JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. The appellant is the petitioner in W.P.No.13210 of 1985. The respondent is the respondent in the writ petition. The parties shall be referred to in this judgment of ours by their nomenclature in the writ petition. The petitioner, who was functioning as a Garden Supervisor at the relevant point of time, has been sent out of service in disciplinary action. The petitioner was having the status of a Government servant The petitioner straightway came to this Court by way of the above writ petition, impugning the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed on him. Three points were urged before the learned single Judge, who heard the writ petition, as follows: (1) The finding of the- disciplinary authority is based on no evidence; (2) A copy of the report of the enquiry authority, which has exonerated the petitioner, was not furnished to the petitioner, before the disciplinary authority, differing from the enquiry authority, imposed the penalty. It must be noted here that a copy of the report of the enquiry authority was forwarded along with the impugned order; and (3) The petitioner ought to have been given a second show cause with reference to the proposed punishment All the above points were repelled by the learned single Judge and as a result the writ petition was dismissed. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 2. Mr. N. Kannadhasan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would first submit that here is a case where the disciplinary authority chose to differ from the findings of the enquiry authority, which findings have gone in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner ought to have been furnished with the copy of the report of the enquiry authority and the petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to make his say with regard to the disciplinary authority differing from the findings of the enquiry authority and imposing the penalty. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would express a grievance that this has violated the principles of natural justice. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would express a grievance that this has violated the principles of natural justice. 3. The right to make a representation on the proposed penalty, which was to be found in Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, has been taken away by the Forty Second Amendment and there is no provision of law under which a Government servant can claim this right See : (i) Union of India v. Tulasiram Patel ; (ii) Ram Chander v. Union of India and Ors. and Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs v. K.S.Mahalingam A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1919. It is not stated that any service rules contemplate a contrary position. The disciplinary authority is the deciding authority. He has to decide about the guilt or otherwise of the servant of the charges levelled against the servant. His decision must be based on evidence adduced during the enquiry held for the purpose, after the servant has been informed of the charges levelled against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges. The disciplinary authority himself could be the enquiry authority. For the sake of convenience, the disciplinary authority may entrust the holding of the enquiry to a separate enquiry authority. The enquiry authority, unless he is also the disciplinary authority, has no right to decide and punish or exonerate. He could only submit his findings and recommendations. Those findings are not all binding on the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority is free to make an independent assessment of the evidence and come to his own conclusion differing from the findings of the enquiry authority. The disciplinary authority alone is competent to decide about the guilt and impose the punishment. 4. Those findings are not all binding on the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority is free to make an independent assessment of the evidence and come to his own conclusion differing from the findings of the enquiry authority. The disciplinary authority alone is competent to decide about the guilt and impose the punishment. 4. Once it is accepted that the decision making authority on the question of guilt and punishment is the disciplinary authority and the findings of the enquiry authority are not at all binding on the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority can ignore them and he is free to render findings of his own based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry, it is not possible to hear and accept a proposition that after the enquiry and before the disciplinary authority acts, decides about the guilt and imposes the penalty, the servant must be afforded an opportunity to make his say over the same, after he has been furnished with a copy of the report of the enquiry authority because it is in his favour. It is for the disciplinary authority to accept or reject or differ from the findings of the enquiry authority. Merely on the ground that the disciplinary authority has differed from the enquiry authority, there is no warrant to ask for a second opportunity. After the enquiry has been held, affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the servant, there is no scope for a second opportunity to the servant before the disciplinary authority decides on the guilt and the punishment. To say otherwise on the mere ground of the disciplinary authority differing from the findings of the enquiry authority, would be introducing by a side-door the theme of second opportunity, after it has been deleted by the Constitutional Amendment. That will be resurrecting a provision and a position which has got to be forgotten in view of the Forty Second Amendment to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. That should not be allowed to be achieved. 5. The disciplinary authority on the evidence adduced during the enquiry, makes up his mind, either affirming or differing from the view of enquiry authority on the question of guilt of the servant, and further on the punishment to be imposed. At that stage, no question of further opportunity to the servant would arise, even in a case of the disciplinary authority differing from the enquiry authority. At that stage, no question of further opportunity to the servant would arise, even in a case of the disciplinary authority differing from the enquiry authority. The ultimate deciding authority being the disciplinary authority, after he so decides, the only opportunity available to the servant to canvass the entire gamut of the findings against him and the propriety of the punishment imposed on him, will be before the appellate authority in a departmental appeal. The petitioner in his wisdom has not preferred any departmental appeal and we have not heard any explanation for the same. It would have been a different matter if the servant was not at all furnished with a copy of the report of the enquiry authority even at the time of or immediately after the ultimate older by the disciplinary authority. Then the servant may complain of handicap and prejudice in presenting and prosecuting effectively the departmental appeal. Such is not the position in the present case. The petitioner, as already noted, has been furnished with the said copy along with the impugned order. Hence, we are not able to sustain the first point urged by Mr. N. Kannadhasan, learned Counsel for the petitioner. In Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam the learned single Judge and the learned Judges of the Bench of this Court, on appeal, countenanced the grievance of the servant with regard to non-furnishing of the report of the enquiry authority. The Supreme Court dispelled this line of thinking, taking note of the Forty Second Amendment to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In that case also, it was found that after the order of dismissal was passed, the copy of the report of enquiry authority was supplied to the servant and that was countenanced as sufficient to enable the servant to prefer the departmental appeal. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner next wanted to canvass the findings of the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry authority. We must first of all point out that we have our own limitations while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with regard to assessing the evidence in the case. We ate not supposed to convert ourselves into an appellate forum in this behalf. As pointed out by the learned single Judge, the impugned order has come to be passed on appreciation of evidence. We ate not supposed to convert ourselves into an appellate forum in this behalf. As pointed out by the learned single Judge, the impugned order has come to be passed on appreciation of evidence. Hence, we cannot sustain this point also. No other point was urged before us. 7. As a result, this writ appeal fails and the same in dismissed. No costs.