Judgment G. C. Bharuka, J. 1. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by thesole appellant against the judgment dated 5th October, 1988, rendered by one of the Hon ble Single Judges of this Court in C. W. J. C. No.690 of 1988. 2. The appellant was a Branch Manager, Grade b Officer, in the puniab National Bank. On 26-7-1976 he was suspended from service and then he served with the charge-sheet on 29-7-1977/2-8-1977 which contained five charges. On Appellants denial of those charges, a departmental enquiry was initiated and, in the departmental enquiry, as the appellant was found guilty of the charges, his services were terminated by an order dated 14-9-1978. This order of termination of service of the appellant was challenged by him by filing a writ application in this Court being C W J C No 1896 of 1979. This Court quashed the order of termination by its judgment dated 1st September, 1981, on the ground of procedural infirmities but permitted the Disciplinary authorities to frame charges against the appellant in accordance with law and after following the procedures laid down under the Regulations of the Bank and thereafter pass appropriate orders It appears that consequent to the above order of this Court, a second order of suspension was passed against the appellant under Regulation 12 (4) of the Regulations of the Bank and a fresh departmental proceeding was initiated against him. Pursuant to the aforesaid fresh departmental enquiry, by an order dated 19-11-1985, which was communicated to the appellant along with inter office letter dated 21-11-1985 the appellant was dismissed from service once again. This order was challenged by the appellants in this Court by filing C. W. J. C. No.5967 of 1985 But by an order dated 7-1-1986, a Bench of this Court dismissed the writ application as withdrawn by passing the following order : "7-1-1986 After a long argument, Mr. Krishna Nand Choudhary, who has argued his matter ably, in person, wishes to withdraw this writ petition in order to resortt to the statutory remedy of appeal available to him under Regulation 17 of the Punjab National bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. This application is dismissed as withdrawn. Krishna Nand Choudhary, who has argued his matter ably, in person, wishes to withdraw this writ petition in order to resortt to the statutory remedy of appeal available to him under Regulation 17 of the Punjab National bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. This application is dismissed as withdrawn. " After withdrawing the writ application, as stated above, in order to avail the statutory remedy of appeal under the Regulations, the appellant seems to have filed an Appeal before the statutory authorities as also a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court. This Writ petition was registered as W. P. No, 795 of 1986. It appears that before this Writ Petition could be taken up for preliminary hearing, the statutory appeal filed by the Appellant was disposed of by an order dated 21-5-1986. The appellate authorities reduced the punishment of dismissal of the appellant from Banks Service to that of major penalty of reduction of his salary by two stages in the time scale. The appellant challenged the validity of this appellate order also in the Supreme Court by filing a Supplementary Affidavit in the aforementioned writ petition on various grounds. 3. The Supreme Court by its order dated 25-8-1986 rejected the writ petition by passing the following order : "this Writ Petition is rejected. It will, however, be open for the management of the Punjab National Bank to consider, in the event of the petitioner showing marked improvement in the discharge of his responsibilities, whether the order of penalty imposed on him should not be superseded on a subsequent date prospectively. " In spite of the rejection of the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant before the supreme Court against the Appellate order, imposing penalty upon him, the appellant again filed a writ application in this Court being C. W. J. C. No.690 of 1988, the judgment whereof, has been impugned in the present appeal. 4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the aforesaid writ application subject to certain observations on the ground of its very maintainability as it was found to be barred both by the principle of rts judicata and constructive res judicata in view of the rejection of the Writ Petition since the writ Petition filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution was dismissed on merit. 5. 5. Before entering into the submissions made by the appellant, who has appealed in person, 1 may state that subsequent to the passing of the passing first suspension order against the appellant in the year 1976 till his second order of dismissal passed on 19-11-1985 there were series litigations by way cf filing writ applications in the High Court and Special leave petitions in the Supreme Court; tut, since those are now only matters of history, which have been duly noticed in the Judgment, under appeal, I do not think it necessary to go into the details of those cases except one. which will have some bearings on one of the pleas advanced by the appellant in this appeal by an order dated 1-9-1981 passed in M. J. C. No.672 of 1985, this Court had held that the appellant was entitled to all the benefits of salary etc. upto the 14th September, 1978, i. e. the date of his first dismissal and, accordingly it was directed that the same should be paid to the appellant by 24-2-19a6 either by theque or flank draft. Against this order, the Bank preferred Special Leave petition in the Supreme Court being S. L. P. (Civil) No.3116 of 1986 in which leave was granted. As a conscquerce thereof, Civil Appeal No.1559 of 1986 was registered in the Supreme Court. At the time of grant of special leave, the Supreme Court permitted the present appellant to withdraw the amount of his salary on furnishing security. This appeal was disposed of on 23-10-1986 since the present appellant had withdrawn the amount and the respondent-Bank gave an undertaking that it does not intend to recover pack the amount from the present appellant. It further appears that in this appeal, a Miscellaneous Petition was filsd by the present appellant, making certain prayers but he withdraw the said Miscellaneous petition on an assertion that he purposes to apply to the High Court for the reliefs. A copy of this order has been filed as Annexure-4 to this appeal. This Miscellaneous petition was filed in Civil Appeal No.1559 of 1986 is clear from the title of the order in which punjab National Bank has been shown as Appellant. A copy of this order has been filed as Annexure-4 to this appeal. This Miscellaneous petition was filed in Civil Appeal No.1559 of 1986 is clear from the title of the order in which punjab National Bank has been shown as Appellant. The order of the Supreme Court is in the following terms : "the petitioners who appears in person prays for permission to withdraw the civil Miscellaneous Petition as he proposes to apply to the High Court for relief. The Civil Miicellaneous petition is disposed of as withdrawn. " 6. The submissions of the appellant is that the learned Single Judge of this Court has erred in dismissing the writ application as non-maintainable on the ground of res-judicata for the following reasons : (i) Since the Supreme Court has not dismissed him writ petition by any speaking order, therefore, it can not operate as res-judicate so as to defeat his right of preferring a writ application under articles 22b and 227 of the Constitution ; and (ii) By the appellant under in his Miscellaneous petition, the Supreme court had permitted the appellant to approach the High Court for seeking the relief sought for in the writ application in question. 7. In my view there is no substance in either of the contentions raised by the appellant so far as the second plea is concerned, it is suffice to say that the order seeking withdrawal of the Miscellaneous petition with an intention to apply to the High Court for the relief, can not tantamount to the grant of any permission by the Supreme Court. Secondly this Miscellaneous petition appears to have been filed in the Civil Appeal, which was filed by the Respondent Bank and, as such, it had no bearing on the impugned penalty imposed upon the appellant. 8. Referring to the order dated 25-8-1986 passed by the Supreme Court (quoted in paragraph no.3 of this judgment) the learned Single Judge has paid that, "could it be said that this order is not passed on merits by the supreme Court I am of the firm opinion that even though the court has not given detailed reasons, but it did apply its judicial mind and dismissed the writ petition on merits. The petitioner, therefore, is shut out from challenging the appellate order afresh before this Court in the instant writ petition. " 9. The petitioner, therefore, is shut out from challenging the appellate order afresh before this Court in the instant writ petition. " 9. I respectfully agree with the reasonings given above by learned single Judge in this regard. 10. So far the Submissions of the appellant that since the writ petition was not dismissed by the Supreme Court by a speaking order, therefore it will not operate as res-judicata is concerned. It may better quote the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of The Workmen of cochin Port Trust V/s. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another, AIR 1978 SC 1283 , at page 1288. "if the writ petition is dismissed after contest by a speaking order obviously it will operate as res Judicata in any other proceeding. Such as, of suit, Article 32 or Article 136 directed from the same order or decision. If the writ petition is dismissed by a speaking order either at the threshold or after contest, say, only on the ground of laches or the availability of an alternative remedy, then another remedy open in law either by way of suit or any other proceeding obviously will not be barred on the principle of res judicata. Of 4 course, a second writ petition on the same cause of action either filed in the same High Court or in another will not be maintainable because the dismissal of the petition will operate as a bar in the entertainment or another writ petition. Similarly even if one writ petition is dismissed in limine by a non-speaking one word order dismissed, another writ petition would not be maintainable because even the one word order, as we have indicated above, must necessarily be taken to have decided impliedly that the case is not a fit one for exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the high Court, Another writ petition from the same order or decision will not lie. " 11. " 11. With respect, applying the above principle of law laid down by the supreme Court, in my opinion, even if the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the Writ Petition of the Appellant can be construed to be a non-speaking order, still since the dismissal was on merit, for the same cause of action and against the same appellate order a second on writ petition is not maintainable in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 12. For the reasons stated above, the present Appeal is dismissed being devoid of any substance. But in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.