ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER calls in question legality of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar, upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Judicial Magistrate, first class, Barbil stationed at Champua. ( 2 ) A brief recital of the factual position as presented by the prosecution, relevant for disposal of this revision, is that on 29-9-1983, the Hivaldar and Sepoy of Tisco, Joda noticed some people loading iron scrap materials in a truck at Bottom Bin Area; this was brought to the notice of the Assistant Security Officer, who proceeded to the spot, but by that time the truck had already left the place; the security staff kept watch, over the movement of the truck, which was found speedily proceeding towards Notified Area Council, Check Gate, Joda; even though the security staff wanted to stop the vehicle, it did not stop; the Assistant Security Officer and the security staff chased the truck and at last the truck stopped at Ranasala Chat; three persons including the present petitioner were found escaping from the truck; while the petitioner could be caught hold, all others escaped; the present petitioner was the driver of the truck; on interrogation, he named two other persons, who had fled away, to be the owners of the truck, the truck was found to have been loaded with scrap materials of Tisco. ( 3 ) PLEA of the accused persons was one of denial of the occurrence. The petitioner and one Durga Bahadur Thippa stated to be the owner of the truck faced trial being charged under Ss. 379 /411 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the 'ipc' ). ( 4 ) TWELVE witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. The trial Court, on consideration of the evidence on record, found both the accused persons guilty under S. 411, I. P. C. , but not under S. 379, I. P. C. It convicted each of them and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each. The conviction and sentence were assailed in appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Keonjhar, who acquitted the co-accused, but maintained the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. ( 5 ) THE main plank of argument advanced in support of the petitioner's case is that the ingredients of S. 411, I. P. C. have not been established to warrant any conviction and sentence. ( 5 ) THE main plank of argument advanced in support of the petitioner's case is that the ingredients of S. 411, I. P. C. have not been established to warrant any conviction and sentence. It is submitted that a carrier or transporter which has no knowledge that the goods were stolen cannot be held guilty under S. 411, I. P. C. The learned Standing Counsel, however, submits that the narration of facts clearly establishes that the accused person had knowledge that the materials were stolen property and therefore, the conviction and sentence are in order. ( 6 ) ON consideration of the rival submissions, I find that the only question that falls for determination is whether the petitioner was guilty of dishonest receipt or retention of stolen property and whether he had knowledge or reason to believe at the time of receipt that the property was obtained in one of the ways indicated above. It is the duty of the prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of a person under S. 411, I. P. C. , and to secure conviction to prove that (i) the property in question was 'stolen property' within the meaning of S. 410 of the Code; (ii) the stolen property was in possession of the accused; (iii) some other person, other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got possession of the same; and (iv) the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that the property was stolen property, and with such knowledge or belief dishonestly received it or dishonestly retained it. The offences for receiving and retaining property was contextually different. The use of alternative expression 'dishonestly receives or retains' in one and the same section requires the prosecutor of proving that the accused either received or retained the property (of course dishonestly), that is to say, that the prosecutor need not prove that it was dishonestly received as distinct from dishonestly retained or dishonestly retained as distinct from dishonestly received. It is enough to prove facts which justify inference that the accused either dishonestly received or retained the property. The prosecution has to establish that the property in question was stolen property and there was either dishonest receipt or dishonest retention. A carrier or transporter, who carries or transports goods cannot generally be ascribed with the knowledge about the source of the property. The prosecution has to establish that the property in question was stolen property and there was either dishonest receipt or dishonest retention. A carrier or transporter, who carries or transports goods cannot generally be ascribed with the knowledge about the source of the property. It would be hazardous to presume that because a property is stolen, the carrier or the transporter had the necessary knowledge that it was stolen property. In an almost identical case where some cable wires belonging to the Trunk Telephone Exchange Office in Hubli were found in the rear portion of a tonga when it was stopped for inspection, it was held that there was no material to ascribe any knowledge to the carrier or the transporter that the property in question was stolen property. Therefore, the presumption as illustrated in illustration (a) to S. 114 of the Evidence Act was held not available to be drawn. The presumption which is provided by the said Illustration can only be raised when a person is in possession of the stolen property after the theft. There is no material produced in this case to indicate what is the time of the alleged theft. The evidence is remiss in that regard. Therefore, the view expressed by the Mysore High Court reported in 1970 Mad LJ (Cri) 59; Krishna Shetaba Hutagi v. State of Mysore, appears to be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the absence of necessary materials and evidence to show that the goods in question were known to be stolen property to the petitioner, the conviction and consequently the sentence cannot be maintained. The revision is accordingly allowed. The bail-bonds be discharged. Petition allowed.