JUDGMENT V. S. KOKJE, J. - This is an appeal filed by the State Government and the Additional Tahsildar and Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam, against the judgment and decree dated 14th October, 1977, passed by the District Judge, Ratlam, in Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1977 arising out of the judgment and decree passed in Civil Original Suit No. 5-A/75. 2. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : "Whether the finding of the court below that the transfer of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff by the defendants Nos. 3 and 4 was for valuable consideration without notice of the pendency of the proceedings under the Sales Tax Act, is perverse ?" 3. The facts necessary for the purpose of this appeal are as follows : The respondent No. 1, Abhayakumar Jain, filed a suit against the State Government, Additional Tahsildar and Sales Tax Officer, Ratiam, Kanhaiyalal, s/o. Lalchand and M/s. Badichand Lalchand for a declaration of his title to the suit land and house and a declaration that the house could not be sold for recovering arrears of sales tax from M/s. Badichand Lalchand or Kanhaiyalal. The suit was decreed by the trial court and the appeal filed by the State Government against it has also been dismissed. Against the dismissal of the appeal, the present appeal has been filed. 4. It is not in dispute that the suit property originally belonged to Kanhaiyalal, who along with his father Lalchand, had mortgaged the suit house in favour of the respondent No. 1, Abhayakumar. Kanhaiyalal sold his rights in the house thereafter to one Mishrilal and deposited Rs. 800 towards interest and Rs. 3,500 towards principal. Later on, for the balance amount of Rs. 6,500 Kanhaiyalal and his father conveyed the property by a registered sale deed to the respondent No. 1, Abhayakumar. It is also not in dispute that there are certain recoveries of sales tax on firm Badichand Lalchand belonging to Kanhalyalal and Lalchand. For the recovery of the aforesaid amounts of sales tax, the suit property was attached and it was contended that the property was charged with the burden of sales tax recoverable from the original owners. 5. It is also not in dispute that there are certain recoveries of sales tax on firm Badichand Lalchand belonging to Kanhalyalal and Lalchand. For the recovery of the aforesaid amounts of sales tax, the suit property was attached and it was contended that the property was charged with the burden of sales tax recoverable from the original owners. 5. Shri S. K. Paonekar, learned Government Advocate, contended that in view of section 33-A of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, the suit property could be auctioned for the recovery of sales tax from M/s. Badichand Lalchand and the lower courts have erred in interpretation of section 33-A of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the burden was on the respondent No. 1 to show that the property was acquired by him for valuable consideration and it was not sold to defraud the revenue. 6. Shri S. D. Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand contended that the lower courts have correctly interpreted section 33-A of the Act, which requires the proof of the fact that the property was transferred with the intention to defraud the revenue, before it could be declared that the transaction was void. According to him, in this case it has further been proved that the transfer was for valuable consideration and without notice of the pendency of the proceedings under the Sales Tax Act and, therefore, it falls under the exception created by the proviso to section 33-A of the Act. Shri Sanghi also brought to my notice a Division Bench decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 47 of 1974 (Mishrimal v. State of M. P.) decided an January 11, 1983, wherein proviso to section 33-A of the Act was considered by the court. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. It has not been proved in this case by the State that the impugned transfer was effected with the intention to defraud the revenue. It is not, therefore, covered by section 33-A of the Act. Moreover, it is amply proved from the evidence in the case that the transfer was for valuable consideration, which would as such fall within proviso to section 33-A of the Act also. It is not, therefore, covered by section 33-A of the Act. Moreover, it is amply proved from the evidence in the case that the transfer was for valuable consideration, which would as such fall within proviso to section 33-A of the Act also. In this appeal, the finding of facts arrived at by the lower courts cannot be allowed to be challenged as the circumstances in which such findings of fact can he challenged are not available in this case. 8. In the result, the appeal is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.