MURLIDHER RAO, J. ( 1 ) UNSUCCESSFUL plaintiffs are the appellants. Claiming to be the members of the sadar community (sadhu matha) they instituted the suit in a representative capacity and under Section 92, CPC after obtaining the consent of the Advocate general. They alleged that property bearing door No. 270, old tharagupeth (godown) in Bangalore city, belongs to a public trust having been created by the award of the arbitrator, on 17th january, 1898. (this is the date on which certain disputes, hereafter narrated, were referred to arbitrator and the award is actually passed on 7th february, 1898 ). They also alleged that the terms of the award have been accepted and they have been acted upon. Their further plea was it was a perpetual endowment and its object was "anna daana" (free feeding), which was a public purpose of a charitable and religious nature. By the said award, which was registered, javaraya lingappa, mandi hariyappa and kalappa were appointed as trustees. All the three trustees have expired. The last one to die was kalappa who expired on 5-11-1967. It was alleged that he had purported to transfer the property to "sadhu mathada sangha", society registered under the societies Registration Act, however, fact remains that he had bequeathed the property in favour of his wife gowramma (respondent ). On these grounds it was alleged that there was a breach of express trust. Hence they prayed for the following reliefs:1) settling a scheme; 2) appointing new trustees and vesting the property in them; 3) declaring that the income of properties be allocated for purposes re-defining the objects of trust; and 4) directing the defendant (respondent) to render accounts. suit having been dismissed, they have filed this appeal. Before going into the further details of the suit, factual background, which is borne out by the records, and which gave rise to this litigation needs to he narrated. The family of the defendant (respondent) and the trustees mentioned above is illustrated by this geneology: ( 2 ) PROPERTIES including suit property were bequeathed by kallappa in favour of his wife by registered will dated 7-6-1965. In the will it was stated that under a partition deed registered on 7th february, 1989 (document No. 1164, book I of volume 257, pages 219 to 242) these items were allotted to the testator. In the will it was stated that under a partition deed registered on 7th february, 1989 (document No. 1164, book I of volume 257, pages 219 to 242) these items were allotted to the testator. To avoid confusion it has to be clarified that this partition deed which is not produced is different from the arbitrator's award of the same date which is also registered on that date. ( 3 ) MANDI hariyanna, who is named as one of the trustees, was occupying the suit premises as a tenant running a business in the name and style of M/s. Mandi hariyanna and sons. Gowramma (respondent-defendant) in whose favour the property had been bequeathed by her husband kalappa, as landlord, initiated eviction proceedings in h. r. c. No. 1373/1971, against mandi hariyanna and few other tenants. In those proceedings the tenants contended that gowramma is not the landlord, as the property had been dedicated to a charitable trust. Consequently a preliminary issue was framed regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant. M. h. raju, son of mandi hariyanna was examined as rw-2. In his statement he stated that as per the arbitrator's award this property was set apart for charitable purposes and it was a trust property; the then surviving trustees namely, his father and kalappa (husband of gowramma-respondent who initiated eviction proceedings) had to execute the trust deed. He admitted that rents were being sent by cheque to gowramma, who admittedly was not a trustee. ( 4 ) ON this material the court held that the property belonged to gowramma and no trust had been created. The said order is confirmed by this court in c. r. p. nos, 467 and 468 of 1974. Thereafter the present suit is filed on 31-10-1974, after obtaining the consent of Advocate general on 23-10-1974. ( 5 ) REVERTING back to the suit, the defendant denied the allegation that it was a trust property, she asserted that it was her personal and exclusive property. She contended that property not being a trust property, suit under Section 92, CPC was not maintainable. She specifically alleged that facts alleged are false and vexatious, suit is got filed at the instance of tenants whose contention was overruled in the eviction proceedings. ( 6 ) ON the pleadings, the court-below framed the following issues:"1. She contended that property not being a trust property, suit under Section 92, CPC was not maintainable. She specifically alleged that facts alleged are false and vexatious, suit is got filed at the instance of tenants whose contention was overruled in the eviction proceedings. ( 6 ) ON the pleadings, the court-below framed the following issues:"1. Whether the plaint schedule godown was impressed with the character of trust for the fulfilment of the object of the trust by virtue of the registered award dated 17-1-1898 between mallamma, wife of doddalingappa and kalappa, narasamma, and gowramma, registered as No. 1165/1897-98 at Bangalore city sub-registrar's office? 2. Whether late kalappa was not a party to the registered award bearing document No. 1165, dated 17-1-1898? 3. Whether the schedule godown property was the only godown in old tharagupet which belonged to the joint family of javaraya lingappa, hariyanna and kalappa? 4. Whether kalappa, was, some years before his death, acting in a manner which was inconsistent with his position as a trustee? 5. Whether the award dated 17-1-1898 between mallamma, kalappa, narasamma and gowramma was not acted upon between the parties? 6. Whether the plaintiffs do not have locus standi to field the suit?7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs prayed for?" ( 7 ) ON behalf of the plaintiffs four witnesses are examined and in rebuttal defendant is examined as dw-1, the court-below held that the suit property, namely, godown, was not the trust property; kalappa though named as trustee, bad not signed the award; as the property in question namely, 'godown' had not been specifically referred to and there was no schedule appended to the award, it was not possible to hold that the 'property' in the award is referable to and identified with the suit godown; as no trust was created, kalappa's act in bequeathing the suit property in favour of his wife was not inconsistent with his position as trustee; suit is not tenable under Section 92, CPC. ( 8 ) MR. Gopalaswamy, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the award dated 7th february, 1898 (ext. P-1) has created a trust and suit property stands endowed to the said trust; suit property having been endowed as trust property, the findings of the court-below on other issues which flow from this finding are liable to be set aside. Gopalaswamy, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the award dated 7th february, 1898 (ext. P-1) has created a trust and suit property stands endowed to the said trust; suit property having been endowed as trust property, the findings of the court-below on other issues which flow from this finding are liable to be set aside. He maintained that on facts, irrespective of the factual background which had preceded the filing of suit, the suit should have been decreed. Mr. Davanam satyanarayan, learned counsel for respondent-plaintiff, supported the findings and persisted that they should be affirmed and there is no ground for reversal. ( 9 ) ON the contentions, so urged, the following questions emerge for consideration:1. Whether a valid trust is created and the suit property was converted as trust property? 2. Whether the award, by itself and without anything more, placed a restriction on kallappa to dispose of the suit property in the way he has done? 3. Whether the findings of the court-below, including the question of maintainability, warrant interference? ( 10 ) POINT no, i: as the matter pertains to events that have happened six decades ago, no useful purpose will be served by the oral evidence which is more hearsay and not worthy of acceptance. Therefore the conclusions have to rest on the appreciation of documents and other circumstances. As the plaintiffs have based their assertion on the basis of award, passed by arbitrators, on 7-2-1898 (ex, p-1), it is necessary to scrutinize the same. In respect of the family properties several in number, there arose disputes between mallamma, the fifth wife of doddalingappa and kalappa, husband of defendant-respondent. They referred their disputes to three arbitrators, namely: 1. Maganahalli sangappa, 2. Attibele rudrappa, 3. Ex-jamedar mohamed budansab. These arbitrators submitted an award. Though several issues were considered, we are concerned with only issue No. 7 which pertains to the desire of doddalingappa husband of mallamma to provide for 'free food' and establishment of hospital in the choultry constructed by mandi mariyappa, father of mandi hariyanna, one of the trustees designate. Attibele rudrappa, 3. Ex-jamedar mohamed budansab. These arbitrators submitted an award. Though several issues were considered, we are concerned with only issue No. 7 which pertains to the desire of doddalingappa husband of mallamma to provide for 'free food' and establishment of hospital in the choultry constructed by mandi mariyappa, father of mandi hariyanna, one of the trustees designate. Mallamma and kalappa have consented to make provision in this regard, but as establishment of hospital required huge amount and parties to dispute were not in a position to provide funds, it was abandoned; but for providing 'free food', it was stated thus: (emphasis supplied) ( 11 ) THE award did not provide the schedule and it was not made part of the award. Therefore the property remained unspecified in the schedule. Without the clarification and description of boundaries, the property on which charge was created for rendering service of 'free food' became vague and unidentifiable. The description of the property as mentioned in the award does not, by itself, change the ownership and user of the property. Further, the latter portion extracted above, clearly states that from out of the income "waqrt rfjseowrood" kalappa, mandi hariyappa and javarai lingappa shall arrange the service. This only means that the responsibility of arranging the service from the 'income' is thrust on these three persons. Plain reading of this part of the document, on which the claim of the plaintiffs hinges, does neither spell out creation of trust, nor the dedication of any property to the trust, nor treat these persons as having been appointed as trustees. ( 12 ) BUT Mr. Gopalswamy in his endeavour to canvass that 'trust' is created by this part of document, stressed that there was only one 'gadang' (godown) belonging to the family, therefore there was no ambiguity or vagueness regarding identification of property; secondly the charitable purpose having been mentioned that fulfils yet another essential ingredient of 'public trust' and lastly the naming of three persons, to discharge the 'purpose' from the demarcated property would only imply that these persons are to function as 'trustees'. Elaborating his contention he added that the intention of charitable purpose having been manifested in the document, all the essential ingredients of "trust" exist, therefore the conclusion to the contrary would be erroneous. Elaborating his contention he added that the intention of charitable purpose having been manifested in the document, all the essential ingredients of "trust" exist, therefore the conclusion to the contrary would be erroneous. He submitted, without anything more, trust has come into existence and the property ceased to be the property of any individual and was transformed as 'trust property'. He submitted though the award has not been made a decree of the court, by itself, it is legally operative and binds all the parties. The award having been registered, contended the counsel, the conclusion is inescapable that it is a trust property. These submissions need examination. "trust" originates from a declaration by the owner in respect of property for the benefit of some other person or object; wherein, the object being the dominant purpose he constitutes himself or some other person or persons as trustees to utilise the property and its income for the fulfilment of the object. It is an instance of dual ownership. The one who takes the burden of discharging the object has ownership rights with an obligation, simultaneously the beneficiary or the recipient of service has a right to demand its utilisation for the object or purpose. The owner who dedicates the property, deprives himself of several rights in the property, as soon as it is conveyed to the 'trust' - a body which has to discharge the obligation. Therefore it has the following characteristics:a) trust property on which the dedicator has absolute right. B) intention to create trust. C) purpose of the trust. D) person or persons named or to be appointed as trustees and their qualifications including the successors. ( 13 ) IN the instant case, the suit property along with other items belonged to the family of muddalinganna. After his death, it devolved on his sons doddalingappa and mudlappa. On doddaliugappa's death, his heir was his wife mallamma; similarly mudlappa died leaving behind his son kalappa. Disputes having cropped up between kalappa and mallamma, it had been referred to arbitration. If mallamma and kalappa are to be construed as persons having rights in the properties, any dedication or endowment, for any charitable purpose, has to be done by both of them after observing such formalities as law requires them to do for conveying their respective rights in the property. If mallamma and kalappa are to be construed as persons having rights in the properties, any dedication or endowment, for any charitable purpose, has to be done by both of them after observing such formalities as law requires them to do for conveying their respective rights in the property. It is only thereafter that particular property passes from their hands and gets vested in the one named by them. Admittedly mallamma and kalappa either jointly or individually had not executed any document. Hence it follows that owners have not alienated their rights, creating rights in others. Therefore, there is neither any creation of any trust nor of trust property at the instance of true owners. ( 14 ) WHILEEX. P-1 narrates that doddalingappa had a desire for 'free food' being done in mandi mariyappa's choultry there is nothing to indicate, except the so-called consent mentioned by the arbitrators in the award (ex. P-l) to conclude that mallamma and kalappa had nourished similar desire, which has blended their intention to create a trust and set apart the suit schedule property for that purpose. The arbitration award does not bear their signatures. Hence it is not possible to infer that they bad such an intention. ( 15 ) THE beneficiary in this case would be those who get the supply of 'free food'. In ext. P-l they are described as "ajdcj rtereqcdosn" i. Community leaders, coming from out stations. There is no evidence that at any time after 7-2-1898, this activity or service is rendered in the place. That is the reason why the plaintiffs have prayed for redefining the object. ( 16 ) LASTLY while kalappa, javarailingappa and hariyappa are entrusted with this responsibility, there is nothing in the deed about their successors. Admittedly none of them is alive; as on the date of the suit, there were no trustees. ( 17 ) ABOVE all this, in no part of the document the word is mentioned. Further, kalappa in his life time has treated the property as hispersonal property and there is no iota of evidence to show that he looked after the property as trustee. In the last will executed by him (ext. P-3) he has stated that they - are his absolute property and he had bequeathed the same in favour of his wife gowramma (defendant-respondent ). He had annulled and revoked the earlier will dated 1st february, 1965. In the last will executed by him (ext. P-3) he has stated that they - are his absolute property and he had bequeathed the same in favour of his wife gowramma (defendant-respondent ). He had annulled and revoked the earlier will dated 1st february, 1965. These acts on his part manifestly demonstrate that he had ' never acted as trustee. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that suit property is a trust property, originating from the award (ex. P-l ). ( 18 ) POINT No. Ii: that takes us to the next question whether the arbitrators could themselves create a trust arbitration, as is well known, is a chosen forum for adjudication of dispute, wherein the parties voluntarily agree to abide by its adjudication. As the arbitration proceedings are of the year 1889, the law then governing the subject has to be examined. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 was introduced in the former state of Mysore by regulation II of 1884 with effect from 1st july, 1884. Chapter xxxvii (part v) contains Provisions regarding arbitration. Sections 506 to 524 deal with arbitration through the court. Sections 525 and 526 deal with the awards passed by arbitrators without the intervention of court. These sections read thus:"525. When any matter has been referred to arbitration without the intervention of a court of justice, andan award has been made thereon, any person interested in the award may apply to the court of the lowest grade having jurisdiction over the matter to which the award relates, that the award be filed in court. The application shall be in writing and shall be numbered and registered as a sail between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties as defendants. The court shall direct notice to be given to the parties to the arbitration, other than the applicant, requiring them to show cause, within a time specified, why the award should not be filed. 526. If no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in Section 520 or Section 521 be shown against the award, the court shall order it to be filed, and such award shall then take effect as an award made under the Provisions of this chapter. " ( 19 ) IT follows that awards becomes effective only when it is filed in the court after due notice to parties. But Mr. " ( 19 ) IT follows that awards becomes effective only when it is filed in the court after due notice to parties. But Mr. Gopalswamy relying on rambilas mahto and others v babu durga bijai prasad singh and others, AIR 1965 Patna 239 submitted that the award could be treated as source of title and could be enforced as a decree of the court. In that case the learned judges were considering a case where the plaintiff sought a decree for declaration of title, recovery of possession and for a further declaration that award of the arbitrators was void and inoperative. At para 10 it is stated thus:"it is pertinent to observe that before the 1st july, 1940, when the present Arbitration Act came into force, the law governing "arbitration by agreement without the intervention of a court" was contained in the Indian Arbitration Act (act ix of 1899 ). In that Act, there was no provision for passing a judgment or a decree on the basis of the award. The award, if validly made, was operative by itself. If could also be treated as an independent source of title and it could be enforced as if it were a decree of the court. That is no longer the law, and an award made, after the act of 1940 came into force, assumes validity and becomes effective or bind ing upon the rights of the parties when it has been made a Rule of the court. This follows clearly from the Provisions of the act referred to above. If an award would have been effective even without being made a Rule of the court, then it is difficult to appreciate why Section 17 of the Present Act which occurs in the chapter relating to "arbitration without intervention of a court" should have at all provided for the pronouncement of a judgment in terms of the award and for a decree to follow upon the judgment so pronounced. The necessity for making the award a Rule of the court cannot be an idle formality. It is obviously designed to clothe the award with the requisite sanctity. It is equally clear that an award which has not been subjected to the scrutiny of the court cannot stand at par with an award which after the court's scrutiny has become a Rule of the court. It is obviously designed to clothe the award with the requisite sanctity. It is equally clear that an award which has not been subjected to the scrutiny of the court cannot stand at par with an award which after the court's scrutiny has become a Rule of the court. It seems to me, therefore, that the bar envisaged by Section 32 contemplates that the award has been duly made a Rule of the court under Section 17". (emphasis added) further, the concluding portion of para 11 reads thus:"----it follows, therefore, that an award that has not been filed or made a Rule of the court is wholly ineffective and the parties are relegated to the position as if there was no arbitration and no award. " ( 20 ) THE above observations indeed hold that the award becomes effective only when it is made Rule of the court. The conclusion reinforces our view based on the interpretation of sections 525 and 526, quoted above. ( 21 ) IN satish kumar v surinder kumar, AIR 1970 SC 833 it was held that an award effects partition of immoveable property exceeding Rs. 100/- requires registration. In the course of judgment, his lordship k. s. hegde, agreeing with the judgment Delivered by Sikri, J. Added:"the award does create rights in immoveable property but these rights cannot be enforced until the award is made a decree of court. It is one thing to say that a right is not created, it is entirely different thing to say that the right created cannot be enforced without further step". (emphasis added) therefore, the award, in the instant case, though registered cannot be enforced. ( 22 ) FINALLY Mr. Gopalswamy placed reliance on venkatammah v a. Krishna setty, 1885 (8) Mys. L. r. 235 ad to contend that a suit is maintainable to enforce an award and it is not imperative to adopt the procedure under Section 526, C. P. C. in that case a suit was instituted on 11-7-1884 to recover money due under an award dated 10-7-1881. The trial court had held that suit was barred by limitation, as it had been filed beyond six months. The high court held that the suit having been brought within three years, it was not barred by limitation. It was held that award was a contract. The trial court had held that suit was barred by limitation, as it had been filed beyond six months. The high court held that the suit having been brought within three years, it was not barred by limitation. It was held that award was a contract. In our view this ruling, persuasive as it is, does not assist the plaintiffs. The specific case is that trust is created by the award and properties which belonged to kalappa, had been transferred to the non-existing trust. Admittedly plaintiffs are not parties to the arbitration proceedings, they are strangers. Their assumed right flows from their belief that the non-existing trust has become the owner with no trustees, as on the date of suit. Hence this ruling has no application particularly in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above. ( 23 ) OUR conclusion on points I and II leads us to hold that kalappa had not been deprived of his rights in the property and therefore he could, as he did, deal with the property as he liked. Hence the bequest made in favour of his wife holds the field and remains unaffected by the award (ext. P-1 ). ( 24 ) POINT No. III. As no trust is created, suit under Section 92, CPC was not maintainable. The court-below was justified in so holding. In all other respects the findings do not call for interference. Hence this appeal, fails. It is dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .