M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiffs second appeal. They brought the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the suit schedule property bearing S. No. 42/2-A of Tarihal Village in hubli Taluk was purchased by them by a deed of sale executed on 17-6-1967 paying consideration in that behalf in the sum of Rs. 1000/ -. The plaintiffs used to work as labourers in the construction of buildings and also work on lands. Plaintiff No. 3 was working as a coolie or hamal in the shop of M/s. Nulvi of Hubli. Therefore, the plaintiffs earned independent income and were able to purchase the property viz. , the suit schedule property. The defendant who was their brother, a literate, taking advantage of their ignorance and illiteracy, on the death of their father obtained their signatures on blank papers on the pretext that they were required to report the death of their father to the Village Accountant and made use of the same to get the mutation entry in the revenue registers changed in respect of the suit schedule property. Therefore, a declaration was sought that the plaintiffs were the absolute owners of the said property and that the defendant be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. ( 2 ) THE defendant contested the claim inter alia denying most of the allegations, but with specific pleading that the property in question claimed by the plaintiffs to be their self-acquired property fell to his share at a partition that took place in the year 1982 in accordance with Vatani Fathra and he had been in lawful possession and enjoyment of the same since and the suit of the plaintiffs was misconceived and therefore liable to be dismissed. ( 3 ) THE trial court on such pleadings framed as many as four issues as follows: (1) Whether plaintiffs prove that the suit property is their exclusive property and they are in legal possession of it on the date of suit? (2) Whether defendant proves that the suit property was the joint family property of plaintiffs and himself and he got it in partition? (3) Whether plaintiffs prove regarding alleged obstruction? (2) Whether defendant proves that the suit property was the joint family property of plaintiffs and himself and he got it in partition? (3) Whether plaintiffs prove regarding alleged obstruction? (4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled for injunction as prayed for?on Issue No. 1 the trial court held that the suit property was the self-acquired property of the plaintiffs, buton the other half of the issue in regard to possession, it held against them. On Issue No. 2 it held against the defendant. On Issue No. 3 it held against the plaintiffs. On Issue No. 4 it held against the plaintiffs. ( 4 ) IN the result, it decreed the suit partly declaring the title of the plaintiffs and refused the injunction prayed for. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the said Judgment and decree, the defendant preferred in the court of the Principal Civil Judge, Hubli, R. A. No. 65/1986. The plaintiffs also filed cross-objections to the extent of their failure with an application for amendment of the prayer in the plaint seeking relief of possession which came to be rejected. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing the counsel for parties, the lower appellate court formulated the following four points for consideration and they were as follows: (1) Whether plaintiffs prove that the suit property is their exclusive property; and they are in legal possession of it on the date of the suit? -. (2) Whether defendant proves that the suit property was the joint family property of plaintiffs and himself and he got it in partition? (3) Whether plaintiffs prove regarding alleged obstruction? (4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled for injunction as prayed for? ( 7 ) IT must go on record, by total confusion of the law regarding the burden ofproof, the lower appellate court misdirected itself in regard to the burden to be discharged by the parties. From a reading of the Judgment, it appears, it came to the conclusion that the defendant was required to prove that the suit schedule property was the self-acquired property of the plaintiffs and not the plaintiffs. The suit, admittedly , was not a suit for partition. Therefore, there was no issue framed as to whether any property liable for partition was a joint family property. The frame of suit was one for declaration of title to suit schedule land and injunction in that behalf and no more. The suit, admittedly , was not a suit for partition. Therefore, there was no issue framed as to whether any property liable for partition was a joint family property. The frame of suit was one for declaration of title to suit schedule land and injunction in that behalf and no more. However, after concurring with the findings recorded by the trial court, that the plaintiffs had indeed proved that some 7 acres of land in the said survey number had been purchased by the sale deed Ex. P-l for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/- nevertheless the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that having regard to the totality of circumstances of the case and the conduct of parties and particularly in the absence of failure on the part of the plaintiffs to prove any kind of fraud or mis representation on the part of the defendant in obtaining their signatures to get the mutation in his favour, the suit schedule land had been thrown into the hotch-potch voluntarily blended with the joint family properties which undisputed! y was about 9 acres of land and which came to be partitioned in the year 1982, the factum of partition having been proved by Ex. D-l and therefore by the conduct of the plaintiffs it was to be inferred that they had voluntarily added the suit schedule property though self-acquired to be blended with the joint family properties and in the result dismissed the suit. ( 8 ) THEREFORE, the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. ( 9 ) AT the outset I must point out that the appellants' counsel has not formulated any substantial question of law which arises for consideration by this court under section 100 of the CPC. However, in the course of arguing the appeal which was heard today after notice to the respondent, a question was formulated that without there being a specific plea by the defendant in regard to the blending of the properties, it was not open to the lower appellate court to hold that it could be inferred regarding being had to the totality of circumstances of the evidence and the conduct of parties. It was also urged that throwing any of the self-acquired property to the joint family hotch-potch should be specifically pleaded and it was not a matter for inference. It was also urged that throwing any of the self-acquired property to the joint family hotch-potch should be specifically pleaded and it was not a matter for inference. ( 10 ) IN my view, both the questions of law are one and the same and must be dealt with as such. The undisputed facts in evidence were that the version put forward by the plaintiffs that they were labourers and that they used to work in that capacity and earned the money and were in a position to acquire the property as Ex. P-1 could not be doubted. There was a partition as evidenced by Ex. D-l. It was admitted in evidence for the limited purpose of proving the factum of partition though not the details of partition. Ex. D-2 was the certified record of rights extract which disclosed the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the property measuring 3 acres 10 guntas of land; that it fell to his share a partition; and that the plaintiffs failed to prove that there was any misrepresentation and fraud played by the defendant in securing such mutation in the revenue records. Therefore, the learned civil Judge reasoned that though the property was self-acquired as proved by direct evidence, the defendant had proved that it had fallen to bis share at a partition and therefore regard being had to the conduct of the parties and the evidence led, it was reasonable to infer that the plaintiffs had voluntarily blended the suit schedule property also for partition treating it as joint family property. ( 11 ) AS earlier noticed, the propositions of law canvassed by Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil as extracted earlier in the course of this Judgment clearly indicate that there was no specific plea by the defendant to the effect that the suit property was included at the partition voluntarily by the plaintiffs. But then the defendant was not required to plead something which was not raised as a case against him by the plaintiffs in their plaint. I have earlier summarised the plaint allegations. The plaintiffs were silent in regard to partition. The partition was pleaded for the first time by the defendant He could not rely upon that partition deed because it was not registered. If it was admissible in evidence as a deed of partition, then it would have knocked out the case of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were silent in regard to partition. The partition was pleaded for the first time by the defendant He could not rely upon that partition deed because it was not registered. If it was admissible in evidence as a deed of partition, then it would have knocked out the case of the plaintiffs. But not being a registered document, it was admitted for the collateral purpose of proving the factum of partition and no more. But the land lawfully came to the possession of the plaintiffs as evidenced by Ex. D-2, the certified extract of the record of rights. Therefore, there was no occasion for the defendant to plead specifically that this property was voluntarily thrown by the plaintiffs into the hotch-potch of the joint family and thereafterwards divided. Had the plaintiffs raised the question of partition or the legality of partition directly or indirectly in their plaint, then the scope for proper pleading in that behalf would have arisen. In the absence of that there was no need for specific plea by the defendant to the effect as contended by the learned counsel. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, he placed reliance upon three decisions. In foe case of C. Mallappajaiah v M. Muddanna and Others, 1990 (3) Kar. L. J. 160: ILR 1990 (1) Karnataka 336, the learned Single Judge of this court held that a member of a joint hindu family when acquired a property by way of gift, it become his self-acquired property and devolved as his self-acquired property and the burden was on the other members of the joint family who claimed that such a property was a joint family property to plead and prove that such a property was blended with the other joint family properties. He further held that as far as the blending of self-acquired property with the joint family properties was concerned, it had to be specifically pleaded and an issue had to be raised and evidence had to be adduced in that regard. One cannot have any quarrel with the proposition of law. But whether that decision has any application to the facts decided in this case is the question. In my view they do not have. It was nobody's case that the property in respect of which the declaration of title was claimed had wrongly been included as a joint family property. One cannot have any quarrel with the proposition of law. But whether that decision has any application to the facts decided in this case is the question. In my view they do not have. It was nobody's case that the property in respect of which the declaration of title was claimed had wrongly been included as a joint family property. If it had been so, pleaded by the plaintiffs then there would have been proper pleading in that behalf by the defendant in the written statement. Therefore, it is not open to the plaintiffs to raise that plea now. ( 13 ) SIMILAR is the effect of the ruling of this court in the case of Gopal Purushotham Bichu v Purushothatm Govind Bichu (dead) by L. Rs. , 1988 (3) Kar, l. J. 1 (DB): ILR 1989 (1) Karnataka 169 decided by a Division Bench of this court the learned Judge who rendered the decision in the earlier mentioned case spoke for the Bench. He stated the same propositions of law in regard to pleadings. I should only repeat that the proposition of law is correctly stated but the question again is whether it has any relevance to the facts of the case on hand. ( 14 ) THE next case relied upon by the learned counsel is a case decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Singh and Others v Jaswant Singh, AIR 1966 sc 1861 . What fell for consideration by the Supreme Court in that case was Section 6 of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act (2 of 1920 ). In dealing with that question, the Supreme Court explained the scope of Section 6 of the Act. It was held as follows:" (6) Section 6 of the Act reads: subject to the provisions contained in Section 4 and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Section 5, Punjab Laws Act, 1872, no person shall contest any alienation of ancestral immoveable property or any appointment of an heir to such property on the ground that such alienation or appointment is contrary to custom, unless such person is descended in male lineal descent from the great-great-grand-father of the person making the alienation or appointment. "it is necessary that a person objecting to the validity of the appointment of an heir to the property on the ground of custom must plead and prove that the land in suit is ancestral and mat he comes within five degrees of the common ancestor. The mere fact that the defendants contended in the written statement that the plaintiff could not be adopted according to the custom does not tantamount to making the. requisite pleas and, therefore, the view taken by both the District Judge and the high Court cannot be said to be wrong. In fact, this view is in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1 of Order XIV, CPC and what was held by the Judicial committee in Siddik Mohamed Sash v Mt. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57 (1 ). (7) It may further be observed that the appellants did not, in their written statement, state what the custom was and why the adoption of the plaintiff was against that custom. No issue was framed with respect to the specific custom which could invalidate the adoption of the plaintiff. The mere fact that the issues as framed did involve the consideration of the validity of the adoption and the ancestral nature of the land in suit will not clothe the vague allegation in the written statement with the definiteness of the requisite pleadings and will not make it incumbent on the parties to lead evidence for or against the existence of a certain custom and the plaintiff's case not coming within it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 15 ) FROM the above it cannot be said the ruling is attracted to the facts of this case. It was not a case of partition nor was there any provision of law like Section 6 of the punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act (2 of 1920) which arose for consideration by the courts-below. . . . . . ( 15 ) FROM the above it cannot be said the ruling is attracted to the facts of this case. It was not a case of partition nor was there any provision of law like Section 6 of the punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act (2 of 1920) which arose for consideration by the courts-below. On the facts of this case, which was only a simple suit for declaration of titleby the plaintiffs suppressing certain material facts pleading for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession which they had lost and had failed to state the same to the court at the trial stage or at the first appellate stage i. e. , the manner in which they had lost the possession, the lower appellate court was correct in taking the totality of circumstances and draw an inference on the basis of. the conduct of the plaintiffs in arriving at the conclusion that by their own conduct they had divested themselves of their right to treat that part of the land in S. No. 42/2-A which fell to the share of the plaintiffs at that partition to be divisible property of the joint family. ( 16 ) I therefore do not see that the questions of law raised by Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned counsel for the appellants really arises for consideration in this case. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed, but as earlier noticed, after summoning the records and after hearing the other side at the stage of admission. ( 17 ) BUT, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this court. --- *** --- .