii) and 3 (1) (iv) We are of the opinion that impugned order cannot be challenged merely by the rejection of the inference drawn from confession. The same argument was presented in a little different shade namely the fact of retraction should have been considered by the detaining authority and the Court dons not know that had that been taken Into consideration what conclusion the detaining authority would have arrived at. This contention cannot be accepted. We are not concerned with the sufficiency of the grounds. The same argument was presented in a little different shade namely the fact of retraction should have been considered by the detaining authority and the Court dons not know that had that been taken Into consideration what conclusion the detaining authority would have arrived at. This contention cannot be accepted. We are not concerned with the sufficiency of the grounds. We are concerned whether there are relevant materials on which a reasonable belief or Conviction could have been entertained by the detaining authority on the grounds mentioned in Sec. 3 (1) of the said Act. Whether other grounds should have been taken into consideration or not is not relevant at the stage of the passing of the detention order. This contention therefore can not he accepted. If that is the position that in view of Sec. 5a of the Act there was sufficient material to sustain this ground of detention. ( 24 ) THERE is another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Meera Rani v Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1989 (4) SCC 418 wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 7 of the said judgment:7 Section 5a of the Act clearly provides that the detention order under Sec. 3 of the Act which has been made on two or more grounds shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly such order shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because one or some of the grounds is or are invalid of any lesson whatsoever. It further says that the detaining autho- rity shall be deemed to have made a detention order after being satisfied as provided in Sec. 3 with reference to the remaining Grounds or ground. In other words a ground of detention which is rendered invalid for any reason whatsoever shall be treated as non-existent and the surviving grounds which remain after excluding the invalid grounds shall be deemed to be the foundation of the detention order. In other words a ground of detention which is rendered invalid for any reason whatsoever shall be treated as non-existent and the surviving grounds which remain after excluding the invalid grounds shall be deemed to be the foundation of the detention order. Section 5a was insurted in the Act with effect from 21/06/1984 to over- come the effect of the decisions which had held that where one or more of the grounds of detention is found to b invalid the entire detention order must fall since it would not be possible to hold that the detaining authority making such order would have been satisfied as provided In Sec. 3 with reference to the remaining ground of grounds It is therefore doubtful whether the construction of Sec. 5a suggested by learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner can be accepted. However in the present case it was not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion on this point since we have reached the conclusion that the detection order must be quashed on one of the other contentions to which we shall advert later. The aforesaid authorities of the Supreme Court also fully support the view which we have taken on the bare reading of Sec. 6 of the PASA Act. ( 25 ) HOWEVER Mr. Patel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D. S. Agarwal v. Police Commissioner AIR 1989 SC 1282 : [1989 (2) GLR 1035 (SC)]. Before we consider this authority we may mention that the judgment in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra) is a judgment of three Judges of the Supreme Court spoken through Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji while the judgment in the case of D. S. Agarwal ( AIR 1989 SC 1282 ) is a judgment of two Judges of the Supreme Court. Before we consider this authority we may mention that the judgment in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra) is a judgment of three Judges of the Supreme Court spoken through Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji while the judgment in the case of D. S. Agarwal ( AIR 1989 SC 1282 ) is a judgment of two Judges of the Supreme Court. In the case of D. S. Agarwal (supra) after considering various authorities cited before the Supreme Court including the judgment in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra) it is observed that the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced his mind are either with-hold or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order. In the said case acquittals of the detenu in the cases mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2 and 3 were not brought to the notice of the detaining authority and on the other hand they were withheld and the detaining authority was given to understand that the trial of those cases were pending. On the facts of that case the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that result is that non-placing of the material fact namely acquittal of the detenu in the said two cases resulting in non-application of mind of the detaining authority to the said fact vitiated the requisite subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order invalid. But it cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that consideration of non- existent irrelevant or vague fact vitiates the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the remaining ground or grounds particularly in view of Sec. 6 of the PASA Act. It may be mentioned that in the said case the petitioner was detained as he was 8 dangerous person as defined under Sec. 2 (c) of the PASA Act with a view to preventing his activity as such. It may be mentioned that in the said case the petitioner was detained as he was 8 dangerous person as defined under Sec. 2 (c) of the PASA Act with a view to preventing his activity as such. The detention order was passed on the grounds for which a chart was made and the said chart shows that there were five cases against him out of which one case of 1981 was compromised on 16-2-1982 the fourth one was not proved two other cases (Sr. Nos. 2 and 3) were shown to be pending trial while it is clear from the judgment that the detenu was acquitted on 20-8-1988 in case at Sr. No. 2 and on 5-6-1986 in the case at Sr. No. 3. Therefore out of five cases he was already acquitted in four cases while only one case was pending against him. Therefore the material was only with regard to one case while as per the definition of dangerous person one case would not be sufficient for holding him to be a dangerous person. Therefore in the background of the aforesaid acts the observations made by the Supreme Court are to be read. As stated above that is with regard to non-consideration of vital or material fact which is not the case here and therefore this authority does not help the petitioner. ( 26 ) THE second authority relied on by Mr. Patel is the judgment in the case of Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan v. The Police Commissioner Ahmedabad and Anr. AIR 1989 SC 1812 : [1990 (1) GLR 53 (SC)] On perusal of the said case it is clear that ratio of the said judgment is only to the effect that an order of detention cannot be made after considering the previous grounds of detention when the same had been quashed by the High Court and if such previous grounds of detention are taken into consideration while forming subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making the detention order the order of detention will be vitiated. It is of no consequence if other fresh facts disclosed in the grounds of impugned detention order have been considered. It appears from the authorities considered by the Supreme Court it that case that the Supreme Court has considered the effect of Sec. 15 of PASA Act vis-a-vis Art. 22 (4) of the Constitution of India. It is of no consequence if other fresh facts disclosed in the grounds of impugned detention order have been considered. It appears from the authorities considered by the Supreme Court it that case that the Supreme Court has considered the effect of Sec. 15 of PASA Act vis-a-vis Art. 22 (4) of the Constitution of India. In the said case it appears that Sec. 6 of the PASA Act was not brought to the notice of the Court and hence it was not considered. No contention was raised on this point. In absence of such contention it Cannot be said to be a decision invalidating the order inspite of Sec. 6 of the Act. In absence of any discussion on Sec. 6 of the PASA Act it is a binding authority only on the point that previous grounds of detention which had been quashed by the High Court cannot be made the grounds for subsequent detention order and/or for that purpose forming subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and if that is done it would be vitiated. In the present case there is no question of Sec. 15 at all. Hence this is not useful to the petitioner in this case. ( 27 ) IN view of the settled legal position as stated above Mr. Patel has submitted that if the second ground is taken away from consideration then the only ground remains is the ground with regard to the storing of denatured spirit of 800 ltrs. by the petitioner in the factory and the question is whether that ground by itself would be sufficient for basing subjective satisfaction on the point. It may be mentioned that on this point Mr. O. D Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. has relied in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 1255 : [1989 (1) GLR 238 (SC)] In the said case direct and proximate cause for the order of detention was the importation i bulk of Indian made foreign liquor by the detenu acting as a broker from across the border. AIR 1988 SC 1255 : [1989 (1) GLR 238 (SC)] In the said case direct and proximate cause for the order of detention was the importation i bulk of Indian made foreign liquor by the detenu acting as a broker from across the border. In para 14 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has observed as under (at page No. 248 of GLR):it was not seriously disputed before us that the prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a bootlegger as defined in See 2 and therefore he comes within the purview of sub-sec (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act by reason of sub-sec (4) thereof. Sub-sec. (4) of Seen 3 with the Explanation appended thereto given an enlarged meaning to the words nothing in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thereafter sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 is quoted along with its explanation and the Supreme Court has further observed as under (at page No. 249 of GLR): the District Magistrate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective faction with respect to the appellant that with a view to preventing him from action in any wanner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is necessary to taken order that he be detained. In the accompanying grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective satisfaction They go on to state that unless the order of detention was made he would not stope his illicit liqor traffic on brokerage end therefore it was necessary to detain him under Sec. 3 (2) of the Act and recite; in order to safeguard the health of the People of Gujarat for public peace and in the interest of the nation with a view to stop such anti-national activities. . . . . . for the purpose of public Order and peace and in the interest of the State. . . . In our opinion those words added by way of superscription were wholly unnece- ssary. They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Secs. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debare at the Bar. They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Secs. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debare at the Bar. ( 28 ) IT is therefore clear that if there is any activity of a boot- legger which is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the enlarged meaning of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the Act that would be the material on the basis of which subjective satisfaction can be arrived at. In light of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court subsequent judgments have been delivered by this Court. In the case of Popat Mohan Vaghri v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1989 (1) GLH 551 : [ 1989 (1) GLR 412 ] it is observed by Justice A. P. Ravani in para 5 thereof as under (at page No. 414-415 of GLR):. . . ACTIVITY of storing liquor on a large scale and selling the same through liquor dens in public along would be sufficient to adversely affect public order. one has to wink his eyes just for a moment and imagine his own mother wife sister or daughter passing through public street where liquor is being sold in public and consumed openly. . . . . But in view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court and that of the Supreme Court in the ease of Rajendrakumar (supra) and particularly in view of the explanation to Sec. 3 (4) of PASA it is not permi- ssible to take such a detached and disintegrated view of the matter. Explanation to Sec. 3 (4) provides that public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-section directly or indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any harm danger or alum or feeling-of insecurity among the several public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life property or public health. Once the meaning of public order as defined in explanation to Sec. 3 (4) is kept in view it if difficult to hold that activity by which a person sells liquor In Public streets and allows and/or entice other people to drink the same in public place would not adversely affect public order ( 29 ) IN another judgment in the case of Hiraben Sadashiv Pawar v. Commissioner of Police Baroda and Ors. 1988 C2) GLH 363: [ 1989 (1) GLR 27 ] in para 14 it is observed at under (at page No. 33 of GLR):from the above authorities it is clear that once when detaining authority is acting under the provisions of the not be has to keep in mind the enlarged meaning given in explanation to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the act. When the detention order speaks about the detaining authority satisfaction on the point of necessity of detaining any person (in the present case bootlegger) with a view to preventing him/her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order he has always within his mind the enlarged meaning of the phrase acting In any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as given in explanation to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3. Therefore when a person is engaged in or is making any preparation for any activities as a bootlegger which affect or likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order within the enlarged meaning of the explanation of said sub-section he is coming within the scope of tub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act. When the wordings are used in the explanation that directly or Indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any widespread danger to public health it would be a matter of drawing inference by the detaining authority on the material placed before him and it is not necessary that there should be separate material for having satisfaction on that point. When the wordings are used in the explanation that directly or Indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any widespread danger to public health it would be a matter of drawing inference by the detaining authority on the material placed before him and it is not necessary that there should be separate material for having satisfaction on that point. In the said case there were about six cases filed against the petitioner under the Bombay Prohibition Act which clearly disclosed that in every case large quantity of liquor was seized and petitioner was engaged in the activities of a bootlegger and the liquor seized from the peti- tioner-detenu itself would indicate that country liquor was meant for sale to others and consumption thereof was likely to cause grave and widespread danger to public health ( 30 ) IN view of the above authorities and position of law Mr. Patel submitted that in all the cases referred to by Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. as also in the case of Rajendrakumar (supra) question was with regard to either country liquor or foreign liquor which could be consumed while in the present case the question pertains to denatured spirit which is poisonous and therefore it would be hazar- dous to both that the petitioner was though a bootlegger running the activity which was necessarily prejudicial to the mountaineers of public order even accept the enlarged meaning given under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the Act along with its explanation as also the afore- said Supreme Court judgments. ( 31 ) PRIMA facie the argument of Mr. Patel appears to he attractive that the denatured spirit could be used not only for the purpose of latha there of and using it as an intoxicating drink but it can also be used for many other medical domestic business professional or other purposes and therefore the facts of the respect case differ from the facts of the cases considered hereinabove. It may be mentioned that Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P was at gains to take up to the relevant Rules framed by the State Government known as the Bombay Denatured Sprit Rules 1959 Rule 2 (14) of the said Rules defines spirit as rectified spirit and includes the absolute alcohol. It may be mentioned that Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P was at gains to take up to the relevant Rules framed by the State Government known as the Bombay Denatured Sprit Rules 1959 Rule 2 (14) of the said Rules defines spirit as rectified spirit and includes the absolute alcohol. Rule 3 of the said Rules activities that no person shall denature spirit except under a licence under these Rules and in accordance with the process laid down in any regulations made in that behalf by the Director. Rule 23 of the said Rules provides that the permit and licences of the following kind in the possession and use of ordinary denature sprit may be granted under these Rules namely (1) Permit for domestic purposes (2) Licence for medical purposes of registered medical practi- tioners. (3) Licence for medical scientific and educational purposes. (4) Licence for the purposes of any art industry or profession. Rule 24 provides that any person desiring to use ordinary denatured spirit for domestic purposes shall apply to the Prohibition and Excise Inspector in the required form Rule 25 provided that any registered medical practitioner desiring to use ordinary denatured spirit for medical purposes must apply to the Superintendent or the District Inspector as the Case may be for a licence in that behalf Rule 26 requires that any person desiring to use ordinary denatured spirit for bona fide medical scientific or educational purposes shall apply to Superintendent or the District Inspector as the case may be for a licence in that behalf. Mr. Patel has stated in clear terms before us that the said factory of the petitioner for manufacturing sodium alginate is closed since 1986 and that he is not holding any licence or permit for any of the purposes when that is so legitimate inference that can be drawn is that he was not to use it for domestic purpose or medical purpose or scientific or educational purpose or any other legitimate purpose as provided under Rule 23 of the said Rules. ( 32 ) MR. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. has also drawn our attention to the Rules known as the Gujarat Spirit Denaturing Rules 1964 Rule 4 of the said Rules provides that any person desires to denature spirit for any purpose a specified in Rule 3 shall have to make an application in that behalf. ( 32 ) MR. G. D. Bhatt learned Addl. P. P. has also drawn our attention to the Rules known as the Gujarat Spirit Denaturing Rules 1964 Rule 4 of the said Rules provides that any person desires to denature spirit for any purpose a specified in Rule 3 shall have to make an application in that behalf. Therefore the petitioner has no authority to denature the spirit without licence and he had no licence for denaturing spirit. ( 33 ) MR. Bhatt has also invited our attention to Sec. 2 (10) of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 which defines that denatured means subjected to a process prescribed for the purpose of rendering unfit for human consumption. Section 2 (24) of the said Act defines that liquor included spirit denatured spirits wine beer toddy and all liquids Consisting of or containing alcohol. Section 2c43) of the said Act defines that spirit means any liquor containing alcohol and obtained by distillation. Section 21 of the said Act provides that no person shall alter or attempt to alter any denatured spirit by dilution with water or by any method whatsoever with the intention that such spirit may be used for human consumption whether as a beverages or internally as a medicine in any other way whatsoever and it further provides that no person shall have in his possession any denatured spirit in respect of which he knows or has reason to believe that such alteration or attempt has been made. Section 67 of the said Act prescribes for punishments for offences under the said Act. ( 34 ) IT is clear from the facts of the present case that 800 ltrs. Of denatured spirit from four barrels was found from the factory of the petitioner. When the petitioner was not having any licence as provided under the Rules the legitimate inference that can be drawn on the facts and circumstances of the case is that he was storing the same with an intention to sell it to the bootleggers who would use it after diluting the same as latha contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Under the circumstances we are unable to agree on the special facts of this case with this contention of Mr. Patel. Under the circumstances we are unable to agree on the special facts of this case with this contention of Mr. Patel. In our view ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendrakumars case (supra) will squarely apply to the facts of the present case. ( 35 ) IN result all the contentions raised by Mr. Patel before us fail and therefore the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. (KMV) rule discharged. .