K. S. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE trial Court has permitted the landlord to raise an additional ground under Section 21 (1) (h) the Karnataka Rent control Act ('the Act' for short), by allowing I. A. III. This order is under challenge. ( 2 ) IT is contended by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner before me that the petition for amendment was not maintainable because the proceedings had come up to this Court earlier in C. R. P. No. 591 of 1990 and the matter was remitted back to the trial Court for a fresh consideration in the light of the decision therein. From this, the learned Counsel for the petitioner wants to derive the inference that the parties are confined to the existing contentions before the order of remand and no amendment is permissible after the matter is remitted. It is not possible for me to accept this contention. When the order was set aside and the matter was remitted back by this Court, the entire' proceedings before the trial court revived in the absence of any limitation imposed on the proceedings, by this court after the remand- This Court said, in the earlier C. R. P. , that the parties are at liberty to lead further evidence for which opportunity was given to the parties. If for any reason any one of the parties makes out a case for amendment of the pleadings, such a matter cannot come in the way; an order thereon has to be made depending upon the merits of the application. ( 3 ) BY the application for amendment,the respondent herein sought to claim the benefit of Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act is different from a claim under Section 21-B and therefore a claim under Section 21 (1) (h) cannot be clubbed with an application filed earlier seeking an eviction under Sec. 21 -B of the act. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, under Section 21-B all that the landlord had to do was to establish his requirement being bonafide by producing the requisite certificate. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, under Section 21-B all that the landlord had to do was to establish his requirement being bonafide by producing the requisite certificate. The approach of the Court under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act will be quite different and the rights and liabilities of parties also would be different thereunder, such as the consideration of comparative hardship under Section 21 (h ). The learned Counsel also refers to the opening words in section 21-B, It says that the said provision is "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act". In other words, according to the learned Counsel, Section 21-B is entirely independent and exclusive not only in its application but also in the matter of invoking it by the landlord. The contention is that claims under Section 21 (1) (h) and 21-B cannot be clubbed together in a single petition for eviction. ( 4 ) I am not able to persuade myselfto agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner on this contention, also. A land-lord can make out a case either under clause (h) or under other clauses of section 21 (1) of the Act. He may also seek eviction alternatively under these provisions, though it can also be the basis of an independent claim. in the instant case, the land-lord sought eviction under section 21-B. Now he is seeking eviction on another ground, under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. The mode of proof under section 21-B is more liberal and 'entirely in favour of the land-lord, in view of the evidenciary value attached to the certificate, he is required to produce. But under section 21 (1) (h), the burden of establishing the genuiness and reasonableness of the requirement is entirely on the landlord. By the amendment, seeking the introduction of a case under Section 21 (1) (h), landlord is seeking to make an alternative case, in case the certificate he produces for the purpose of Section 21-B fails to satisfy the Court. The ultimate object, whether it is a case under Section 21 (1) (h) or under Section 21-B, is to get the tenant vacated so that landlord may occupy the premises, by himself. The basic idea behind Section 21 (1) (h) and 21-B is the same; i. e. , to facilitate the eviction of tenant when the landlord requires the premises bonafide and reasonably, for his own occupation. The basic idea behind Section 21 (1) (h) and 21-B is the same; i. e. , to facilitate the eviction of tenant when the landlord requires the premises bonafide and reasonably, for his own occupation. The amendment sought by the landlord, thus, in no way alters the real character of the eviction petition. Section 21-B was introduced in the year 1988 as another ground enabling the landlord to seek eviction. This ground was introduced by a seperate Section, only for the legislative convenience instead of adding another clause to Section 21 (1) of the Act. Nothing prevented the legisla'ure from introducing Section 21-B as another Clause to Section 21 (1) of the act. The format in which a new circumstance for eviction has been brought into the Act does not in any way alter the substance of the ground for the eviction of the tenant. The decision of the Supreme court in Shiva Rao v Cecilia Pereira (1987 (1) Karnataka Law Journal - Page 182), has no application to the facts of this case. In the said case, after the land-lord obtained a decree in a Civil court for possession of the property, the act stood extended to the area and it is in that situation the Supreme Court held that the Civil Court's decree was inexecutable. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to para 5 of the said decision. Observations in Para 5 refers to the principle governing the interpretation of a beneficial legislation like Rent control Act. That principle does not extend to compel a landlord to seek eviction under Section 21-B independently of a claim under Section 21 (1) (h ). Beneficial legislations do rot expect multiplicity of proceedings; in fact, to achieve the object of the Act, multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided, Section 21-B is a special provision enacted for the benefit of members of Armed forces; those who are the beneficiaries of the said provision cannot be and should not be compelled to resort to several proceedings to get vacant possession of the premises; the very object of Section 21-B will be frustrated otherwise. Section 21-B shortens the process of litigation by ensuring evidentiary value to the certificate referred therein. Similarly, the decision in Govindamma v Murugash Mudallar (I. L. R. 1990 karnataka 2639) also has no application, it considered the Civil Court's jurisdiction to make an order of eviction. Section 21-B shortens the process of litigation by ensuring evidentiary value to the certificate referred therein. Similarly, the decision in Govindamma v Murugash Mudallar (I. L. R. 1990 karnataka 2639) also has no application, it considered the Civil Court's jurisdiction to make an order of eviction. The said decision does not say that the non- abstante clause in the opening section of section 21-B results in denying the benefits of other provisions of the Act to the land-lord. The non-abstante clause in section 21-B only highlights the special feature of the provision and deprives the protection afforded to the tenant under other provision of the Act, if the case falls under section 21-B. ( 5 ) THE trial Court has rightly permitted the amendment. Civil Revision Petitionis accordingly dismissed. The trial Court is directed to conclude the trial and dispose of the matter before the end of january, 1991. C. --- *** --- .