Judgment :- Revision petitioner, the Union of India, represented by the General Manager, Southern Railway, Madras challenges the judgment in A.S.21 of 1986 and A.S.1 of 1987 of the 1st Additional Sub Judge, Trichur. The Sub Judge dismissed the appeals upholding the compensation granted by the trial court in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that as the railway authorities failed to provide them berths and seats despite reservations in their favour considerable hardship and distress resulted and on account of it they suffered physically and mentally during the journey from New Delhi to Trichur in an overcrowded compartment. Plaintiffs reserved their seats and berths in 126 K.K. Express from New Delhi Railway Station. The train left New Delhi Railway Station on 18-10-1981 and reached Trichur on 20-10-1981 and plaintiffs travelled without the assured berths and seats. 3. One of the contentions of the defendant is that the Sub Judge, Trichur had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits as the plaintiffs purchased the tickets and obtained reservation from New Delhi Railway Station and so Court at New Delhi alone has jurisdiction. We have to consider whether the contention is legally tenable. If such a stand is adopted, plaintiffs would have to approach New Delhi Court to file the suits. That would lead to an absurd and incongruous position. Defendant cannot obviously challenge the jurisdiction of the Trichur Court in view of S.80 of the Indian Railways Act. S.80(b) states that if a passenger purchased his ticket and travelled to a particular destination and if he suffered any loss or injury or damage he can institute the suit either in the Court having jurisdiction over the place at which he obtained the ticket or in the Court having jurisdiction over the destination station. As the destination station admittedly is Trichur, the suits filed by the plaintiffs cannot be thrown out on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. There is no merit in the defence contention that the Court lacked jurisdiction in trying the suits. 4. Another contention of the defendant is that the plaintiffs have not suffered any personal injury and so they cannot claim any compensation under S.80 of the Act. There is no merit in the defence contention that the Court lacked jurisdiction in trying the suits. 4. Another contention of the defendant is that the plaintiffs have not suffered any personal injury and so they cannot claim any compensation under S.80 of the Act. S.80 provides that suit can be filed against Railways for compensation for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger or for loss or destruction or damage or deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods. 5. The term "injury" cannot be limited to any physical injury sustained by the plaintiffs. The term "injury" would encompass any hardship, or deal and inconvenience caused to a passenger when he is denied of berth he had reserved and consequently when he had to travel in an overcrowded compartment. The mental agony suffered by him cannot be brushed aside. In Bantam English Dictionary "injury" is defined as follows: "Any hurt or harm, physical or moral, any damage to or violation of one's rights or property. SYM damage, detriment, loss, hurt, harm, mischief, impairment, injustice, wrong, evil, outrage, prejudice." In Burton's Legal Thesaurus "injury" is defined: "bias, adversity, pain, brakeage, damage, damnum, deprivation, detriment, detrimentum, disservice, harm, harmful act, hurt, illtreatment, impairment, incommodum, invasion of a legal right, loss, offence, physical hurt, prejudice, privation, violence, wrong". Whenever a person is affected disadvantageously by the act of another he is said to be injured, the magnitude of which would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. As the law is the rule of right, whatever is contrary to rule of right is an injury. In Surendrasingh v. Lai Sheoraj (AIR 1975 M.P. 85) the Court held thus: "In legal parlance 'injury' means any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or property. In other words, it means an act which harms, hurts or damages irrespective of the consideration how the harm, hurt or damage may arise." The term "injury" cannot be confined to physical or bodily injury. If such a narrow view is adopted, the result would be that aggrieved persons would be denied of any compensation legitimately due to them on account of breach of contract. 6. There are sufficient averments in both the plaints that the plaintiff in each case suffered much mental agony apart from physical discomfort. If such a narrow view is adopted, the result would be that aggrieved persons would be denied of any compensation legitimately due to them on account of breach of contract. 6. There are sufficient averments in both the plaints that the plaintiff in each case suffered much mental agony apart from physical discomfort. As the defendant could not prevent overcrowding in the compartment which was exclusively kept for reserved passengers, plaintiffs were unable to get seating accommodation. On account of it plaintiffs' journey from New Delhi to Trichur became arduous and miserable. Plaintiffs never wanted to travel in the unreserved compartment. They reserved the berths sufficiently in advance and it was only when they came to the Railway Station that they realised that due to the callous indifference of the defendant they were deprived of their legitimate berths and seats in the compartment. As this has resulted in hardship and injury to the plaintiffs, their claim for compensation cannot be denied. 7. Counsel for the defendant next contended that at best plaintiffs were entitled only to the refund of the tickets as provided under S.67 of the Indian Railways Act. S.67(2) provides that a person to whom a ticket has been issued and for whom there is no room available in the train for which the ticket was issued shall on returning the ticket within three hours after the departure of the train be entitled to have his fare at once refunded. Relying on S.67 counsel for the defendant submitted that the course open to the plaintiffs was to have obtained the refund of the value of the tickets and so they cannot claim any compensation. Counsel relied on Manendra Chandra v. E.I. Ry. Co. (AIR 1927 Patna 352), Shankar Narayan v. Bars! Light Railway Co. (AIR 1947 Bombay 390) and Union of India v. Shri Nivas Mai (AIR 1955 Patna 282) in support of the above contention. These rulings under S.67 have no application to the case in hand as the claim of the plaintiffs does not come under that Section. As this is a case of denial of reserved berths to the plaintiffs, S.67 has absolutely no application. 8. Rule 5 of the Guide Book for passengers in Chapter VI published by the Southern Railway in 1977 at page 42 states: "5. As this is a case of denial of reserved berths to the plaintiffs, S.67 has absolutely no application. 8. Rule 5 of the Guide Book for passengers in Chapter VI published by the Southern Railway in 1977 at page 42 states: "5. Occupying a seat or berth already reserved:-no passenger can enter a reserved compartment or occupy a seat/berth which is already reserved for some other passenger. S.109 of the Indian Railways Act prohibits such an act. If any person violates S.109 and also refuses to vacate, he may be removed by force and may also be fined." The above provision would clearly show that a passenger who has reserved seat or berth is entitled to occupy his seat or berth and no other passenger is entitled to encroach upon that right. If any person violates the said provision, he is liable to be proceeded against under S.109 of the Railways Act. S.109 empowers the authority concerned to remove any person who unlawfully enters into a reserved compartment and infringes the lawful right of the passengers who have reserved berth or seat. It gives ample power to the railway authorities to remove such a person from the compartment or the berth or the seat. Apparently no action was taken under S.109 to eject those persons who unauthorisedly entered into the reserved compartment and denied the lawful right of the plaintiffs. As the defendant's officers did not provide adequate protection and safe-guard the interests of the plaintiffs, their claim for compensation cannot be resisted by the defendant. S.73 of the Contract Act provides that where a party suffers loss or damage in consequence of breach of contract he is entitled to recover compensation from the party breaking the contract. It confers a statutory right on a party to get compensation. As the defendant was bound to provide berths and seats to the plaintiffs as they obtained reservations well in advance and as they encountered much inconvenience and discomfort during the journey as a result of the lethargy and. inaction on the part of the defendant in not going to the rescue of the plaintiffs, defendant cannot be absolved from the liability of payment of compensation. 9. In deciding whether damages claimed are too remote the test is whether the damage is such as must have been in the contemplation of the parties as being a possible result of the breach. 9. In deciding whether damages claimed are too remote the test is whether the damage is such as must have been in the contemplation of the parties as being a possible result of the breach. If the answer is affirmative, then it cannot be regarded as too remote. Berths were reserved by the plaintiffs who wanted to travel comfortably and with greater ease and convenience. As they could not get berth not on their fault but due to the acts of omission on the part of the defendant, knowledge of their sufferings had to be attributed to the defendant's failure to give them the berths. It cannot be said that damage claimed is too remote. Damages have to be assessed on the basis of natural and probable consequenes of the breach of contract. In Pravudayal v. Ramkumar (AIR 1956 Cal. 41) the Court held that where the plaintiff had suffered damages as a direct consequence of the breach of contract by the defendant and it is difficult to calculate the same with mathematical accuracy by instituting enquiries, the plaintiff is presumed to have sustained damages. It is difficult to accept the contention of the defendant that the alleged sufferings of the plaintiffs were not in any way attributable to the action of the defendant. In the case of breach of contract, the aggrieved party is entitled to damages which naturally arise in the usual course of business. It cannot be said that claim made by the plaintiffs for compensation is remote or indirect that they are not entitled to any compensation. The Courts below were justified in decreeing the suits in favour of the plaintiffs. The C.R.Ps. are without any merit and hence they are dismissed with costs.