M. RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision petition, the petitioner has called in question the legality and correctness of the order passed by the civil judge, hospet on the preliminary issues Nos. 5 and 6 in misc. No. 33 of 1987. ( 2 ) THE facts that are necessary for the disposal of this petition are as follows:-in the election held on 2-1-1987 to the office of the zilla parisnad, hagaribommanahalli constituency, under the karaataka zilla parishads, taluk panchayat samithis, mandal panchayats and nyaya panchayats Act, 1983 (the 'act' for short), the petitioner herein was declared elected. In other words, while the petitioner was elected, respondent 1 lost the election. Having been aggrieved, respondent 1 presented an election petition before the learned civil judge, hospet, in accordance with the Provisions of the act. It is not in dispute that a copy of the election petition so filed in the court was served upon the petitioner. 2. At this stage, an objection was taken by the petitioner that the petition copy served on him was not signed by respondent 1; therefore, the election petition was not maintainable. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the pleadings, issues were framed. Amongst them, issues Nos. 5 and 6 were tried as preliminary issues. They are as follows:- (5) whether the 1st respondent proves that the petitioner has not complied with the Provisions of sections 14 (3) and 16 of the Karnataka zilla parishad and taluk panchayat samithis, mandal panchayats and nyaya panchayats Act, 1983? (6) if so, is the petition maintainable? ( 4 ) BY the order impugned herein, learned civil judge answered issue No. 5 in the negative and issue No. 6 in the affirmative. It is this order that has been challenged in this revision petition. ( 5 ) SRI Rangavittalachar, learned counsel for the petitioner, took me through the impugned order and the affidavit sworn to by respondent 1 and submitted that respondent 1 had admitted at page 2 of the affidavit that he had not signed the copy of the petition; that therefore respondent 1 failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 14 of the act and that that defect being one not curable that goes to the root of the matter, the election petition ought to have been dismissed on this sole ground. The learned counsel further submitted that the view taken by the learned civil judge that ex. C-4 (b), marked portion of the affidavit sworn to by respondent 1, could not be construed as an admission as it was brought to the notice of the respondent 1 in his cross-examination, is a twisted one and that the learned civil judge was not right in construing that part of the affidavit marked as ex. c-4 (b) in the manner in which it came to be construed by the court-below. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the learned civil judge could not be sustained. He further submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the judgment recently pronounced by this court, non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of law, apart from the Provisions of Section 14 of the Act, made the conclusion reached by the learned civil judge illegal and as a consequence, the petition was liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for respondent 1 argued supporting the conclusion reached by the learned civil judge. Indeed, he contended that if the entire gamut of the sworn statement of respondent 1 was construed, there was no admission as alleged. In any event, the petitioner having come to know that the copy of the election petition served on him was not signed by the election petitioner (respondent 1 herein), it was open to him to show before the court that there was no mandatory requirement of Section 14. This he had not done. He lastly submitted that even considering the answer given by respondent 1 during the course of the cross-examination, on behalf of the state it was pointed out that the copy of the election petition served upon the petitioner was signed by the 1st respondent. Therefore, on the whole, the conclusion reached by the court below in dealing with issues Nos. 5 and 6 was justified and this court need not interfere with it. ( 6 ) ANOTHER important contention urged by the learned counsel is that the revision petition filed by the petitioner itself is not maintainable. This he has taken as a preliminary objection. The contention is that in view of the Provisions of Section 158 of the Act, the impugned order being one appealable under that Section, it is not open to the petitioner to maintain this petition under Section 151, CPC. This he has taken as a preliminary objection. The contention is that in view of the Provisions of Section 158 of the Act, the impugned order being one appealable under that Section, it is not open to the petitioner to maintain this petition under Section 151, CPC. In that view, the revision petition itself is not maintainable. ( 7 ) I will first deal with the last contention of the learned counsel for respondent 1 that the revision petition itself is not maintainable. In order to understand the correctness of the submission, it is better to extract Section 158 of the Act, which reads: "158. Application of certain sections relating to election. (1) the Provisions of sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of election to zilla parishad the application being to the civil judge having jurisdiction and the deposit as security for costs being two hundred rupees. (2) any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the civil judge under this Section may within thirty days from the date of such decision or order appeal to the district judge and the decision of the district judge on such appeal shall be final. " ( 8 ) BY reading the above Provisions of law, it is clear that any order or decision rendered by the civil judge having jurisdiction under the Provisions of sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the act shall be appealable and no revision is provided for. But the question is whether the impugned order is passed invoking any of these Provisions of law referred to in Section 158 of the act. It is contended that as there is a discussion made in the impugned order in relation to the compliance or non-compliance with Section 14 of the act and the conclusion that the objection of the petitioner herein cannot be sustained it must be construed that the impugned order came to be passed under Section 14 of the act. It is contended that as there is a discussion made in the impugned order in relation to the compliance or non-compliance with Section 14 of the act and the conclusion that the objection of the petitioner herein cannot be sustained it must be construed that the impugned order came to be passed under Section 14 of the act. ( 9 ) IT is not in dispute that for the purpose of trying an election petition, sub-section (7)of Section 16 of the act provides as follows:- " (7) subject to the Provisions of the act every election petition shall be tried by the munsiff, as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) to the trial of suits:" xx xx xx. In other words, for purposes of procedure in the trial of an election petition, the Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called 'the code') are made applicable. There is no specific Provisions of law provided in the act for raising or considering the issues arising in an election petition. In the absence of such a provision in the Act, we will have to fall back to the code which deals with the framing of issues. ( 10 ) AS already stated, the question of non-compliance with Section 14 of the act was raised in the trial court at the tune of framing issues. Therefore, the trial court was called upon to try issues Nos. 5 and 6 as preliminary issues. Accordingly, by the impugned Order, the trial court tried the said issues and held as above. Therefore, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the impugned order came to be rendered while dealing with issues Nos. 5 and 6. There is no dispute about that because even the concluding paragraph reads: "it was also contended that the petitioner has not signed the copy of the petition and has not verified as was required under Section 15 (1) (c) because it has not been signed by the petitioner and not verified in the manner laid down. But the original petition has been signed by the petitioner. It is not necessary that the copies also to be signed by the petitioner. But the original petition has been signed by the petitioner. It is not necessary that the copies also to be signed by the petitioner. What requires under Section 14 (3) of the said act is that copy of the petition has to be attested by the petitioner and not in respect of the verification, as contemplated under Section 15 (l) (c) of the act. As a result, there is no substance in the contention taken by the respondents. In view of this, I hold issue No. 5 in the negative and consequently issue No. 6 in the affirmative holding that the petition is maintainable. " ( 11 ) IN that view of the matter, merely because a contention was urged in relating to the non-compliance with the requirement of Section 14 of the act and the same was considered in the body of the Order, it cannot be construed that the order impugned herein came to be passed under Section 14 of the act. ( 12 ) ORDER xiv, Rule 1 of the code provides as follows:"framing of issues. 1 (1) issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. (2) material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. (4) issues are of two kinds: (a) issues of fact, (b) issues of law. (5) at the first hearing of the suit the court shall, after reading the plaint and the written statements, if any, and after examination under Rule 2 of order x and after hearing the parties or their pleaders, ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right decision of the case appears to depend. (6) nothing in this Rule requires the court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence. " Similarly, order xv, Rule 1, CPC, provides as follows:- "parties not at issue. (6) nothing in this Rule requires the court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence. " Similarly, order xv, Rule 1, CPC, provides as follows:- "parties not at issue. 1 where at the first hearing of a suit it appears that the parties are not at issue on any question of law or of fact, the court may at once pronounce judgment. " ( 13 ) IT is well-settled principle that the issues will have to be founded on pleadings. When a specific contention was taken in the written statement by the petitioner that the copy of the election petition served on him was not signed and that therefore there was an inherent defect with reference to Section 14 of the Act, it gave raise for a specific plea and which was the basis for raising issues Nos. 5 and 6 and it was in this context the learned trial judge proceeded to decide them. Therefore, though the compliance or non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of law came to be discussed, it was only during the course of the procedure adopted applying the Provisions of the code in dealing with the said issues, the court-below had to record a finding one way or the other. From these circumstances, if we construe the real question, there may not be any difficulty to reach a conclusion that the impugned order came to be passed while adopting the procedure provided under the code in dealing with the question at issue. If any person is aggrieved by reason of the nature of the procedure adopted in raising a specific issue or in dealing with a specific issue, having regard to the dispute or the variance the parties are, he can certainly avail himself of the benefit under Section 115 of the code seeking to challenge the validity of such an order in a revision petition. Section 115 provides for the same. Viewed from this angle and the nature of the order passed by the court-below, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is revisable under Section 115, CPC. Section 115 provides for the same. Viewed from this angle and the nature of the order passed by the court-below, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is revisable under Section 115, CPC. ( 14 ) DEALING with the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that non-signing the copy of the election petition served upon the petitioner resulted in grave defect which would go into the root of the matter, and that such a defect being incurable, the election petition was liable to be dismissed. ( 15 ) IN order to understand the correctness of the submission, it is better to extract sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the act which reads: " (3) every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. " Once the court comes to the conclusion that the Provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 14 are mandatory, then we will have to investigate whether respondent 1 has complied with this requirement of law. The trial court marked as c4 (b)portion of the affidavit sworn to by respondent 1 herein, which reads: ". . . . . . the 1st respondent submits in para 11 of his counter that the copy of the main petition served on the 1st respondent was not complied with procedure of Zilla Parishad Act as the petitioner has not signed the true copy of the original petition and hence the election petition is not maintainable under Section 14 (3) read with Section 16 of the Zilla Parishad Act, 1983. The petitioner to his knowledge has initialled to some copies of the main petition, but at the time of putting initials for some copies, I was asked by my Advocate that it is not necessary to sign. With that advice of my advocate, I stopped further signing on the copies of the main petition on bona fides, on the advice of my advocate. It was not intended by me not to sign for all copies. I would have signed all copies if my Advocate had not asked me not to sign. With that advice of my advocate, I stopped further signing on the copies of the main petition on bona fides, on the advice of my advocate. It was not intended by me not to sign for all copies. I would have signed all copies if my Advocate had not asked me not to sign. I came to know about this fact of not signing true copies of petition served on the 1st respondent only after receipt of the counter on 27-7-1987. Hence afterwards in consultation with my lawyer, I am advised to file this fresh set of true copies attested by me for the serving on the respondents to meet the ends of justice. This petition is filed with the copies at the earliest opportunity. After filing the counter, no enquiry proceedings have been commenced as the petition is posted for enquiry on 19-8-1987. Further it is to be noted that the substantial compliance has been sufficiently made to achieve the object regarding the Rule is enacted. Ordinarily procedure Rule should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage under the facts of the case. This is one of that type as the some of the copies have been initialled by me and as my signatures on all copies were not taken on the advice of my lawyer. At the earliest opportunity, I have complied with the procedural Rule by filing this application. Hence these copies be served on the parties who are the respondents for the ends of justice. Therefore, it is just and necessary in the interest of Justice that the Hon'ble court be pleased to order to serve the true copies of the election petition duly attested by me in personal signature and order to service of the same to all the parties and pass such other orders as the Hon'ble court deem fit. " The deponent himself has admitted that he came to know that the copy of the election petition served upon the petitioner herein was not signed till 27-7-1987. " The deponent himself has admitted that he came to know that the copy of the election petition served upon the petitioner herein was not signed till 27-7-1987. Therefore, I have no hesitation to say by looking at this part of the statement on oath that there is a clear admission on the part of respondent 1 herein that the copy of the election petition served by him on the petitioner herein was not signed by him. This court while considering the similar question in rajasekhar v chandrakant veerabhadrappa desai and others, 1989 (2) KAR. L. J. 37: ilr1989 KAR. 1829 has held as follows:- " (i) an analysis of the Provisions of this Section leads to the inference that the object of attestation is to certify that the copy attested is a true copy of the original petition. The statutory compulsion is that the attesting authority shall be the petitioner himself and the wordings clearly implies that attestation by proxy is not permitted whether through an Advocate or through a recognised or authorised agent of the petitioner. The words "under his own signature" clearly convey the meaning that the signature shall be exclusively and solely of the petitioner himself. It is also provided under this Section that every copy shall be attested by the petitioner himself under his own signature certifying that it is a true copy of the petition. It is impossible to construe this statutory provision in any other fashion. The one and the only meaning is that the attestation of every copy of the petition shall be by the petitioner himself and it is mandatory and not recommendatory or directory. (ii) in a participatory democracy, accountability being a necessary concomitant, the legislature reposing confidence and conferring the power of attestation on the person like the petitioner competing for office through electoral process has to be regarded as a special power conferred by the legislature on the petitioner and this power is neither delegable nor transferable unless the statute itself provides for the same. The power to attest is exclusively given to the petitioner by the statute and it is his responsibility to exercise that power. The power is non-transferable and the duty is residual and mandatory. (iii) when the act invests the power with the petitioner and. The power to attest is exclusively given to the petitioner by the statute and it is his responsibility to exercise that power. The power is non-transferable and the duty is residual and mandatory. (iii) when the act invests the power with the petitioner and. The dictate of the Provisions in unmistakable terms postulate that such a power should be exercised only by the petitioner, to give a different meaning would be clearly in contravention of the object of the legislature. (iv) Section 14 (3) of the act not only empowers the petitioner to attest the copies of the petition but also imposes a responsibility on him as a candidate for the election which may be classified as accountability in a sense, committing him to the correctness, authenticity and genuineness of the contents of the copies. Indeed, it is not a power without responsibility since the power is not conferred either on an Advocate or an authorised agent of the petitioner by the statute. The dictum in the context appears to be that one who files the election petition alone shall attest every copy of the petition. No one else is permilted to do so. Therefore, non-comptiance with the statutory dictates is fatal entailing dismissal of the election petition. The defect is incurable. The power conferred carries with it effects which traverse beyond a more duty and enter the realm of non-delegable responsibility. " ( 16 ) SPECIFICALLY referring to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act, this court in the above case held that the requirement of law as found in Section 14 (3) is mandatory and that therefore non-compliance with the statutory dictates is fatal entailing dismissal of the election petition and the defect is incurable. Indeed, balakrishna, j. , While holding so, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in sharif-ud-din v abdul gani lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 . ( 17 ) IN the light of the foregoing, I have no hesitation to hold that, as disclosed inex. C-4 (b), marked portion of the affidavit of respondent 1 herein, the copy of the election petition served on the petitioner was not signed by respondent 1 and therefore there is non- compliance with Section 14 of the act which is mandatory. C-4 (b), marked portion of the affidavit of respondent 1 herein, the copy of the election petition served on the petitioner was not signed by respondent 1 and therefore there is non- compliance with Section 14 of the act which is mandatory. As held by this court in rajasekhar's case, the said defect being incurable, it entails dismissal of the election petition as there is no choice left to the court. Indeed, by a perusal of the order made by the learned judge, it is not correct on the part of the court to say that ex. C-4 (b) was brought to the notice of respondent 1 when he was cross-examined by the counsel for the state. That is not material because what is material is the sworn statement of the election petitioner particularly ex. C-4 (b) wherein there is an admission made by him. Therefore, the approach of the learned civil judge is perverse and cannot be sustained. Applying the principle rendered in rajasekhar's case, I have no alternative but to hold that the conclusion of the learned civil judge in dealing with issues Nos. 5 and 6 is illegal and cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the order impugned herein is set aside. Consequently, the election petition is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .