JUDGMENT - RATNAPARKHI M.S., J.:---The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked for quashing the order passed by the School Tribunal, Nagpur on 15th December, 1983. A declaration is sought that the appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 before the School Tribunal was not maintainable and the School Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the said appeal. Alternatively, it is claimed that the order passed by the School Tribunal be quashed and the matter be remanded for decision according to law. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows : The petitioner runs a Primary School at Bhandara. The respondent No. 3 was appointed initially, on a temporary basis, by order dated 23-8-1978. This appointment lapsed on 30th June, 1979. She was again temporarily from 2-7-1979 to 30-4-1981. She had no right to the post. As the last appointment expired on 30th April, 1981, she did not join thereafter and no fresh appointment order was issued. She, however, filed an appeal before the Education Officer of the Zilla Parishad, Bhandara on 4-7-1981. The Education Officer conducted an enquiry and passed an order on 14th September, 1981 rejecting the said appeal. Nothing happened thereafter. 3. However, the petitioner-society received a notice from the School Tribunal on 13th September, 1982. The petitioner filed a reply before the School Tribunal on 11-10-1982. Thereafter the case was closed. No opportunity was granted to the petitioner for leading any evidence, nor was the petitioner ever heard. Without hearing, the School Tribunal allowed this appeal on 15-12-1983 after the lapse of one year and one month. It is the contention of the petitioner that the School Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because it was hopelessly bared by limitation. No appeal could be preferred against the order of the Education Officer and the School Tribunal does not sit in judgment as an Appellate Authority from the order of the educational authority. The law has prescribed a limitation of 30 days for filing an appeal, but this appeal came to be filed long after the said period. No opportunity was ever granted to the petitioner to put up his case. The law has prescribed a limitation of 30 days for filing an appeal, but this appeal came to be filed long after the said period. No opportunity was ever granted to the petitioner to put up his case. The School Tribunal was incompetent to entertain this appeal, because the cause of action had accrued long before the coming into existence, under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The School Tribunal came to be established under this Act, and, therefore, it could not take cognizance of the matter which was already decided before the enforcement of the rights. Lastly, it was contended that under section 10(3) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Services) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation Act, 1977" for the purposes of brevity), the Tribunal was under obligation to dispose of this appeal within three months from the date on which it is received by the Tribunal. As it has failed to dispose of the appeal, the judgment is contrary to the requirements of the statute and as such not binding. On these grounds the judgment is assailed. 4. The School Tribunal negatived the contentions of the petitioner and allowed the appeal. It directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No. 3 forthwith with all back wages. Feeling aggrieved with this order, this petition has been filed. 5. Mr. Madkholkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, took us extensively through the record. It is an admitted position that the respondent No. 3 was employed in this school from year to year, starting with 23-8-1978. A fresh order has been issued every year and the service was to continue upto the end of the academic year. It is an undisputed position that the petitioner did put in service for more than 2 years before the last appointment expired on 30th April, 1981. 6. There was a considerable debate as to what was the status of the respondent No. 3. It was conceded that she was not governed by the School Code because admittedly the School Code was not applicable to the primary teachers. Mr. Mohta, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3, urged before us that the conditions of service were definitely governed by the Rules framed under the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947. Mr. It was conceded that she was not governed by the School Code because admittedly the School Code was not applicable to the primary teachers. Mr. Mohta, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3, urged before us that the conditions of service were definitely governed by the Rules framed under the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947. Mr. Mohta could not show us whether the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947 was made applicable to this part of the State because this part of the State becomes part of Maharashtra only in 1956. However, a resolution passed by the Education Department of the Government of Maharashtra (Education Department Resolution No. VLS-1074-F-34892, dated 8th February, 1974), Mantralaya Annexe, Bombay 32 was produced before us to show that the service conditions of the primary teachers working in this part of the State were governed by the amended Rules framed in 1974. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution reads as follows: "2. After careful consideration, Government is now pleased to direct that a uniform pattern for payment of grant-in-aid and service conditions to approved private primary schools in Western Maharashtra will be governed by the Amended Rules, 1974 of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 which are appended herewith as the accompaniment to this Government Resolution. The approved private primary schools in Vidarbha and Marathwada Regions would also be governed by these Rules and they should also be held eligible for payment of maintenance grant prescribed under them. The amended Rules along with service conditions will come into force in the whole of the State of Maharashtra from the date of issue of the Government Resolution. However, the managements will be given the option for the purposes of grant-in-aid during the current financial year (1973-1974) only. The managements should give their option in writing upto the end of February 1974 to the Education Officers of Z.Ps/A.Os. of Municipal Corporations indicating clearly whether they desire to get grant according to the new or old formula that was in force in the respective regions of the State. No option, however, would be given after 31st March, 1974 and all the approved private primary schools in the State would be governed by amended Rules from the financial year 1974-75." 7. It was not disputed before us that the school run by the petitioner was the approved school. No option, however, would be given after 31st March, 1974 and all the approved private primary schools in the State would be governed by amended Rules from the financial year 1974-75." 7. It was not disputed before us that the school run by the petitioner was the approved school. This resolution thus clearly shows that as far as service conditions of the primary teachers are concerned, the Bombay Primary Education Rules, as amended in 1974, would govern the approved private primary schools in Vidarbha and Marathwada. There was no option as far as this part was concerned. The option was only in respect of grant-in-aid. It is thus clear from this resolution that the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949, as amended in 1974, were to govern the service conditions of the primary teachers of the approved private primary schools in this part of the Region also. 8. The Rules, as amended in 1974 called the Bombay Primary Education (Amendment) Rules, 1974, were produced before us for our perusal. The requisite provisions which are necessary for our purpose are contained in Schedule-F attached to these Rules. A note below Schedule-F reads as follows: "The condition of employment given in this Schedule are in respect of teachers employed in approved private schools. Unless the management of the schools prescribed other conditions with the approval of the Deputy Director of Educational Division these model conditions shall be applied." It was not the case put up before us that the management, i.e. the petitioner, had made any special Rules governing the conditions of the teachers. 9. With this background, we may proceed further. Clause 5 of the Schedule prescribes that unless it is a purely temporary vacancy a teacher professionally qualified shall be on probation for a period of 2 years from the date of his first taking over charge of this appointment. Clause 6 of the Schedule reads as follows: "6. If a teacher is professional qualified and appointed to a permanent vacancy, he will be regarded as a permanent teacher after a service of 2 years." In the present case, the respondent No. 3 came to be appointed initially by the order issued vide Annexure-A. Admittedly she worked from 25-8-1978 to 30-6-1980. A fresh order was again issued (Annexure-B) when she was appointed from 2-7-1989 to 30-6-1979. A fresh order was again issued (Annexure-B) when she was appointed from 2-7-1989 to 30-6-1979. A last order came to be issued to the respondent No. 3 vide Annexure-C whereunder she was appointed on the same post from 4-7-1980 to 30-4-1981. In such order there is a specific condition that the appointment is purely temporary. These is nothing in the order to show that the post was temporary. Thus we can reasonably hold that she was appointed initially temporarily against a permanent vacancy. We are now required to interpret Clause 5 of Schedule-F to the Rules referred to in the last paragraph. The post was permanent. She was appointed temporarily against a permanent vacancy. Clause 5 requires that when a post is permanent, an incumbent has to be appointed as a probationer. Clause 6, on the other hand, declares that when an incumbent is appointed in a permanent vacancy, after 2 complete years of service he shall be treated as a permanent teachers. Considered from this point of view, it can be reasonably said that before 30th of June, 1981, the respondent No. 3 had completed two years of service in a permanent post and therefore she was under Clause 6 was regarded as a permanent teacher. Thus there shall be no doubt that after 30-6-1981 she held the status of a permanent nature in the school. 10. What happened in this case was that there was no termination order. It is the case of the petitioner that the contract of service terminated with the efflux of time prescribed in the order and, therefore, she had no concern with the society. Thus there is no formal termination order. What the respondent No. 3 states before the Court is that she went to join her duties on 1-7-1981 and she was precluded from joining the duties on the ground that her contract of service had expired. Her case, now before us and also before the School Tribunal and Education Authority, was that this amounts to "service otherwise terminated". There appears to be a considerable force in what the respondent No. 3 states. The position which prevailed after 30th of June, 1981 is that she had acquired the status of permanent teacher, but she was precluded from joining the duties on the ground that the contract of service had expired. 11. This now takes us to the further part of the controversy. The position which prevailed after 30th of June, 1981 is that she had acquired the status of permanent teacher, but she was precluded from joining the duties on the ground that the contract of service had expired. 11. This now takes us to the further part of the controversy. It is her case that she appealed to the Education Officer on 4-7-1981. Copy of this can be found at Annexure-R-2. She addressed the appeal against the injustice caused to her by the management. To this, a reply was filed on 20th June, 1981 vide Annexure-K. The main thrust of the reply was that the conduct of the respondent No. 3 was not befitting a teacher, and therefore, she was not allowed to join the school. This was an appeal and even in paragraph 4 of the petition, the petitioner has admitted that this was an appeal before the second respondent, the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Bhandara. Thus as far as the forum is concerned and as far as the remedy is concerned, there is no dispute between the parties. 12. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the petitioner did not contend before the Education Officer that there was no remedy of appeal available. They did not contend that the appeal did not lay before the Education Officer. In fact, Rule 9(2) permits the termination of the services of the permanent employee on certain conditions. Rule 9(2) prescribes the procedure for termination of the services of the employees without enquiry. Except for the cases covered by Rules 9.2(1) and 9.2(2) of the Rules, termination for other reasons requires an enquiry by the Committee. What happened in the present case was that the respondent was a permanent employee. Her services were not terminated under Rule 9.2. Rule 9.2(2) prescribes that such termination can be done only with the approval of the Appropriate Authority. The 'Appropriate Authority' is the Education Officer. It is the case of the respondent No. 3 that as her termination was not effected under this Rule, she had only one forum available and that was before the Appropriate Authority. Call it as an appeal, or call it as a representation, the substance remains the same, namely, that she agitated against the injustice before the Appropriate Authority. This appeal was pending when the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 came into force. Call it as an appeal, or call it as a representation, the substance remains the same, namely, that she agitated against the injustice before the Appropriate Authority. This appeal was pending when the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 came into force. It is admitted position that the Regulation Act of 1977 came into force on 15th July, 1981, whereas the Rules framed thereunder came into force on 16th July, 1981. Thus, it is clear that when this Act and the Rules came into force, the appeal of the respondent No. 3 before the Appropriate Authority was pending. Section 15 of the said Act prescribes that whenever such appeals are pending before the Deputy Director or any officer subordinate to him, they shall be transferred to the School Tribunal, we have before us the material to show that the School Tribunal came into existence on 16th July, 1981. 13. Mr. Madkholkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, invited our attention to section 15. He urged before us that only those appeals pending before the Deputy Director or an officer subordinate to him, in accordance with the provisions of the Secondary School Code could be transferred to the Tribunal. This was a mandate given by the statute. This mandate was applicable only to those appeals which were filed in accordance with the School Code. What Mr. Madkholkar urged before us was that the present appeal was not filed in accordance with the provisions of the School Code, because the School Code was not applicable to the primary teachers. Thus according to him, the appeal of the respondent No. 3 was not liable to be transferred and hence the respondent No. 2 was justified in deciding this appeal. Mr. Mohta, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3, however, urged before us that with the introduction of section 9 in the statute, such interpretation would be anomalous because the School Tribunal has been authorised under the statute to hear the appeals which arise out of the cases enumerated in section 9. 14. It will, therefore, be necessary to reproduce section 9, which reads as under : "9(1). 14. It will, therefore, be necessary to reproduce section 9, which reads as under : "9(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force : (a) an employee in a private school, who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the order passed by the management, or (b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion, and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against say such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under section 8: Provided that no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court on the appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before the 1st July, 1976. (2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank, as the case may be: Provided that, where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it after the expiry of the said period of thirty or sixty days, as the case may be, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period. (4) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a fee of fifty rupees, which shall not be refunded and shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State." 15. Mr. Madkholkar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, could not point out to us anything to show that this controversy was adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction before this Act came into force. There being no adjudication before, by the competent Court, the provisions of sub-section (1)(a) and (b) (having a non obstante clause) would prevail so that the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal becomes all pervasive to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other authorities. There being no adjudication before, by the competent Court, the provisions of sub-section (1)(a) and (b) (having a non obstante clause) would prevail so that the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal becomes all pervasive to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other authorities. Thus the mere reading of section 9 would show that a substantive right has been conferred on an employee in the private school to agitate against the orders passed by the management. This right is not merely a procedural right. No case law is required for supporting this proposition. Whenever there is an adverse order against him and when that order relates to dismissal, removal or termination of service otherwise, he has a substantive right to agitate. The position which prevails is that the respondent No. 3 was a permanent employee. Her services came to be terminated not on the grounds permissible under Clause 9.2(1) and 9.2(2) of Schedule F, nor was any enquiry conducted against her. Thus she had a substantive right which was infringed, otherwise than in due process of law. This was in short the state of things. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that the respondent No. 3 had already filed an appeal before the competent authority agitating against this highhanded action of the management and that appeal was pending before the authority, which was subordinate to the Education Officer. 16. Mr. Madkholkar wanted us to interpret section 15 in a limited way, inasmuch as, according to him only those appeals filed in accordance with School Code and pending before the Education Authorities on the appointed date were to be transferred to the Tribunal. There is no dispute that the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 before the Education Officer was not in accordance with the School Code; because the primary teachers were not governed by the School Code. They were governed by the rules which had a force of statute and the appellant forum was the Education Officer. That appeal was, therefore, competent. The position which prevails at this stage is that there was a dispute between the employer and the employee. The employee had taken up the matter before the Appellate Authority. That appeal was pending when the Regulation Act, 1977 came into force. That appeal was, therefore, competent. The position which prevails at this stage is that there was a dispute between the employer and the employee. The employee had taken up the matter before the Appellate Authority. That appeal was pending when the Regulation Act, 1977 came into force. The question that arises for decision at this stage is whether that appeal also was required to be transferred to the School Tribunal or whether the authority could hear and decide that appeal. 17. In this respect, the opening sentence in section 15 assumes considerable importance. It refers to all appeals of employees or as the case may be, of the managements of private schools relating to the matters specified in section 9. 18. Section 15 is only a transitional provision. It is purely of a procedural nature. This provision was required to be brought on the statute book because of some circumstances prevailing. The Regulation Act, 1977 came into operation on 15th of July, 1981. The Tribunals came into existence immediately thereafter. Before that the Tribunal was not in existence. There were so many appeals arising out of the School Code and the other provisions including the Bombay Primary Education Act, which were pending before the Competent Authorities. This provision came to be enacted only for enabling the education authorities to transfer the matters pending before them to the Tribunal. While interpreting section 15, the provisions of section 9 cannot be overlooked. To repeat it once again, section 9 creates a forum for deciding the cases filed by the employees. The jurisdiction of the forum was restricted inasmuch as it was restricted to the appeals filed by the employees in the private schools who were dismissed, or removed or whose services are otherwise terminate or who are reduced in rank by the order passed by the management or who are superseded by the management while making any appointment by promotion. Thus a specific forum came to be created for redressing the grievance of the employees. Before this forum came into existence, there were many other matters in which the similar grievances were sought to be vindicated, but the forum then available was the Education Officers of different categories. Section 15 of the Act, therefore, issues a legislative mandate that all appeals of employees of private schools relating to the matters specified in section 9 shall be transferred to the Tribunal. Section 15 of the Act, therefore, issues a legislative mandate that all appeals of employees of private schools relating to the matters specified in section 9 shall be transferred to the Tribunal. By necessary implication it curtails the jurisdiction of the Education Authorities, who were otherwise, before the coming into force of this Act, competent to decide these matters. 19. There is a qualifying clause in section 15 itself which qualifies the pending appeals. One of the qualifications is that these appeals must be relating to the matters specified in section 9 and the second qualification is that this must be in accordance with the provisions of the Secondary School Code. As far as the first qualification is concerned, the present case does satisfy that qualification so that the matter has to be transferred to the School Tribunal. As far as the second qualification is concerned, the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 was not in accordance with the School Code. This is an admitted position. The point which arises for decision in this case is whether the education authorities who had already taken the seisin of this matter, could decide these cases or could transfer these cases. As far as the appeals in accordance with the provisions of Secondary School Code were concerned, they were necessarily to be transferred because of the legislative mandate. There was no such mandate if the appeals were not in accordance with the Secondary School Code. 20. What we are required to consider is, what is the fate of such appeals? 21. In our view, once the exclusive forum is created by the statute, the jurisdiction of other authorities, who were otherwise competent, before coming into existence of the Tribunals, is ousted due to necessary implication. Only thing one has to see is whether the dispute falls within the four corners of section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulation Act, 1977. If the dispute fits within the scheme provided by section 9, the Public Authorities, who had jurisdiction before, ceased to have the same. The Education Officer could not, thus, decide the controversy as he ceased to have the requisite jurisdiction. 22. The Education Officer did decide this appeal and confirm the action of the management. It has to be borne in mind that the Education Officer rejected this appeal because, according to him, there were serious complaints against the respondent No. 3. The Education Officer could not, thus, decide the controversy as he ceased to have the requisite jurisdiction. 22. The Education Officer did decide this appeal and confirm the action of the management. It has to be borne in mind that the Education Officer rejected this appeal because, according to him, there were serious complaints against the respondent No. 3. In fact, the question before the Education Officer was whether the respondent No. 3's services could be terminated in the way they have been terminated. The Education Officer, however, did not apply his mind to this aspect of the case. He simply found that there were complaints and hence the termination was proper. This order of the Education Officer was appealed against before the Deputy Director of Education. While this appeal before the Deputy Director of Education was pending, the Deputy Director addressed a letter, Annexure R. 7, informing the respondent No. 3 that the appeal would be sent to the School Tribunal as the Tribunal has come into existence. Annexure R. 8 does show that the Deputy Director of Education has, in fact, transmitted all the papers to the School Tribunal. Thus what we find from the facts is that the order passed by the Education Officer was sub judice before the Deputy Director and the Deputy Director transmitted all these papers to the School Tribunal as the matter was covered by section 9(1) of the Regulation Act, 1977. 23. What Mr. Madkholkar urged before us, and quite strenuously, was that this appeal presented before the Education Officer fell outside the ambit of the legislative mandate contained in section 15 of the Regulations Act, 1977 and, therefore, the Education Officer was quite competent to decide this matter. He has decided this matter, though after the Regulation Act, 1977 came into force and after the Tribunal was established. According to Mr. Madkholkar, there was no mandate to transfer such matters and, therefore, the Education Officer did have jurisdiction to decide it and accordingly he has decided it. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument. Because, in our view, once the Tribunals were brought into existence to decide the controversy covered by section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977, the jurisdiction of the Education Officer was ousted by necessary implication. Thus, in our view, whatever the Education Officer decided was without jurisdiction. 24. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument. Because, in our view, once the Tribunals were brought into existence to decide the controversy covered by section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977, the jurisdiction of the Education Officer was ousted by necessary implication. Thus, in our view, whatever the Education Officer decided was without jurisdiction. 24. This being the case, we have now to consider the controversy further. The cause of action occurred at the beginning of July, 1981. As it occurred before the coming into force of the Regulation Act, 1977, the respondent No. 3 had two months time to seek redress against the injustice caused to her. Before that period elapsed, the School Tribunal came to be constituted and it was made the exclusive forum for deciding the controversies covered within the four corners of section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977. Here is, thus, a case where the respondent No. 3 was aggrieved; she had a substantive right of appeal before the School Tribunal and that substantive right continued to vest in her. We have already referred to the letter addressed by the Deputy Director to the School Tribunal transferring this appeal to the School Tribunal. As the School Tribunal was the exclusive forum for deciding the grievances covered by section 9, it was competent for the Deputy Director to send these matters to the appropriate forum. This is why the Deputy Director transmitted the appeal to the School Tribunal. It is evident from paragraph 4 of the order passed by the School Tribunal that this appeal papers were received by it from the education authorities. Thus, from the material available on record, it can be reasonably said that the Deputy Director of Education transferred these matters to the School Tribunal within the parameters permissible under section 15 of the Regulation Act, 1977. The School Tribunal, therefore, exercised its jurisdiction because the controversy was covered by section 9 and there was no final decision on this controversy. 25. Even assuming that the matter was not transferred by the Deputy Director to the School Tribunal, the respondent No. 3 did file an appeal before the School Tribunal on 13-7-1982 and this is evident from Annexure-F. It is true that this appeal has been filed long after the expiry of the limitation permissible. We shall consider the point of limitation at appropriate stage. We shall consider the point of limitation at appropriate stage. But it has to be held that the petitioner did file the appeal before the Tribunal. The grounds covered in the appeal fell within the four corners of section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977 and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain this appeal subject to the Law of Limitation. It must be said here at this stage that when this appeal was preferred before the School Tribunal by the respondent No. 3, the notice was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner did put its grievances before the Tribunal. But no defence of bar of limitation was taken. In fact section 10 of the Regulation Act, 1977 is clear enough. The Tribunal has powers to condone the limitation, if it thinks that there are sufficient reasons. When the Tribunal has taken the seisin of the matter, without there being any defence of limitation, it impliedly means that the delay, if at all, was condoned by necessary implication by it. 26. From this point of view, it is very difficult to accept the arguments of Mr. Madkholkar that the Tribunal had absolutely no jurisdiction. This argument cannot be accepted in view of the positive provision enacted in section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977. There is nothing to show that this controversy was adjudicated by the Court of competent jurisdiction, before the Act came into force. 27. It was next contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because it has been lodged after the expiry of limitation prescribed. There are two hurdles in the way of the petitioner, as far as this argument is concerned. Firstly, we find some material showing that the Deputy Director transferred this matter to the Tribunal. When the matters are transferred to the Tribunal, the Tribunal under section 15 has to hear such appeals, as if it were preferred under section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977. The question of limitation does not arise in such appeals. 28. Even assuming that the Tribunal took seisin of the matter under the appeal memo filed by the respondent No. 3, and not of the transfer directed by the Deputy Director, the question of limitation would arise. Mr. Madkholkar urged before us that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in case it is lodged after the expiry of limitation. Mr. Madkholkar urged before us that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in case it is lodged after the expiry of limitation. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from the nature and character of the controversy. If the controversy is covered by section 9, the Tribunal gets jurisdiction. Limitation does not affect jurisdiction. In time-barred matters, the Tribunal may refuse to exercise the jurisdiction. Sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Regulation Act, 1977 vests the discretion in the Tribunals to condone the delay, in case there is sufficient cause. In the present case, there was material before the Tribunal that (i) the Tribunal was not in existence when the cause arose; (ii) that the respondent No. 3 had taken remedies before the appropriate authorities, bona fide believing that it was a proper forum; and (3) no defence of bar was raised before the Tribunal. When the Tribunal heard the petition, on merits, on the background of these circumstances, it means that by necessary implication, the Tribunal has condoned the delay. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in entertaining and deciding the time-barred appeal. 29. It was then urged that under section 10(3) of the Regulation Act, 1977, it was obligatory on the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal within three months. And as this appeal has taken more than a year, according to Mr. Madkholkar, this vitiates the judgment. We are unable to accept this argument. In our view, sub-section (3) does not give a mandate. It only prescribes the norm. 30. Thus what was before the Tribunal was (i) that the respondent No. 3 had attained the status of permanent teacher, (ii) that her service is not terminated under Rule 9(1) and (2) of the Rules and (iii) that no departmental enquiry prescribed under the Rules was initiated against her. Hence the termination was struck down and, according to us, quite correctly. 31. In the result, there is hardly any merit in the petition, which deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----