B. N. KRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant was plaintiff before Munsiff, Chitradurga in Original Suit No. 359 of 1980. He sought for a declaration that he is the joint owner of the suit properties along with his adoptive mother the defendant and permanent injunction to restrain her from alienating or disposing of the suit properties. The suit was decreed in the first Court in favour of the plaintiff. The appeal preferred by the defendant came to be allowed and thereby the suit stands dismissed. It is against this judgment and decree of Civil Judge, Chitradurage that the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. ( 2 ) THE following facts are undisputed in this appeal. The suit properties formerly belonged to Panchaksharappa the husband of defendant who died on 14-5-1970. At the time of death of Panchaksharappa there was no other coparcener in his family and the only heir left by him was his wife the defendant and that she succeeded to her deceased husband in respect of the suit properties. The plaintiff was adopted by the defendant by a registered adoption deed dated 10-12-1972. ( 3 ) IT has to be seen whether in view of these undisputed facts the plaintiff became the joint owner of suit properties along with his adoptive mother the defendant, by virtue of his adoption. ( 4 ) THOUGH Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (for short 'the Act) is to the effect that the adopted child shall be deemed to be child of his or her adoptive mother or father for all purposes, sub-section (c) of the said Section is to the effect that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any right vested in him or her before the adoption. ( 5 ) AFTER the death of Panchaksharappa, in view of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, the suit properties became vested in the defendant absolutely, has not been disputed. When that is so, it has to be seen whether the subsequent adoption of the plaintiff could divest her of the same. The matter squarely comes within the scope of S. 12 (c) of the Act. Even Mulla in his book 'hindu Law', 15th Edition at page 1109 has given the following illustration which is practically analogous to the facts of the present case. The matter squarely comes within the scope of S. 12 (c) of the Act. Even Mulla in his book 'hindu Law', 15th Edition at page 1109 has given the following illustration which is practically analogous to the facts of the present case. "a died leaving him surviving his widow Al and property both self acquired and ancestral. On A's death Al had inherited the property as a Hindu widow. On the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she held the property as absolute owner by operation of S. 14 of the Act. Al adopts the son B after the present Act came into force. The effect of the adoption is not to divest any of the property vested in Al. The position is the same if Al had adopted a daughter instead of a son. "in the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Dina Ji v. Daddi ( AIR 1990 SC 1153 ) this position in law has been put beyond all doubt. That was a case where the death of the adoptive father must have taken place prior to the promulgation of Hindu Succession Act and it has been pointed out that the adoptive mother got limited estate in the property which originally belonged to her husband and by virtue of the said Act she acquired rights of absolute ownership and the subsequent adoption made by her could not divest her of the right of her husband vested in her in view of the provisions of Section 12 (c) of the Act. ( 6 ) IN view of the unambiguous language of Section 12 (c) of the Act, as also the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court it may not be quite necessary to refer to any of the decisions referred to by the trial Court to hold that the plaintiff has become the joint owner along with his mother in respect of the suit properties. But anyway as those decisions were cited at the bar and have also been made the basis by the trial Court for decreeing the suit, a brief reference to the same could be made. In the decision in Smt. Sitabai v. Ramachandra ( AIR 1970 SC 343 ), though S. 12 (c) of the Act also came up for consideration the facts were altogether different. In the decision in Smt. Sitabai v. Ramachandra ( AIR 1970 SC 343 ), though S. 12 (c) of the Act also came up for consideration the facts were altogether different. At the time of the death of the lady who later adopted, in addition to her husband there was his brother and it was held that where a Hindu undivided family consisted of two brothers, on the death of one of them, the joint family property continued to retain its character as joint family property in the hands of the surviving brother when the widow of deceased brother continued to enjoy the right of maintenance out of the joint family properties. Therefore it was held that after adoption the adopted son became a coparcener with his uncle in the joint family properties. In the decision of this Court in Shrishailappa v. Muttawwa, 1982 (1) KLJ 9 : AIR 1982 Kar 334 , also, the two brothers viz. , Mallappa and Parappa lived jointly and enjoyed the property jointly till the death of Parappa and thereafter Mallappa and Parappa's widow Laxmawwa lived together and later she adopted the first plaintiff. It is under these circumstances following the decision of the Supreme Court this Court held the Civil Judge was not justified in holding that the adopted son could not divest the property vested in Mallappa as sole surviving coparcener. Therefore it was held that the property continued to have the character of joint family property. Even otherwise it may be noted that in a case where there is another coparcener in the family at the time of the death of the adoptive father, it cannot also be said that the property became vested in the other coparcener, as the essence of a coparcenary under Mitakshara Law is Unity of Ownership, in that there is community of interest and unity of possession and on the death of one of the coparceners, the property devolves on the sole surviving coparcener. In that view of the matter it would be inappropriate to say that the property became vested in the sole surviving coparcener on the death of the other coparcener. ( 7 ) THE facts of the present case are altogether different as on the death of Panchaksharappa except his widow there were no other coparceners in the family. In that view of the matter it would be inappropriate to say that the property became vested in the sole surviving coparcener on the death of the other coparcener. ( 7 ) THE facts of the present case are altogether different as on the death of Panchaksharappa except his widow there were no other coparceners in the family. Therefore these decisions in (2), and (3) cannot be pressed into service on behalf of the appellant to held that after he was adopted, he became a joint owner along with his adoptive mother. ( 8 ) IT was contended on behalf of the appellant that the cause that has been espoused by him is a very righteous one, in that by virtue of the adoption, his relationship with his original family stands severed and that if he has also no rights in the property of his deceased father, he would be practically in streets. It may be that the appellant is landed in such a situation on account of adoption made by the defendant. But when the position in law is crystal clear, there is no scope for this Court to give any kind of relief to him except stating that he should try to keep up the best relationship with his adoptive mother so that she may not dispose of the property in any manner, in which event he could hope to succeed to her estate after her death. Barring that he has no other scope to lay any claim to suit properties at present. Therefore it is clear that the appeal is devoid of any merit. ( 9 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .