JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.:---The question arising for determination in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is whether the operation described in para 2 read with ground (i) of the petition entitled the petitioners to an exemption from octroi duty vis-a-vis Rule 7 framed under section 195-1A(iv) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, being Bombay Act No. III of 1888-- hereinafter referred to as the 'Rule' and 'Act' respectively. 2. One of the sources of revenue for the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) is octroi which is a tax levied under section 192(1) of the Act on the import of articles listed in Schedule 'H' into Greater Bombay the purpose of entry being "consumption use or sale" in Greater Bombay. Section 195-1A(iv) entitles the framing of Rules for the purpose of grant of exemption to articles otherwise subject to levy of octroi duty. In exercise of this power, Rule 7 has been framed and the heading given to the said rule is - "Exemption of articles imported or exported temporarily for the purpose of inspection demonstration exhibition, repairs, processing or such other similar purposes." Sub-rules relevant, and, to the extent of the relevancy, read as follows :- "(a) Articles liable to octroi which are temporarily imported into or exported temporarily from Greater Bombay and reimported into Greater Bombay for the purposes of .................... processing ................... may be exempted from octroi provided that--- (iv) No change of form, condition or appearance is involved except to the extent inherent in the processing or ............... allowed. (b) For the purposes of this rule, processing shall include--- (1) Dyeing, bleaching, painting, printing, finishing, stentering, embroidering, doubling, twisting, metallising and electroplating. (2) Building and mounting of bodies over chassis of vehicles of all kinds, and shall include such other processes as may be approved by Commissioner from time to time." The 2nd petitioner is a shareholder and/or director of the 1st petitioner which is a public limited company governed by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The company has a factory at Thane and is engaged in the manufacture of super enamelled copper wires, covered round and rectangular copper conductors, steel and alloy steel wires and heat resistent wires. One of the raw materials required by it is electrolytic copper (EC). The company has a factory at Thane and is engaged in the manufacture of super enamelled copper wires, covered round and rectangular copper conductors, steel and alloy steel wires and heat resistent wires. One of the raw materials required by it is electrolytic copper (EC). EC is imported from abroad or purchased from the Mines and Minerals Trading Corporation and it is obtained by the company in the form of wire bars and wire rods. The bars and rods cannot be used in the form purchased for the manufacture of the company's products specified above. This is because the manufacturer requires wire rods in smaller sizes. For obtaining wire rods of smaller size, the company sends the imported/purchased rods to certain processing units within the territorial limits of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The said units process the rods and bars received and after reducing the thickness thereof, send them back to the company. Approximately, the processing involves 1% loss in the weight of the copper bars made over and the wires received back. There is no change in the chemical or electrical composition and the product received back from the processing units is the same that was sent to it, so assert the petitioners. 3. The B.M.C. contended that the processing to which the bars and rods were subjected brought about a complete transformation of the identity of the material. In any case the 'processing' which entitled the exporter to exemption was limited by sub-rule (b) reproduced above. The processing which the wire bars and rods underwent did not fall within the exhaustive definition of 'processing' given in sub-rule (b). Proceeding on this basis, the exports were subjected to levy of octroi. The company contends that no manufacture or transformation of the material had taken place. Sub-rule (b) was not exhaustive of the meaning to be given to the expression 'processing'. The use of the word 'include' in the sub-rule indicated the giving of an extended meaning to the word 'processing'. There was no reason to levy octroi, inasmuch as there was no use, sale or consumption of the material within the territorial limits of the BMC. 4. The description of the processing given in the petition is not disputed by the respondents at least not by filing a return giving its own version of what the operation consists of. There was no reason to levy octroi, inasmuch as there was no use, sale or consumption of the material within the territorial limits of the BMC. 4. The description of the processing given in the petition is not disputed by the respondents at least not by filing a return giving its own version of what the operation consists of. Therefore, the petition averments on this subject will have to be taken as the basis for ruling upon the legality of the collection of octroi made by the BMC. To repeat, the wires and rods sent to the processing units in Greater Bombay are so sent with the object of reducing the thickness thereof. It is the thickness reduced product which is used by the company in the manufacture of its products. First, I will deal with the contention of Mr. Dalal that the use of the word 'include' in sub-rule (b) should be read in the sense of 'means'. In support of this submission, learned Counsel relies upon various authorities such as those reported in (South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat)1, A.I.R 1977 S.C. 90, (Devi Das Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab)2, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1895, (Venkatrao Narayanao Ambedkar v. Alma Sugar Mills)3, A.I.R. 1979 Bom. 38. Consideration of these authorities will be better in the background of the leading case on the subject, viz. (Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps)4, 1899 A.C. 99. In that case it was said- "When the word 'include' is used in interpretation clauses to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases in the statute these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include........... But the word 'includes' is susceptible of another construction which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purpose of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions." This statement from the leading case has been accepted by the courts in India. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purpose of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions." This statement from the leading case has been accepted by the courts in India. The case reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 90, related to an entry in the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which entry reads as follows :- "Employment in Potteries Industry. Explanation.---For the purpose of this entry potteries industry includes the manufacture of the following articles of pottery, namely :- (a) Crockery. (b) Sanitary appliances and fittings. (c) Refractories. (d) Jars. (e) Electrical accessories. (f) Hospitalware. (g) Textile accessories. (h) Toys. (i) Glazed tiles." It was contended by Counsel representing the State of Gujarat that the explanation was to be given an extended meaning because of the use of the word 'includes'. This view was disputed by Counsel representing the appellants the South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers' Association. The Court held that having regard to the detailed enumeration of the pottery industry given in the explanation, the word used had to be read as an expression of limitation. According to the Court there could be no inflexible rule that the word 'include' always had to be read as a word of extension without reference to the context. The case reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1895 is emphasised by Mr. Dalal to the limited extent of its 31st paragraph (page 1905). The point dealt with in that paragraph is the plea that iron scrap converted into rolled steel did not involve the process of manufacture. The conversion of scrap into rolled steel, it was said, resulted in the scrap being made into a better marketable commodity. Negativing this contention the Court held :- "It is clear that scrap iron ingots undergo a vital change in the process of manufacture and are converted into a different commodity, viz. rolled steel sections. During the process the scrap iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity. The process is certainly one of manufacture." The remaining Bombay authority deals with the construction of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1964. rolled steel sections. During the process the scrap iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity. The process is certainly one of manufacture." The remaining Bombay authority deals with the construction of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1964. The passage relied upon by the learned Counsel is to the following effect :- "The word 'process' has got several meanings and in fact may mean different things in a different context. But looking to the context in which it is used and gathering the natural meaning of the word in this context, the word 'process' must be held to mean to subject a particular product or a commodity with the object of making it finer or improving its quality. It may mean to treat a particular commodity by any method but not in such a way that the commodity itself is completely transformed into a new commodity. When a particular agricultural produce like sugarcane is crushed and a large part of the original commodity is thrown away and the juice is alone later by a series of processes converted into a new product like Khandsari sugar or sugar it will be difficult to say that the sugarcane has been subjected to a process or sugarcane has been processed. In my opinion, the character of sugarcane has been destroyed resulting in the appearance of altogether a new product which may be called Khandsari sugar or sugar." Now in the instant case, the object of Rule 7 is to exempt from octroi articles temporarily imported into Greater Bombay for the purpose of processing. The processing contemplated is that set out with greater precision in sub-rule (iv). The processing for which import is permitted is limited to that which involves no substantive change in the form, condition or appearance. Mr. Dalal argues that the use of the word 'allowed' in sub-rule (iv) indicates a further limitation in the sense that to get an exemption the processing must conform to that specified in sub-rule (b). Unless such be the case it will not be a processing 'allowed' within the meaning of sub-rule (iv) and therefore, the goods will be outside the area of exemption from octroi duty. It is not possible to accept this submission. Unless such be the case it will not be a processing 'allowed' within the meaning of sub-rule (iv) and therefore, the goods will be outside the area of exemption from octroi duty. It is not possible to accept this submission. The use of the word 'allowed' is not to confer upon the Corporation a power to legislate as to what form of processing will entitle exemption from the levy of octroi. The word 'allowed' is to be read in the context of the preceding words i.e. the processing not resulting in any change of form, condition or appearance in the product. The limitation sought to be placed upon the word 'processing' by Mr. Dalal is contrary to the natural meaning of the words employed in sub-rule (b)(1) and (2). 5. In sub-rule (b)(1) are enumerated dyeing, bleaching, painting, printing, finishing, stentering, embroidering, doubting, twisting, metallising and electroplating. In the normal course dyeing, bleaching and painting are not mere acts of processing not resulting in a manufacture. In fact in (Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India)5, 1985(20) E.L.T. 179 (S.C.), it was held - "The process of bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water proofing, etc. conducted in respect of cotton fabrics, woollen fabrics and man made fabric would amount to manufacture." These processes it was held, brought about a transformation of an object into a new commodity commercially known as a distinct and separate commodity having its own character, use and name. This decision negatives to some extent the contention of Mr. Dalal that no artificially has been introduced to widen the meaning to be given to the expression 'processing' in sub-rule (b). At least three of the processes there mentioned, though resulting into the transformation of fabrics, have been defined as not resulting in processing depriving the product of exemption from octroi duty. Sub-rule (b)(2) may be conveniently divided into two parts. The first part deals with the building and mounting of bodies over chassis of vehicles of all kinds. A chassis without the bodies is very different a commodity from a chassis with built and mounted bodies and yet the process of transforming one into another is excluded from the category of levy of octroi duty. The second part deals with such processes as may be approved by the Commissioner for an entitlement of exemption. This however does not mean that the Commissioner can grant exemption to any process. The second part deals with such processes as may be approved by the Commissioner for an entitlement of exemption. This however does not mean that the Commissioner can grant exemption to any process. The process has to be one which does not bring about a transformation of one commodity into a totally different commodity. Reasonably read, the scheme of Rule 7 is to grant exemption from levy of octroi on goods temporarily brought into Greater Bombay for limited durations and for a particular object, viz. exhibition, processing etc. The processing for which the exemption is granted should not result in any change in form, condition or appearance. However, certain processes which do bring about a change in form, condition or appearance are given the benefit of the exemption and this is not because they fall within the normal rule of exclusion set out in sub-rule (iv), but because without the exclusion, they would not have been the innocuous processing contemplated by the said sub-rule (iv). In addition to the artificially specified processing, the rule provides for exemption to all forms of processing which do not result in any change in form, condition or appearance except to an extent inherent in the process employed. Understood thus, it is not possible to agree with Mr. Dalal. 6. The next question would be whether the process employed in the case of bars and rods figuring in this petition is a process to which the exemption of Rule 7 is applicable. Mr. Bharucha for the petitioners had referred to a number of cases beginning with (Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)6, 1981(47) S.T.C. 124 . That case dealt with the meaning to be given to the word 'processing' appearing in section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and Rule 13 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. The word had not been defined in the Act and the question before the Court was to ascertain its plain natural meaning. The Court held:- "The nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case. In one case the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive; but with each process suffered, the commodity would experience a change. The Court held:- "The nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case. In one case the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive; but with each process suffered, the commodity would experience a change. Wherever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity. The nature and extent of the change is not material. The question is not whether there is manual application of energy or there is application of mechanical force. Whatever be the means employed for the purpose of carrying out the operation, it is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation constitutes 'processing'." In (Standard Industrial Engineering Co. v. Collector of Central Excise)7, 1988(38) E.L.T. 196, the appellants were manufacturing purlins, trusses, rafters, bracings etc. from material such as steel plates, channels, angles, rounds and other steel products. The materials were drilled, cut, seized and removed to the work site. The differently cut and seized materials were put up and fitted into a structure only at the site. It was held that there was no manufacture. Almost to the same effect is the decision of CEGAT reported in (Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise)8, 1988(36) E.L.T. 316. In that case the appellants from raw materials like channels, angles, H.R. Sheets, C.R. Sheets, H.S. Plates, rounds etc. manufactured trusses, bend pipes, fabricated beams, trestles, ducting and columns out of the same. Conversion of the items was held not amounting to manufacture. Nearer in point of identities are the decisions in (Collector of Central Excise v. M/s. Kiran Spinning Mills)9, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 871 and (Collector of Central Excise v. M/s. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co.)10, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1164 respectively. In the first case polyester fibre tow was cut into short lengths for producing staple fibre. An attempt was made to levy tax on the basis that a manufacture had intervened and brought about a new product. This contention was negatived on the finding that cutting of man made fibre of running length into staple length did not amount to manufacture. Mr. Dalal argues that the decision turns upon the tariff entry which recognised the single description "man-made fibre" with no further sub-divisions. This contention was negatived on the finding that cutting of man made fibre of running length into staple length did not amount to manufacture. Mr. Dalal argues that the decision turns upon the tariff entry which recognised the single description "man-made fibre" with no further sub-divisions. Had there been more than one entry, the cutting of the two into shorter pieces would have been held to amount to manufacture. There appears to be some substance in this contention, but the main thrust of the ratio is that a mere change in the substance is not enough to constitute a manufacture. This aspect of the matter was brought out with greater clarity in the latter case where it was observed :- "It may be worthwhile to note that 'manufacture' implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more was necessary and there must be transformation, a new and different articles must emerge having a distinct name, character or use." 7. Considered in the background of the analysis of Rule 7 and the authorities, what we get is the following : Wire bars and wire rods are sent by the petitioners to processing units located in Greater Bombay. The object is to secure wire bars of a reduced thickness. It is these thickness reduced wire bars which are used by the company in the manufacture of various articles. The processing to which the bars and rods are subjected does no more than to reduce the thickness. The company receives back from the processors the product which in weight corresponds to the original, except for a fractional loss of 1% this loss being attributable to the process employed. There is no change in the chemical composition of the product sent as distinct from the product received back. The change in form, condition or appearance has an unbreakable nexus to the process involved. To use the words of sub-rule (4), the change is inherent in the processing involved. In the natural sense this would be processing and sub-rule (b) cannot be read as excluding only the processes enumerated therein. The change in form, condition or appearance has an unbreakable nexus to the process involved. To use the words of sub-rule (4), the change is inherent in the processing involved. In the natural sense this would be processing and sub-rule (b) cannot be read as excluding only the processes enumerated therein. To put it differently processes entitled to exemption include not only those artificially brought in by sub-rule (b), but also which are covered by the natural meaning given to the word 'processing' the only limitation being that the processing should not be divorced to such an extent from the original product so as to result in the creation of a totally different product. The BMC was therefore not justified in refusing the petitioner company the benefit of the exemption of Rule 7. It shall desist from making such refusals in future and shall refund octroi collected on such imports as those figuring in the petition as with effect from 29th April, 1983. Rule in these terms made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs. Operation of the judgment stayed for 8 weeks as from today, during which period, the guarantees furnished by the petitioners shall remain in operation. Order accordingly. -----