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1990 DIGILAW 428 (PAT)

K. P. Verma v. State of Bihar

1990-12-04

G.C.BHARUKA, N.P.SINGH, SACHCHIDANAND JHA

body1990
Judgment N.P. Singh, Sachchidanand Jha and G.C. Bharuka, JJ. This writ application has be n filed on behalf of the petitioner by way of public interest litigation for quashing a notification dated 21.11.1984 issued by the State Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Section 6 of the Act aforesaid is as follows ;- "6. Power to appoint Special Judges.- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences namely:- (a) an offence punishable under Section 161. [Section 161, Section 163, Section 164] Section 165 or Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code or Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abatement of any of the offences specified in clause (a). (2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act unless he is, or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898." 3. Mr. K.P. Verma, who has appeared in person, fairly conceded that, in view of the express and explicit language of section 6, it will be open to the State Government to appoint Special Judges as may be necessary for any area to be specified in the notification to fry the offences punishable under sections 161, 165 and/or 165A of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 4. According to the petitioner, even if the State Government may have power to establish such Special Courts under the provisions of the Act aforesaid, there does not appear to be any justification to establish only two such Special Courts for vigilance cases, one at Patna and the other at Ranchi. 5. It was pointed out that by establishment of only two Special Courts for vigilance cases, the fundamental right of accused persons to have speedy trial of their cases, as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, is being infringed. 5. It was pointed out that by establishment of only two Special Courts for vigilance cases, the fundamental right of accused persons to have speedy trial of their cases, as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, is being infringed. In this connection reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.V. Vathewsaran vs. The State of Tamil Nadu (1983 BBCJ 60-SC). 6. In principle there cannot be two opinions on that question. But it may be pointed out that the petitioner has questioned the validity of the said notification without giving the details as to how by establishment of only two Special Courts for trial of vigilance cases, the speedy justice is being denied to accused in such cases. We have already pointed out above that this application has been filed by way of public interest litigation. None of the accused in any such cases has approached this Court with the necessary materials to demonstrate that there being only two Special Courts their cases are not being heard or disposed of at an early date. If any such material had been brought on the record then certainly this Court would have considered the validity of the impugned notification. In absence of any such material, in our view, it will be a futile exercise on the part of this Court to issue any such direction. 7. However, we make it clear that it will be open to the State Government after making necessary enquiries, to apply its mind to the question whether at present there is necessity of more than two such Special Courts to be established in the State of Bihar fur vigilance cases. 8. This writ application is, accordingly, disposed of.