JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Plaintiff's success in the trial Court having been reversed by the appellate Court, the present second appeal has been filed mainly raising one short but interesting point for adjudication. 2. Plaintiff also described hereinafter as the appellant, filed a suit for declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit properties recovery of possession and in the alternative, for recovery of consideration money of Rs. 1,000/- on equitable grounds. The factual antecedents, as averred in the plaint, in which controversy arose as are follows ; Defendant, hereinafter also described as the respondent, for family necessity and to pay off debts, sold the suit house along with some paddy lands for a consideration of Rs. 1500/- under a registered sale deed dated 21-7-1965, and delivered possession of both the suit house and paddy lands to the plaintiff after sale. But with his permission the defendant remaned in the suit house as a licensee oromising to give up possession to the plain- tiff after constructing; a residential house of his own, at a different plain. Such a permission was granted by the plaintiff to the defendant as both were in friendly terms. After some time, the defendant along. with his son- in-law purchased back the paddy lands on 15-3- 1987, and at that time also assurance was given to the plaintiff that the suit hose shall be vacated shortly. Unfortunately, subsequently attitude of the defendant changed and he did not give up possession of the house in spite of several demands and this necessitated filing of the suit, with prayer as aforesaid. 3. Defendant filed a written statement denying the allegations of the plaintiff. His plea inter alia is that the plaintiff was not a regular money-lender but was advancing loan and as the defendant was involved in certain litigations, he was seeking advice from the plaintiff, and availed loans from him at different times and agreed to execute a mortgage deed in respect of his properties. His plea inter alia is that the plaintiff was not a regular money-lender but was advancing loan and as the defendant was involved in certain litigations, he was seeking advice from the plaintiff, and availed loans from him at different times and agreed to execute a mortgage deed in respect of his properties. But the plaintiff being not a money-lender proposed that the defendant should execute a site deed to avoid future trouble with the understanding that the same was to be treated as a security for the loan already incurred by the defendant from the plaintiff, with further agreement between parties that after repayment of the loan amount with interest, the property in question was to be reconvened to the defendant, accordingly, the document in question was executed on 21-7-1965, without the contents being read over and explained to the defendant and without payment of any consideration whatsoever and without any intention of it being acted upon. The plea of delivery of possession of the suit house and/or paddy land in favor of the plaintiff was specifically denied. The intention of the document being not acted upon is manifest from the re-purchase of paddy lands, and. it was never the intention of the defendant to sell it, the same being the only ancestral residential house where he was living with his family members all along. In essence, the case of the defendant is that the document though styled as a sale deed not intended to be acted upon, was obtained fraudulently and no title was conveyed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff's prayers were not available to be granted. 4. Six issues were framed by the trial Court, issue Nos. 1,3 and 5 related to the question (a) whether the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land ?, (b) whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the suit land ? and (c) whether the sale-deed dated 21-7-1965 was a fraudulent one ?. On evaluation of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and on consideration of the sale deed exhibited as Ext. 1, it was concluded that the same was executed for due consideration, and the plaintiff was entitled to relief as prayed for 5. and (c) whether the sale-deed dated 21-7-1965 was a fraudulent one ?. On evaluation of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and on consideration of the sale deed exhibited as Ext. 1, it was concluded that the same was executed for due consideration, and the plaintiff was entitled to relief as prayed for 5. The conclusions were assailed-in appeal and the appellate .Court was of the view that the question that fell for consideration was whether the deed in question was not for sale, bit was executed by way of security with the intention that after repayment of the loan amount, the suit house even if included in the sale-deed with the knowledge of the defendant, was to be reconveved by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant and in such circumstance", the defendant was to return consideration money in terms of the alternative praver. Considering the fact that no attesting witness was examined and evidence of the witnesses examined to further the plaintiff's case was inconsistent and deficient, it came to hold that the deed though styled as a sale-deed was not intended to be acted upon as a sale-deed. For coming to this conclusion, it relied on several facts including reconveyance of paddy lands after about two years of the execution of the sale deed. It also noticed possession of the defendant for about twelve years. According to it, even if a document is styled in one way, if at the time of execution of the document, the intention, of the parties was something different, the evidence can be led to prove the intention of the parties at the time of execution of the deed ie the real agreement underlying the execution. Differing from the findings of the learned Munsif, the learned Subordinate Judge held that under the sale-deeds, no title passed in respect of the suit house and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit property and consequentially relief for recovery of possession. However, he held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover consideration money. Accordingly, the judgment and decree "of the Munsif were modified to the extent that the suit was decreed for recovery of consideration money only and defendant was held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. However, he held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover consideration money. Accordingly, the judgment and decree "of the Munsif were modified to the extent that the suit was decreed for recovery of consideration money only and defendant was held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. to the plaintiff towards refund of consideration money of the suit house together with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the date of realisation. 6. The main plank of argument of the appellant is that the learned Subordinate Judge failed to appreciate that in view of Sac 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, oral evidence was to be kept out of consideration. The learned counsel for the appellant, how, ever, submitted that though it may be available in certain cases to be pleaded that the document was riot intended to be acted upon the present case is not of that nature. He further submitted that there is a gulf of differences between "was not intended to be acted upon" and "has not been acted upon" and in any event that question does not fall for consideration in the present case. On behalf of the respondent, it has been submitted that the conclusions of the first appellate Court are indefeasible Additionally, it has been submitted that the alternative prayer of the plaintiff having been allowed, the appeal was incompetent. I shall deal with this contention relating to the non-maintainability of the appeal first. The contention is clearly untenable and unsustainable. Denial of primary remedy also amounted to a decree within the meaning of Sec 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'CPC'), for it was dismissal of the suit so far as this relief was concerned. As a decree, it was appenlable, in the absence of any provision which takes away the right of the appeal To illustrate, if the plaintiff was to sue two persons in the alter- native, and the Court were to decree the suit against one, and not against the other, it is elementary that the plaintiff would be entitled to contest in appeal that the party exonerated is the party primarily liable. My view finds support from the decision of several High Courts. To indicate a few AIR 1987 Pat 428 : Bank of Behar Ltd. v. Madhusudan Lal and Anr. My view finds support from the decision of several High Courts. To indicate a few AIR 1987 Pat 428 : Bank of Behar Ltd. v. Madhusudan Lal and Anr. : AIR 1947 Pat 231 : Amir Mahton and other v. Sheopujan Missir and another, Bariar Singh Vs. Durga Gir and Others AIR 1941 Nag 84 : Shrideo Pam Janki Mandir through Sarbarakara Telsiran and Ors. v. Nathuram Nanhobhai Lohar and others; and Velayudhan Nair Gopalan Nair Vs. Ayyappan Pillai Madhavan Pillai and Others. The decsions of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts in Reajuddin Patwari and Others Vs. Syed Abdul Jobbar, andi AIR 1977 Mad. 223 : Sakku Bai Ammal v. R. Babu Reddiar and Ors. taking a contrary view have no universal application. In my view, where the plaint read as a whole disclosed that the plaintiff will be satisfied with either of the alternative reliefs claimed by him, he cannot be allowed to appeal if one of the reliefs is granted. Where, however, the plaint gives the impression that of the reliefs claimed one is the main relief and the other is claimed only if it is found that the main relief cannot possibly be given, it is open to the plaintiff to appeal urging that on the facts and Saw he is entitled to the main relief. Similar view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court where almost similar facts were involved in AIR 1983 All. 23 Smt. Sunder Rai dead by L. R. Kishorifal v. Anandalal dead and after him Smt. Mohaniwali and others. A Divisional Bench of the Patna High Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Garbhu Sao and Another also took the same view. On consideration of the reliefs prayed for in the suit, the contention raised by the respondent is untenable. 23 Smt. Sunder Rai dead by L. R. Kishorifal v. Anandalal dead and after him Smt. Mohaniwali and others. A Divisional Bench of the Patna High Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Garbhu Sao and Another also took the same view. On consideration of the reliefs prayed for in the suit, the contention raised by the respondent is untenable. It is relevant to mention here that Midras High Court in Sikku Bai's case (supra) has taken the view that as the choice of reliefs is always with the plaintiff, who is the dominus litus in a litigation; he could seek for more than one relief, seek for more than one independent relief or ask for alternative reliefs and if he asks for the last such reliefs, then he is placing the reliefs so sought for by him on a par with each other and if the Court trying the subject-matter, grants him one relief, then it follows that he has the benefit of the relief and he cannot throw overboard such a benefit with a design or motive or to further his own cause by seeking umbrage in an appellate Court and ask for the relief not granted to him. According to the Court, 'alternative' is an expression, which indicates a choice of the person and if that choice is exercised by him, then he cannot ask for the reliefs not granted. This, according to them, was a question of approbation and reprobation, and where alternative prayers are made and one of the reliefs is granted, appeal is not maintainable against the unallowed reliefs. In my view, the question is not as to what has been alternatively prayed. It has to be fathomed from the pleadings what were really the grievances of the party which brought him beforet he Court and merely because he has made an alternative prayer it cannot be and should not be presumed that he has abandoned the main relief prayed for. As indicated above, it would depend on the circumstances and no generalisation can be made. The mere use of the word 'alternative' should not be construed as the indication of abindonment of the prayer for main relief. It may at the most indicate that if the main relief prayed for is not available to be granted then the alter- native relief prayed for may be granted. The mere use of the word 'alternative' should not be construed as the indication of abindonment of the prayer for main relief. It may at the most indicate that if the main relief prayed for is not available to be granted then the alter- native relief prayed for may be granted. The Patna view in Garbhu Sao's case (supra) seems to be more on the point and logical. The contention raised by the respondent in this regard is rejected. 7. The vital point that survives for consideration is whether the appellate Court was justified in considering the oral evidence while the appellant characterises the action as indefensible. The learned counsel for respondent submits that the provisions of Section 92 have no application to the facts of the case, because respondent's case was that the document was of no consequence. His case simplicities was that the document was not intended to be. acted upon. 8. The contentions need careful consideration. Reference at this stage to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Act') is necessary. It is trite law that if terms of a document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible, because Section 92 mandates that in such a case intention must be gathered from the language employed in the document. This is however, subject to exception that if language employed is ambiguous, or admits of a variety of meanings, 6th Proviso to the section can be invoked which permits tendering of extrinsic evidence as to the acts, conduct and surrounding circumstances to enable the Court to asc rtain the real intention of the parties, in such a case, such oral evidence may guide the Court in unravelling the true intention of the parties. The object of admissibility of such evidence in such circumstances under the 6th Proviso is to assist a Court to get the real intention of the parties and thereby overcome difficulty caused by the ambiguity. in such a case, subsequent conduct of the parties also provides material to clear hazy area and to ascertain true intention of the author of. the document (See paragraph 343 of Hailshim Edition of flalsbjry Vol. 10 at page 274 Abdulla Ahmed Vs. Animendra Kissen Mitter, and Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, ). in such a case, subsequent conduct of the parties also provides material to clear hazy area and to ascertain true intention of the author of. the document (See paragraph 343 of Hailshim Edition of flalsbjry Vol. 10 at page 274 Abdulla Ahmed Vs. Animendra Kissen Mitter, and Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, ). Section 92 cannot be considered in isolation of Section 91 Section 91. is based on what is sometimes described as "the best evidence rule". Best evidence about the contents of a document is the document itself, and production of document is required by Section 91 in proof of its contents. Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without aid. of Section 92, and Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91. The two sections, however, differ in some material particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, where is Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents, which are both bihteral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents Section 91 lays down rule of universal application and is not confined to the executant or executants of the documents. Section 92 on the other hand, applies only between the parties to the instruments or their representative in interest. (See AIR 1958 SC 448 : Bai Mira Devi and Ors. v. Official Assigee of Bombay ). To me it appears, that main part of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the tran- saction. In that event, law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of document itself, and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the patties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The bar is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties. Such a question arises when a party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatsoever. Such a question arises when a party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatsoever. For that purpose, oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement, altogether not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. This view of mine gains strength from the decisions of Privy Council and Supreme Court reported in AIR 1936 70 (Privy Council) and Smt. Gangabai Gilda Vs. Smt. Chhabubai Gandhi, : respectively. It is the conduct of the parties which is relevant. In certain cases the circumstances may indicate that the document was not intended to be acted upon and has not been acted upon; there may be cases where the document was not intended to be acted upon, but has been acted upon; and there may be case where though there was no intention of the document being not acted upon, yet has not been acted upon. The applica- bility of Section 92 would depend on the circumstances and no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to in which cases it can be said that the document was not intended to be acted upon, and thefore, Section 92 applies. Conte- mporaneous conduct, surrounding circumstances and the connected mate- rials would determine the question of applicability of Section 92 If a party pleads that a document was not intended to be acted upon, he has to substantiate the same, and the Court on consideration of the materials placed before it has to give a finding whether the plea is acceptable. If the Court, on consideration of the materials placed before it, gives a finding that the document was not intended to be acted upon, the conclusion will be one primarily based on facts and will not give rise to any question of law. in the instant case, the first appellate Court has proceeded to examine this aspect in great detail. The inferences drawn and the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate Court were in essence that the document was not intended to be acted upon. Therefore, aid of oral evidence was availed for proper determination of the question. 9. in the instant case, the first appellate Court has proceeded to examine this aspect in great detail. The inferences drawn and the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate Court were in essence that the document was not intended to be acted upon. Therefore, aid of oral evidence was availed for proper determination of the question. 9. I he circumstances indicated by the first appellate Court are essentially findings based on facts giving rise to no question of law. The inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is without any merit and deserves dismissal which I hereby direct. 10. In conclusion, there is no merit in this appeal which is accor- dingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their respective costs of this appeal. Final Result : Dismissed