JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Reversal of success by the first appellate Court has brought the defendant before this Court. 2. In the present appeal, the controversy relates to the scope, purport and ambit of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Act'), and the modalities to be performed before a document required by law to be attested can be used in evidence. 3. The fact situation giving rise to the controversy, briefly outlined, is as follows : Plaintiffs, the rspondents herein, filed the suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, alternatively for recovery of possession if there has been any illegal dispossession, and for declaration that an alleged gift deed executed in favour of the defendant was illegal, invalid ; and the transaction was unauthorised as the property was joint family property. Plaintiffs and defendant are progenies of one Bansidhar. Defendant was adopted by one Padmanav, during the former's childhood. Plaintiffs contended.that taking advantage of Bansidhar's illness, fraud and deception was practised, and the outcome is the gift deed. Defendant counter-vailed the plea by urging that the gift was valid, the deed was executed and attested in accordance with law ; and the property being self-acquired property of Bansidhar, there was no illiciticy attached to the transaction. 4. In view of these conflicting stands, the trial Court framed seven issues of which issue Nos. 4 and 5 are pivotal issues and the fate of the suit depends on the answer to these two issues. The two issues were whether the deed of gift was illegal, void and tainted with undue influence and whether same had been acted upon. The trial Court held that the deed of gift had been acted upon. Though issue No. 4 related to the legality and validity of the gift deed, no specific conclusion was recorded. However, from the trend of discussion it appears that the same was held to be valid. In appeal, the learned Subordinate judge considered that the point that arose for consideration was whether the deed of gift was illegal and void and tainted with undue influence, and whether the same was acted upon He held that the deed of gift was illegal and void and tainted with undue influence, and the same was not acted upon. In appeal, the learned Subordinate judge considered that the point that arose for consideration was whether the deed of gift was illegal and void and tainted with undue influence, and whether the same was acted upon He held that the deed of gift was illegal and void and tainted with undue influence, and the same was not acted upon. For this conclusion, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the defendant had not proved the gift deed as required the law. Though he also gave some findings as to the nature of the property it has been accepted by the learned counsel for the parties that the pivotal issues relate to the validity and legality of the deed, and other issues are not of much consequence. They have also accepted that the fate of this appeal would depend on the adjudication of that question alone. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the conclusion of the first appellate Court that the document was not nd sliy proved contrary to law, and that one who disputes proper execution an/or attestation has to specifically plead it. Reference in this context is made to Section 68 of the Act, He also submitted that the plaintiffs-respondents did not' plead absence of valid attestation, and it having not been done, it was not open to the appellate Court below to make out a new case of non-proof of the document in accordance with law. This has been countered by the learned counsel for the respondents urging that the lower appellate Court has rightly observed that attestation having not; been proved, defendant- appellant would derive no benefit from the gift deed. 5. The contentions need careful consideration. The provisions which need reference are Section 68 of the Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property act (in short the "T. P. Act'). The expressions .'execution' and 'attestation' have vital role to play in the present dispute. 'Execution' and 'attestation'are sequela acts. Attestation and execution are two links of the same chain, the former succeeding the latter in the sequence of events.' Section 68 of the Act deals with the proof of the execution of documents required by law to be attested. It provides that such document shall not be used as evidence .until at feast one attesting witness has been called to prove the execution. It provides that such document shall not be used as evidence .until at feast one attesting witness has been called to prove the execution. To execute a document means the completion of legal instrument, fulfilment of all conditions necessary to validity. 'Execution' is a formal completion of a deed. The word 'execution' as used in the proviso to Section 68 of the Act means and" includes not only the signature of the executant out the whole series of acts or formalities which are necessary to give the document validity. (See AIR 1941 Oudh 89 : Kali Charan v. Suraj Bali and others). The execution of a document obviously means a valid, proper and due execution. It means a voluntary execution i, e. signing of the document of the executant's free will, accompanied by the intention to give effect and operation to it (See Abdul Hasan Vs. Mt. Wajih-un-nissa and Others, ). To say that a document has been signed is not the same thing as saying that a document has been executed. (See Shek Basaraddi and Others Vs. Kroshali Taluqdar, ). The purpose of attestation is to ensure that the executant was a free agent and was neither under pressure nor subject to fraud while executing the same. That is the reason behind the legislative imperative set out in Section 68 to call at least one attesting witness in proof of an attestabfe document, so that the circumstances under which the document was executed can be gathered. Whit is vital is to determine whether the document requiring attestation had been executed in an upright manner. This conclusion is reinforced by the provisions contained in the proviso to Section 68. The requirement of attestation is diluted in a case where there is no specific denial of execution. Where, however, the signature of a "person to a document is obtained by duress or intimidation, there is no execution of the document in eye of law. Execution does not mean the mechanical act of signing the dorument or getting it signed without appreciating the contents of the documents. (See AIR 1935 Pat 497 : Keshwar v. Rajeswari Pershad Singh and others) Execution is not mere signature on the document The executant should have appreciated and understood the contents of the document. To put it differently, the mind should have moved with the pen. (See AIR 1935 Pat 497 : Keshwar v. Rajeswari Pershad Singh and others) Execution is not mere signature on the document The executant should have appreciated and understood the contents of the document. To put it differently, the mind should have moved with the pen. Execution of a. document implies intelligent and conscious appreciation of the contents and facts indicated in the document. (See Ramadhin Singh Vs. Siaram Singh and Another, ), 'Attestation 'means that when an instrument is required to be attested a witness shall he present at its execution and shall testify that it has been executed by the proper person. As observed by the Supreme Court in Seth Beni Chand (Since Dead) Now by L.Rs. Vs. Smt. Kamla Kunwar and Others by attestation is meant the signing of a document to signify that, the attestor is a witness to the execution of the document; and by Section 63(c) of the Succession Act, an attesting witness is one who signs the document in the presence of the executant after seeing the execution of the document or after receiving a personal acknowledgement from the executant as regards the execution of the document. To attest means to bear witness to a fact The definition of the word 'attested' as appearing in Section 3 of the T. P. Act includes acknowledgement of signature by the executant as sufficient in cases where the person who signed as an attesting witness did not see the actual 'execution of the deed; but has received personal acknowledgement of execution from the executant. 'Attestation' is intended to ensure that there a is no fraud or other vitiating circumstances in the execution of the document. There are certain documents which are by law required to be attested. Section 68 of the Act comes into operatin when a document in law is required to be attested. It imperates at least one attesting witness to be called for proving its execution, if one is alive, and subject to the process of the Court, and capable of giving evidence. The proviso makes an exception by providing that where execution of the document is not specifically denied, it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and is not a Will. The proviso makes an exception by providing that where execution of the document is not specifically denied, it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and is not a Will. Documents which require attestation are (i) a Will Under Sections 57 and 68 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925; (ii) a mortgage, the principal money secured by which is Rs. 100/-or upwards (Section 59 of the T. P. Act); and (Hi) a gift of immovable property (Section 123 of the T. P. Act). 6. In the case of gift of immovable property, whatever be its value, a registered instrument is necessary. The deed must be (a) signed by or on behalf of the donor, (b) attested by at least two witnesses; and (c) registered. As observed by the Supreme Court in M. L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib Vs. M. V. Venkata Sastri and Sons and Others the act of attestation must be done animo attestandi, that is for the purpose of attesing, and that the attesting witness has seen the executant sigh, or has received from him a personal acknowledgement of his signature. If a person purs his signature for some other purpose, that is, to certify that he is a scribe or an indentifier or Registering Officer, he is not an attesting witness. Thus, the executant has to see that before a document has validity, his signature is there and at le ist there are two persons who have signed before him ; the persons being such as have seen him signing or received a personal acknowledgement of the execution of the deed from him. After the deed is signed and attested it is taken for registration. If the previous signing of the document by the executant, and the previous attestation of the attesting witnesses are dispensed with, the gurantee of genuineness required by Section 123 of, the T. P. Act is lost. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Lachman Singh and Others Vs. If the previous signing of the document by the executant, and the previous attestation of the attesting witnesses are dispensed with, the gurantee of genuineness required by Section 123 of, the T. P. Act is lost. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Lachman Singh and Others Vs. Surendra Bahadur Singha and Others, was confronted with the question as to whether, (a) when a plaintiff sues on a mortgage deed, and the mortgage deed is not admitted by the defendant or defendants, the former has formally to prove it; (b) it is necessary for him to give evidence of the fact that the deed had been attested by two witnesses ; and (c) it would be enough for him to comply with the provisions of Sections 68 to 71 of the Act. In other words, when it is not specifically in dispute whether there were two or more attesting witnesses to the deed or less than two, it is enough for a party .seeking to prove the document to call a marginal witness to prove the signature of the executant and the witness's own signature on the margin ; the deed itself bearing on the face of it the attestation of more than one attesting witness. Answering it, the Full Bench held that where a mortgagee sues to enforce his mortgage and the execution and attestation of the deed are not admitted, the mortgagee need prove only this much that the mortgagor signed the document in the presence of an attesung witness and one man attested the document, provided the document on the face of it bears the attestation of more than one person; but if the validity of the mortgage be specifically denied, in the sense that the document did not effect a mortgage in law then it must be proved by the mortgagee that the mortgage deed was attested by at least two witnesses. 7. What is required under the proviso to Section 68 is that there should be a specific denial of execution of the document. In other words, it means that there should not be mere denial but specific denial, over and above a general denial. (See AIR 1951 Nag 343 : Dashrath Prasad Bajooram v. Lallosingh Sanmansingh and another). The denial must be in express terms, should be distinct, definite and unambiguous. In other words, it means that there should not be mere denial but specific denial, over and above a general denial. (See AIR 1951 Nag 343 : Dashrath Prasad Bajooram v. Lallosingh Sanmansingh and another). The denial must be in express terms, should be distinct, definite and unambiguous. What has to be specifically denied is the execution of the document. 8. The ambit of 'specific denial' would depend on various factors. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that merely stating that the execution of the deed was vitiated on account of undue influence cannot constitute a specific denial, In other words, is submitted that where merely genuineness of the document is disputed, there is no specific denial. There cannot be any generalisation of this aspect. The essence of the averments has to be considered, and expressions do not always:; fully reflect the nature of challenge. Under the proviso necessity of calling an attesting witness is done away with in case of document (not being a Will registered) unless its -execution by person by whom it parports to have been executed is specifically denied. The same meaning as given to the word 'specifically' in Order 8, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'CPC) should be attached to the word in proviso to Section 68. The proviso is merely an exception to the special rate in Section 68. The question further arises as to who has to make specific denial. The words evidently meen specific denial by the party against whom document is sought to be used as evidence and not only by the executant. 9. In the instant case, the plaintiff has described in detail about the fiduciary relationship between the executant and the beneficiary, the physial and mental state of health of the former. It has been averred that the executant was not in a fit state of mind to know about the real nature of execution, and import of the transaction. Additionally, it has been pleaded that the executant had no knowledge about the deed of gift, which was obtained by exercise of undue influence and was not acted upon. In my view, it certainly constitutes specific denial about execution of the deed. The purpo e of a specific denial is to bring to the notice of the contestant, the nature of allegations he has to meet and answer. In my view, it certainly constitutes specific denial about execution of the deed. The purpo e of a specific denial is to bring to the notice of the contestant, the nature of allegations he has to meet and answer. The same flows from application of doctrine of traverse. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in AIR 1944 Mad 121 : Vedachala Chattiar v. Amaena Bi Ammal and others, held that attacking a deed as sham and nominal transaction is not denial of execution. Contrary view was taken by the Oudh High Court in the case of Kali Charan (supra), which held that denial of execution and also a statement to the effect that the document is not genuine is a specific denial. As indicated by me above, no hard and fast rule can be applied in this context. In the instant case, the averments in the plaint clearly put the defendant to proof of the document, which the latter was required to prove according to Jaw. This conclusion of mine is strengthened from the plea irt the written statement with regard to the averments in the plaint on the question of validity of the document. Defendant denied in the written statement the allegation that the executant was not in a fit state of mind to know about the real nature and import of the transaction, and that it was done without his knowledge by exercise of undue influence It was specifically averred that the gift deed was read over and explained to the executants by the scribe in presence of two attesting witnesses. He was, therefore, conscious that he had to prove the document in accordance with law. Significantly, the written statement does not state that the attesting witnesses signed in the presence' of the executant, after having either seen him signing or having; received an acknowledgement in that regard. He was, therefore, conscious that he had to prove the document in accordance with law. Significantly, the written statement does not state that the attesting witnesses signed in the presence' of the executant, after having either seen him signing or having; received an acknowledgement in that regard. Section 3 of the T. P. Act requires that the document is to- be attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the executant sign or affix his mark to the document, or has seen some other person sign the document in the presence and by the direction1 of the executant, or has received from the executant a- personal acknowledgement of his signature op mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of whom has signed the document in the presence of the executant, though ft shall not be necessary that more than one of such witness- should be present at the same time. What his been seated in the written- statement was that the gift deed was read over and explained to the executant by the scribe in the presence of two attesting witnesses. There is no- mention about the signature of .either the executant, or the attesting, witnesses. The document in question being, a gift deed, was required to be attested and was not available to be used in evidence until its execution was proved by calling at least one attesting witness. Unisdisputedly, the document is a registered one, but there being a specific denial as to due execution of the document, the defendant was obliged to prove attestation. The witnesses who have been examined in this case to prove execution and at testati- are DWs 1 and 3; the latter incidentally being the scribe. Their evidence is deficient so far as the question of due execution and proper attestation as required in law is concerned. Therefore, even if the so-called attesting witnesses were examined, their evidence does not prove due and proper attestation as required u/s 68 of the Act. 10. In view of the above conclusion, it is not really necessary to decide as to who has to allege absence of attestation. There may be cases where execution may be admitted, but not valid attestatio'n. If that be the case, it must be specifically stated. 10. In view of the above conclusion, it is not really necessary to decide as to who has to allege absence of attestation. There may be cases where execution may be admitted, but not valid attestatio'n. If that be the case, it must be specifically stated. The denial should be sufficiently ahead of the actual hearing, and the person seeking relief upon the document would in such circumstances be required to prove attestation. This view gains support from a decision of this Court in Sarat Chandra Mohanty Vs. Chandramani Bowa. A leading commentator Sarkar in his Book 'Sarkar on Evidence' has also subscribed to the view. 11. The conclusion of the appellate Court that the gift deed was not proved in accordance with law is indefeasible. The second appeal is without merit and is accordingly dismissed. In view of the complicated nature of the question which fell for determination in this case, I do not think it proper to award costs. Final Result : Dismissed