By the impugned order, the trial Court has restrained the appellants from making any alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the suit. Vide para 7, the trial Court has recorded a finding that the plaintiff had no prima facie case. It is strange how the Court could have granted an injunction in view of that finding. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that last two sentences of para 7 are consequence of clerical error. That explanation is not prima facie acceptable looking to the clear language used in the order. Yet another infirmity noticeable in the order of the trial Court is that the findings recorded on questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury are cryptic, not supported by any reasons. The impugned order fails to satisfy the requirements of a speaking order judically passed. It deserves to be set aside for this short reason. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on Sunil Kumar and another v. Omprakash and others ( AIR 1988 SC 576 ) to contend that in a suit filed by the sons against their father, who would be the manager of the joint Hindu family, no prayer for injunction did lay. However, on that question, I do not propose to express any opinion because tentatively I have formed an opinion that the matter deserves to be remitted back to the trial Court for consideration afresh. The appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside. The case is sent back to the trial Court who shall hear the parties afresh and then dispose of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. in accordance with law. To take care of the apprehension expressed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1, it is directed that until disposal of the application by the trial Court, the defendants No.1 and 2/appellants shall not alienate the suit property. However" it is made clear that this direction has been made only to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff/respondents momentarily and this will not be utilised by the plaintiff/respondent for the purpose of strengthening his prayer for injunction nor shall the trial Court feel embarrassed and impressed in the matter of granting an injunction because of the abovesaid direction made by this Court. The direction has been made merely as a matter of convenience, de hors the merits of the case. The direction has been made merely as a matter of convenience, de hors the merits of the case. No order as to the costs.