JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - The landlord is Petitioner against the order of the appellate and revisional authorities in a proceeding started pursuant to an application u/s 14 of the Orissa land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The Petitioner's case, briefly stated, is that his father was admittedly the landlord and was a person under disability under whom opposite party No. 1 was a tenant. Srinath, father of the Petitioner, died on 9-6-1973. The Petitioner thereafter filed the application u/s 14 alleging therein that opposite party No. 1 was liable to be evicted on account of non-payment of rent within the ambit of Section 14(1)(c) of the Act and further relationship of landlord and tenant ceased with effect from the end of the agricultural year 1973-74, on the death of Srinath on 9-6-1973, within the ambit of Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. Subsequent to the said application, the tenant opposite party No. 1 also filed an application purporting to be one u/s 36-A of the Act. The Revenue Officer clubbed up both these applications and after parties led evidence in the matter, disposed of both these applications by a common order dated 31-1-1978. By the said order he rejected the application of the tenant and allowed the application of the landlord. The said order is annexed as Annexure-1. The tenant, therefore, carried two appeals before the appellate authority. The appellate authority disposed of both these appeals by order dated 29-4-1982. He came to the conclusion that the two cases, one filed by the landlord and the other filed by the tenant could not have been disposed of in one proceeding and should have been independently tried and the Revenue Officer committed an error in clubbing both these applications and disposing of the same by one order. He accordingly set aside the order of the Revenue Officer and remitted the matter for further enquiry in accordance with the direction given by him in the judgment. The landlord then carried two revisions, but the revisional authority without dismissing anything simply came to hold that there was no scope to interfere with the order of the appellate authority and accordingly dismissed the revisions. The landlord thereafter has approached this Court. 2. Mr. The landlord then carried two revisions, but the revisional authority without dismissing anything simply came to hold that there was no scope to interfere with the order of the appellate authority and accordingly dismissed the revisions. The landlord thereafter has approached this Court. 2. Mr. Routray, the learned Counsel for the landlord Petitioner, contends that the application of the landlord u/s 14 and the application of the tenant-opposite party No. 1 u/s 36-A are interlinked and in the interests of justice are required to be clubbed together and heard together and the Revenue Officer did not commit any error in clubbing up both these applications and disposing of the same by a common order. The appellate authority as well as the revisional authority committed gross error in coming to a contrary conclusion. According to Mr. Routray, the order of remand passed by the appellate authority and confirmed by the revisional authority should be set aside and the appellate authority should be directed to re-dispose of the appeals on merit since the appellate authority has not applied his mind to the merits of the case. We find sufficient force in the aforesaid contention. 3. In view of the dispute between the parties and the point for consideration, the application filed by the landlord u/s 14 and the application filed by the tenant u/s 36-A must be disposal of together since the questions to be decided are inter-linked and, in our opinion, the Revenue Officer adopted the right course of action. The appellate authority as well as the revisional authority committed gross error in coming to the conclusion that the two applications should be disposed of independently in two separate trial. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, since the appellate authority has not applied his mind to the merits of the case, normally we would have remitted the matter to the appellate authority. But Mr. Misra appearing for the tenant-opposite party No. 1 contends that the Revenue Officer has not discussed the applicability of Sub-section (2)(b) of Section 14 of the Act though an abrupt finding has been given in that regard and he further contends that there has been no finding of arrear of rent and the alleged finding of the Revenue Officer is based rather on surmises and conjectures than on discussion of the evidence on record. Mr. Mr. Misra, therefore, urges that the original order of the Revenue Officer should also be set aside and the matter may be remitted to the Revenue Officer himself for re-disposal in accordance with law bearing in mind the rival contentions of the parties. On a perusal of the order of the Revenue Officer, we are satisfied that the Revenue Officer has not given his conclusion on the question of arrear of rent on a discussion of the evidence on record and rather has based his conclusion on presumption and surmises. Such a conclusion cannot be said to be a conclusion in accordance with law. Further, the applicability of Section 14(2)(b) of the Act has not been discussed. In that view of the matter, we think it appropriate to set aside the order of the Revenue Officer also and remit the matter to him for re-hearing and re-disposal on the existing materials on record by giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. 4. We would accordingly quash the orders under Annexure 1, 2, 3 and 4 and remit the matter to the Revenue Officer-cum Tahsildar, Baripada, to re-dispose of the matter in accordance with law. Parties through their counsel undertaken to appear before the Revenue Officer on 22nd January, 1990 on which date the Revenue Officer Shall fix a date of hearing and thereafter proceed in accordance with law. The Revenue Officer is directed to dispose of both the applications by 28th of February, 1990. It transpires from the counsel for the parties that the Petitioner has already taken possession of the land. Mr. Misra, however, says that since the order of the Revenue Officer has been interfered with, the possession may be re-delivered to the tenant. In view of our direction to dispose of the matter by 28th of Februuy, 1990, we do not think it appropriate to issue such a direction but we make it clear that in the event the landlord fails and the tenant succeeds before the Revenue Officer then possession must be re-delivered to the tenant immediately thereafter. The writ application is accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. A.K. Padhi, J. 5. I agree. Writ application allowed. Final Result : Allowed