This application under Order 22 Rule 3 and under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for amending the cause title of the Civil Revision No. 17 of 1983 along with a condonation petition for substituting the original opposite party by his heirs, has arisen under a peculiar course of event. 2. The original plaintiff, Jugal Kishore, who was opposite party in appeal died during the pendency of appeal before the Assistant District Judge and his legal representatives had been brought on record by order dated 11.3.81. But the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the present revision petitioner by confirming the trial Court's judgment. Against that judgment of the lower appellate Court, the present revision petitioner preferred a revision petition before this Court. 3. The revision before this court, as admitted and execution stayed, but by mistake, deceased Jugal Kishore was shown as the respondent instead of his legal representatives. But all the heirs of the Jugal Kishore entered appearance and filed Vakalatnama on 11. 8. 83 in the Civil Revision. On information by the office, the petitioner's Advocate came to know about the mistake as he was not informed by the petitioner earlier and on examining the Vakalatnama and going through the case record came to learn, for the first time that the original plaintiff Jugal Kishore had expired during the pendency of the appeal and his heirs were duly sub­stituted. To rectify the mistake the counsel tried to make contact with the applicant, but as he was lying ill at Calcutta he could not be contacted and consequently formal substitution was delayed. Hence this application under Order 22 Rule 3 with a petition for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act being Misc. Case No. 370 of 1987 and Misc. Case No. 369 of 1987 respectively. 4. These applications have been strenuously opposed by the learned counsel for respondents Mr. D. N. Baruah. His contention was that the revision against the dead man being a nullity, and therefore an application under Order 22 Rule 3 can not stand. Case No. 370 of 1987 and Misc. Case No. 369 of 1987 respectively. 4. These applications have been strenuously opposed by the learned counsel for respondents Mr. D. N. Baruah. His contention was that the revision against the dead man being a nullity, and therefore an application under Order 22 Rule 3 can not stand. He submitted that the application for condonation of delay for sub­stitution further aggravatel the petitioners claim as inordinate delay in filing the condonation petition has not been explained to satisfy the Court and lack of diligent and negligence on the part of the applicant can not be taken technically by the High Court to consider such applications. He further submitted that in this case application under Order 22 and section 5 of the Limitation Act, Court can not amend the defects where the applicant apparently failed to satisfy the Court with sufficient reasons of the delay. In support of his contention Mr. D. N. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondents referred some decisions to substantiate his submission. Mr. Baruah referred AIR 1963 Calcutta 417 (S. C.Chakrararty vs. J. N. Sigh Roy), wherein the respondent died after filing the appeal, and in appeal substitution was sought to be made after filing the Memo of Appeal. It is held that the Court can not allow the cause title to be amended by entering the names of the legal representatives of the dead man under section 153 of the C. P. C., where the respondent had died before the presentation of the Memo of Appeal, as the cases is not one of mere addition of parties, but is in substance a case where an appeal is being filed against the legal representatives of the dead party on the day on which application for adding him as party-respondent to the appeal is filed. Section 153 can not be invoked by a party who is guilty of laches to cover up his default. The power thereunder can be executed by the Court in a case where the defect error which would vitiate the proceeding is not due to a party's default. A negligent party can not ask the Court to allow laches and rectify the defects. 5. Mr. The power thereunder can be executed by the Court in a case where the defect error which would vitiate the proceeding is not due to a party's default. A negligent party can not ask the Court to allow laches and rectify the defects. 5. Mr. Baruah further referred the decisions in AIR 1963 Tripura 44 (Abdul Wahed vs. Shukdev Wasti), wherein the Court held that the revision petition against a dead person is a nullity and no question of substituting the names of the legal representatives in place of the deceased person arises at all. Order XXII, C. P. C. will not apply to such a case, A revision petition against a dead person is void and of no legal effect. If the memo of revision petition is sought to be amended, it will mean even if amended that a fresh revision petition is filed on the date of the amendment against the legal representatives of the deceased person. Where the application for amendment is barred by limitation and the petitioner had knowledge of the death even in the trial Court before passing of the order or decree complained against, no question of condonation of delay can arise at all under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court further viewed that section 153 can not also apply to such a case because there is no proceeding before the Court. It is only in a proceeding before the Court that an amendment can be made under section 153 C. P. C. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case this view is not applicable, as in this case, during the pendency of the appeal, the deceased respondent was substituted and accordingly, the Memo of Appeal before the lower Court was amended. 6. The another reference made by Mr. Baruah in AIR 1953 Bombay 353 (Karim Ismail vs. Abdul Rahiman) relates to section 5 of the Limitation Act wherein the plea of limitation was taken first in appeal. In this case the point was that the delay was barred by the law of limitation. It is to be noted that in the trial Court, the plea of limitation was not taken by the defendant and there­fore this case has no bearing with the present case as the fact and circumstances of this case is different. 7. In this case the point was that the delay was barred by the law of limitation. It is to be noted that in the trial Court, the plea of limitation was not taken by the defendant and there­fore this case has no bearing with the present case as the fact and circumstances of this case is different. 7. On the point of the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of substitution Mr. Baruah referred AIR 1962 SC 361 and AIR 1972 SC 749 wherein the Apex Court held that failure to account for non diligence during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal does not disqualify him from praying for the condonation of delay under section 5, and in AIR 1972 SC 749 , it was held that any particular manner on a wrong advise given by legal adviser he can be held guilty of negligence so as to entitle the party to plea sufficient cause under section 5. 8, Mr. Baruah further referred AIR 1979 Madras 115 (4si Bai vs. Goraathi and others), wherein the Court held that in deciding what is sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal, the true guide is whether the appellant has acted with reasonable diligence in prosecution of his appeal. In this case the High Court relied on AIR 1917 PC 156 wherein Privy Council laid down a general rule for the exercise of the judicial discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act to admit for a "sufficient cause" an appeal which would otherwise be barred by limitation. The Privy Council observed that the appellant ought to have deemed to have acted, where, after deducting the time spent in prosecuting with due diligence a proper application for receive of judgment, the period between the date of the decree appealed from and the date of the presenting the appeal does not exceed the period prescribed for preferring an appeal. The gist of submissions of Mr. Baruah was that this Court has no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to amend the Memo of Appeal even if there is sufficient cause. The gist of submissions of Mr. Baruah was that this Court has no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to amend the Memo of Appeal even if there is sufficient cause. Applicants' failure to show sufficient cause for delay and the cause shown as a fault of the lawyer can not be accepted as it was the seer negligence and lack of diligence of the applicant who was a literate man and a long period of time of not taking steps was not satisfactorily explained and the mistake in filing the revision against the dead person is not bonafide. His further submission is that section 153 of the C. P. C. has no appli­cation if the applicant can not show sufficient cause to satisfy the Court for condonation of delay. That the petition under Order XXII was accompanied with a petition for deciding the abatement was not filed within the prescribed period of 60 days, that the applicants relief lies only in filing a fresh revision petition subject to the limitation to file such application. In view of the Apex Court's decision these arguments of Mr. Baruah is not tenable. It is true, that in such a situation the revision petition cannot proceed further but the applicant had the right to file the petition under Order XXII to substitute tie respondents, if he is able to show that he had sufficient cause to file the application. If that is so, he can likewise be permitted to rectify the defects for properly amending the revision petition, if he can show good cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 9. On the other Land Mr. A. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his argument referred (1987) 2 SCC 107 (S.K. Viswabrata vs. S. Koyakinyu) and AIR 1976 Rajasthan 65 (Ramjeewan vs. Clraadmoh mimed). In the S. K. Viswabrata's case, the view of the Apex Court was that Court should adopt a liberal view and justice oriented approach and further held that High Court erred in dismissing the appeal on hyper technical ground of bar of limitation. The Apex Court further held that the legislature has conferred the power to condon delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The Apex Court further held that the legislature has conferred the power to condon delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice, that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of the Court. In AIR 1976 Rajasthan 65, (Ramjeewan vs. Chandmohammed), the Rajasthan High Court, in a similar case, held that section 153 C. P. C. empowers the Courts to allow any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit to be removed by an amendment. In the case of a suit the reference can be allowed to be amended, if the amendment is made within the period of limitation. In the case of appeal, the amendment can be permitted even beyond limitation if the appellant can bring his case within the meaning of section 5 of Limitation Act. I respectfully agree with this view of the Rajasthan High Court. 10. After perusing the records and hearing the arguments of both sides, I find that the mistake on the part of the revision petitioner can not be taken unamenable as this fact of mistake was minimised as the legal heirs of the original petitioner appeared in the Civil Revision No. 17 of 1983 by filing Vakalatnama. Further as the deceased Jugal Kishore was substituted in the appeal and heirs of the deceased contested the appeal, it can not be held that the legal heirs were not substituted at all. The mistake in the revision petition showing the deceased person as respondent can be rectified because the revision petitioner explains the circumstances under which he has to file the revision petition and I do not find to doubt his contentions. The Apex Court's guide line in (1987) 2 SCC 107 (Supra) is clearly applicable in this case and in the facts and circumstances of this case I am satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. 11. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the appellant has been able to make out sufficient cause about the peculiar course of events faced in filing the amendment petition for sub­stitution of the legal representatives of deceased Jugal Kishore. 11. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the appellant has been able to make out sufficient cause about the peculiar course of events faced in filing the amendment petition for sub­stitution of the legal representatives of deceased Jugal Kishore. The delay accordingly condoned and applicant is allowed to amend the cause title of the Revision Petition No. 17 of 1983 and bring on record the names of the legal representatives who already made their appearance by filing Vakalatnama in the Civil Revision No. . 17 of 1983. Accordingly the applications are allowed.