S. K. GUIN, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff, Sagar Kumar Bose filed a suit being Title Suit No. 118 of 1983 in the 3rd Court of Munsif at Sealdah for eviction of the licensee from the suit property i. e. B schedule property and for permanent injunction in respect of A schedule property of which B schedule property is a part. His allegation was that the defendant Ramkrishna Rajak was a, licensee under him in respect of B schedule property, that as he created annoyance, the licence had been revoked asking him to vacate the suit property and that as he did not vacate, the instant suit was filed for the aforesaid reliefs. ( 2 ) THE defendant Ramkrishna Rajak contested the suit by filing a written statement. His defence was that Jayanta Kumar Mukherjee inducted him as a tenant to the suit property at a rental of Rs. 25/- per month payable according to English calendar month from January 1963 and that Jayanta Mukherjee subsequently directed him to pay rent to the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff examined 3 witnesses including himself to prove his case. The other witnesses are P. W. 2 Satyesh Kumar Bose from whom the plaintiff took lease of the entire property and P. W. 3 Jayanta Mukherjee the previous lessee from whom the defendant claimed to have taken tenancy settlement in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff also produced some documents. On 16. 9. 85. the defendant's advocate filed a petition before the learned Munsif to the effect that the defendant would not adduce any evidence in support of his case as the plaintiff had miserably failed to prove his case. In view of such petition and after, hearing the learned advocates for the both sides, the learned Munsif fixed 20. 9. 85 for argument and heard argument on a subsequent date. On consideration of evidence as laid before him, the learned Munsif held that the defendant was a mere licensee in respect of the B schedule property and was not a tenant at all. On such ending he decreed the suit and passed decree for eviction and permanent injunction. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved, the defendant preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 338 of 1986 in the Court of District Judge of Alipore. The learned Addl. On such ending he decreed the suit and passed decree for eviction and permanent injunction. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved, the defendant preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 338 of 1986 in the Court of District Judge of Alipore. The learned Addl. District Judge, 4th Court at Alipore who heard the appeal affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that defendant was a licensee and not a tenant in respect of the suit property and he dismissed the appeal by his judgment dated 19. 5. 87. It appears that on 1. 4. 87 at the time of hearing of appeal the appellant filed a petition for adducing additional evidence under the provision of order 41 rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the allegation that the defendant-appellant never gave any instruction to his lawyer at the time of hearing of this suit that he would not aduce any evidence in support of his case and that he had no prior knowledge of the said petition the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, however, did not allow the appellant to adduce any additional evidence nor did he pass any formal order dismissing the said petition. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the judgment and decree of dismissal of the learned Additional District Judge, the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. ( 6 ) MR. Habibullah, the learned advocate for the appellant has argued that though the finding that the defendant is a, licensee, is a finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below but such finding is erroneous inasmuch as it has been arrived at by improper appreciation of evidence without consideration of the relevant fact that the defendant was a stranger and not a friend or relation of the alleged licensor and that it is highly improbable that a person would allow a stranger to occupy the suit property under leave and licence. He has further argued that as the said finding has been arrived at by improper appreciation of evidence, this Court sitting in second appeal may interfere with such finding. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision in the case of Binod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit Kaur reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2179. He has further argued that as the said finding has been arrived at by improper appreciation of evidence, this Court sitting in second appeal may interfere with such finding. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision in the case of Binod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit Kaur reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2179. He has also argued that as the appellant who is an illiterate person never gave any instruction to his lawyer in the trial Court that he would not adduce evidence in support of his case, the learned Additional District Judge for ends of justice should have allowed the appellant to adduce evidence under the provision of order 41 rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure or should have sent back the case to the trial Court in order to give the defendant an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his case. He has further argued that the learned first appellate Court has, therefore, committed an error in not allowing the appellant's petition for additional evidence and has also committed an error by not giving any reason for disallowing such additional evidence. In support of his argument Mr. Habibullah has referred to a decision in the case of K. Venketaramiah v. A. Seetherama Reddy and Others reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1526. ( 7 ) MR. Sudhish Dasgupta, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has, on the other hand, argued that since the concurrent finding of the Courts below whether the defendant is a licensee or not is a finding of fact on consideration of all evidence on record adduced in the suit, this Court in second appeal cannot interfere with such finding. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision in the case of Sri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and Others reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 361. He has also argued that if the defendant's advocate filed the petition on 16. 9. 85 stating that the defendant would not adduce any evidence without instruction of the defendant and if the defendant was aggrieved by such statement in the petition, he should have at the earliest opportunity moved the Court before which such petition was made for rectification or for review of the judgment and that such contention cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court. In support of his argument he has referred to a decision in the case of Sarat Chandra Maiti and Others v. Bibhabati Debi and Others reported in 34 Callj 302. He has further argued that the learned first appellate Court has rightly disallowed production of additional evidence in proper exercise of discretion and he has emphasized that under order 41 rule 27 (1) (b) additional evidence can be allowed to be adduced when the appellate Court requires it to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause and that it is the requirement of the appellate Court and not of the party. In support of his view, he has referred to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Parsotim Thakur and Others v. Lal Mohar Thakur and Others reported in 35 Calwn 786 and also to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Arjan Singh v. Kattar Singh and Others reported in AIR 1951 Supreme Court 193. So, he has submitted that appeal should be dismissed. ( 8 ) THE main point that arose for decision before the trial Court was whether the defendant was a licensee or a tenant in respect of the suit property. In support of his case the plaintiff examined 3 witnesses and produced some documents and the defendant did not adduce any evidence. On consideration of the evidence as laid before it the trial Court found that the defendant was a licensee and not a tenant in respect of the suit property. The first appellate Court on reappraisal of evidence on record has af5rmed the said finding of the trial Court. So, there is a concurrent finding of fact based on evidence on record that defendant is a licensee in respect of the suit property. Now the question is whether this Court sitting in second appeal has got any jurisdiction to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact. Mr. Habibullah, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that though it was a concurrent finding of fact but it is not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below inasmuch as they did not take into consideration that the defendant was a stranger and not a relation or friend of the plaintiff or Jayanta Mukherjee. Mr. Habibullah, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that though it was a concurrent finding of fact but it is not based upon proper appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below inasmuch as they did not take into consideration that the defendant was a stranger and not a relation or friend of the plaintiff or Jayanta Mukherjee. He has further submitted that it is highly improbable that a person would grant licence in respect of a property to a stranger. It is true that the defendant is not a relation or friend of the plaintiff or Jayanta Mukherjee. It may be that he was stranger to them, But there is no bar in granting leave and licence to a stranger, nor is it necessary that such leave and licence can only be granted to a friend or relation. Each case must be considered in the context of its own facts. Since such finding of fact as arrived at by the Courts below are based on consideration of the evidence as adduced in this case, such finding cannot be interfered with simply because it was a licence to a stranger. In this connection, Mr. Habibullah has referred to the decision in the case of Binod Kumar Bros v. Smt. Surjit Kaur (Supra ). In that case the Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in rejecting the ending of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority even though it was a finding of fact. But the facts of the reported case are quite different from the facts of the instant case, in the reported case both the authorities based their ending on conjectures and surmises and they lost sight of the relevant pieces of evidence which have not been controverted. But in the instant case finding of the Courts below are not based on conjectures or surmises nor have they lost sight of the relevant pieces of evidence which were adduced in this case. So, this decision is not applicable to the instant case. But in the instant case finding of the Courts below are not based on conjectures or surmises nor have they lost sight of the relevant pieces of evidence which were adduced in this case. So, this decision is not applicable to the instant case. In the case of Sri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and Others (Supra) as referred to by learned advocate for the respondent, the Supreme Court has held that a finding by the District Judge on the question whether the defendants were the tenant of the plaintiff, arrived at on consideration of all evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties is a finding of fact and cannot be set aside in second appeal by the High Court. In the instant case the aforesaid concurrent finding of fact was arrived at on consideration of all evidence oral and documentary adduced fez the purpose of the suit. In view of the aforesaid decision such concurrent finding of fact, therefore, cannot be interfered with and set aside by this Court. ( 9 ) NEXT let me consider whether the first appellate Court was justified in disallowing the additional evidence sought to be adduced by the appellant under the provision of order 41 rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The main ground, for production of the additional evidence was that as the defendant's lawyer filed a petition in the trial Court without the instruction of the defendant stating that the defendant would not adduce any evidence, the trial Court fixed the date for argument and heard argument without taking any evidence on the side of the defendant. So the appellant's main grievance is that his lawyer in the trial Court filed such petition without his instruction. It appears that on 16. 9. 85 the learned advocate for the defendant filed such petition before the trial Court stating that the defendant would not adduce any evidence in support of his case. Since he was the lawyer engaged by the defendant to conduct the case on his behalf, he got the authority to say whether he would examine any witness on behalf of his party or not. Such petition appears to have been made in the pursuance of such authority. Since he was the lawyer engaged by the defendant to conduct the case on his behalf, he got the authority to say whether he would examine any witness on behalf of his party or not. Such petition appears to have been made in the pursuance of such authority. If the defendant was aggrieved by such petition he should have moved the trial Court as early as possible for rectification of the mistake or for review of the judgment. But he did not do so. The appellant. in my opinion, cannot now be permitted to reopen such question in this Court. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision in the case of Sarat Chandra Maity v. Bibhabati Debi (supra) as referred to by the learned advocate for the respondent. Though the facts of the reported case are not the same as the fact of the instant case but the principle as enunciated therein is applicable to the instant case. It has been held therein that a statement in judgment as to an admission made before the Court of first instance should not be doubted lightly by the appellate Court, specially in absence of an affidavit by the vokil who appeared in the Court of first instance. It has further been held that in the case of that character, where a litigant feels aggrieved by the statement in a judgment that an admission has been made, the most convenient and satisfactory course to follow, wherever practicable is to apply to the Judge without delay and ask for rectification or review of the judgment. It has also been held therein that the appellant cannot be permitted to reopen the question in the appeal which had been heard by their Lordships. So in view of the principle as enunciated in the reported decision the appellant before this Court cannot be permitted to reopen the question that the aforesaid petition was filed without his instruction. ( 10 ) IT appears that on 1. 4. 87 at the time of hearing of appeal before the first appellate Court the appellant filed a petition under order 41 rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure for allowing adduce evidence on the ground that there was substantial cause for such production of evidence. The normal rule is that the appellant shall not be allowed to adduce additional evidence in the appellate Court. The normal rule is that the appellant shall not be allowed to adduce additional evidence in the appellate Court. But there are exceptions. The appellant wanted to come under the exception as embodied under order 41 Rule 27 (1) (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under this Division the appellate Court may allow production of additional evidence when it requires the same to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. But law is now well settled that such requirement is the requirement of the Court and not of the party. In the case of Parsoti Thakur and Others v. Lal Mohar Thakur and Others (Supra ). Their Lordships of Privy Council have laid down that the provision of section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as elucidated by order 41 Rule 27, are not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omission in the Court of appeal by adducing fresh evidence. Their Lordships have also observed that under clause 1 (b) of rule 27, it is only when the Court itself requires additional evidence, that is to say, finds it needful in order to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, such evidence can be admitted and that legitimate occasion for exercise of this discretion is when on examination of the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes. apparent. It has been further observed that though the defect may be pointed out by a party or a party may move the Court to supply the d feet, but the requirement must be of the Court itself. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Arjan Singh v. Kattar Singh and Others (Supra) that the true test, therefore, is whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. In the instant case the plaintiff examined three witnesses and produced documents and the defendant did not adduce any evidence. As the appellate Court was able to pronounce judgment on the basis of evidence already on record, it did not require any additional evidence to pronounce the judgment. In the instant case the plaintiff examined three witnesses and produced documents and the defendant did not adduce any evidence. As the appellate Court was able to pronounce judgment on the basis of evidence already on record, it did not require any additional evidence to pronounce the judgment. As such it appears to have rightly disallowed the prayer for additional evidence, as made by the appellant before the first appellate Court. Mr. Habibullah has argued that learned Judge of the first appellate Court should have allowed the prayer for additional evidence for substantial cause as mentioned in rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has further argued that in order to do justice to the poor illiterate litigant like the defendant, the appellate Court should have allowed him to adduce additional evidence. In support of his view he has referred to decision in the case of K. Venketaramiah v. Seetherama Reddy and Others (Supra ). This decision in my opinion is not really helpful to the present appellant. It has been observed therein that under Rule 27 (1) the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. It has also been observed as follows:"there may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of record as it is, and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing the additional evidence for any other substantial cause under Rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code. " ( 11 ) IT has further been observed that such requirement of the Court is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. But in an instant case the defendant did not adduce any evidence at all. So question of finding out any inherent lacuna or defect on examination of the evidence does not arise. But in an instant case the defendant did not adduce any evidence at all. So question of finding out any inherent lacuna or defect on examination of the evidence does not arise. As the first appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence as it stood did not require any additional evidence, it appears to have rightly disallowed the prayer far production of additional evidence. Mr. Habibullah has also argued that the learned Judge of the first appellate Court has not recorded any reason for disallowing the appellant's prayer for additional evidence and that the proceeding before him has been vitiated thereby. This argument, in my opinion, has got no substance. Rule 27 (2) enjoins that when the appellate Court allows the additional evidence to be produced, it shall record the reasons. But it does not enjoin that the appellate Court is required to give reason for disallowing the additional evidence sought to be adduced. So, it was not necessary for the appellate Court to record any reason for disallowing such additional evidence. Moreover it has been held in K. Venketaramiah v. A. Seetherama Reddy and Others (Supra) that though that the omission to record the reason must be treated as serious defect, the provision of Rule 27 (2) is not mandatory and therefore, does not vitiate admission of evidence. There is no corresponding provision for recording any reason when the appellate Court disallowed the additional evidence has not vitiated the proceeding. ( 12 ) IT has been seen above that the finding that the appellant is a licensee under the plaintiff is the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below on, proper consideration of the evidence on record and that as such this Court sitting in second appeal has got no jurisdiction to interfere with such concurrent finding of fact. It has also been seen that the first appellate Court rightly disallowed the additional evidence sought to be adduced before it under the provision of order 41 Rule 27 (2 ). That being so I see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree appealed against. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree as appealed against are confirmed. In the circumstances of the ease there shall be no order as to cost. Defendant-appellant is granted three months time to vacate the suit premises. That being so I see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree appealed against. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree as appealed against are confirmed. In the circumstances of the ease there shall be no order as to cost. Defendant-appellant is granted three months time to vacate the suit premises. In default the plaintiff-respondent shall be entitled to execute the decree. Appeal dismissed.