JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---This petition is preferred by the petitioner wife against the respondent-husband. The petitioner had originally filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 117 of 1985 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Madha under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for maintenance to be awarded to her @ Rs. 400/- per month. The respondent-husband contested the application on merits, his basic contention being that the petitioner was not his wife in so far as he had not gone through any ceremony of marriage with her. The respondent had disputed the status of the applicant and had also contended that under these circumstances, she was wholly disentitled to prefer an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate, after recording evidence of the parties accepted the applicant's contention that she was the wife of the respondent and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, passed an order dated 12th December, 1986, directing the respondent to pay maintenance @ Rs. 150/- per month from the date of the filing of the application. 2. The respondent-husband thereafter moved the Sessions Court at Solapur through Criminal Revision Application No. 39 of 1987. The basic contention raised by him was to the effect that the so-called marriage referred to by the applicant-wife was a void marriage by virtue of the fact that it was in contravention of the provisions of the Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriage Act, 1946. It was contended that the applicant being the second wife had, admittedly, contracted a bigamous marriage and that consequently, she could not come within the ambit of the legal definition of the term "wife" as far as section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was concerned. It was further contended that the applicant-wife was a person of loose moral character and that she had conceived the daughter as a result of an unchaste life and consequently, the respondent had denied the paternity of the daughter. 3. The learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the material placed before him recorded the conclusion that the marriage between the parties was hit by the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 and that consequently, the wife was disentitled from claiming any maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the material placed before him recorded the conclusion that the marriage between the parties was hit by the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 and that consequently, the wife was disentitled from claiming any maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is against this order that the petitioner-wife has presented the present petition. 4. Mr. Kulkarni, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, after referring to the order of the trial Court and the order of the Sessions Court, has basically contended that the Sessions Court was in error in holding that the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act applied to the facts of the present case. He has submitted that there is no conclusive evidence before the Court to indicate that the respondent-husband was married earlier and that in the absence of such conclusive evidence, the learned Sessions Judge was wholly unjustified in applying the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, Mr. Kulkarni has contended that in an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court is entitled to proceed on the basis of the presumption that the marriage between the parties is a valid marriage and that consequently, the applicant-wife possess the legal status of a lawfully wedded wife. He has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in 1988 Maharashtra Law Journal, Page 1135 in the case of (Malan wife of Balasaheb Gawde v. Balasaheb Gawde)1. In that case, while dealing with the scope of an enquiry under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court has taken the view that this particular provision of the Code provides a simple and speedy remedy to an aggrieved wife for purposes of obtaining an order for maintenance. The Court has further observed that it is for the party who challenges the validity of the marriage to establish in a competent Civil Court that the marriage in question is no marriage or that it suffers from any legal infirmity. In the absence of the party adopting such a procedure, it would not be open to the learned Magistrate to uphold a mere contention questioning the validity of a marriage. 5. Appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband, Mr. In the absence of the party adopting such a procedure, it would not be open to the learned Magistrate to uphold a mere contention questioning the validity of a marriage. 5. Appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband, Mr. Mane has submitted that as far as the present case is concerned, where the parties have given an approximate indication of the point of time at which the marriage in question took place, that there can be little dispute about the fact that the same was solemnized between the years 1946 and 1955 i.e. the period during which the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act was a valid piece of legislation, the Act having been repealed after the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He has, therefore, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has very rightly upheld the contention that the applicant-wife even if she had gone through a ceremony of marriage with the respondent-husband cannot be conferred with the legal status of a lawfully wedded wife and consequently, that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can have no application. Mr. Mane has placed considerable reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court, Page 644 in the case of (Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivam Adhav anr.)2, in that case, the Supreme Court had observed that a wife whose marriage is hit by the provisions of section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act was not entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court had further observed in that case that while considering an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to take into account such relevant issues as the personal law of the parties and that the personal law is not something which can be ignored or brushed aside. The side decision had gone up to the Supreme Court from a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1983 Criminal Law Journal 259. The side decision had gone up to the Supreme Court from a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1983 Criminal Law Journal 259. One of the contentions sought to be argued before the Full Bench in that decision was that the interpretation of the term "wife" as contemplated in section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be given a proper and wide perspective and that it should not disentitle for purposes of maintenance even those persons in whose cases there existed an apparent infirmity as far as the validity of the marriage is concerned. The Full Bench of our High Court had taken the view that section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would have to be strictly construed and neither a loose nor liberal interpretation was permissible and this is the view that has been upheld and confirmed by the Supreme Court. 6. Mr. Kulkarni placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this High Court reported in 1987 Maharashtra Law Journal, Page 179 in the case of (Shantaram Tukaram Patil anr. v. Dagubai Tukaram Patil ors.)3. In that case, the Division Bench had observed that it was always open to a Hindu wife to prefer her claim for maintenance both before a Civil Court as also in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Division Bench had taken the view that as far as wives and children were concerned, their rights for legitimacy or for support flow from the fact that prior to the validity of the marriage being questioned, that the same did constitute a lawful marriage. The view expounded by the Division Bench that even if the marriages were subsequently to be dissolved, or if it were to be declared a nullity, that the protection conferred by the Act cannot be taken away. This position, however, does not appear to be any longer good law in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Yamunabai's case (supra). This position, however, does not appear to be any longer good law in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Yamunabai's case (supra). The Supreme Court, while construing section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and the subsequent sections, notably section 16, has very clearly pointed out that in the case of a marriage which is held to be void and is subsequently declared a nullity, that the legislature has given a special protection to the children by providing that notwithstanding the marriage having been declared void, the children shall still be deemed to be legitimate. This protection, however, is not conferred on the wife and consequently, she would not be entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There can be no dispute about the fact that where the marriage has been held to be void or where sufficient material has been placed before the trial Court in a section 125 Cr. P.C. proceeding, for the Court to hold that the marriage is void in law, the wife would not be entitled to claim maintenance. 7. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to point out that it is in the first instance wholly distinguishable from the case before the Full Bench of this Court and the one which went up subsequently to the Supreme Court. In so far as Yamunabai's case was concerned, the marriage had taken place after the coming into operation of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Court, in that case, was concerned with a situation where admittedly there existed a statutory bar to the marriage and furthermore, there was no dispute about the fact that the marriage in question was a void marriage. On the facts of the present case, however, having regard to the evidence of the parties, there can be no dispute about the fact that the marriage between them had taken place approximately 30 to 35 years earlier but, in any event, at the point of time prior to the coming into operation of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is precisely for this reason that the contention was taken up that the marriage in question is hit by the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, referred to earlier. 8. There is considerable substance in the contention raised by Mr. It is precisely for this reason that the contention was taken up that the marriage in question is hit by the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, referred to earlier. 8. There is considerable substance in the contention raised by Mr. Kulkarni, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner that in a serious issue such as the question of status, where a party takes up a contention that the spouse is not covered by the legal definition of the term "wife" that it is absolutely essential for the party to adduce necessary evidence before a competent forum and to establish the said contention. It is not sufficient for a contention to be taken up or merely pleaded but it must also be fully established. In the present case, the state of the record is to the effect that the respondent-husband questioned the status of the applicant-wife but no further conclusive evidence was led by him for purposes of establishing that she was never married to him or for purposes of establishing for that matter, that she could not have been lawfully and legally married to him by virtue of the fact that he had been legally wedded to some other person and that his earlier wife was living and that the said marriage was still subsisting on the day of the marriage with the applicant. Mr. Kulkarni may not be fully justified in his demand that it was necessary for the respondent-husband to have sought a declaration from a competent Civil Court. On the basis of the observations of the Full Bench of this Court and in particular the observations of the Supreme Court in Yamunabai's case referred to earlier, it was open to the respondent-husband to have established his contentions even before the trial Magistrate on the basis of cogent evidence. In the absence of any such evidence, it will have to be held that the applicant-wife is entitled to maintenance in so far as there is nothing on record to establish that her marriage suffered from any sort of infirmity. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, fully justified in having ordered the respondent-husband to pay maintenance to the applicant-wife. 9. Before parting with the present case, it is necessary to observe that the contention taken up by the respondent-husband in the present case is deplorable and deserves to be deprecated. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, fully justified in having ordered the respondent-husband to pay maintenance to the applicant-wife. 9. Before parting with the present case, it is necessary to observe that the contention taken up by the respondent-husband in the present case is deplorable and deserves to be deprecated. It is unfortunate characteristic in several of these proceedings particularly more so where illiterate or ignorant women are concerned, for a contention to be adopted that the marriage never took place or the familiar plea that the paternity of children begotten out of such a marriage is not accepted. It is most unfortunate that parties taking up such contentions do so with a sense of impunity and often times get away merely because the opponent is too weak to take appropriate counter action. Whereas, in the present case, the respondent-husband has indulged in the luxury of cohabiting with more than one woman and has fathered children through each of them, he could hardly be protected or allowed to get away from the legal and moral responsibility of maintaining his spouse and the children. Furthermore, it is necessary to observe that on the facts of the present case, before upholding the contention that the second marriage was hit by the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Marriages Act, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have warned the respondent-husband of the consequences of taking up such a contention which would immediately invite a prosecution under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code for a serious offence of bigamy. 10. In the result, the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 2nd April, 1988 is set aside. The petitioner's application for maintenance is allowed and the respondent is directed to pay to the petitioner the maintenance at the rate ordered by the trial Court. 11. On an examination of the order passed by the trial Magistrate, it is seen that he has evaluated the facts relating to the respective financial condition of the two parties. The learned trial Magistrate, after going into the facts and circumstances of the case, has come to the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 400/- that was demanded by the applicant is rather excessive having regard to the capacity of the respondent-husband. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge has awarded a sum of Rs. The learned trial Magistrate, after going into the facts and circumstances of the case, has come to the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 400/- that was demanded by the applicant is rather excessive having regard to the capacity of the respondent-husband. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge has awarded a sum of Rs. 150/- per month from the date of the filing of the application which order is both reasonable and justified. The trial Magistrate has also awarded a sum of Rs. 75/- as costs to the applicant-wife which order is also maintained. 12. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b). In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----