JUDGMENT P.K. Shamsuddin, J. 1. Plaintiff in O.S. No. 128 of 1982 on the file of the Sub Court, Badagara, is the appellant. The suit is for a declaration that the gift deed executed by the plaintiff is not acted upon. 2. The plaint schedule property belonged to plaintiff. He executed a gift deed in favour of his wife the defendant on 25th January 1980. According to the plaintiff though gift deed was executed it was not acted upon and it was only a sham transaction and invalid in law. He averted ' that the original document was with him but his wife stealthly removed it and took it to her residence. 3. Defendant contended that the suit is not maintainable, that it was executed conveying the title to the property to the defendant, that the averment that the original gift deed was with the plaintiff but was subsequently removed by her, was false, that the plaintiff, after taking back the document from the Registrar's Office, handed over the same to her and it was acted upon and that therefore the plaintiff has no right over the property. 4. The Court below held that the gift deed is valid and that it was acted upon and in that view of the matter the suit was dismissed. 5. In this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the finding of the trial Court. Ext. B-1 is the original gift deed and it was produced by the defendant. Ext. A-1 is the registration copy of the gift deed. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that delivery of possession is an essential ingredient for a valid gift and the provision in Ext. B-1 that the donor was entitled to reside in the house and to take the usufructs from the properties would render the document invalid under the Muslim Law. He also contended that though a document was executed it was never acted upon and that he continued in possession of the property and enjoyed the usufructs from the plaint schedule property. Learned counsel also heavily relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Beepathumma and others v. Mohammed Nakoor Meera Rowther and. others I.L.R. 1976 (2) Kerala 137 in support of his contention. 6. Learned counsel also heavily relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Beepathumma and others v. Mohammed Nakoor Meera Rowther and. others I.L.R. 1976 (2) Kerala 137 in support of his contention. 6. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant it would be profitable to quote the relevant recital in Ext. B-1. xxx xxx xxx�. It is clear from the above recital that the donor has only reserved a right to take usufructs and to reside in the house in the property and the entire possession was made over to the donee. In view of the unambiguous recital in the document that possession was made over to the defendant, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that no possession was made over to the donee cannot be countenanced. The relevant recital in the document which J was subject matter of decision in Beepathumma's case I.L.R. 1976 (2) Kerala 137 (supra) has been extracted at page 140 in I.L.R. (2) Ker. 137, which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx In the above referred case, no possession was made over and the donor was allowed to be in possession and to take the usufructs during his life-time. The Division Bench observed that in view of the requirement of Muslim Law that delivery has to be given to make a gift complete, the gift in that case cannot be considered as a valid gift. In the instant case possession was made over and only the right to take usufructs and to reside-in the house was reserved by the donor. 7. In Ibrahimkunju Shahul Hameed and others v. Pakkeer Muhammed Kunju and others I.L.R. 1984 (2) Kerala 337 a Division Bench of this Court, after reviewing the entire case law on the point, held that the mere fact that the donor reserves the right to take usufructs during his life-time does not mean that possession is not given to the donees and such a reservation is quite consistent with delivery of possession of the properties to the donees. In the case which came before the Division Bench the deed of gift provided that the whole of the usufruct would be taken by the donor during his life-time. 8. In the case which came before the Division Bench the deed of gift provided that the whole of the usufruct would be taken by the donor during his life-time. 8. In Kunhamina v. Katheessa 1989 (2) KLT SN 73 Page 61 Pareed Pillay, J. considered the question again and held that reservation in the usufructs during the life-time of the donor will not render the document of gift invalid. Muslim Law makes a distinction between the corpus of the gift (Ayn) and the usufruct (Manafi). Any reservation of right in manafi, so long as the ayn is transferred, does not render the gift deed invalid. 9. Privy Council has occasion to consider the effect of a declaration of delivery of possession in a deed of gift of immovable property by the husband in favour of his wife in Nawab Mirza Mohammed Sadie Ali Khan v. Nawab Fakr Jabar Begum A.I.R. 1937 S.C. 13. The Privy Council held that a declaration contained in the deed that possession was made over to the wife must be regarded as binding on heirs of donor, and relied on the circumstance that gift deed was handed over by the donor to the donee in support of its conclusion that the gift was complete. It is profitable to quote the following observation of the Privy Council in that context. "In the case of a gift by a husband to his wife, their Lordships do not think that Mohammedan Law requires actual vacation by the husband and actual taking of separate possession by the wife. In their opinion the declaration made by the husband followed by the handing over the deed are amply sufficient to establish a transfer of possession." 10. It was however contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that though there is a recital in the document that possession was made over, really no delivery of possession had taken place. It was also contended that the original gift deed was with the plaintiff, but it was stealthly removed by the defendant. Apart from the plaintiff's assertion, there is nothing to substantiate these. The fact that the plaintiff was residing in the house or that he was taking the usufructs would not indicate that Ext. B-1 was not acted upon, inasmuch as those acts are referable to the provision in Ext. Apart from the plaintiff's assertion, there is nothing to substantiate these. The fact that the plaintiff was residing in the house or that he was taking the usufructs would not indicate that Ext. B-1 was not acted upon, inasmuch as those acts are referable to the provision in Ext. B-1 enabling him to take the usufructs and reside in the house during his life-time. Ext. B-1 the original gift deed was produced by the defendant and I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff after taking back the document from the registry handed over the same to the defendant. Payment of tax as per Ext. A-4, dated 19th February 1985, after the filing of suit by the plaintiff would not also show that the document was not acted upon. It follows that the Judgment and decree of the Court below are correct and do not call for any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. I direct the parties to suffer their respective costs.