JUDGMENT - DHANUKA D.R., J.:---The facts of W.Ps. Nos. 2983 and 2984 of 1990 are identical. I am submitting the facts from Writ Petition No. 2983 only. This is a petition filed by the National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited impugning an order passed by 12th Labour Court, Bombay on 7th July, 1990 in an application preferred by the respondent No. 1 under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent No. 1 was an employee of Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd., prior to 18th October, 1983. The respondent No. 1 was employed as a clerk with the Kohinoor Mills Co. Limited on or about 2nd December, 1973. On 18th October, 1983, the President of India issued an Ordinance, authorising the Central Government to take over the management of certain Textile Mills specified in the Schedule thereto. The Textile Undertaking of Kohinoor Mills was one of the Undertakings specified in the said Schedule. The said Ordinance was thereafter replaced by an Act, known as the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983, i.e. Act No. 14 of 1983. Section 3 of the said Act provided that the management of the Textile Undertakings specified in the Schedule shall vest in the Central Government. Section 4 of the Act provided that the Central Government may appoint a custodian to carry on the management of the Textile Industry for and on behalf of the Central Government. Provisions were made in the said Ordinance as well as in the Act for appointment of the additional custodian. Both, the Custodian and the Additional Custodian were enjoined to carry out the management of the "Textile Undertakings" for and on behalf of the Central Government. The employees of the Textile Undertakings continued to be the employees of the Undertakings now managed by the National Textile Corporation. Section 13 of the said Act provided that in certain situation, the contract of employment entered into by any Textile Industry on or behalf of any Managing Director could be terminated by the Custodian by serving one month's notice in writing or making payment of salary or wages in lieu of such Notice. 2. In the application dated 15th October, 1987, filed for computation of wages and Bonus for the period from 1-10-1983 to 30-9-1987, the respondent No. 1 contended that the respondent No. 1 continued to be the employee of the National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited. 2. In the application dated 15th October, 1987, filed for computation of wages and Bonus for the period from 1-10-1983 to 30-9-1987, the respondent No. 1 contended that the respondent No. 1 continued to be the employee of the National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited. It was stated by the respondent No. 1 in the said application that the respondent No. 1 had not participated in any strike. The respondent No. 1 also stated in the said application that the respondent No. 1 had offered to render services to the petitioner, but the respondent No. 1 was prevented by the petitioner herein from working and was not paid salary and bonus which had become due and payable to him under the contract of employment. The respondent No. 1 has contended that the contract of employment entered into between him and Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. was binding on the petitioner and the petitioner was bound to pay all the dues of workmen for the period commencing from 18th October, 1983 on the footing of continuity of service. By the said application, the respondent No. 1 also sought directions to the effect that the petitioner be directed to pay the amount to be computed on account of salary and Bonus along with the interest thereon at 18% per annum from the date from which it had become payable till realisation. The petitioner herein was opponent No. 2 in the said Application (I.D.A.) No. 1209/1987. The petitioner herein disputed the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and contended that the above referred application was not maintainable under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In its written statement filed before the Labour Court, the petitioner further contended as under :- i) The respondent No. 1 had resorted to strike from 18-1-1982 and never reported on work since 18-1-1982. ii) By its order dated 8-2-1982, the Labour Court had declared the said strike as illegal. iii) On 30-3-1982, the Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. had published a Notice in "Navakal" informing the employees about the declaration of the strike as illegal and further advising them to report on duty. ii) By its order dated 8-2-1982, the Labour Court had declared the said strike as illegal. iii) On 30-3-1982, the Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. had published a Notice in "Navakal" informing the employees about the declaration of the strike as illegal and further advising them to report on duty. iv) As per the "understanding", reached between the M.O.A. of which the Kohinoor Mills was a Member and R.M.M.S. the Representative Union for the Cotton Textile Industry in the local area of Greater Bombay, a deadline was fixed for all employees to return to work on 31-5-1983. The respondent No. 1 did not report for duty at all. v) The respondent No. 1 ceased to be in employment of the Textile Undertaking on 31st May, 1983 in view of the respondent No. 1 having not reported for duty. The services of the respondent No. 1 were deemed to be terminated as aforesaid in view of the understanding between the representatives of Mill Owners and labourers as alleged. Each one of the above allegations including the averment of alleged understanding was and is seriously disputed by and on behalf of respondent No. 1. 3. In its written statement, the petitioner further contended that pre-adjudication on all the above referred disputed questions was necessary by the appropriate forum in a reference which could be made by the appropriate Government and section 33-C(2) of the Act could not be invoked by respondent No. 1 as the said provision was in the nature of execution proceeding and not meant for adjudication of disputes that had arisen between the parties. 4. By a separate application, the petitioner raised an additional plea to the effect that the appropriate Government in relation to the said Undertakings run by the National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) was Central Government as the said undertaking was run by and under the authority of the Central Government. The petitioner contended that the above referred application under section 33-C(2) was not maintainable as it was filed in a Court which could entertain application where the appropriate Government concerning the Industry in question was State Government and not the Central Government. 5. The respondent No. 1 examined himself in support of his claim made in the said application. The management examined one Mr. Jagannath Pundlikrao Rane, the Security Officer and also its Administrative Officer by name Shri Sudhir Balekar as witnesses on its behalf. 6. 5. The respondent No. 1 examined himself in support of his claim made in the said application. The management examined one Mr. Jagannath Pundlikrao Rane, the Security Officer and also its Administrative Officer by name Shri Sudhir Balekar as witnesses on its behalf. 6. No dispute was raised before the Labour Court in respect of calculation of amounts claimed. It has been so observed by the learned Presiding Officer of 12th Labour Court in para 12 of the impugned judgment. 7. The learned Presiding Officer, 12th Labour Court raised 5 (five) issues on the pleadings before him. The said issues are as under :- i) Does applicant prove that he was continued in the Service of opponent No. 2 from 1-10-1983? ii) Does applicant prove that he is entitled for salary from 1-10-1983 to 30-9-1987? iii) Does applicant prove that he is entitled for bonus for the years 1984, 1985? iv) Whether the application is maintainable against opponent No. 2 ? v) What is found due ? 8. The Labour Court recorded the findings after careful consideration of the evidence laid before it to the effect that the respondent No. 1 continued to be in the service of the petitioner herein, who was opponent No. 2 in the said proceedings. The Labour Court also recorded the findings to the effect that the said application was maintainable and the Labour Court had the necessary jurisdiction to compute the amount of salary and Bonus and pass the necessary orders under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 9. It is obvious from the provisions of the Act No. 14 of 1983, that the petitioner is not liable to discharge any liability for the period prior to 18th October, 1983. Wages for the month of October, 1983 became due and payable on the last day of the month. From this angle, the respondent No. 1 claimed the wages for the entire month of October, 1983 from National Textile Corporation Limited. The National Textile Corporation would be liable to pay the salary for the entire month of October, 1983 and onwards, if the other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are not acceptable to the Court. 10. It was argued by Mr. The National Textile Corporation would be liable to pay the salary for the entire month of October, 1983 and onwards, if the other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are not acceptable to the Court. 10. It was argued by Mr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the petitioner that an understanding had been arrived at between the representative Union of the workers and the Mill owners Association to the effect that if the workmen did not report for duty by 31st May, 1983, then their services will be deemed to be terminated. There is no evidence whatsoever of the alleged understanding. I am satisfied that there is no infirmity whatsoever in the findings of the fact recorded by the Labour Court on issue No. 1 to the effect that the respondent No. 1 continued to be in service and his services were not terminated or cannot be said to have been terminated. The name of the respondent No. 1 continued to be on the Muster roll. It was admitted in para 4 of his deposition by Shri Sudhir Jeevajirao Balekar, the Administrative Officer of the Undertakings that the clerks used to approach Mill with the application for providing work. No one prevented the petitioner from proving the alleged understanding between the Mill Owners' Association and the R.M.M.S. Even if such alleged understanding would have been proved, a further question would have arisen as to what was the legal efficacy of such alleged understanding, if any. However I am not concerned with the questions which are now being raised for the first time for which no factual foundation was laid down before the Labour Court. A mere plea in the written statement in absence of any proof is of no consequence whatsoever. 11. Before I examine the contentions seriously urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I would like to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of our High Court in Writ Petition No. 2486 of 1986 and other companion petitions in the case of (National Textile Corporation v. R.M.M.S.)1, reported in 1987(2) C.L.R. 482. In these group of matters also a reference was made by the National Textile Corporation to the above referred strike, the strike having been declared as illegal, newspaper notices having been published and various other facets which are relied on before me as obvious from the judgment. In these group of matters also a reference was made by the National Textile Corporation to the above referred strike, the strike having been declared as illegal, newspaper notices having been published and various other facets which are relied on before me as obvious from the judgment. The principal question in these groups of writ petitions was as to whether the National Textile Corporation could rely on section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bharucha speaking for the Division Bench of this Court that section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not at all attracted to this case and the workmen continued to be in service of National Textile Corporation Limited. Mr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has informed me that an appeal has been preferred against the said judgment before the Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India and the said appeal is pending. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the scope of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was limited and in absence of pre-adjudication of disputes raised by the petitioner in his written statement, the question of computation of salary and bonus could not arise. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent No. 1 had misconceived his remedy and the application filed by him under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not maintainable. It was contended by the learned Counsel that the dispute as to the alleged termination of the services of the respondent No. 1 could not be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court in a proceeding under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and if it could not be so adjudicated upon, the question of computation of the amount would not arise. 13. On this aspect of the matter, Mr. Naik the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. The Workmen and another)2, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1604. In particular, the learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to para 15 of the judgment. On this aspect of the matter, Mr. Naik the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. The Workmen and another)2, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1604. In particular, the learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to para 15 of the judgment. This judgment proceeds on the footing that once it was shown that the employer had dismissed the employee and the claim arose to the effect as to whether the dismissal was unlawful, the proceedings under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 could not be maintainable for award of benefits due to the employee. In the present case, however, as per the findings of the fact recorded in this case, there was no termination of the services of the respondent No. 1 at all. In the present case it was not shown by the petitioner that the services of the respondent No. 1 were terminated or deemed to be terminated. On the contrary it is proved by the respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 1 continued to be in service. I have already held that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court on issue No. 1 is acceptable to me as valid and correct finding. In this view of the matter, the ratio of this judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of (The Management of Himalaya Embroidery Mills v. Tarseen Lal and other)3, reported in 1986(I) C.L.R. 421. In this case a reference was made to the Labour Court under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question before the High Court of Delhi was as to whether refusal to provide work could be made the subject matter of the dispute under Item 6' of Second Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this context, it was observed by the learned Judge of the High Court of Delhi that refusal to give work amounted to dismissal. It was held that the order of reference made by the Delhi High Court was valid. This case cannot assist me to determine the scope and ambit of and ambit of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 15. It was held that the order of reference made by the Delhi High Court was valid. This case cannot assist me to determine the scope and ambit of and ambit of section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directly and clearly in its judgment in the case of (R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court)4, reported in A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451. In this case, which is relied upon by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, an application was made for computation of lay off compensation before the Labour Court invoking section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court was disputed by the management on the footing that its contentions could be dealt with only by an Industrial Tribunal in a reference. After considering several judgments, Miter, J., speaking for the Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim to the computation of the benefit in terms of money. The relevant portion of para 23 of the judgment reads as under : "The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim to the computation of the benefit in terms of money; the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether on the facts, it had jurisdiction to make the computation. It could not however give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the jurisdicational plea." 16. It is well settled by this time that if the right to computation was disputed by the employer, the Labour Court must hold enquiry in the matter, which enquiry would be incidental to its jurisdiction to compute the benefits claimed by the workmen under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The above referred judgment of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Patel in the case reported in A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451 is directly on the point. At this stage, I may also refer to the Division Bench judgment of our High Court in the case (Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra)5, reported in 1975 L.I.C. 1561. The above referred judgment of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Patel in the case reported in A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451 is directly on the point. At this stage, I may also refer to the Division Bench judgment of our High Court in the case (Ramkrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra)5, reported in 1975 L.I.C. 1561. In this case, an application made by the workman under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was opposed by the employer on the ground that the applicant was not a workman. It was further contended on behalf of the management in this case that the dispute as to whether the applicant was a workman or not could not be decided in the proceedings under section 33-C(2) of the Act, which were in the nature of execution proceedings. It was contended that the said question could be decided only in a reference of an Industrial Disputes to be made by the appropriate Government. The Division Bench of our High Court held that the Labour Court could enquire into the question as to whether the applicant was a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act or not. It may be that a reference is also competent for adjudication of such dispute under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is however, not the law that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the provisions contained in section 33-C(2) of the Act is ousted as soon as some controversies and contentions are raised on behalf of the employer in the written statement. It is also true that the Labour Court cannot derive jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the jurisdiction facts. If the Labour Court is required to reject an application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as soon as a plea is raised in the written statement of the type raised by the petitioner in this case, perhaps, all applications under the Act could have to be rejected and the workmen will be then deprived of this speedy beneficial remedy. I am therefore not prepared to accept the submission of the petitioner to the effect that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the said application under section 33-C(2) of the Act was ousted by reason of the pleas taken by the petitioner in its written statement. I am therefore not prepared to accept the submission of the petitioner to the effect that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the said application under section 33-C(2) of the Act was ousted by reason of the pleas taken by the petitioner in its written statement. It cannot be forgotten that none of these pleas was substantiated by the petitioner by evidence. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the said provisions is undoubtedly circumscribed, but even keeping the limits of circumscribed jurisdiction in mind, I hold that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to examine the question as to whether the applicant continued to be the employee of National Textile Corporation or not. 17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Santuram Khudai v. Kimatrai Printers, Processors and others)6, reported in 1978(I) L.L.J. 174 , in support of his contention that the RMMS was a Representative Union and an employee had no right to appear in the proceedings under the Act, if the recognised Union had already appeared in the proceedings under the Act. This authority would have been of some relevance if the alleged understanding between the Mill Owners Association and Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh was proved. Since the alleged understanding was never proved, reference to the above cited authority is totally irrelevant. 18. I shall now deal with the second limb of Mr. Naik's arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Naik has analysed the provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 as well as the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The learned Counsel has invited my attention to the definition of the expression, 'appropriate Government' as contained in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The expression 'Appropriate Government' has been defined under section 2(a) of the Act, in so far as its relevance for our case is as under: "Appropriate Government means- in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government." 19. I have therefore to ask myself as to whether the Textile Industry formerly owned by Kohinoor Mills Company Limited is an Industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. There is no dispute that the Undertaking is still owned by Kohinoor Mills Company Limited. I have therefore to ask myself as to whether the Textile Industry formerly owned by Kohinoor Mills Company Limited is an Industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. There is no dispute that the Undertaking is still owned by Kohinoor Mills Company Limited. There is also no dispute that the Undertaking is managed by the Additional Custodian i.e. the National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) for and on behalf of the Central Government by virtue of the provisions contained in the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983. 20. It is not disputed by Mr. Patel, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that in case I come to the conclusion that the Undertaking is run by the National Textile Corporations "by or under the authority of the Central Government" within meaning of the said expression used in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the application made by the respondent No. 1 would not be maintainable before the Labour Court as it was filed before the Labour Court specified by the State Government for entertaining such applications under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. I shall now proceed to examine the submissions made by the learned Counsel on both sides on this aspect of the matter. 21. Having regard to the judgment of the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of (Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees and others v. M.T.N.L.)7, reported in 1989(1) C.L.R. 348, the labour Court held that the Undertaking was not run by or under the authority of the Central Government within the meaning of the said expression used by the legislature under section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court, therefore, held that the application filed by the respondent No. 1 was maintainable and it had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the said application. The Labour Court directed the petitioner to pay the sum of Rs. 74,129.35 ps. to respondent No. 1. In my judgment, it would be more convenient to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.M.M.S. v. Model Mills, Nagpur and another)8, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1813 in the first instance. The Labour Court directed the petitioner to pay the sum of Rs. 74,129.35 ps. to respondent No. 1. In my judgment, it would be more convenient to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.M.M.S. v. Model Mills, Nagpur and another)8, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1813 in the first instance. In the case before the Supreme Court, the question arose as to whether the Model Mills, Nagpur which was being managed by an authorised controller appointed by the Central Government under section 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 could be considered as an Industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the "Central Government". In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the interpretation of the provisions contained in section 32(4) of the Payment of Bonus Act. In para 10 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the significant consequence that ensued on the issue of a notified order appointing authorised controller under the said Act was to divert the management from the present managers and to vest it in the authorised controller. In the same paragraph, the Supreme Court held that the change of management did not tantamount to either acquisition of the industrial undertaking or a take over of its ownership. It was held that the industrial undertaking continued to be governed by the Companies Act or the Partnership Act as the case may be. It was held that a substitution of a management did not make the undertaking as an Undertaking run by or under the authority of the Central Government. In this case, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the High Court of Madras, in the case of (M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Thozhilalar Shemalana Padukappu Union v. M/s. National Textile Corporation Ltd.)9, 1984(1) Lab. L.J. 140. In the Madras case also it was held that the Appropriate Government was not the Central Government merely because the Undertaking was managed by a Controller appointed by the Central Government appointed under section 18-A of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951. 22. Mr. L.J. 140. In the Madras case also it was held that the Appropriate Government was not the Central Government merely because the Undertaking was managed by a Controller appointed by the Central Government appointed under section 18-A of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951. 22. Mr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and also the provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 and has urged with some justification that the scheme of management of the Textile Undertaking (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 is somewhat different to be compared to the scheme of management of the Textile Undertaking under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. To some extent, Mr. Naik may perhaps be right in contending that in our case the management of the Textile Mills by the custodian or the Additional Custodian is liable to be treated on par with management of the undertaking by a department of Central Government. I am however convinced that the distinction between the scheme of management under the two acts is not sufficient to hold that the Textile Undertaking is run by or under the authority of the Central Government within the meaning of the expression a used in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the appropriate Government would be Central Government. There may be a slight distinction between the cases covered under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and the cases covered under the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983. Still the meat of the matter is that there is merely a change of management. In my opinion, even if the Government were to manage the Mill departmentally by virtue of an authority conferred on it under a legislation, it would not necessarily follow that the Mill run by the Undertaking is a Government Undertaking unless the Undertaking is owned by the Government itself. On this aspect of the matter the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 10 of the above referred judgment are undoubtedly helpful to Mr. Patel, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1. 23. On this aspect of the matter the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 10 of the above referred judgment are undoubtedly helpful to Mr. Patel, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1. 23. I shall now proceed to consider the Division Bench Judgment of our High Court in the case of Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees and others v. M.T.N.L. reported in 1989 Mh.L.J. 6 : 1989(1) C.L.R. 348, where also the same very expression "Appropriate Government" was interpreted by the Government. In this case, the question was as to whether the Central Government was the Appropriate Government for the purpose of making a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. While interpreting the expression "Appropriate Government", as defined in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was observed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sawant speaking on behalf of the Division Bench in para 7 of the judgment that two tests must be cumulatively satisfied before it could be held that the Undertaking was run by or under the authority of the Central Government. The said two tests laid down in the said judgment are as under :- i) Whether the Company or the Corporation is established to carry on a function which is exclusively the privilege of the government to carry on? and ii) Whether the Government exercises control or supervision over the working of such a Company or Corporation ? 24. It is clear that the second test is satisfied in this case, as the Central Government exercises sufficient control or supervision over the working of the textile undertaking. It is however, impossible to take the view that the first test is satisfied. It was laid down in the case that unless the Company or Corporation was established to carry on the functions which would exclusively to carry on by the Company or Corporation, it could not be said to have been established to run the Undertaking by or under the authority of the Central Government. The function of running a Textile Industry was not such that it could be considered as the exclusive privilege of the Government. The function which is discharged by the National Textile Corporation in this case cannot be said to be a function which is exclusive the privilege of the Company. The above referred judgment of the Division Bench is binding on me. The function which is discharged by the National Textile Corporation in this case cannot be said to be a function which is exclusive the privilege of the Company. The above referred judgment of the Division Bench is binding on me. The above referred judgment of the Division Bench concludes the matter against the petitioner on the aspect just discussed above. I hold that the Central Government was not an appropriate Government in relation to the Textile Undertaking managed by the National Textile Corporation and the application made in this case under section 33-C(2) of the Act was filed before an appropriate forum. 25. Mr. Naik has also relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (C.V. Raman v. Management of Bank of India and another)10, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1369. In this case, the question before the Hon'ble Court was as to whether the employees of the Nationalised Bank were the employees "Under the Central Government" within the meaning of the said expression used in T.N. Shops and Establishments Act, 1947. This case is of no assistance to the Court for interpreting the word "The Appropriate Government" as defined under section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 26. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others)11, reported in 1979(II) L.L.J. 217 . This case is an authority interpreting under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. With respect to the learned Counsel this case is of no assistance to me for interpreting the expression 'by or under the authority of the Central Government' used in section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Article 12 of the Constitution defines the expression 'State' only for purpose of Part III of the Constitution. The above referred case cannot be applied to the present situated by analogy. 27. There is no merit in any of the contentions of the petitioner. 28. In this view of the discussion, rule is discharged. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The interim order passed by me will be effective for a period of three weeks from today. The respondent No. 1 shall be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. 40,000/- (Rs. In this view of the discussion, rule is discharged. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. The interim order passed by me will be effective for a period of three weeks from today. The respondent No. 1 shall be at liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. 40,000/- (Rs. Forty thousand) from the amount deposited by the petitioner forthwith without furnishing any guarantee of security whatsoever. If the petitioner is unable to obtain any stay order, the respondent No. 1 shall be at liberty to withdraw the balance of amount deposited by the petitioner without any security. The petitioner shall give at least 48 hours' notice of any intended appeal to Advocate for respondent No. 1. 29. Before parting with this case, I express my gratitude to learned Counsel on both sides for their valuable assistance. Rule discharged. -----