Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited
1990-12-12
G.C.BHARUKA, G.G.SOHANI
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment G.C.Bharuka, J. 1. These references under Sec. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act" only), are at the instance of the Revenue calling for an answer to the following common question of law: "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in accepting the contentions of the assessee that the toll tax collection made by the assessee is the income of the State Government and not the assessees income ?" 2. These two tax cases relate to the assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79. Since a common question of law arising out of identical facts is involved in both the cases, these cases are being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. The assessee, Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter to be referred to as the "Corporation"), is a "Government company" within the meaning of Sec. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. It was incorporated on June 11, 1975. Its shares are held by the Government of Bihar through its officers. During the said two assessment years, the Corporation had collected Rs. 34,48,235 and Rs. 41,89,718 as tolls, respectively, in respect of the bridges of the State Government. It is the common ground that these collections by way of toll had been made by the Corporation pursuant to an authorisation as contained in a letter of the State Government bearing No. 8185 dated May 3, 1975 the relevant contents whereof have been recorded by the Tribunal as follows : "It has also been decided by the Government that the tolls on bridges will be collected by the Bridge Construction Corporation as per the approved rates enclosed and the funds received in this way will be considered as the income of the Bridge Construction Corporation." 4. On the above premise, the Income-tax Officer took the view that the tolls collected by the Corporation are its income and he, accordingly, made the assessment. The Corporation went in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), but lost. Aggrieved by the said order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.
On the above premise, the Income-tax Officer took the view that the tolls collected by the Corporation are its income and he, accordingly, made the assessment. The Corporation went in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), but lost. Aggrieved by the said order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after examining the provisions of the Indian Tolls Act, 1851 , various communications between the State Government and the Corporation, notifications of the State Government, reports of the directors of the Corporation as also by closely examining the mode of accounting of these collections, came to the conclusion that the tolls collected by the assessee during the years under consideration were the income of the Bihar Government and only to the extent of 15% of the realisations, the Corporation was entitled to appropriate them as its income which was to be utilised by it in managing the toll collection. 5. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Tribunal took into account the reports of the directors of the Corporation dated September 22, 1976, pertaining to the first accounting year ending on March 31, 1976. This report clearly contains that "toll taxes were being collected by the Corporation on behalf of the Bihar Government. The Corporation had been entrusted with the work of constructing bridges, approach roads and other types of civil works and for collection of tolls on bridges as an agent of the said Public Works Department." Paragraph No. 3 of the said report further contained that the manner in which the toll as collected by the Corporation was to be accounted for, was under the consideration of the Government and that pending finalisation of that matter and preparation of detailed rules, the collection of toll charges was to be treated as receipts of the Corporation. 6. I may state here that, as it appears from paragraph 1.7 of the Appellate Assistant Commissioners order, some draft rules framed under Sec. 9 of the Indian Tolls Act, as amended by the State Legislature, were prepared on April 23, 1979, but these rules were finalised and enforced much after the close of the financial year in question and, as such, these rules may not be of much help for resolving the issue at hand. 7.
7. It may also be mentioned here that a notification dated May 25, 1976, issued by the Public Works Department of the Government of Bihar forms part of the record wherein it has been, inter alia, provided that 29 specified bridges, under the administrative control of the Public Works Department and the construction cost of which was more than 25 lakhs of rupees, were transferred to the Corporation for collection of toll with effect from the date of taking over as per order contained in Public Works Department resolution No. 3782 dated February 26, 1976. 8. The main thrust of the submissions made by Mr. Rajgarhia, senior counsel appearing for the Revenue, is that since letter dated May 3, 1975 (quoted above) issued by the State Government itself provides that the tolls collected by the Corporation will be considered as the income of the Corporation, the departmental authorities have rightly taken it to be the income of the assessee and brought it to levy of tax. According to him, it amounts to an overriding title of the Corporation over the collection of tolls since the State Government by its unequivocal declaration had diverted its income of toll in favour of the Corporation at the very source. On the other hand, Mr. K.N. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the assessee-Corporation, has submitted that looking at the relevant statutory provisions and the attending facts and circumstances, the tolls collected by the Corporation as per the authorisation of the Government, cannot be treated as the income of the Corporation since, while managing the collection of tolls, the Corporation had acted merely as an agent of the State Government. 9. At the very outset, I may state that the indications made in the letter dated May 3, 1975, to the effect that the tolls collected will be considered to be the income of the Corporation per se cannot be of much consequence in determining the issue involved since by now it is well settled that the name given to a transaction or receipt by the parties concerned does not necessarily decide the nature thereof. Despite any such name given to a transaction or receipt, whenever the occasion arises, the Tribunal and the court have to independently apply themselves in order to ascertain the nature of the transaction and the receipt.
Despite any such name given to a transaction or receipt, whenever the occasion arises, the Tribunal and the court have to independently apply themselves in order to ascertain the nature of the transaction and the receipt. In such a situation, the question always is as to what is the real character of the payment or receipt and not as to what a party calls it. In this connection, I may usefully refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of National Cement Mines Industries Ltd. V/s. CIT [1961 ] 42 ITR 69 to the effect that (headnote) : "The name which the parties may give to the transaction which is the source of the receipt and the characterization of the receipt by them are of little moment, and the true nature and character of the transaction have to be ascertained from the covenants of the contract, in the light of the surrounding circumstances." 10. A similar view in a slightly different language has again been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT V/s. Panbari Tea Co. Ltd. [1965] 57 ITR 422, 425, wherein it has been held that: "There may be circumstances where the parties may camouflage the real nature of the transaction by using clever phraseology. In some cases, the so-called premium is in fact advance rent and in others rent is a deferred price. It is not the form but the substance of the transaction that matters. The nomenclature used may not be decisive or conclusive but it helps the court, having regard to the other circumstances, to ascertain the intention of the parties." 11. In the above background, it has to be examined and ascertained as to whether the tolls collected by the Corporation can at all be treated as the income of the Corporation for the purpose of the Income-tax Act. 12. It is not in dispute that the bridges in respect of which the State Government had authorised the Corporation to collect tolls are of the Government. The statutory authority for levy and collection of tolls is contained in the Indian Toils Act, 1851 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Tolls Act"). The preamble to this Act makes it clear that it is an Act for enabling the Government to levy toll on public roads and bridges.
The statutory authority for levy and collection of tolls is contained in the Indian Toils Act, 1851 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Tolls Act"). The preamble to this Act makes it clear that it is an Act for enabling the Government to levy toll on public roads and bridges. Sec. 2 of this Act provides for levy and collection of tolls and reads as under : "The State Government may cause such rates of toll, as it thinks fit to be levied upon any road or bridge which has been, or shall hereafter be, made or repaired at the expense of the Central or any State Government, and may place the collection of such tolls under the management of such persons as may appear to it proper ; and all persons employed in the management and collection of such tolls shall be liable to the same responsibilities as would belong to them if employed in the collection of land revenue." 13. Sec. 8 of the Tolls Act contemplates that the tolls levied under this Act shall be deemed public revenue. 14. In view of Sec. 2 of the Tolls Act, the State Government has been authorised to place collection of tolls under the management of such persons as may appear to it proper and in pursuance of this provision, by the letter dated May 3, 1975 (quoted above), the State Government decided to authorise the Corporation to manage the collection of tolls in respect of the specified bridges of the State Government. Therefore, in view of the statutory provisions, there cannot be even the slightest doubt that, in the present case, while managing the collection of tolls, the Corporation had merely acted as an agent of the State Government. It is needless to say that this statutory provision will have an overriding effect on the covenants and communications contained in intentions contrary to the statutory provision. A person authorised to manage the collection of tolls cannot have a status other than that of an agent of the State Government which is further amplified by the last part of Sec. 2 of the Tolls Act where it has been said that: "all persons employed in the management and collection of such tolls shall be liable to the same responsibilities as would belong to them if employed in the collection of the land revenue." 15.
Therefore, even if the Government at all intended which, in the present case, the Government does not seem to have done, the Corporation could not have treated the collection to be its income because it was under a statutory liability to account for the entire collection to the Government as the other collectors of land revenue are. 16. There is an equally strong reasoning for taking the above view. Sec. 8 of the Tolls Act provides that tolls received under that Act shall be deemed to be public revenue. Article 266(1) of the Constitution of India, inter alia, provides that: "... all revenues received by the Government of a State, all loans raised by that Government by the issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all moneys received by that Government in repayment of loans shall form one consolidated fund to be entitled the Consolidated Fund of the State." 17. Therefore, the tolls collected by the Corporation will immediately become part of the "Consolidated Fund of the State" and the Corporation cannot have any authority to spend the same except as per directions of the Government and for public purposes keeping in view the Constitutional mandate. 18. The reasoning noted above clearly negatives the applicability of the doctrine of overriding title in the present case because, even if the State Government at all intended to divert the ownership of the tolls collected by the Corporation at the very source in favour of the Corporation, it was not legally permissible because Sec. 2 of the Tolls Act read with the constitutional provisions debars the State Government from doing so. Therefore, any such presumption is impermissible in law, 19. In view of the foregoing discussions, I hold that the Tribunal was right in law in accepting the contentions of the assessee that the toll collections made by the assessee-Corporation was the income of the State Government and not the assessees income. Accordingly, the question as referred is answered in the affirmative and against the Department. Under the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. G.G. Sohani, C.J. 20. I agree.