JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, C.J. - The petitioners while serving as Headmasters of different High Schools were pbbed under suspension, vide Annexure 4 of O. C. J, No 2439/84 and Annexure 1 of O. C. J. No. 2452/84, pursuant to memo of the Inspector of Schools informing about misappropriation of large suits of money (Rs. 24,615,25 in one case and Rs, 35.4S4.40 in the other) by committing forgery, fraud and embezzlement. The ordeTS of suspension stated that the same would remain in force till the criminal and civ! proceedings that would be drawn up are finalised. 2. The validity of these suspension orders has been assailed in these two writ petitions. The attack is on the ground that the second Proviso to Rule 21 (2) of the Orissa Education (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and Members of the Staff of Aided Educational Institutions) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") was not attracted since under that proviso an order of suspension can be passed only when a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. When this matter came to be heard by a Division Bench on 10-5-1990, Shri Rath appearing for the petitioners contended that as no disciplinary proceeding had been initiated or even contemplated, the orders of suspension were invalid inasmuch as the same were beyond the scope and ambit of the power of suspension conferred by the aforesaid proviso. In support of his contention, Shri Rath placed reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Adiiunda Jena and Anr. v. State of Orissa-and others 1990 (1) OlK 234). The Bench hearing these petitions felt that this decision supported the contention of Rath but thought that the said decision might be reconsidered by a larger Bench. It is because of this that the matter has been heard by this Bench. 3. Shri Rath has contended that in view of what has been stated in Rule 15 of the Rules, an employee is table for disciplinary action only if there be breach of any of the rules of conduct prescribed in Rule 11. it is urged that the power of suspension conferred by the aforesaid proviso cannot be invoked during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Adikanda (supra). it is urged that the power of suspension conferred by the aforesaid proviso cannot be invoked during the pendency of the criminal proceeding. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Adikanda (supra). In that case what happened was that some disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner on the ground of his having submitted casual leave application directly to the authority instead of being sent through the jail authorities but the suspension order had been passed with the aid of Rule 12 (2) of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1%2 which states that if a government servant is. detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of .his detention and he shall remain under suspension until further orders. This Court in Adikanda (supra) held that as the cause of suspension had no connection with the initiatio-i of the disciplinary action and as it was conceded that the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules had no application to the staff of aided educational institutions and the petitioners of the aforesaid cases were members of such staff, the suspension orders could not be sustained. 4. In so far as the facts of the present cases are concerned, we are really not called upon to decide whether during the pendency of any criminal proceeding.; suspension can be ordered in exercise of the powers conferred by the second proviso to Rule 21 (2) of the Rules. We have said so because the two suspension orders at hand clearly state that the suspension shall remain in force till the civil proceedings that would also be drawn up are finalised. Now, though the orders have spoken about "civil proceedings", we have no doubt that the authority passing, the orders had in mind "disciplinary proceedings" as mentioned has been made about drawing up of the 'proceedings. Had it been that filing of civil suit would have been in contemplation, mention would not have been made about drawing up of a proceeding. That power under the aforesaid proviso can be invoked even when disciplinary proceeding is under contemplation has not been doubted before us, and rightly, in view of the decision of this Court in Pitabas Sahoo Vs. That power under the aforesaid proviso can be invoked even when disciplinary proceeding is under contemplation has not been doubted before us, and rightly, in view of the decision of this Court in Pitabas Sahoo Vs. The Managing Committee of Sahada N. N. M. E. School and Others the ratio of which on .this point has been recently approved, by a Full Bench of this Court in Keshab Chandra v. State of Orissa 1990 (II) OLR 276. 5. Trough the question of placing a member of the staff governed by the Rules under suspension because of the pendency of a criminal proceeding alone .has not arisen for our decision in the present cases, we may nonetheless say a few words on the contention of Shri Rath that disciplinary proceeding as contemplated by the rules cannot be drawn up because of a criminal act not connected with the functioning of the institution or where the criminal act is not committed within the premises of the institution. As to this contention, we would like to observe that as Rule 11 of the Rules dealing with the conduct of employees requires, inter alia, maintenance of absolute integrity of character, devotion to duty and decorum of conduct, vide Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1), there is no doubt in our mind that if an employee of an aided educational institution would for instance commit rape or theft, even outside the educational premises and/or unconnected with the affairs of the institution, a disciplinary proceeding can definitely be drawn up against him as the case would be squarely covered by the aforesaid clause. 6. In so far as the cases at hand are concerned, we are not called upon to elaborate the aforesaid point inasmuch as the disciplinary proceedings in so far as O J. C. No. 24J9/84 . is concerned was contemplated because the Headmaster of the school in question had received the involved amount which was in excess of the requirement. This had come out during the internal audit of accounts. This transpires from Annexure 1. is concerned was contemplated because the Headmaster of the school in question had received the involved amount which was in excess of the requirement. This had come out during the internal audit of accounts. This transpires from Annexure 1. In so far as the other case (O. J. C. No. 2452/84) is concerned, though there is nothing specifically on record about receipt of the amount in question by the Headmaster and detection of the misappropriation in the course of internal audit, from Annexure 1 it transpires that |he order was passed after receipt of some communication from the Inspector of Schools of the concerned Circle and there was some audit and that is why the order of suspension states that detection is provisional and may undergo change after completion of detailed audit. The alleged appropriation was thus intimately connected with the affairs of the two schools. Even if the appropriation would not have been so connected, we would have felt no doubt in our mind about the. permissibility.of drawing up of disciplinary proceedings against the two petitioners on, their having been found involved in misappropriation of large sums of money as such an act would have definitely thrown out the integrity of. .character which is required to be maintained in its absolute form by Clause (b), Sub-rule (1) of ..Rule 11. of the Rules. The two petitioners being Headmasters, their close association with the accounts of the schools is apparent and if integrity of such persons be in doubt, their conduct would be definitely such as and be examined by drawing up disciplinary proceedings. 7. In view of the above, we hold that employees of aided educational institutions can be suspended for criminal acts which would tell upon their integrity of character and decorum of conduct even though the acts may not be connected with the discharge of their duties as such employees or may not be committed within the premises of the institutions; and in such cases, it would not be permissible to draw any support from what has been stated by this Court in Adikanda. S.B. Pattnaik, J. I agree. S.K. Mohanty, J. I agree.