JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Can an accused be convicted on the basis of the testimony of witnesses, who have been disbelieved in respect of major portion of their evidence, is the salient question that falls for adjudication in this appeal. 2. The Appellant along with five others stood trial under Sections 148, 302/149, in the alternative u/s 302/14 of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'the IPC'). While others have been acquitted, the Appellant was held guilty, convicted u/s 304, Part II, IPC and sentenced to undergo, rigorous imprisonment for seven years. 3. Synaptical resumption of the prosecution case is as follows: Accused Iswar Rout (since acquitted) took a loan from one Dhaneswar Mohapatra, father of Govinda Chardra Mohapatra (P.W. 1) and on his inability to clear up the loan, a suit was filed, execution was levied for realisation of the decretal amount, certain lands belonging to the said accused were purchased in Court auction possession whereof was taken in the year 1971; Dhaneswar was in cultivating possession of the land since the time of his purchase and in the year 1981, P.W. 1 had raised paddy on the same. On 7-9-1981 at about 9.30 a.m. while P.W. 1 was harvesting paddy with the help of some labourers including Sudarsan Bhuyan (deceased), the accused persons came in a group armed with lathis, balam and tenta; on being assaulted by accused Kirtan, Bhagaban and Kapila, deceased felt down and Appellant Naba dealt a balam blow on his neck the accused persons ran away when hue and cry was raised by the labourers. Govinda Chandra Mohapatra (P.W. 1), Ganesh Mohapatra (P.W. 2) and some others who were present at the spot wanted to take the deceased to Jenapur for treatment, but he succumbed on the way. The dead-body was kept under a banian tree near the spot where he died. The Officer-in-charge of Dharmasala Police Station (P.W. 4) on receipt of information from other source about the incident made one station diary entry and proceeded to the spot where P.W. 1, lodged a written report which was treated as the First Information Report. After investigation and examination of the informant and other witnesses, spot mao prepared, inquest over the dead-body was held and the dead-body was sent far post mortem examination. On the following day, accused persons were arrested and forwarded to custody. After investigation and examination of the informant and other witnesses, spot mao prepared, inquest over the dead-body was held and the dead-body was sent far post mortem examination. On the following day, accused persons were arrested and forwarded to custody. Subsequently, the successor of the Officer-in-charge (P.W. 5) submitted charge sheet against the accused persons. 4. Accused Kirtan, Bhagaban, Krushna and Kapila took the plea that they were not present at the spat and have been falsely implicated in the case. The present Appellant and his father Iswar took the plea that the disputed land was all along in their possession, and they had raised paddy thereon. On the date of occurrence, P.W. 1 sent a large number of labourers to cut the unripe paddy from the case land and while they were cutting paddy, on protest being raised, the labourers replied that they were directed by P.W. 1 to do so. On the advice of the Appellant and his father, some of the labourers including the deceased went to call P.W. 1. The Appellant and his father waited near a banian tree. The deceased went and called P.W. 1 to that place. Discussions were held between the Appellant and his father on the one hand and the deceased and P.W. 1 on the other. In course of discussion, a quarrel ensued, at the direction of P.W. 1 the deceased dealt a push to Iswar, as a result of which he fell down, whereafter accused Iswar got up and dealt two blows with a lathi to the deceased. When the deceased rushed towards the Appellant with a sickle to assault him, the latter caught hold of it, and a tussle took place in course of which the pointed portion of the sickle accidentally pierced the neck of the deceased causing bleeding injury. The Appellant and Iswar went away, and had no idea as to what happened thereafter. 5. The prosecution in support of its version examined seven witnesses whereas six witnesses were examined in support of the defence version. The Appellant and Iswar went away, and had no idea as to what happened thereafter. 5. The prosecution in support of its version examined seven witnesses whereas six witnesses were examined in support of the defence version. On consideration of the evidence, the learned trial Judge held that there was some discrepancy regarding mode and place of lodging of the F.I.R. by P.W. 1 While this witness state that he went to the police station after the occurrence and lodged the F.I.R. there, the statement of I.O. (P.W. 4) is to the effect that he had received information about the occurrence from Some other source, and after making one station diary entry proceeded to the spat, where a written report was submitted by P.W. 1. Though the station diary, entry has not been exhibited, there is an endorsement on the F.I.R. (Ext. 1) by P.W. 4 that he received the same at the spot and not in tile police station. This has been treated as a minor discrepancy by the learned trial judge, who held that it did not affect the credibility of the prosecution case. He also observed that though admittedly, blood-stained earth and sample earth were available to be corrected, which would have thrown light on the actual state of affairs, there Was no seizure, but the same did not affect the credibility of the prosecution version. He observed that no reliance could be placed on the evidence of P.W. 1 about the alleged occurrence, in view of his statement in Misc. Case No. 29 of 1981 in the Court of Munsif, Jajpur (Ext. B). He also observed that evidence of P.W. 2 is highly contradictory, inconsistent, highly exaggerated, and that he made futile attempt to falsely implicate accused Kirtan, Bhagaban and Krushna. Similarly, the evidence of P.W. 3 was substantially disbelieved on the ground that he too attempted to exaggerate to impute culpability on the parts of the accused Iswar, Krushna, Bhagaban and Kapila. So far as the Appellant is concerned, he held that assault by him is clearly culled out from the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, and their version is consistent with the medical evidence. Having so observed the learned trial judge considered the question whether Appellant was liable u/s 302, IPC. According to him, the circumstances indicated that Appellant was at best, liable u/s 304, Part II, IPC. 2 and 3, and their version is consistent with the medical evidence. Having so observed the learned trial judge considered the question whether Appellant was liable u/s 302, IPC. According to him, the circumstances indicated that Appellant was at best, liable u/s 304, Part II, IPC. With that conclusion, all the accused persons except the Appellant were acquitted of all the charges levelled against them, while the Appellant was convicted and sentenced as indicated above. 6. In appeal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has strenuously urged that the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 having been substantially disbelieved, was unworthy of any credence and therefore, conviction and sentence as awarded do not stand to reason. He has also highlighted that discrepancy as to the manner of lodging of F.I.R. casts a grave shadow of doubt on the credibility of the prosecution version, and the learned trial Judge has erroneously lightly brushed aside the same. On behalf of the State, however, it has been urged that there is no rule that when a witness has been disbelieves in respect of certain accused persons, residuary of his evidence cannot be utilised for the purpose of convicting another, and that the learned trial Judge on a careful appreciation and analysis of the evidence, has rightly come to the conclusion about the guilt of the Appellant, and therefore, there is nothing illicit in the judgment of conviction and sentence. 7. On consideration of the rival sumissions find that, as noticed earlier, the only question that emerges for consideration is whether the learned trial Judge was justified in holding the Appellant guilty oh the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, whose testimony has been termed unreliable and been discarded substantially. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing; false in every thing) has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India, nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". See Nisar Ali Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". See Nisar Ali Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. See AIR 1956 460 Gurcharn Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab. The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in one more particular, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. The witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. See Sohrab and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ugar Ahir and Others Vs. The State of Bihar. An attempt has to be made to, in terms of, felicitous metaphor, separate grain and chaff truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. See Zwinglee Ariel Vs. See Zwinglee Ariel Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Balaka Singh and Others Vs. The State of Punjab. As observed by the apex Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Smt. Kalki and Another normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and these are always there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorised. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the prosecution has to establish its Case beyond a shadow of doubt and the accused is always entitled to a benefit of doubt. The maxim that it is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted, rather than one innocent person be convicted, is nowhere laid down in the Evidence Act but is a rule of prudence founded on public policy, as serious consequences' of an erroneous, condemnation are much more serious both to the accused and society than the consequences of an erroneous acquittal. The maxim has, however, often been misunderstood and misapplied. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. See Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh and others, Therefore, in each case it has to be seen whether the course of justice is not deflected by fanciful possibilities. Absolute certainty is impossible ill any human adventure, including the administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of fanciful possibilities, but it does admit at a high degree of cogency consistent with an equally high degree of probability. The requirement of proof beyond-reasonable doubt undoubtedly stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit of fanciful possibilities, but it does admit at a high degree of cogency consistent with an equally high degree of probability. The requirement of proof beyond-reasonable doubt undoubtedly stems out of the compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof of an offence with certainty of the criminal law, to the effect that the offence has been committed and that no other person but the accused can be said to have committed the offence on the available evidence. Where the evidence conclusively establishes these two facts, the case is said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See (1987) CLR 179 (law Reports of the Commonwealth). Keeping the above principles in view it has to be judged as to what extent the prosecution has been able to place evidence to unerringly point out that the accused Appellant is the author of the crime. 8. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is found that the pivotal role in the incident was played by P.W. 1. His evidence has been discarded in toto. The evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 can be characterised as unreliable and exaggerated and has been rightly discarded substantially by the learned trial Judge being of uncredible nature. Attempt has been made by these two witnesses to falsely implicate a large number of accused persons imputing them of having participated in the crime. But substratum of the allegations has collapsed. The evidence is of highly tainted nature. The evidence was disbelieved so far as the complicity of the other accused persons is concerned. Though evidence of partisan witnesses cannot be rejected outright, but in a case where they have gone to the extent of implicating several persons falsely and their version as far as scenario of alleged crime has been found unacceptable, their evidence is not trustworthy against any of the accused persons, and its acceptance would result in miscarriage of justice. They gave a fanciful picture of alleged assaults by several persons. Under almost similar circumstances, the apex Court has directed acquittal of accused persons. See B.N. Singh Etc. Vs. State Of Gujarat Etc.. The conclusions about the guilt of the Appellant are indefensible. To what extent falsity in the evidence has spread is hard to fathom. They gave a fanciful picture of alleged assaults by several persons. Under almost similar circumstances, the apex Court has directed acquittal of accused persons. See B.N. Singh Etc. Vs. State Of Gujarat Etc.. The conclusions about the guilt of the Appellant are indefensible. To what extent falsity in the evidence has spread is hard to fathom. The irresistible and inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges against the Appellant. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Judge are set aside. The bill-bonds be discharged. Final Result : Allowed