JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh J.—This revision petition is directed against the judgment of District Judge, Solan, in petition No. 7-S/10 of 1982, deeded on S-8-1982, thereby dismissing the application of the petitioner for the recovery of Rs 42,484.44. 2. Briefly the facts are that the petitioner Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation" preferred an application under section 32 (8) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (for short the Act) read with. Order 21 Rule 11 and section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming thereby rc 42 484 44 together with future interest from 7-3-1982 till realisation from the respondents As a matter of fact, the petitioner advanced some loan to he respondents The respondents defaulted in making the payment. As such the petitioner proceeded against the respondents by initiating an application under section 31 of the Act. During the pendency or this application. So District Judge, by an order of 17-11-1978, Issued warrants of sale of the mortgaged Property A proclamation was also issued. The amount covered under these proceeding? was to the extent of Rs. 43,091.25. This action of the District Judge was assailed by the respondents in this Court through F. A. O. No. 57 of 1978. When the matter came up for hearing, a compromise was effected by the parties on 30-3-1979. They made the following statements: "Statement of Shri Guru Datt Sharma, appellant, on S. A. I undertake to pay the balance amount due to the respondent Corporation in four half-yearly instalments, the first falling due on 5-7-1979 ; the second on 5-1-1980 ; the third on 5-7-1980 and the fourth on 5-1-198 i. In case on default of any instalment, the respondent Corporation shall be at liberty to realise the balance amount by sale of the mortgage property. In case these instalments are acceptable to the respondent-Corporation, I do not press this appeal which may be dismissed. R. O. &A C. Sd/- (T. R Handa), Judge Sd/- Guru Datt Sharma, March 30, 1979. Statement of Shri Kailash Chand Counsel for the respondent Corporation. I have heard the above statement of the appellant. / have no objection if the amount due to the Corporation is paid in the aforesaid instalments. R. O. & A. C. Sd/- (T. R. HANDA), Judge. Statement of Shri Kedar Ishwar, Counsel for the appellant. In view of the aforesaid statement, I do not press this appeal. I have heard the above statement of the appellant. / have no objection if the amount due to the Corporation is paid in the aforesaid instalments. R. O. & A. C. Sd/- (T. R. HANDA), Judge. Statement of Shri Kedar Ishwar, Counsel for the appellant. In view of the aforesaid statement, I do not press this appeal. It may be dismissed as withdrawn. R. O. & A. C. Sd/- (T. R. HANDA), Judge". 3. According to the respondents, in pursuance of this compromise, the sum due was paid even before 24-10-1980 although the last instalment could be paid on 5-1-1981. 4. Again, the petitioner moved an application (No. 128-S/1O of 1980) dated 17-7-1980 before the District Judge and it was decided on 24-12-1980. By this application, the petitioner claimed Rs. 51,836.16. It was dismissed after observing that the respondents had categorically stated that they had made payment of Rs. 43,091.21 to the petitioner in full and final settlement of the entire claim for which the property was attached and sale proclamation was issued. Against this order, the petitioner filed Civil Revision No. 49 of 1981, Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation v. Mis. Highway Paying Guest Establishment and another^ and the same was also dismissed on 11-5-1981. While disposing of this petition, the Court stated as under: “The only grievance of the petitioner is that some other amount which had accrued on account of interest is still due from the respondent and till such amount had been paid, the attached property could not be released by the District Judge. Since the petitioner Corporation failed to give full details of the further amount alleged to be due to it from the respondents, the learned District Judge had no option but to dispose of the execution petition of the petitioner on the lines of the impugned order. If the petitioner feels that some further amount is still due to them, it would be open to them, as observed by the learned District Judge, to bring a separate action under law for the recovery thereof. With these remarks this revision petition is dismissed." 5. If the petitioner feels that some further amount is still due to them, it would be open to them, as observed by the learned District Judge, to bring a separate action under law for the recovery thereof. With these remarks this revision petition is dismissed." 5. Since the Court made certain observations like "if the petitioner feels that some further amount is still due to them, it would be open to them, as observed by the learned District Judge, to bring a separate action under law for the recovery thereof", another application was moved before the District Judge for claiming some more amount, by way of interest and other charges. After going into the respective contentions of the parties, the learned District Judge dismissed this claim holding that except . Rs. 43,091 21 covered by the warrant of sale issued by his predecessor as well as by the order of this Court and the compromise of the parties dated ^0-3-1979, no other amount by way of future interest was due. Moreover, since it was not covered by the order, the same is deemed to have been refused. 6. Shri A. K, Goel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside since the learned District Judge could not have declined the claim of interest and other charges from the respondents by observing that the same were refused, This was not within the jurisdiction of the Court, the learned Counsel stated. 7. On the other hand, Shri I K. Mehta, Counsel for the respondents, submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is confined to material irregularities or want of jurisdiction. He further submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any of these infirmities, therefore, this Court may not interfere in the matter being raised by the petitioner, in order to support his submission, reliance was placed on para 5 of the judgment reported in AIR 1973 SC 76, the Managing Director {M. I G) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another v Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar Hyderabad, which is reproduced as under: "5. In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court. It is not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong ; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law ; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code : See the decisions of this Court in Pandurang Dhoni v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, (1966) 1 SCR 102 : AIR 1966 SC 153, and D. L. F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd, New Delhi v. Sarup Singh, (1970) 2 SCR 368 : AIR 1971 SC2324." 8. Further, the second contention was that the matter stood concluded by the compromise arrived at between the parties which was recorded on 30-3-1979 in F. A. O. No 57 of 1978. Whatever was due to the petitioner, has been paid. The compromise related to the total amount due and payable to the petitioner, therefore, the statements made by the parties covered the whole dispute between the parties and in case any amount more than Rs 43,091.2! was due and payable, nothing prevented the petitioner from saying so during the course of the compromise, It was on the basis of this claim that the respondents had also agreed to settle the matter which they did by agreeing to the compromise. In view of this, the petitioner is estopped from initiating further proceedings and agitate the matter again and again by trying to take advantage of certain observations from the order dated 11-5-1981. 9, There is substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents The claim of the petitioner was for Rs, 43,091.21 and the petitioner did not allege and assert that some more amount in addition to this was due on 30 3-1979. In such a situation, it is obvious that this was the only amount due from the respondents and both the parties compromised the matter accordingly. In such a situation, it is obvious that this was the only amount due from the respondents and both the parties compromised the matter accordingly. It is true that under the Act, the loan amount is governed by the terms and conditions of the agreement that takes place between the parties and in case of default, the court has to proceed to recover the same from the defaulting party in terms of the agreement and the Act. However, where there is dispute as to the total amount payable, that can be gone into by the Court (See: AIR lv87^SC 1950, Everest Industrial Corporation and others v Gujarat State Financial Corporation.) Secondly, even if the parties have executed a document regarding the conditions, grant and realisation of the loan by way of agreement, they can, at a subsequent stage arrive at a compromise on the terms and conditions different from the original stipulations since there is no prohibition in the Act against adopting such a course. Moreover, such a course is otherwise permissible by the nature of the transaction and dealings of the parties See : AIR 1962 SC 903, Munshi Ram v. Banwari Lal (deceased) and after him his heirs and legal representatives and another). 10 Besides, what has been discussed above, the factors that the matter is very old and the respondents have paid practically double the principal amount and that the petitioner had not been coming forward specifying the sum due over and above the aforesaid amount Equitable principles can be successfully evoked in favour of the respondents against the petitioner, in addition to the limited jurisdiction of this Court, as held in Hindustan Aeronautics case (supra), 1 decline to interfere with the judgment of the District Judge and dismiss the petition leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed. -