Judgment RAM NARAYAN LAL and BHUVANESHWAR PRASAD JJ. 1. This is an application filed by the second party to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter referred to as the Codes. It has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is directed against the entire proceeding of the Case No. M-760 of 1966 under the aforesaid provisions of law pending in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chapra. 2. It appears that a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code was started on 24-6-1966 before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chapra, regarding 15 Kathas and 1/2 Dhurs of land in Plot No. 80 under Khata No 73 situated in village Dhane Chapra, P. S. Dhariapur, District Saran. Later on the same was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code on 23-7-1966 and the parties were asked to file their written statements, documents and affidavits. Thereafter, the Magistrate on 7-4-1967 declared the possession of the first party (Respondent No. 2) over the disputed land. 3. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioners came to this Court in Criminal Revision No. 1448 of 1969. This Court remanded back the case to the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chapra, with a direction that all the affidavits which were to be used by the Magistrate must be sworn before him or re-affirmed by the parties in his court. While the petitioners re-affirmed those affidavits on 15-6-1973, Respondent No. 2 failed to comply with this order till today though a large number of ad- journments were granted to her by the Magistrate. Respondeat No. 2 in spite of the notice even did not attend the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in spite of notice from 13-8-1974 to various other dates fixed in the proceeding till 4-11-1986. As such the proceeding is still pending in the court of the learned Magistrate for re-affirming or re-swearing the affidavits by Respondent No. 2. 4. Shri Ramanand Prasad Yadav, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that though the proceeding is pending since over twenty years and though a large number of opportunities were given to Respondent No. 2 to re-affirm or re-swear the affidavits before the learned Magistrate, Respondent No. 2 has failed to comply with the order passed by the Court. 4. Shri Ramanand Prasad Yadav, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that though the proceeding is pending since over twenty years and though a large number of opportunities were given to Respondent No. 2 to re-affirm or re-swear the affidavits before the learned Magistrate, Respondent No. 2 has failed to comply with the order passed by the Court. Since no body has appeared on behalf of Respondent No. 2 this statement of the Seamed counsel has been left unchallenged. Shri Yadav has further submitted that during this period there has been no breach of peace caused by either of the parties and there is no such allegation to th is effect by either of them. Relying upon the case of Kameshwar Rai and others V/s. Keshav Rai and others, 1986 BBCJ 678 he has submitted that the proceeding should be dropped. In particular he has drawn our attention to the following observations made by the Court in above mentioned case : "Such a Case which remained pending for seventeen years, it may be termed as stale and in this view of the matter, interference is only warranted if there be such compeling aad extraordinary situation. It is never permissible to allow such proceedings to prolong machanically without any valid reason and if that is allowed, certainly complications will arise leading to the denial of right and possession of a true possessor and owner." 5. While provision of Section 144 of the Code deal with urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger, the provision of Section 145 of the Code also deals with a situation when an apprehension of breach of peace exists or continues. In this view of the matter, the provisions of these two sections can be said to be for urgent steps to be taken by a Magistrate to meet any apprehension of breach of peace. As such these provisions are in the nature of emergency provisions. If, however, a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code remains pending for more than seven years without any fresh allegation of an apprehension of breach of peace we feel that such a proceeding should not be allowed to continue beyond this period since obviously it cannot be said that there is any longer any urgency in the matter. If, however, a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code remains pending for more than seven years without any fresh allegation of an apprehension of breach of peace we feel that such a proceeding should not be allowed to continue beyond this period since obviously it cannot be said that there is any longer any urgency in the matter. In the meantime, the parties will have ample opportunity to go to a civil court of competent jurisdiction to get their right, title or interest as also their claim for possession over the disputed land decided finally instead of going to the Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code. If the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code under the aforesaid condition is allowed to continue beyond a period of seven years in our view the very purpose of the judicial process gets defeated. Any such proceeding cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely if there is no apprehension of breach of peace or any new dispute likely to cause a breach of peace concerning land or water or boundaries thereof. It also goes against the principle of expeditious disposal of the cases. No harm is likely to be caused to the parties who can seek the redressal of their grievances in civil court by competent jurisdiction. In the present case it appears that the parties have remained litigating in this proceeding under Section 145 of the Code for two decades since it appears that the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code was started on 24-6-1966 and was converted into proceeding under Section 145 of the Code on 23-7-1966. Hence we hold that the urgent proceeding under Section 145 of the Code must be treated to be closed after a lapse of seven years as an urgency cannot be said to continue beyond this period In suitable cases, however, there can be no bar in starting fresh proceeding under Section 145 of the Code if the situation so warrants. 6. In the instant case we find that the Respondent No. 2 did not file affidavits in spite of more than a dozen adjournments granted by the Magistrate in the court below, and in spite of the direction given by this Court. The same position continues even today. 7. 6. In the instant case we find that the Respondent No. 2 did not file affidavits in spite of more than a dozen adjournments granted by the Magistrate in the court below, and in spite of the direction given by this Court. The same position continues even today. 7. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, we find that there is no apprehension of breach of peace in this case and there is no justification for the proceeding to continue under Section 145 of the Code any further. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the impugned proceeding pending before the Sub-divisioml Magistrate Chapra vide Case No.M-76G of 1966 is hereby quashed.