Judgment :- The petitioners own sugar factories. They also have distillery divisions where alcohol is manufactured from molasses by fermentation. They challenge the orders levying 'the cess' within the meaning of The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1974, for short, The Cess Act. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the industry carried on by the petitioners is not a 'specified industry' within the meaning of The Cess Act and therefore the levy of the cess is not sustainable in law. On the other hand it is the case of the assessing authority that the industry carried on by the petitioner is, in any event, a Vegetable products industry', if not a 'chemical industry' and hence a specified industry. 3. The short question arising for consideration thus is: Can these petitioners be said to carry on a 'specified industry' within the meaning of S.2(c) of The Cess Act and hence liable for 'cess'. The answer depends upon the construction of the relevant provisions of The Cess Act. 4. S.2(c) defines specified industry thus: It means any industry specified in Schedule I. The industries specified in Schedule I are: 1. Ferrous metallurgical industry. 2. Non-ferrous metallurgical industry. 3. Mining industry. 4. Ore processing industry. 5. Petroleum industry. 6. Petro-chemical industry. 7. Chemical industry. 8. Ceramic industry. 9. Cement industry. 10. Textile industry. 11. Paper industry. 12. Fertilizer industry. 13. Coal (including coke) industry. 14. Power (thermal and diesel) generating industry. 15. Processing of animal or vegetable products industry. S.3 provides that there shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and utilisation thereunder. Sub-section 2 thereof says that every person carrying on any specified industry and also every local authority shall be liable to pay the cess. The cess shall be collected on the basis of the water consumed by such person or local authority as the case may be, for any of the purposes specified in column (1) of Schedule II, at such rate, not exceeding the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof, as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, specify. Sub-section 3 is not necessary to be considered here. Sub-section 3 is not necessary to be considered here. S.5 commends that every person carrying on any specified industry and every local authority, liable to pay the case, shall furnish the returns enabling levy of the cess. S.6 empowers the authority concerned to make the assessment and S.7 enables any person or local authority, liable to pay the cess to a rebate provided the said person or the local authority, as the case ma) be, instals plant for the treatment of sewage or trade affluent. Such rebate the said person or the local authority is entitled to get from such date on which the plant is commissioned. S.13 confers on the person or the local authority the right to file an appeal against the order of assessment or an order imposing penalty under S.11, within the prescribed period. The cumulative effect of these provisions is that every person carrying on a 'specified industry'/ every local authority, in liable to pay the cess levied under the Act, This in short is the scheme of The Act. The question requires to be considered in this background. 5. To call an industry a Vegetable products industry' it should be established that the products of the industry are made out of vegetables. That the product manufactured by the industry is sugar is beyond dispute. Sugar, it is common knowledge, is principally produced from sugarcane. Similarly it is not disputed that molasses is used in the distillery to produce alcohol. To put it briefly, the basic raw material used in the sugar industry is the juice taken from the sugarcane and that used in the distillery is molasses and therefore, if sugarcane is treated as vegetable, then, the industries carried on by the petitioners can be called a Vegetable products industry'. The word Vegetable' is not defined in the Act which, undoubtedly has all the trappings of a fiscal enactment. 6. Where no definition is provided in a fiscal enactment, it is by now a well established principle, to ascertain the correct meaning of a word, reference to dictionaries is not always safe. The correct guide in such cases is the context and the trade meaning. A reference in this connection to the observations made by the Supreme Court at para 5 page 80 of the decision in Commr. of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. S.N. Brothers, Kanpur (AIR 1973 SC 78), is profitable. The correct guide in such cases is the context and the trade meaning. A reference in this connection to the observations made by the Supreme Court at para 5 page 80 of the decision in Commr. of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. S.N. Brothers, Kanpur (AIR 1973 SC 78), is profitable. Yet another principle that should be borne in mind while interpreting a fiscal enactment is that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that the word in a taxing statute must be held to have been used, unless it be that a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. That means, if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense such statute shall not be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language employed in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning thereby that, what people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute Is dealing, would attribute to it (See Collector, Central Excise, Kanpur v. Krishna Carbon Paper Co., AIR 1988 S.C. 2223). The rule of construction as regards a word in a fiscal statute which is not defined, can therefore be stated thus: Such word shall be construed not from a technical or scientific point of view but from the point of view of the people in that trade dealing with this particular type of goods unless it be that a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. 7. The question therefore is what meaning we shall attribute to the word Vegetable' used in en try 15. "Decided cases would show that the word Vegetates' in taxing statute is generally to be understood as in common parlance that is denoting class of vegetables which are grown in kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table" (See Ramavatar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1325). Relying on this ruling of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the word Vegetables' employed in entry 15 of the 1st Schedule must he given the popular meaning. If that be the position, sugarcane cannot be said to be Vegetable'. Relying on this ruling of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the word Vegetables' employed in entry 15 of the 1st Schedule must he given the popular meaning. If that be the position, sugarcane cannot be said to be Vegetable'. There the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether 'betel leaves are exempt from Sales Tax levied under C.P.& Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act XXI of 1947). The order levying tax on betel leaves was under challenge. Facts relevant for consideration of this question are stated thus in the ruling:- "Thus under the Act all articles mentioned in the Schedule were exempt from Sales Tax and articles not so specified were taxable. In the Schedule applicable there were originally two items which are relevant for the purposes of the case. They were items Nos. 6 and 3(5: Item 6 Vegetables-Except when sold in sealed containers. Item 36 Betel leaves. (4) The Schedule was amended by the C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Amendment Act (Act XVI of 1948) by which item No. 36 was omitted. It is contended that in spite of this omission they were exempt from Sales Tax as they are vegetables. The intention of the legislature in regard to what is vegetables is shown by its specifying vegetables and betel leaves as separate items in the Schedule exempting articles from Sales Tax. Subsequently betel leaves were removed from the Schedule which is indicative of the legislature's intention of not exempting betel leaves from the imposition of the tax. But it was submitted that betel leaves are vegetables and therefore they would be exempt from Sales Tax under item 6. Reliance was placed on the dictionary meaning of the word' Vegetable" as given in Shorter Oxford Dictionary where the word is defined as "of or pertaining to, comprised or consisting of, or derived, or obtained from plants or their parts". But this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed nits popular sense meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it". It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed nits popular sense meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it". It is to be construed as understood in common language; Zaics on Statute Law, p. 153 (51h Ed.). It was so held in Planters Nut Chocolate Co. Ltd. v. The King 1952-1 Doni LIZ 385 at p. 389. This interpretation was accepted by the High Court of Madhya 'radcshin Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants' Association, Santra Market, Nagpur v. State of Madhyapradesh, 1956-7 STC 99 at p. 102: ((S) AIR 1956 Nag. 54 at p. 56) where it was observed:- "In our opinion, the word "vegetables" cannot be given the comprehensive meaning the term bears in natural history and has not been given that meaning in taxing statutes before. The term "vegetables" is to be understood as commonly under denoting those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and are used for the table". In that case the word 'Vegetables" was construed and in our opinion correctly construed in relation to the very provisions of The Act which are now in controversy before us. In cases under the U.P. Sales Tax Act betel leaves have been held not to be within the expression "green vegetables", Brahma Nand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1956-7 STC 206 (All); Firm Shri Krishna Chaudhryv. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1956-7 STC 742 (All). In Bhairondon Tolaram v. State of Rajasthan, 1957-8 STC 798(Raj) they were held not to be plants and in Kokil Ram v. State of Bihar, 1949-1 STC 217: (AIR 1951 Pat. 367), it was held that vegetables meant plants cultivated for food and Pans are not foodstuffs. In Dharamdas Paul v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, 1958-9 STC 194: (AIR 1958 Cal. 302) also they were held not to be vegetables which specifically meant Sabzi, Tarkari & sak. Therefore apart from the fact that the legislature by using two distinct and different items i.e. item 6 'Vegetables" and item No.36 "betel leaves" has indicated its intention, decided cases also show that the word 'Vegetables " in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table". In the sale strain is another decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 660). In Motipur Zamindary, the Supreme Court was considering the question whether sugarcane is a 'green vegetable' within the meaning of item 6 of Notification No.9884 PT dt. 28-8-1947 and as such exempt from taxation. Considering the various aspects of this question, the Supreme Court observed that it cannot be said that sugarcane falls within the definition of 'green vegetable'. 8. From these decisions, it can also be inferred that if a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature a word, not defined in the Act, can be attributed a meaning different from the meaning it has acquired in common parlance. The question here therefore is, can the word Vegetable' in entry 15 be given a meaning different from the meaning attributed to that word in the above decisions of the Supreme Court namely., that class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. The answer to be 'Yes', it shall be shown that the Parliament has clearly expressed a contrary intention. The correct guide in such cases is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. To ascertain the intention, all the constituent parts of a statute requires to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be construed in the light of the general purposes and object of the enactment itself. The object of the Cess Act discernible from the preamble is this: an Act to provide for the levy and collection of cess on water consumed by persons carrying on certain industry and by local authorities with a view to augment the resources of Central Board and the State Boards, constituted under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, for short, Prevention of Pollution Act for the prevention and control of water pollution. That that is the object of the Act is further established by S.3 of the Cess Act. It says that Cess is collected for the purposes of the above Act, and utilisation thereunder. The preamble and S.3 therefore clearly show that cess is levied to provide funds to the Central and State Boards constituted under the Prevention of Pollution Act, for prevention and control of water pollution. It says that Cess is collected for the purposes of the above Act, and utilisation thereunder. The preamble and S.3 therefore clearly show that cess is levied to provide funds to the Central and State Boards constituted under the Prevention of Pollution Act, for prevention and control of water pollution. Viewed from this angle, the word Vegetable' should be attributed literal meaning ie. the meaning a botanist would attribute to it, and not a restricted meaning namely, denoting a class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. If the narrow or restricted meaning is attributed to this word, that meaning would lead to some result which is not intended by the Parliament. In other words, the word Vegetable' in the context in which it is used in the Act should be understood in its plain and natural meaning which is wide enough to cover sugarcane, which is used as a raw material by the petitioners for producing sugar and alcohol. Similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. v.State of UP. (AIR 1987 All. 298). It must therefore be held that the Petitioners are carrying on a specified industry within the meaning of entry 15 of the 1st Schedule. 9. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that this industry can be said to be covered by entry 7 also cannot be countenanced in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Andhra P.S.B.P. & C of Water Pollution v. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. (1988 (2) KLT 903 (S.C.) ). There the Supreme Court has held that in a case where the question is whether a particular industry is an industry as covered in Schedule I of The Act, it has to be judged normally by what that industry produces mainly. It has also been observed that chemical process would be involved to considerable extent in all industries but an industry could be called a chemical industry only if it carries out predominantly chemical activities and is involved in chemical endeavours. The sugar industries therefore cannot be said to be a chemical industry within the meaning of item 7 in Schedule I. 10. The sugar industries therefore cannot be said to be a chemical industry within the meaning of item 7 in Schedule I. 10. The petitioners have a further case and it is this: They in any event are entitled to the rebate under S.7 of The Cess Act. This aspect does not appear to have been considered by the authority concerned the way in which this requires to be considered. If as a matter of fact these industries have installed plants to cure the affluent, then they are entitled to get the rebate from the date on which the plant was commissioned. This aspect requires a fresh investigation. I therefore direct the Pollution Board to enquire into this case of the petitioners afresh, after giving them an opportunity of being heard. The petitioners if so advised can produce materials before the Board in proof of the case that they have already installed plants to cure the affluent. The petitioners in this regard can file representations to the Board and such representations shall be made within two months from today. On such representations being made the Board shall take them on to file and consider and dispose of them after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. The order staying recovery of the cess, except to the extent of 30%, will continue to be in force until the disposal of the representations, the petitioners would file within the stipulated period. The Original Petitions, for the reasons stated above, are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly they are dismissed. No order as to costs.