J. M. MAHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THE revision is directed against the order of taking cognizance by the S. DJ. M. Jaypore in case No. icc 21/86 against the petitioners. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS were police officers of Jaypore P. S. at the material time. It is alleged that opp. party No. 1 Ramakrishna Das, the complainant in a complaint case, was detained by the petitioners and third degree method was adopted to extract certain statements from him while he was in the Police Station. The learned S. D. J. M. took cognizance of the offences under sections 330, 323 and 342 nw 34 I. P. C. and directed issuance of process against the petitioners for their appearance. Against the order of the S. D. J. M. , revision was carried to the Sessions Judge, Koraput, Jaypore in C. R. P. No. 51/86. The learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Jeypore heard the matter in extenso, and by a reasoned order partly allowed the revision and quashed the order of the S. D J. M. taking cognizance of the offences under sections 330 and 342 I. P. C. He, however, maintained the order of taking cognizance under section 323 I. P. C. Being thus aggrieved the petitioners have approached this court for quashing the order dated 20-11-1986 of the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Jeypore. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned counsel on both sides. For two reasons I am not inclined to allow the petition. The first is regarding the maintainability of the petition. Section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down as follows: Sec. 397 (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. The purport of this provision is very clear that the person aggrieved is to choose his forum to prefer revision either before the Sessions Court or before the High Court, both having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining a revision application against the order of subordinate court. The provision laid down in section 399 (3) Cr. The purport of this provision is very clear that the person aggrieved is to choose his forum to prefer revision either before the Sessions Court or before the High Court, both having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining a revision application against the order of subordinate court. The provision laid down in section 399 (3) Cr. P. C. dealing with the powers of revision of the Sessions Judge makes it further clear and peremptory which says Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by High Court or any other court. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to the mandatory provisions of law contained in section 397 (3) and Cr. P. C. , I am of the view that revision to this Court against the order of the Sessions Court by the self-same petitioner in the self-same matter is strictly barred. As such the present revision would not lie. ( 5 ) AS to the merits of the case, I may point out that the matter has been elaborately discussed by the learned Sessions Judge in his order dated 20-11-1986. The law on the point as to on what materials cognizance is to be taken has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Magawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajkapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and others,, seeks to contend that under the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 Cr. P. C. such an application is maintainable. A careful reading of the principles laid down therein does not appear to support the stand of the petitioner. It is laid down by Their Lordships as follows: The inherent power of the High Court under section 482 does not stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Nothing in the Code not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. It is laid down by Their Lordships as follows: The inherent power of the High Court under section 482 does not stand repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. Nothing in the Code not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power show earned not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extra ordinary situation excites the courts jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. . . ( 7 ) APPLYING the principles of law laid down by Their Lordships in the afore-stated decisions of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under section 482 Cr. P. C. should not be pressed into service when the petition is directly hit by section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners also relies on a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kuldeep Kumar v. Chandrakanta. In the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court the leading decision of the Supreme Court referred to above (A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 258) was relied upon. For the reasons stated earlier, I am of the view that the, aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court also would be of any avail to the petitioners. ( 9 ) ON the aforesaid analysis, I would hold that the revision is to fail being devoid of merits. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.