JUDGMENT Balanarayana Marar, J 1. 3rd respondent in O. P. 2693 of 1990 is the appellant. His father Anujan Namboodiripad and first respondent were partners of a firm named 'Periyar Oil Mills'. The mill was established in the Mini Industrial Estate at Sreemoolanagaram. Each of the partners was having 50 per cent share in profits and loss. The mill was running at a loss. A deed of dissolution was executed by the partners on 2nd November 1987 by which first respondent took over the assets and liabilities. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal 2241 of 1987 it was ' found that the partnership firm was eligible for a refund of Rs. 3,68,977.58 paid by way of sales tax. The assessing authority issued refund orders as per Exts. P-2 to P-4, On ' the basis of the dissolution deed first respondent claimed the amount. The assessing authority directed him to furnish the names of the legal heirs of the deceased partner. That proceeding Ext. P-6 was challenged in the Original Petition and the reliefs asked for are: (i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Ext. P-6. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents to refund the amount due to the petitioner as per Exts. P-2 to P-4. Only the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the State of Kerala were made parties to the petition originally. One of the sons of Anujan Namboodiripad was since then impleaded as the 3rd respondent and the Chartered Accountant who figured as a witness in the dissolution deed as 4th respondent. Counter affidavit was filed by appellant 3rd respondent wherein mention was made about another agreement executed between the partners on 1st November 1987 by which the amounts to be refunded by the Sales Tax Department and other authorities were to be divided between the partners equally. The names of the other legal representatives of Anujan Namboodiripad were also furnished. The maintainability of the petition without those persons on the party array was also questioned by appellant. 2. The learned Single Judge after hearing both sides allowed the writ petition, quashed Ext. P-6 and directed the first respondent, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Special Circle, Mattancherry to refund the amount due under Exts. The maintainability of the petition without those persons on the party array was also questioned by appellant. 2. The learned Single Judge after hearing both sides allowed the writ petition, quashed Ext. P-6 and directed the first respondent, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Special Circle, Mattancherry to refund the amount due under Exts. P-2 to P-4 to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible and in any event within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the Judgment. This appeal is against that decision. 3. The claim of first respondent petitioner in the Original Petition was based on the dissolution deed entered into between him and the other partner Sri Anujan Namboodiripad. The refund orders Exts. P-2 to P-4 are seen to have been issued in the name of the firm 'Periyar Oil Mills'. The dissolution deed was exhibited as Ext. P-1. The learned Single Judge observed that prima facie deceased partner Anujan Namboodiripad cannot claim any share in the refund in view of the following clause in the deed of dissolution. "That the assets and liabilities of the partnership firm have been taken over by party No. 1 (the petitioner) with effect from 1st November 1987". The Judge was also not impressed by the argument that the Original Petition is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of the other legal representatives of Anujan Namboodiripad. The court was aware of the claim raised by the heirs of Anujan Namboodiripad. On this point the court observed that this can be decided only after taking evidence and the question was left open for consideration in appropriate proceedings. 4. Sri. C. S. Rajan, learned counsel for appellant argues that the learned Single Judge had directed issue of refund order to the first respondent without considering the agreement entered into between the parties on 1st November 1987 about which reference has been made in the counter affidavit of appellant. It is also his contention that the disputed questions of fact relating to the nature of rights of the parties in pursuance to the dissolution deed and the other agreement entered into between the parties cannot be considered in a writ petition. It is also his contention that the disputed questions of fact relating to the nature of rights of the parties in pursuance to the dissolution deed and the other agreement entered into between the parties cannot be considered in a writ petition. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent points out that the claim of first respondent is based on the dissolution deed and the direction of the learned Single Judge to refund the amount to first respondent is justified according to him. 5. It is settled law that rival claims of title to property cannot be enquired into in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in Sohan Lal v. Union of India and another AIR 1957 S.C. 529 observed that if such questions are gone into in a writ petition the court would be entering into a field of investigation which is more appropriate for a Civil Court in a properly constituted suit to do rather than for a Court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. In that case the question arose whether the appellant therein had acquired a legal right to hold the property as against one Jagan Nath. The Supreme Court observed that there are questions of law in dispute requiring determination before the respective claims of the parties can be decided. That would in effect amount to passing a decree in favour of one of the parties. It was held that all these questions should be decided in a properly constituted suit in a Civil Court rather than in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. 6. In the decision in D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corpn. AIR 1976 S.C. 386 the Supreme Court held that the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief in a case where the basic facts are disputed and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved. It was observed that the right course for the High Court was to dismiss the writ petition without entering upon the merits of the case. It is further held that it is hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved in the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation. 7. Here is a case where an alternate remedy is available to the first respondent by way of suit to get the dispute settled. It is further held that it is hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved in the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation. 7. Here is a case where an alternate remedy is available to the first respondent by way of suit to get the dispute settled. The claim for refund is based on the clause in the deed of dissolution by which first respondent has taken over all the assets and liabilities of the firm. But the appellant has also set up a claim over the money along with other heirs of Anujan Namboodiripad basing on another agreement entered into between the partners. In a case where an alternate Remedy is available the normally party should be directed to pursue that remedy rather than invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It may be, that the existence of the alternate remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of this court to issue the writ. But it is settled law that the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. T. R. Varma AIR 1957 S.C. 882 held: "And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art.226, unless there are good grounds therefore". No such ground appears in the present case and the only ground relied on is the clause in the dissolution deed which by itself will not enable first respondent to claim the entire amount in view of the agreement set up by appellant whereby the partners had agreed to share the amount equally. There is thus dispute between the parties as to whether first respondent alone is entitled to get the refund or whether the amount has to be shared between the two partners with the result that one half can be claimed by the legal representatives of Anujan Namboodiripad. That dispute cannot be decided without taking evidence. As held by the Supreme Court it is not the practice of Courts to decide such questions in a writ petition. It would have been a sound exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Single Judge had referred the first respondent to a suit. 8. That dispute cannot be decided without taking evidence. As held by the Supreme Court it is not the practice of Courts to decide such questions in a writ petition. It would have been a sound exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Single Judge had referred the first respondent to a suit. 8. In a recent bench decision of this court in George v. Circle Inspector of Police 1990 (1) KLT 741 one of us (Paripoornan, J.) held: "It is settled law that the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution is an extra ordinary one and the grant of relief is discretionary. The jurisdiction is one to be exercised with great circumspection and to remedy injustice. Broadly stated, the existence of an alternate remedy is no bar for the exercise of jurisdiction. But one of the important factors, which will deter this Court to entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution to grant the relief, is where there exists an alternate remedy, which is equally efficacious and adequate to the petitioner to ventilate his grievances. As to whether an alternate remedy is equally efficacious and adequate is largely a question of fact which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 9. An equally efficacious and adequate remedy is available to the first respondent herein by getting his right established in a civil suit. It is contended that it will be unduly onerous for first respondent to seek that remedy and claim can be made on the basis of the refund orders. S.44 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act directs that when the assessing authority receives an order from any appellate or revisional authority to make refund of tax or penalty by a dealer it shall effect the refund. The assessing authority has therefore a duty to make the refund. But it should be noted that the refund can be made only to the assessee, who in this case, is "the firm." On the basis of the dissolution deed, first respondent claimed the amount, But the dissolution deed is not conclusive in the matter, in view of the earlier agreement entered into between the partners, who agreed to share the amount equally. There is therefore a bona fide, real dispute between the parties regarding the claim to the money and that cannot be decided in a writ petitioner under Art.226 of the Constitution. First respondent has therefore to resort to the alternate remedy of suit, even if it is considered as onerous and involves expenses and delay. 10. We are therefore of the opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in allowing the application under Art.226 of the Constitution and in quashing Ext. P-6 and directing the assessing authority to refund the amount due under Ext. P-2 to P-4 to the first respondent. The Original Petition should fail for the reasons mentioned by us and the appeal has therefore to be allowed. 11. The Original Petition should fail for another reason also. In spite of the specific plea taken by appellant that the half share of Anujan Namboodiripad had devolved on him and his brothers and sisters whose names were also furnished by him in his counter affidavit first respondent did not choose to make them parties in the Original Petition. A determination of the dispute cannot be had in the absence of the other legal representatives of Anujan Namboodiripad. For that reason also the Original Petition should have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. We therefore allow this appeal, reverse the decision of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the Original Petition. Both parties are directed to suffer their costs.