Judgment :- RAJU, J. Since the legal issues raised are common in these two tax cases and arguments submitted as such, we are dealing with both the cases by way of a common judgment. 2. The relevant facts in T.C. No. 1126 of 1980 are as follows : The assessee in this case is dealer in wood splints and for the assessment year 1978-79 they have reported a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 5, 33, 560. In the course of the checking of their accounts for final assessment, the assessing authority came to a different conclusion with reference to the quantum of turnover as well as the taxability of certain items and rates to be applied thereto and ultimately determined the total and taxable turnover at Rs. 6, 76, 572. In so doing, the assessing authority, in addition to the admitted items of turnover, chose to include within the taxable turnover a sum of Rs. 1, 36, 038.40 claiming to represent by the assessee to be charges incurred towards cutting, loading, unloading and freight charges in respect of the wood purchased as forming part of the purchase turnover of the wood for purposes of section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 3. So far as the facts in T.C. No. 1129 of 1980 are concerned, it is seen that the assessee reported a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 6, 89, 540.35 and Rs. 6, 88, 284.34, respectively. The assessing authority, while scrutinising and checking the accounts, found that the assessee purchased splints wood and veneers wood from both unregistered and registered dealers and while rejecting the claim of the assessee that those commodities are not exigible to tax under entry 84 of the First Schedule, ordered the levy of tax at 5 per cent and also ordered the levy of tax at 4 per cent on wastages. The plea raised to exempt the turnover relating to cutting, cooly and transport charges was also rejected. The assessee filed an appeal and the appellate authority allowed the claim of the assessee in respect of wastage wood as falling within "firewood" and rejected the claim of the assessee in respect of the rate to be applied to the commodity. The appellate authority held the commodity to constitute "timber" within the meaning of entry 84. The assessee filed an appeal and the appellate authority allowed the claim of the assessee in respect of wastage wood as falling within "firewood" and rejected the claim of the assessee in respect of the rate to be applied to the commodity. The appellate authority held the commodity to constitute "timber" within the meaning of entry 84. So far as the claim relating to cutting and transport charges is concerned, from the purchase turnover the assessee appears to have confined his argument to dispute the assessment on a turnover of Rs. 1, 73, 286 only consisting of Rs. 1, 00, 701 towards cutting charges and Rs. 72, 585 towards transport charges. The appellate authority found that there was no evidence to show that the cutting charges and transport charges were incurred subsequent to the purchases in all cases and that only in cases where the assessee had used their own delivery notes in form XX for the transport, it could be held that the transport was made by them subsequent to the purchase at the site and that in respect of items where there was no such proof of transport subsequent to the purchase by the assessee, the appellate authority held that the vouchers produced by them cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence as they were only prepared by the assessee themselves. The appellate authority also considered the impact of the decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Gill & Company Ltd. 1974 TAXLR 1943, 1974 (33) STC 536 (MP) and distinguished the said case from the case on hand on the ground that unlike the case reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Gill & Company Ltd. 1974 TAXLR 1943, 1974 (33) STC 536 (MP) wherein the assessee produced sale bills issued by the vendor which would constitute prima facie sufficient evidence, in the case on hand, what was produced was only the purchase vouchers prepared by the assessee themselves. With this view, the appellate authority chose to grant relief in respect of the purchase turnover to the tune of Rs. 92, 858 which represented the turnover of the commodity wherein the logs were found to have been cut and transported in the assessee's own delivery notes. With this view, the appellate authority chose to grant relief in respect of the purchase turnover to the tune of Rs. 92, 858 which represented the turnover of the commodity wherein the logs were found to have been cut and transported in the assessee's own delivery notes. On further appeal to the Tribunal by the assessee, the Tribunal purported to follow an earlier judgment in coming to the conclusion that the commodity in question did not fall under entry 84 of the First Schedule, but taxable under the multi-point rate. The Tribunal further granted relief in respect of cutting and transport charges on the ground that as per accounts, there is no warrant to hold that the cutting and transport charges were per-purchase expenses and, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the inclusion of the same in the purchase turnover under section 7-A was not in order. Consequently, the Tribunal ordered that the purchase turnover under section 7-A be fixed at Rs. 2, 12, 020.70 at 4 per cent multi-point. As against this, the State has filed the above tax case. 4. The learned Additional Government Pleader (C.T.) appearing for the State made two submissions, viz., (i) that the Tribunal committed an error in construing the commodity in question to be not "timber" within the meaning of entry 84 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, but one exigible to tax under the general charging provision at multi-point; and (ii) that the Tribunal further erred in directing the exclusion of cutting and transport charges as not forming part of the purchase turnover attracting levy under section 7-A of the Act. In reply thereto, Mrs. Chitra Venkataraman placed reliance upon Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1988 AIR(SC) 563, 1988 (14) ECR 353, 1988 (1) JT 50 , 1988 (68) STC 324, 1988 (1) Scale 1 , 1988 (S) SCC 232, 1988 (2) SCR 501 , 2004 (178) ELT 3, 1988 SSCC 232, 1988 Supp(SCC) 232(SC) in meeting the first point in addition to placing reliance upon the conclusions of the Tribunal and submitted that all timber may fall within the definition of "wood" but all wood need not come within the definition of "timber" and that inasmuch as what was purchased by the assessee was "soft wood", it will not fall under the category of "timber". In respect of the second submission on behalf of the State, the counsel for the assessee submitted that the conclusions of the Tribunal on the issue are findings of fact which cannot be assailed in this proceeding before this Court. 5. We have given our careful consideration to the issues raised before us. So far as entry 84 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, is concerned, omitting the explanation thereto, the description of the goods reads as "timber and bamboo". The word "timber" came up for consideration in various contexts and situations before several High Courts and the Supreme Court of India. We feel it necessary and sufficient to refer to only some of them which have a direct bearing on the issue now for consideration before us. In a decision reported in Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1973 (32) STC 309 the question of construction of the word "timber" as in item 63 of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The assessee therein purchased logs of wood and after sawing and cutting them into planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc., sold them. The assessee therein was sought to be taxed on such sales treating them as general goods under the general charging provision which was challenged by the assessee before the High Court contending that planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc., were timber within the meaning of the said item and that they were not liable to pay any tax as the sales effected by them were not first sales. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court referred in grant detail to the meanings of the word "timber" from dictionaries and law lexicon and after a careful consideration of the same and other relevant materials, held that because planks, rafters and cut sizes, etc., are sawn or cut from the logs of wood, they do not cease to be timber or alter their character. The learned Judges further held that the log of wood purchased by timber merchant is merely cut or sawn to sizes for convenience sake and make them acceptable to the customers and they do not in that process lose their character as timber. The learned Judges further held that the log of wood purchased by timber merchant is merely cut or sawn to sizes for convenience sake and make them acceptable to the customers and they do not in that process lose their character as timber. In the decision reported in Mohanlal Vishram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1969 (24) STC 101 , a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that by feeling standing timber trees, cutting them and converting some of them into ballis, the assessee did not alter their character as timber or used them for the manufacture of "other goods". In a decision reported in Hari Samanta and Sons v. State of Orissa 1987 (66) STC 86 a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court held, referring to the earlier case law on the subject, that by processing the logs and timbers and making them as "sized timbers", the resultant product would still be covered within the ambit of the expression "timber" put to a particular use. In Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kunhalavi & Co. 1987 (66) STC 100, 1987 KLT 317 , Division Bench of the Kerala High Court considered the question in the light of some of the judgments and came to the conclusion that rafter, planks, beams and the like were the same commodity as timber logs. In the decision reported in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. 1985 AIR(SC) 1293, 1985 (3) SCR 26 , 1985 (S) SCC 280, 1985 (2) SCALE 410 , 1986 (1) ArbLR 135 , 1985 (60) STC 213, 1985 (2) Scale 410 , 1985 TaxLR 2948, 1985 Supp(SCC) 280, 1985 SCC(Tax) 538, the Supreme Court of India considered the question arising under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, in great detail. This Supreme Court judgment also considered the views expressed by the decisions reported in Mohanlal Vishram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1969 (24) STC 101 (MP) and Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1973 (32) STC 309 (AP) referred to above and quoted them with approval. This Supreme Court judgment also considered the views expressed by the decisions reported in Mohanlal Vishram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1969 (24) STC 101 (MP) and Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1973 (32) STC 309 (AP) referred to above and quoted them with approval. At page 262 of the Report, the Supreme Court specifically referred to and considered the view expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that in dealing with matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular rather than their narrowly legal or technical sense, and that as the provision levying a tax on timber was directed to deal with a matter affecting people generally, as timber is in common use, the word "timber" would have the same meaning attached to it as in the common and ordinary use of language. The definition of the term "timber" often quoted in many of these decisions including that of the Supreme Court refers "timber" as "wood used for or suitable for building (as a house or boat) or for carpentry or joinery." * In considering the word "timber" conjointly with the word " plank", the Supreme Court expressed the view that the exact thickness and width of a plank may be of importance in technical specifications but in ordinary parlance planks would be flattened and smoothed timber and that such flatness and smoothness can only be achieved by using a saw and other implements required for that purpose. So saying, the views expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court were considered to be in order. Form the reported volume of [1988] 68 STC under the heading "From our Reporter at the Supreme Court," at page 9, item 31, it is seen that the Supreme Court appears to have dismissed the special leave petition filed against the judgment of the Kerala High Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kunhalavi & Co. 1987 (66) STC 100, 1987 KLT 317 . As for the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the assessee reported in Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. 1987 (66) STC 100, 1987 KLT 317 . As for the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the assessee reported in Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1988 AIR(SC) 563, 1988 (14) ECR 353, 1988 (1) JT 50 , 1988 (68) STC 324, 1988 (1) Scale 1 , 1988 (S) SCC 232, 1988 (2) SCR 501 , 2004 (178) ELT 3, 1988 SSCC 232, 1988 Supp(SCC) 232, it could be seen that it is a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court on appeal from the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The question for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether stacks of "eucalyptus wood" sold by the forest department after separating the "ballies" and "poles" constitute and answer the deception of "timber" under entry 32A of Part II of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The High Court, rejecting the contention of the assessee that what was sold to them was merely "firewood", held that the goods were "timber" under entry 32A. On appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed with the vie of the High Court and held that the goods in question are not timber. In considering this question, the Supreme Court referred to the definition of "timber" from various dictionaries and held as follows : "In a taxing statute words which are not technical expressions or words of art, but are words of everyday use, must be understood and given a meaning, not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense as understood in common parlance, i.e., that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it. Such words must be understood in their 'popular sense'. The particular terms used by the Legislature in the denomination of articles are to be understood according to the common commercial understanding of those terms used and not in their scientific and technical sense 'for the Legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists of geologists or botanists'. The expression 'timber', it seems to us, has an accepted and well-recognised legal connotation and is nomen juris. It has also a popular meaning as a word of everyday use. The expression 'timber', it seems to us, has an accepted and well-recognised legal connotation and is nomen juris. It has also a popular meaning as a word of everyday use. In this case, the two meanings of 'timber', the legal and the popular, coalesce and are broadly subsumed in each other." The Supreme Court also considered the usefulness of" use-test"in the following words : " Here again, pushed to its logical conclusions, the reasoning incurs the criticism of proceeding to determine the nature of the 'goods' by the test of the use to which they are capable of being put. The user-test is logical; but is, again, inconclusive. The particular use to which an article can be applied in the hands of a special consumer is not determinative of the nature of the goods. Even as the description of the goods by the authorities of the forest department who called them varyingly as 'eucalyptus fuel-wood' 'eucalyptus wood-heap', etc., is not determinative, the fact that the purchasers were dealers in timber is also not conclusive." * Ultimately in paragraphs 6 and 7, the Supreme Court concluded the question as hereunder : "We must, however, add that no tests of general validity applicable to or governing all cases can at all be laid down. The point to note and emphases is that all parts or portions of even a timber-tree need not necessarily be 'timber'. Some parts are timber, some parts merely 'firewood' and yet others merely 'wood'. Having regard to the nature and description of the wood in the present case, we think, the 'wood-heaps' are not susceptible to be or admit of being called 'timber' with all the concomitants and associations of that idea. Perhaps, different considerations might apply if, say, the pieces of eucalyptus wood are of a longer-length or of a higher girth. Difference of degree can bring about difference of kind. What emerges therefore, is that the goods in question are not 'timber' which the meaning and for purposes of entry 32A of the Act." * Thus it could be seen having regard to the particular type of wood considered in that case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it cannot be called "timber". The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision, according to us, does not help in any manner to support the plea of the assessee. 6. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision, according to us, does not help in any manner to support the plea of the assessee. 6. So far as the commodity under consideration in this case is concerned, the wood purchased is indisputably in the shape of logs though the assessee would call it to be "soft wood" specially suited perhaps for producing splints. It cannot be from that contended nor there is any substantive plea or proof in this case to the extent that it may not be used for other purposes too, namely, as "building material generally or for the building of houses or ships, etc., or for the use of the carpenter, joiner or other artisan" * . Merely because the petitioner has chosen to use the particular logs to manufacture splints, and call these logs as soft wood, the logs purchased by the assessee do not cease to be "timber" or possess a different character than the wood falling within the category of "timber". For all these reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal was wrong in construing the commodity to be not falling within "timber". We hold that the commodity purchased will squarely fall within the term "timber" as found in entry 84 of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. 7. With reference to the other contention about the exclusion of the cutting and freight charges from the purchase turnover liable to tax under section 7-A of the Act, we are of the view that the Tribunal again went astray and failed to properly advert to the materials on record and draw correct legal inference from the same. Both the assessing authority and the first appellate authority in particular dealt with this issue in detail. But the Tribunal readily assumed, after merely referring to the plea of the assessee, that there is no positive material to show that the cutting, loading, unloading and other transport charges have all been incurred only by the sellers. The Tribunal further observed that in the absence of any material to show that the sellers, the owners of the trees, had received besides the value of the wood involved cutting, loading, unloading and lorry freight charges, it is difficult to uphold the case of the Revenue that the purchase turnover would include those charges. The Tribunal further observed that in the absence of any material to show that the sellers, the owners of the trees, had received besides the value of the wood involved cutting, loading, unloading and lorry freight charges, it is difficult to uphold the case of the Revenue that the purchase turnover would include those charges. In our view, the Tribunal really missed the vital fact as to whose obligation was it to produce such material and to substantiate the case for exclusion. Unless the assessee produced sufficient and acceptable material to substantiate the fact that they purchased the wood by number of trees, arranged for their cutting and got them transported under the required and prescribed forms for transportation or they were able to produce the sale bills issued by the seller of the trees sufficiently indicating the details in terms of rule 6(c), the assessee could not have the benefit of exclusion. In this case, we find conspicuous absence of any such material except the purchase vouchers prepaid by the assessee themselves on which much weight could not have been placed in the teeth of the statements of the partner and the further fact that the entries made in the chittai also disclose calculation of the value of logs and credits having been given for full amounts. Thus no exception could be taken to the findings of the assessing authority and the first appellate authority and the conclusions of the Tribunal to the contrary in respect of Tax Case No. 1126 of 1980 on the question of exclusion of the turnover claimed by the assessee representing the charges for cutting and freight, do not lay down the correct proposition of the law on the subject. The Tribunal, in our view, misdirected itself to the vital facts and the principles of law governing the issue. Consequently, we set aside that portion of the order of the Tribunal also. 8. So far as T.C. No. 1129 of 1980 is concerned it could be seen that the first appellate authority considered the issue relating to the exclusion of cutting and transport charges, etc., in proper perspective and allowed the claim of the assessee wherever the assessee have used their own delivery notes in form XX for the transport and disallowed the same in respect of the other items. While so, the Tribunal was not right in interfering with such conclusion and that too in a summary fashion as has been done in paragraph 3 of the order of the Tribunal. The conclusions of the Tribunal in this regard cannot be sustained. So far as the question as to whether the commodity in question in this case also falls within the term "timber", used in entry 84 of the First Schedule to the Act, our conclusions in the other tax case equally apply to this case with all force and we set aside the order of the Tribunal on both counts in this case also. 9. In the result, the orders of the Tribunal are set aside and the tax cases are allowed. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.