SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the landlord ; he sought eviction of the respondent tinder sec. 21 (1) (b), (h) and (o) of the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act, for short), in the year 1980. In the year 1988, he filed I. A. No. IV in the trial court seeking the amendment of the main application, by introducing a new ground under sec. 21 (1) (p) of the Act. ( 2 ) THE trial court rejected the application holding that the alleged acquisition of two premises by the tenant was in the name of his two sons and that the petitioner nowhere contended that the respondent and his sons constitute a Hindu undivided family. Trial court, further held that those two premises were not vacant and were not available to the respondent to be occupied at the time when the petitioner filed eviction case against him. Thus the substantial reasons for rejecting the application for amendment of the eviction petition, was on the merits of the new ground; in the course of its order, trial court refers to the citation of the decision of Supreme Court in Municipal corporation of Greater Bombay v Lal pancham ( AIR 1965 SC 1008 ). ( 3 ) IN the aforesaid decision, Supreme Court held that where the plaintiffs are making out a case of fraud for which there was not the slightest basis in the original plaint, amendment of plaint should not be permitted; a new case should not be permitted to be made out, by the amendment. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petiioner urged before me that the trial courterred in going into the merits of the case under Sec. 21 (1) (p) of the Act while rejecting the application for amendment. The learned counsel is certainly justified in attacking the order to this extent. Consideration of the case under Sec, 21 (1){p) would arise only if the amendment application is allowed and the parties goto trial on the relevant question. At the stage of considering the application for amendment, merits of the case on amendment cannot be considered, except to the extent of the relevancy of the amendment to the original case. ( 5 ) THE procedure of the court under the Act is not strictly controlled by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the stage of considering the application for amendment, merits of the case on amendment cannot be considered, except to the extent of the relevancy of the amendment to the original case. ( 5 ) THE procedure of the court under the Act is not strictly controlled by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 14 of the Rules under the Act says that "in applications made under the Act to the Court, the Court shall follow, as far as may be and with the necessary modifications, the procedure prescribed in the code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when such suits are tried by courts invested with the jurisdiction of a court of Small Causes under any law relating to Small cause courts in force in any area of the State". Again, as per Rule 35, "in deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided for by these Rules, the court shall as far as possible bo guided by the provisions contained in the Code of civil Procedure, 1908". ( 6 ) AMENDMENT of an application filed under Sec. 21 of the Act is not specifically provided for, in the Rules. Therefore, provisions of the Civil Procedure code are to be applied "as far as possible", as "guidence". Those provisions do not control the procedure; but are to be looked into for guidence only. ( 7 ) RULES of procedure are meant to advance the course of justice and technicalities have no place in construing them; broad and generous approach has to be adopted by the court in the light of the scheme and purpose of the Act, while formulating the principles to govern the procedural aspects under the Act. ( 8 ) UNDER proviso to Sec. 21 (1) of the Act, several grounds stated in subclauses (a) to (p) are available to a landlord to seek the recovery of possession of the premises let out. All or any of these grounds (more than one) can be clubbed together and urged in the application seeking eviction; in fact, it is nobody's case " that separate applications should be filed in respect of different grounds. The learned counsel for the respondent agreed that any number of grounds falling under, sub-clauses (a) to (p) of proviso to Sec. 21 (1) may be clubbed together, if available to the landlord, at the time of filing the application for eviction. The learned counsel for the respondent agreed that any number of grounds falling under, sub-clauses (a) to (p) of proviso to Sec. 21 (1) may be clubbed together, if available to the landlord, at the time of filing the application for eviction. Therefore, here, the question is, if a ground for eviction comes into existence subsequently, or an available ground was not noticed by the landlord comes to his knowledge subsequently, can he be permitted to add the said ground, by way of an amendment, to the original application for amendment. Landlord is seeking the relief of eviction of the same tenant from the same premises, but under a new ground which was already in existence but of which the landlord was not aware of, or the ground cropped up due to events subsequent to the filing of the eviction petition. ( 9 ) THOUGH eviction petition is of the year 1980, recording of evidence seems to have not commenced in this case, when l. A. No. IV for amendment was filed in the trial court. It is also not disputed before me, that, in case, a fresh eviction petition was filed under Sec. 21 (1) (p) of the Act, the landlord may move the court to club it for trial with the pending eviction petition and normally, in the circumstances of this case, the court would have allowed the prayer for clubbing the two applications (generally referred as 'petitions') ; if so, is it not an exercise in technicality to expect the landlord to file a separate eviction petition under the new ground of sec. 21 (1) (p) and seek its clubbing with the pending eviction petition ? Why and to what extent the scheme and purpose of the Act would be defeated by permitting the amendment of the original eviction petition to include the new ground, is not clear to me. ( 10 ) THE principle slated in AIR 1965 SC 1008 is quite different and would govern the strict procedure regarding amendments to the plaint. Such a rigid approach is unnecessary and not called for while construing the procedural powers of the court under the provisions of the act and the Rules made there under. ( 11 ) IN Joseph D'souza v Stateof Mysore [1972 (1) Mys. L. J. 356] the landlord was the petitioner before this court. Such a rigid approach is unnecessary and not called for while construing the procedural powers of the court under the provisions of the act and the Rules made there under. ( 11 ) IN Joseph D'souza v Stateof Mysore [1972 (1) Mys. L. J. 356] the landlord was the petitioner before this court. He had sought eviction under Sec. 21 (1) (d), (e), (h) and (1) of the Act. Eviction was ordered by the trial court only under Sec. 21 (1) (d), rejecting the grounds under other clauses of Sec. 21 (1 ). Tenant preferred an appeal to District court which reversed the order of the trial court. Since the landlord had not filed any appeal or cross-objections, the District court did not go into the other grounds pleaded by the landlord. Jagannatha shelly, J. held that, this was "wholly an erroneous view. There need not be any cross-objection against an adverse finding. The party has always the liberty to support the order in his favour on any ground before the appellate authority". ( 12 ) IF each of the grounds under Sec. 21 (1), is of such a separata and distinct, character requiring an entirely independent proceeding for examination, the above view expressed by Jagannatha shetty, J. , would not have been possible. This decision clearly implies that the subject of the litigation-under Sec. 21 (1) of the Act is the recoverability of possession of the premises by the landlord and the several sub-clauses of Sec. 21 (1) enumerate only the various circumstances that come into existence by virtue of the several grounds stated therein; a different ground for eviction of the same premises would not alter the subject of litigation, at all. ( 13 ) A wife is entitled to separatemaintenance from her husband under various circumstances (similar to 'groudns'); they are enumerated in the decision of Daenadayal Reddy v Lalithakumari ( AIR 1953 Mad. 402 ). During the pendency, of 3 proceeding for separate maintenance, the husband had taken a second wife; the first wife was permitted to amend her petition to include this new ground. This was questioned before the high Court, in an appeal filed against the awarding of maintenance. The High Court rejected the contention that such a now cause of action should not have been permitted to be substituted. This was questioned before the high Court, in an appeal filed against the awarding of maintenance. The High Court rejected the contention that such a now cause of action should not have been permitted to be substituted. The Court held at page 403 :"i do not think that I can agree with the learned counsel for the appellant in this contention, for the reasons that the suit itself was for a separate maintenance on the ground that there was desertion on the part of the defendant, but during the pendency of the suit when a further event took place it cannot be said that it was not open to the plaintiff to take advantage of that ground, which would give rise to a further cause of action for maintaining her suit for separate maintenance. After all what she was claiming was only separate maintenance, and she could easily urge more than one ground for the purpose of establishing her claim for maintenance. It has been an accepted principle that courts when deciding suits, could take into account events that happen either during the pendency of the suit, or even at the stage of the first or second appeal". The court further held that the amendment did not prejudice the fair trial of the proceedings in any manner. ( 14 ) IN Amritlal N. Shah v Aliaannapurnam (AIR 1959 Andhra Pradesh 9) a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh high Court had occasion to consider a similar question wherein, suit was brought for eviction on the ground of forfeiture of lease for non-payment of rent. During the pendency of the suit, the lease expired and the plaintiff sought an amendment of the plaint by putting forward this alternative ground for eviction. The Bench held that, the prayer for amendment should be allowed, and relief could be granted to the plaintiff without driving him to a separate suit. ( 15 ) THE rights and liabilities underthe Act are not decided strictly on the basis of facts existing on the date of eviciion petition. Events happening after the decree for eviction are now freely considered even to nullify the decree; if so, why not new grounds be permitted to be pleaded to seek a decree for eviction ? ( 15 ) THE rights and liabilities underthe Act are not decided strictly on the basis of facts existing on the date of eviciion petition. Events happening after the decree for eviction are now freely considered even to nullify the decree; if so, why not new grounds be permitted to be pleaded to seek a decree for eviction ? ( 16 ) IF multiplicity of proceedings canbe avoided and court's time could thus be saved by permitting the amendment of an eviction petition so that filing of another eviction petition can be avoided, there is an element of public interest, in permitting the amendment. In fact, a single trial regarding inclusive of the new ground of eviction would save the parties from incurring further expenditure of money and time. ( 17 ) IN these circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to have the amendmentcarried out; his I. A. No. IV filed in the trial court has to be allowed; it is allowed accordingly. ( 18 ) THE revision petition is accordingly allowed, the order under revision isset aside and I. A. No. IV is allowed. No costs. Petition Allowed. --- *** --- .