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1990 DIGILAW 448 (KAR)

SHARADA BAI v. CHAINA SATTAR

1990-08-23

M.P.CHANDRAKANTARAJ

body1990
CHANDRAKANTARAJ URS, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgments and decrees of the lower appellate Court and the trial Court. The facts in this appeal, in brief, are as follows : ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF presented the suit in ther. 26 court of Munsiff at Ramanagaram in O. S. No. 95/83 seeking the following reliefs :- that the defendants be prevented from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the suit schedule properties items 1 and 2 - of which she was in lawful possession. Defendants resisted the suit inter-alia on the ground while the plaintiff was the owner of suit item No. 1 schedule property, the item No. 2 belonged to the Makhan property and members of Muslim community were using the same for offering their worship and also celebrating 'baba Habba' in that part of the property. The trial court on such pleadings, formulated the following issues for trial :- 1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are the owners in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties ? 2) Whether the plaintiffs prove the alleged interference by the defendants ? 3) If so, whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for permanent injunction as sought for ? 4) For what relief the parties are entitled to ? parties in support of their case led evidence and got marked several documents. Plaintiff examined herself and two others. While defendants examined defendant nos. 1 and 3 and two others and we see the evidence of P W. 3 was rejected as he was not produced to subject him for crossexamination. At this stage, it is useful to state that plaint averments were supported by certain documents produced along with the plaint by a separate list. Item No. 7 of that list was a rough sketch of said schedule properties 1 and 2. But, for some reason, the same was not marked in evidence. But, however, it is seen that the trial Court has made use of that sketch in reaching its conclusion. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion on the issues framed that the plaintiff had not discharged the burden cast on her, and proved that she was in lawful possession of the suit schedule properties and there was interference by the defendants in regard to the enjoyment of those properties by he. On appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion on the issues framed that the plaintiff had not discharged the burden cast on her, and proved that she was in lawful possession of the suit schedule properties and there was interference by the defendants in regard to the enjoyment of those properties by he. r in the manner pleaded, and therefore, dismissed the suit in limine. In appreciating the evidence on record, both oral and documentary he laid stress on the interested nature of the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 and the material contradiction between the oral evidence of P W. 1 and P W. 2. He attached great importance to the evidence of D. W. 1 and the document - Ex. D-2 produced by him which was a licence granted by the village panchayst to construct a compound surrounding the vacant space with defined measurements for the use of Muslim community. He attached some importance to the fact that the plaintiff did not take any steps to challenge the licence granted by the village panchayat for the construction of compound around the vacant space claimed to be the Wakf property by the defendants. He also came to the conclusion that the reliance placed by the plaintiff on the primary documentary evidence viz. , Ex. P-1 - the sale deed in favour of the mother of the plaintiff - that it was not evidence of lawful possession of the suit properties as the description of the properties sold under Ex. P-1 did not contain any measurement, but only described the boundaries within which the property was situate. Despite the several photographs exhibited by the plaintiff, there was no clear identification of the suit schedule properties and the interference thereto in the opinion of the learned Munsiff. Therefore, he dismissed the suit in toto. ( 3 ) ON appeal to the Civil Judge at Ramanagaram in R. A No. 4/87, the lower appellate Court after hearing arguments for the parties before it, formulated the following questions for consideration :- 1) Whether the appellant had established her lawful possession over the suit schedule properties ? 2) Whether the interference alleged by the appellant was true ? 2) Whether the interference alleged by the appellant was true ? on the first point formulated by him, he came to the conclusion that the documentary and oral evidence read with the evidence of the defendant No. 1 established that plaintiff was in occupation of item 1 of the suit schedule property - her house which was indeed conveyed to her by her mother by Ex. P-1, and therefore, the trial court was wrong in coming to the conclusion in respect of item 1 property also plaintiff had failed to prove her lawful possession. On point No. 2 formulated, he came to the conclusion that she had not proved interference with her enjoyment of suit schedule 1 property as disclosed by her own evidence. Therefore, he did not grant any injunction. In the result, the appeal came to be partly allowed, establishing the lawful possession of the plaintiff to the suit item schedule 1 of the property. Having failed to secure the relief prayed for even in the lower appellate court, this second appeal is filed. ( 4 ) NO substantial question of law assuch is formulated in the memorandum of appeal. The learned Counsel presenting arguments in this Court, stated that the courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not established her case despite the admissions which were in favour of her case pleaded by her by the defendants. The crux of the argument was, the defendants had admitted in their oral evidence that there was vacant space on the southern side of her property, and therefore, the space available on the southern side of her residence was hers and that was in her exclusive possession, and therefore, the Courts below erred in dismissing her suit in toto. ( 5 ) I do not think there is merit in the proposition as a proposition of law even if it is construed as such. It is true if admission by one party is favourable to the other party, and is overlooked, then there will be a clear error on the part of the Court which does so. But, the question is whether there is such admission as is pleaded by the learned counsel. ( 6 ) ON carefully going through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, there is no admission which establishes her lawful possession of suit schedule item 2 property. But, the question is whether there is such admission as is pleaded by the learned counsel. ( 6 ) ON carefully going through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2, there is no admission which establishes her lawful possession of suit schedule item 2 property. D. W 1 the first defendant is very emphatic about the vacant space of defined measurements which has been used by the Muslim community for offering prayers. He has admitted that the property, suit schedule item 1 has a door on the southern side. But, he has never spoken that the door is within any vacant space belonging to that property. All that he has said is that on the southern side of suit item 1 schedule property, the vacant space used by them for offering prayers and the road exists. The implication is between the vacant space claimed by the plaintiff and the space used by the defendants, a road intervenes. Therefore, it clearly establishes there cannot possibly be any admission from the defendants that on the southern side of the suit item schedule 1 property, suit item schedule 2 property must definitely fall on the northern side of the road. If it is the inevitable conclusion reached on the evidence of the parties, it cannot be said that there is any admission in favour of the plaintiff. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel persistently drew the attention of the Court to the admission of the D. W 2 who was the chairman of the village panchayat and who was familier with the property located in and around the suit schedule properties. In the cross-examination, it was elicited that on the southern side of the suit schedule properties there was a lane and vacant space. That in fact corroborates the evidence of D W. 1 and cannot be said to be an admission in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, what the learned counsel tried in this Court was to call upon this Court to reappreciate the evidence in order to make out a fresh case and give her title as well as possession to suit schedule item 2 based solely on recitals in ex. P-1 the title deed. There was never a plea for declaration of title despite Ex. D-2 the licence to construct a compound around suit schedule item 2 in favour of the defendants. P-1 the title deed. There was never a plea for declaration of title despite Ex. D-2 the licence to construct a compound around suit schedule item 2 in favour of the defendants. ( 8 ) IN that circumstance, I do not think this Court would be justified in interfering with the lower appellate court's judgment which to some extent benefitted the appellant and the appellant must be content with that. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .