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1990 DIGILAW 427 (KAR)

VITHAL WAMAN ANGADI v. JOHN SALDHANA

1990-08-16

M.P.CHANDRAKANTARAJ

body1990
CHANDRAKANTHARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's appeal against the concurrent findings of the Courts below. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff brought the suit in the Court of the Munsiff, Khanapur inter alia seeking a declaration that a well situated in the suit schedule property is his absolute property and the claim of the respondents to 2/3 of water in the said well under an instrument created by one Anasuya anant Diggikar and eight others in favour of defendant No. 1-Mrs. Iyra was not binding on the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE defendants resisted the suit, based on the title they had acquired by a certain instrument executed by their predecessor-in-title to the property. In fact it is seen from the order of the trial Court that those facts i. e. the plaintiff and defendants had derived their title as successive inheritors of the right, title and interest of the predecessors-in-title who had apportioned the properties between themselves, were not disputed. Therefore, the plaintiff could not lay claim to more than 1/3 share to the water in the well by virtue of the transactions of the predecessors-in-title. In fact, during the course of the trial it was conceded by the plaintiff that he was only a joint owner and not an absolute owner. Thus, the scope of the suit was limited to the right of the plaintiff to draw and make use of the water from the well as and when he desired and it became the cause of action to the suit. In the first instance the suit had come to be decreed by the trial Court as prayed for by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court the defendants preferred an appeal in the Court of the civil Judge, Belgaum. The said appeal, on the directions issued by this Court, was transferred to the Court of the Prl. District Judge, Belgaum. In the course of the hearing of the appeal by the district Judge, the District Judge suggested that the matter may be settled amicably by providing a separate access to the plaintiff as well as the defendants to go to the well and by permitting them to draw water from the well at different times. On the proposal being agreed to between the parties, for settlement, the matter was remanded to the learned Civil Judge. On the proposal being agreed to between the parties, for settlement, the matter was remanded to the learned Civil Judge. At that juncture the plaintiff took up a plea that he being an Hindu he was required to take bath atleast once a day and some times more often than that and in summer he was required to take bath even late in the night after return from the work in the factory and as such there should be no restriction on his use of water from the well at all. The court did not accede to that contention mainly on the ground that the defendants being women, their privacy would be affected if plaintiff was permitted to use the well late in the evenings. In that view of the matter having regard to the fact that 2/3 share was with the defendant and 1/3 share was with the plaintiff, the Court fixed separate timings as well as separate access to the well taking into consideration the provisions made in the Easement Act of 1882 particularly section 28 (g) in regard to passage. Section 28 (2), it was found, had no application to the facts of the present case as both parties had independent access to the well and the question of determining the right of one owner in regard to the passage, as such, did not arise. In that circumstance the Court directed the plaintiff to make use of the well between 5 a. m. and 8 p. m. forbidding him from drawing the water after 8 p. m. till 5 a. m. on the following day. Aggrieved by that restriction imposed on him the plaintiff preferred the appeal. The appellate Court also found favour with the reasoning adopted by the trial Court and confirmed the judgment and decree. Therefore, the present appeal by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE question of law formulated for consideration of the Court in the memorandum of appeal reads as follows: (I) When plaintiff is the joint owner of the suit well situated in H. No. 225, whether courts below were right in passing a decree directing that plaintiff and him men, servants etc. shall draw water only between 5 a. m. and 8 p. m. ? (ii) Whether in a suit of the plaintiff, directions in the nature of injunction could be issued against the plaintiff himself? shall draw water only between 5 a. m. and 8 p. m. ? (ii) Whether in a suit of the plaintiff, directions in the nature of injunction could be issued against the plaintiff himself? ( 5 ) I do not think such questions of law really arise for consideration in this case. In fact I would go to the extent of saying that there is no question of law at all which calls for determination by this Court. What perhaps the appellant really means is whether the appellate Court has jurisdiction, in a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendants for injunction, to restrain the plaintiff himself by an injunction order or an order in the nature of an injunction. If the question as formulated by the Court is the one which really falls for determination, then I have no hesitation to answer that the Courts do have such a jurisdiction. From the facts stated above it could be seen that the plaint was presented to the Court alleging that the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the well and he had exclusive right and the defendants should be excluded from ping that well. At a subsequent stage in the suit it was discovered that he could not sustain that plea. Therefore, when the matter was before the District Judge, by virtue of the transfer directed by this Court from the Court of the Civil judge, a compromise was agreed to in principle and the execution of the compromise in principle was left to the trial Court to decide, after receiving fresh evidence and formulating additional issues in that behalf. It was in such circumstances that the Court, endowed with jurisdiction to subserve the ends of justice which the Courts always have as inherent power under Section 151 C. P. C. , acted and fixed separate passage and timings to enable both the plaintiff and defendants to make use of the well. The compelling argument advanced for the appellant was, he as a Hindu; is expected to take bath daily and many times on special occasions and, therefore, his access to the well and use of the well water could not have been curbed. His claim is he should be allowed to take bath as and when he likes. The compelling argument advanced for the appellant was, he as a Hindu; is expected to take bath daily and many times on special occasions and, therefore, his access to the well and use of the well water could not have been curbed. His claim is he should be allowed to take bath as and when he likes. I do not think that fixing timings to make use of the well in any way impedes the right of the plaintiff to take bath whenever he likes. After all he can store the water drawn from the well, within the hours permitted to him, and make use of it to take bath whenever he likes. Therefore, I do not see how the restriction imposed on the plaintiff acts as an injunction against him to take bath whenever he feels unless it be the plaintiff insists on taking bath at the well or near the well. All this appears to me to be an endeavour on the part of the plaintiff to protect what he considered it to be his personal pride. If the Court below had found it necessary to prevent the plaintiff to draw water from the well after 8 p. m. and, therefore, access to the well after 8 p. m. having regard to the fact that the defendants on the relevant date were all women and on the reasoning that it would invade their privacy, such a restriction would not result in injustice and nor could it be termed as an act without jurisdiction. ( 6 ) THE appeal is misconceived and is rejected. Appeal rejected. --- *** --- .