ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. The defendant has come up in appeal aggrieved by an order of temporary injunction passed by the trial Court restraining the defendant/appellant from alienating the suit property and executing any sale-deed either in favour of Gurucharansingh or any other person. 2. The plaintiff/respondent has filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell of the suit property said to have been entered into by the defendant in favour of plaintiff on 6-5-1988. The consideration recited is Rs. 20,000/- out of which Rs. 10,000/- are said to have been paid simultaneously with the execution of the agreement. The defendant has denied the execution of the agreement and receipt of part consideration. On the other hand, the plea is that on 17-4-1988 he has entered into an agreement to sell the suit property in favour of his tenant Gurucharansingh and Gopalsingh, parting with possession in their favour in part performance of the agreement. Admittedly, the possession is not with the plaintiff though it is disputed as to whether the entire suit property is in possession of the tenants or the defendant. The plaintiff prayed for an ad-interim injunction restraining the attempted alienation of the suit property by the defendant. The prayer was allowed and the trial Court has granted the injunction as prayed for. 3. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant, placing reliance on Jamnabai v. Narmadashankar, 1957 JLJ 914 DB, Anil Kumar Kitesh v. Kashinath, 1982 MPWN 247 and Sitaram v. Tularam, 1989 JLJ 432 , contended that the interest of the plaintiff/respondent being sufficiently protected by the doctrine of Us pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892, the plaintiff was not going to suffer any irreparable injury and even otherwise, the plaintiff had failed in making out any prima facie case and as such, no injunction should have been granted on his application. He has also submitted, in the alternative, that the Court below has not legally disposed of the issue as to the grant of temporary injunction and hence setting aside the impugned order the matter deserves to be remanded back for reconsiderattion. 4. He has also submitted, in the alternative, that the Court below has not legally disposed of the issue as to the grant of temporary injunction and hence setting aside the impugned order the matter deserves to be remanded back for reconsiderattion. 4. Shri J. P. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned order and placed reliance on Mukesh v. Deonarayan and Ors., 1987JLJ 572, Awadh Bihari v. Ashok Kumar, 1987 (2) MPWN 24 and Kailash Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1988 (2) MPWN 125, to submit that an injunction restraining an alienation pendente lite has rightly been granted by the trial Court. 5. It is true that the Civil Court does have power to issue a temporary injunction restraining an attempted alienation of the suit property by either party. Merely because Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act protects the interest of the complaining party by providing that an alienation lis pendens shall be subject to the result of the suit, but, that does not mean that the Civil Court does not have power to issue an injunction. A contention to the contrary, if accepted, would have the effect of rendering part of the provisions contained in Clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code otiose. The power is there but, needless to say, that it is not to be exercised necessarily merely because it has been asked to be exercised. 6. In Jamnabai's case (supra), the suit filed was for partition of property and not one to obtain an injunction. Out of the substantial property involved in the suit, the plaintiff had an undivided interest only, and that too not considerable one. The balance of convenience was against the plaintiff. The Division Bench having expressed an opinion that no order of injunction could be issued which would operate only to the extent of plaintiffs undivided interest, held that the plaintiffs interest was sufficiently protected by the principle of Us pendens and issue of injunction would only complicate the matter. Order rejecting the prayer for the grant of interim injunction was upheld. 7. Order rejecting the prayer for the grant of interim injunction was upheld. 7. In Anil Kumar Hitesh (supra) also, the Single Bench of this Court was of the opinion that balance of convenience was not in favour of the plaintiff and withholding of the injunction was not going to cause any injury to the plaintiff whose interest was protected well by the doctrine of lis pendens. 8. In Sitaram (supra), again a Single Bench of this Court formed an opinion that on the facts of the case, that the plaintiff suing for specific performance relying on an agreement to sell, disputed by the defendant, was not entitled to an injunction as no prima facie case existed in his favour. 9. In Mukesh (supra), vide para 23, this Court granted art injunction to the plaintiff, allowing his appeal because on the facts of the case it had formed an opinion that the doctrine of Us pendens would not afford any real protection to the plaintiff. Similar is the view taken in Awadh Bihari (supra) and Kailash Kaur (supra). 10. In the opinion of this Court, the matter as to the grant of a temporary injunction restraining alienation is governed by the same principles as are applicable to the grant of prayer for temporary injunction of any other nature, such as one restraining waste or damage to the suit property or dispossession of the plaintiff with the only distinction that consideration of the doctrine of lis pendens as affording protection the aggrieved party has also to be kept in view. The Division Bench in Jamnabai's case (supra), quoted with approval the view of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Man Mohinee Dossee v. Ichamoyee Dossee, 13 Sutherland's Weekly Reporter (Civil Rulings) 60, wherein the Court exercising the power of issuing injunctions and appointing receiver pendente lite has been cautioned to act most cautiously. Paramount consideration is to see whether the property in the suit required to be retained in existing condition and the attempted alienation, if not restrained, would cause the danger of the property in suit being destroyed, damaged or put beyond the reach of the Court. In Sitaram's case (supra), it has been said in para 20 : - "... it is a matter of discretion, whether an injunction will or will not be granted. In Sitaram's case (supra), it has been said in para 20 : - "... it is a matter of discretion, whether an injunction will or will not be granted. But the manner of exercise of that discretion depends upon the precise nature of the particular right, which is sought to protect and upon all the other material circumstances. An application for an injunction is an appeal to the extraordinary power of the Court and the plaintiff is bound to make out the case showing a clear necessity for its exercise, it being the duty of the Court rather to protect acknowledged rights than to establish new and doubtful ones." 11. Recently, in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 , while laying down the principles for the grant of temporary injunction in mandatory form, their Lordships observed : - "...Since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are : (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive or complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as pre-requisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion." In the opinion of this Court, the abovesaid law applies to the case governing the grant of prohibitory injunction in temporary form restraining the attempted alienation. Extra care and caution has to be adopted by the Court to see that the plaintiff does not intend to achieve something else or is not acting with the ulterior motive in the garb of seeking a temporary injunction. People do not ordinarily alienate their property but for reasons. A temporary injunction granted without care and caution may have the effect of making the situation irreversible and by the time the case comes to be decided, it may become practically impossible to place the person injuncted in the same position in which he would have been if the injuction was not granted. The necessity of a strong prima facie case arises in such cases because the plaintiff must have extra strength for piercing into the umbrella of shelter taken by the defendant Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Whether the plaintiff has reasonable prospects of obtaining permanent injunction at the end of the suit and how the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in spite of the protection enjoyed by him Under Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, are the additional questions which must be posed by the Court to itself while considering a prayer for the grant of temporary injunction restraining alienation of the suit property. 12. Having reviewed the law as aforesaid, now the facts of the case. 13. The trial Court in its impugned order has observed that the defendant while contesting the plaintiffs prayer for the grant of an injunction had filed only a typed copy (and not a photo copy) of the agreement dated 17-4-1988 said to have been entered by him. It has been further observed that Hariprasad and M. C. Behl, the attesting witnesses to the agreement had not appeared for the defendant and deposed on affidavits. Gurucharansingh's not swearing any affidavit also impressed the Court. However, the trial Court failed to see that the agreement executed by the defendant, in the very nature of the things, was not expected to be in his possession but to be with the contract-vendee who were not parties to the case and it was not within the power of the defendant to have brought them or the document in their possession to the Court. The affidavits sworn in by Hariprasad and M. C. Behl are available on record but the trial Court failed to notice them. The affidavits sworn in by Hariprasad and M. C. Behl are available on record but the trial Court failed to notice them. This Court cannot resist observing that the trial Court did not apply its mind seriously to all the material available on record. It has also not considered the law deducible from the several cases which were cited before it. 14. In Laturiya v. Shyambabu, 1990 (2) MPWN 126, this Court has expressed agreement with the view taken in Vadivel Mudaliar and Anr. v. Pachianna Counder, AIR 1974 Madras 87, wherein it has been held : - "In the matter of granting temporary injunction, it is the duty of the Court to take into consideration the affidavits and the relevant documents before it records a finding. 'Taking into consideration the documents' does not mean merely referring to the same in the judgment; but there must be some discussion about them before any conclusion is arrived at. Unfortunately, the Courts below have not adverted to these documents, though not in detail at least prima facie, except referring them in their judgments. This has completely vitiated the orders of the Courts below, which, in my opinion, is a material irregularity, and has to be taken that the Courts below have not exercised their jurisdiction vested in them bylaw." 15. As the trial Court has failed in discharging its duty expected of a trial Court, both in the matter of applying its mind to the facts of the case and taking into consideration the relevant legal principles, the impugned order deserves to be set aside with a consequent remand to the trial Court for consideration of the matter afresh. 16. The appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court which shall rehear the parties and decide the plaintiff/respondent's application for the grant of temporary injunction afresh, in accordance with law and consistently with the observations made hereinabove. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this appeal.