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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 40 (MP)

KANHIYALAL v. ANIL KUMAR

1990-01-19

K.L.SHRIVASTAVA

body1990
K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 12-3-1986 passed by the J. M. F. C. , Alirajpur in Cri. Case No. 132 of 1984 whereby the N. A. No. 1 has been acquitted of the offence under Section 304a of the Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution, the N. A. No. 1 at about 2. 30 P. M.-on 7-1-1984 driving rashly and negligently the motorcycle bearing registration No. M. B. U. 8541 in Alirajpuron Umrali Road near Water Tank, dashed it against Dinesh aged 9 years, the son of the petitioner. As a consequence of the injuries sustained, the said Dinesh died in the evening the same day. The occurrence was reported to the Police Station, Alirajpur. A crime was registered and investigation was set forth. ( 3 ) AT the conclusion of the investigation, the N. A. No. 1 was prosecuted. The learned Magistrate framed charge under Section 304a, I. P. C. and at the conclusion of the trial Passed the impugned order. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned trial courts conclusions that the N. A. No. 1 is the defaulting driver and the occurrence resulted in the childts death are on firm foundation and are unassailable and his ultimate conclusion is clearly wrong. The contention of the learned counsel for the N. A. No. 1 is that the conclusion reached by the learned trial Magistrate that on the evidence on record rash or negligent driving has not been proved is independant of the earlier conclusions and conviction was rightly not entered. According to him no interference with the impugned order is called for. ( 5 ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed. ( 6 ) SECTION 304a embodies the Penal Provision for homicide by rash or negligent act. In order to attract this penal Provision rashness or negligence must be of a higher degree than that which is sufficient to entail Civil liability. In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused goes beyond a mere matter of compensation between citizens and shows such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused goes beyond a mere matter of compensation between citizens and shows such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. It may be pointed out that inevitable accident is always a complete defence not only in criminal law but also in civil law. Reference at this stage may be made to Section 80 in Chapter IV of the Penal Code (Section 76 to 106) dealing with general exceptions. It deals with accident in doing a legal act and reads as under: 8o Accident in doing a lawful act Nothing is an-offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution. Driving a vehicle at a reasonable high speed in itself does riot consitute either rashness or negligence. By accident is meant the happening of an event over which the actor has no control. By rashness on the other side is meant the pursuing of the conduct with the hope that a consequence shall not follow and it nonetheless eventuates. By negligence is meant not conforming to the standards of a reasonable man in the circumstances. It consists, in not taking care and caution expected of a reasonable man in a set of circumstances. ( 7 ) IN the decision in Rameshchandras case1, the maxim res ipsa loquitur, and the last opportunity principle have been dealt with and it has been held that where the petitioner had taken his vehicle slightly towards right side of the road in order to avoid dashing against the bullock carts in front and happened to strike against the unattended Child, the case was of an accident as he could not be expected to stop the vehicle all at once. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the N. A. No. 1 pointing out that as provided under Section 401 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in revision, finding or acquittal cannot be converted into one of conviction urges that in an appeal against acquittal the scope of interference is merely subject to a caution but the scope is necessarily narrower where the discretionary jurisdiction in revision is being invoked for challenging the order of acquittal. In support of his submission he had placed reliance on the following observation in the decision in Lalit Kumarts case2. It is now well settled that the power of an appellate court to review evidence in appeals against acquittal is as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions, but that power is with a note or caution that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the orders of acquittals unless there are compelling reasons to do so. If a finding reached by the trial Judge cannot be said to be an unreasonable finding, then the appellate court should not disturb that finding even if it is possible to reach a different conclusion on the basis of the material on record. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the prosecution has examined (Mst Kapila Bai P. W. 3); Madan (P. W. 4); Kantilal (P. W. 5) and Rameshchandra (P. W. 9) as eye witnesses, Kantilal and Rameshchandra have stated that the motorcycle was being driven at a slow speed. Paragraph 7 of his deposition Madan has stated he did not witness the actual collusion as such. Mst. Kapila Bai stating that the motorcycle was being driven in a zig-zag way, has given a graphic description of the accident but in so doing she stands materially contradicted with her previous statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. ( 10 ) ON the state of evidence discussed above and in the light of the law on the subject, I am clearly of the view that the order of acquittal does not call for any interference in exercise of the discretionary revisional jurisdiction. In the result, the revision petition being totally devoid of merit is dismissed. Revision dismissed. .