Judgment :- Defendant is the appellant. The suit is for possession and damages for use occupation. Admittedly, the defendant became the tenant of the suit property belonging the plaintiff under Ex.A-1 lease agreement dated 4.6.1968, which gave a lease of the properly for a period of five years with option to the defendant-lessee to renew the lease a further term of 5 years from the expiry of the said term on a rent to be "then mutually negotiated and settled". Further, admittedly subsequent to the execution of Ex.A defendant under Ex.B-8 letter dated 4.7.1968 addressed to the plaintiff, undertook reimburse the plaintiff the municipal property tax for the demised site every half year soon as the plaintiff passes on the "demand notice or the tax receipt for the amount towards the said tax. It is also common ground that the defendant sent Ex.B-2 letter 11.1.1973 to the plaintiff expressing his option to renew the lease for a further period years at a rent to be mutually negotiated and settled as per the Ex.A-1. Agreement and reply was sent by the plaintiff to the said letter. However it is also borne out from evidence that the defendant made efforts to meet the plaintiff, so that a mutually agreed rent could be settled for the abovesaid lease period of five years. However, the plaintiff not respond. On the other hand, the plaintiff sent Ex.A-6 letter dated 5.2.1973 to defendant alleging that the defendant failed to discharge its obligation to pay the abovesaid municipal tax and that hence it forfeited the right to continue in occupation of the site question and calling upon the defendant to vacate and deliver possession of the suit property on the expiry of the five year period from 16.6.1968, that is on 16.12.1973 and since defendant did not so vacate, the present suit O.S.No.201 of 1974 was filed by the plaintiff, claiming possession and damages to the extent of Rs.6,000 for the period of six months from February, 1974 at the rate of Rs.1,000 per month. (The rent fixed under Ex.A Rs.460 per month). The trial Court has decreed the suit for possession and also granted decree for a sum of Rs.3000 by way of damages for use and occupation, fixing the damages per month at the rate of Rs.500. 2. (The rent fixed under Ex.A Rs.460 per month). The trial Court has decreed the suit for possession and also granted decree for a sum of Rs.3000 by way of damages for use and occupation, fixing the damages per month at the rate of Rs.500. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant rightly contended that there was no forfeiture tenancy on the ground that the above said municipal taxes were not paid since, admittedly, the plaintiff did not pass on either the demand notice or the tax receipt and that under 8 the liability of the defendant to pay the property tax arises only if the plaintiff "passed the demand notice or the tax receipt for the amount paid." So, there is no forfeiture at all on the ground. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant next submitted that apart from intimating his to renew the lease as per the term under Ex.A-1, the appellant made all efforts to meet plaintiff so as to arrive at a mutually agreed rent and that since the plaintiff had not forward to mutually agree for the future rent for the succeeding five year period appellant is entitled to continue to occupy the site in question on payment of the old that the appellant could not be ejected from the suit site. 4. But this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. learned counsel for the respondent cited before me Nava Kishore Das v. Madan Mohan 69 I.C. 600, to persuade me that the abovesaid submission of the learned counsel appellant was untenable. In that decision it was held that where, by a covenant for of a lease, the lessor was given the power to enhance the rent without any limit or on the part of the lessee and no method was stated as to how the rent was to be fixed, contract was too vague and incomplete to be specifically enforced and was vitiated uncertainty. No, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that when there agreement between the parties regarding the quantum of rent applicable for any future after the expiry of the above said initial 5 years, the defendant-appellant could not even the aid of the court in specifically enforcing the relevant clause in Ex.A-1 and the has no alternative except to vacate the suit property and give delivery of possession plaintiff. 5. 5. The learned counsel also relied on a more direct decision of the Division Bench court reported in United Plantations and Industries v. Tata Tea Ltd, (1990)1 L.W. 402. as in the present case, the agreement was for the renewal of a lease stating "this lease be renewed for such further period and upon such revised rent and other terms conditions as may be mutually agreed upon" and this Court held that the abovesaid the lease deed was void for uncertainty and not specifically enforceable. In that context, relevant to note the following observation of the Bench in the said decision in paragraph of the judgment: "Therefore, this is only a contract to make a further contract. In such case, it is impossible for the court to fill in all those (terms) which are to be mutually agreed upon and that a time when the renewal takes place. However might be our endeavour to do so, portion agreed to make a further contract, we cannot help. As observed in Gujarat Company v. Motilal Ltd, 31 Bom.L.R. 130, the court does not exist for the purpose of a new contract between the parties if there is no contract as stated in G.Scammell Nephew Limited v. H.C. and J.G. Oustom, 1941 A.C. 231, we have but to necessarily that there is no contract between the parties. Therefore, we hold that the contract is uncertainty." 6. Therefore, the above said contention of the respondent is correct The relevant Ex.A-1 only says that renewal could take place when there is an agreement between parties regarding the question of rent. If there is no agreement, there can be no renewal all even as per Ex.A-1. No doubt in Port of Tuticorin v. Tuticorin Salt and Marine Chemicals, 90L.W. 45, it was observed as follows: "The Supreme Court in Damodar Tularam Mangalmoti v. The State of Bombay, 1959 180, had to consider the term in a Lease deed wherein the lessee secured an option to the lease, but subject to such fair and equitable enhancement of rent as the lessor determine. The expression ‘fair and equitable’ rent to be fixed by the landlord in occasion to renew the lease arises was held to be not void for uncertainty. The expression ‘fair and equitable’ rent to be fixed by the landlord in occasion to renew the lease arises was held to be not void for uncertainty. The court the view that it was open to the lessee to ask the court to determine what was equitable enhancement." So, if under Ex.A-1 it was stipulated that the future rent for the succeeding period of when the option for renewal is exercised, was ‘fair rent’, then at least it could be said the defendant could have moved the Court for fixing such a fair rent on the ground that was no mutual agreement regarding the fair rent. But, as already noted, the relevant Ex.A-1 did not speak about any fair rent at all. It only stated that if the lease has renewed, the rent should be mutually agreed between the parties. In such a situation, plaintiff cannot even go to court seeking its assistance for fixing the rent if the lease is renewed. At any rate, it is not the case of the defendant that it took any legal action the plaintiff for fixing the rent under Ex.A-1 for the renewal period. Therefore, the appellant has no alternative except to vacate the suit site and give vacant possession thereof plaintiff. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant no doubt cited Badri Lal v. Municipal Corporation Indore, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 508: (1973)2 S.C.C. 588, in support of his contention. But, even said decision only held that on the determination of the lease, it is the duty of the lessee deliver up possession of the demised premises to the lessor and that if the lessee continues in possession even after the determination of the lease, the landlord undoubtedly has eject him forthwith. In the present case, even before the expiry of the lease under the landlord - plaintiff has written the above said letter Ex.A-6 dated 5.2.1973 demanding possession of the property back to him and subsequently has filed the present suit doubt, the Supreme Court observes in the above said decision that if the landlord does take steps to eject the tenant and there is neither assent nor dissent on his part continuance of occupation of the lessee the latter becomes a tenant on sufferance, who no lawful title to the land but holds it merely through the laches of the landlord. But situation has not arisen at all in the present case, as stated above. So, the abovesaid Supreme Court decision does not support the appellant, but only supports the respondent. 8. Therefore, I confirm the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismiss the with costs. Appeal dismissed.