Research › Browse › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 459 (MP)

MANIK CHANDRA v. CHANDRA BHUSHAN

1990-12-03

GULAB C.GUPTA

body1990
GULAB CHAND GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is complainants application u/s 439 (2), Cr. P. C. complaining that the anticipatory bail granted to the non-applicant No. 1 by 4th Addi. Sessions Judge Chhatarpuf is wholly unjustified and therefore the prayer is that the same be cancelled. ( 2 ) FROM the facts appearing in the charge-sheet, it appears that on 13-11-1989 at 8 a. m. applicant lodged the complaint at police station Maharajpur, Distt. Chhatarpur that he was returning home in the morning from his agricultural field alongwith his brother Dharam. As they reached near the agriculture field of Chourasia, Deoki, Chandra Bhushan, Shanker, Santan, Chandan and Suresh came from the opposite direction. The non applicant Chandra Bhushan was armed with a gun. These persons caught hold of him and his brother. Non-applicant Chandra Bhushan fired his gun from behind his brother Dharam, hitting on his back. . Deoki who was catching hold of him, then told that Matadeen had asked him not to spare anyone and kill everyone and this Chandan took a Deshi Katta from his pocket and fired. He tried to disengage himself and ran away. According to him there is previous enmity between Deoki about some land dispute and he therefore complained that because of that enmity and at the instance of Matadeen, non-applicant No. 1 and others have killed his brother. The F. I. R. was lodged within an hour and half of the incident which must be treated to be almost immediately considering the distance of 2 Kms. between the police station and the place of the incident. It appears that the statement of the applicant corroborated his version in the F. I. R. Sushil sb Rampyare and Barelal sb Ganpat both stated that they had seen the two parties at the place of the incident and the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan was armed with a 12- bore gun. They also heard the firing of the gun and subsequently saw the deceased lying on the ground. Munna s/c Govind, Kamlapati s/c Shanker, Han sb Natthu, Dasrath s/c Nandu and Lalaram s/c Laxmi Prasad proved involvement of the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan in the incident. The post-mortem indicated the gun-shot wound on the dead body. On this the investigating officer lodged offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302, IPC on the non-applicant and others. Munna s/c Govind, Kamlapati s/c Shanker, Han sb Natthu, Dasrath s/c Nandu and Lalaram s/c Laxmi Prasad proved involvement of the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan in the incident. The post-mortem indicated the gun-shot wound on the dead body. On this the investigating officer lodged offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302, IPC on the non-applicant and others. They could arrest Deoki, Shanker, Santa and Suresh, the four co-accused but could not arrest Chandra Bhushan, Chandan and Matadeen. In the charge-sheet file by them on 4-12-1989 these three accused persons were shown as absconding and therefore, the request was made to the Court to proceed declaring them to be absconding. ( 3 ) IT appears that the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan made an application for grant of anticipatory bail in the Court of 4th Addi. Sessions Judge Chhatarpur where it was subject-matter of bail application Nos. 381190. Shri K. P. Tiwari, the Presiding Officer of the Court by his order dated 23-5-1990 rejected the said application on a finding that the evidence collected during the investigation establishes a prime facie case against the non-applicant No. 1 which was enough to refuse benefit of anticipatory bail. The learned A. S. I. further observed that it was difficult to believe that the non-applicant No. 1 was falsely involved in the case. It was also observed that in a case like murder, anticipatory bail cannot easily be framed. The non-applicant No. 1 does not seem to have thereafter approached this Court for grant of anticipatory bail and decided to evade his arrest inspite of this refusal. The non-applicant No. 1 again made an application for grant of anticipatory bail. This application was placed not before Shri K. P. Tiwari who had earlier rejected the application but before Shri L. N. Mishra who must have by then taken over as the 4th Addi. Judge to the Court of Sessions Judge Chhatarpur. The non-applicant No. 1 again made an application for grant of anticipatory bail. This application was placed not before Shri K. P. Tiwari who had earlier rejected the application but before Shri L. N. Mishra who must have by then taken over as the 4th Addi. Judge to the Court of Sessions Judge Chhatarpur. Shri Mishra, in his order dated 12-7-1990 reconsidered the matter and condemned the prosecution story because the gun alleged to have been used by the nonapplicant No. 1 to commit murder was not seized the post mortem report indicates that the incident did not take place at about 6 a. m. but had taken place at about 2 a. m. and the other accused persons Matadeen and Shankarlal were released on bail and Matadeen had been provided police protection as he has apprehending danger to his life. The learned Judge therefore directed that in case the nonapplicant No. 1 is arrested in connection with the aforesaid crime, he would be forthwith released on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 15,000/ -. It is this order which is impugned in this application. ( 4 ) A perusal of the impugned order does not indicate that the learned A. S. I. ever applied his mind to the fact that the non-applicant was evading his arrest inspite of rejection of his anticipatory bail application. He also seems to have missed the fact that the order dated 23-5-1990, in the absence of challenge in this Court or elsewhere had b0come final and therefore deserved notice, particularly when, contrary finding about the merits of the case were being recorded. It should also have been noticed that the non-applicant No. 1 had filed this application only because Shri K. P. Tiwari, the Presiding Officer of the Court had been transferred. But for this transfer, the second bail application would have been placed for consideration before Shri Tiwari. This, however, does not mean that the finding recorded by Shri Tiwari should have been brushed aside. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding further in the matter, the law regarding cancellation of bail should be recalled. According to the learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1, once bail has been granted by the Court, it can be cancelled only on considerations mentioned in Bhagirathsingh Judeja v. State of Gujarut. This Court having gone through the aforesaid Judgment, it not inclined to accept the submission. According to the learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1, once bail has been granted by the Court, it can be cancelled only on considerations mentioned in Bhagirathsingh Judeja v. State of Gujarut. This Court having gone through the aforesaid Judgment, it not inclined to accept the submission. The said case was a case where the bait was lawfully and justifiably granted by the Sessions Court. In such cases, the Court considering cancellation would require very cogent and overwhelming circumstance for the purpose. Inspite of it, it must be accepted that cancellation of bail is not done with a view to impose punishment. Indeed, the provision has been couched in wide language and gives power to the High Court to cancel bail not only in those cases where subsequent developments justify cancellation but also where bail order suffers from patent Illegality. This position, in the opinion of this Court is beyond controversy. As regards grant of anticipatory bail, it is clear that while exercising this power, seriousness of accusations against the persons seeking bail have got to be taken into account. In The Slate v. Captain Jagjit Singh, it was clarified that where there is a reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court should not as a general rule exercise its power to grant bail. Such a power should be exercised only in exceptional cases. In Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and others, the Supreme Court laid down the duty of the Court considering bail application and clarified that detailed examination of evidence or elaborate documentation of the merit of the case should be avoided. Its satisfaction about a prima facie case is needed. It is not the same as all exhaustive exploration of the merits of the allegations. Very recently in State of Maharashtra v. A. C. Dighe the Supreme Court took a fresh look into the matter and provided the following guidelines: There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its can merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Very recently in State of Maharashtra v. A. C. Dighe the Supreme Court took a fresh look into the matter and provided the following guidelines: There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its can merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Where the offence is of serious nature, the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offences, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such other similar considerations. It may be that these guidelines have been provided in the context of bail after arrest but it cannot seriously be doubted that these guidelines are also relevant in case of anticipatory bail. Section 438, Cr. P. C. is not intended to confer a wider jurisdiction on the Court to grant bail even in those cases where the bail could not be granted after arrest. ( 6 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter. Section 437 (1) specifically prohibits releasing a person accused of a non-bailable offence on bail if there appears a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Under the circumstances, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the charges against the applicant do not prima facie attract Section 302, IPC, the Court would not be justified in granting bail even after his arrest. ( 7 ) THE impugned order of learned A. S. J. is really based on three facts; which do not appeal to reason. The first observation that though the non-applicant No. 1 is alleged to be armed with a gun and having killed the deceased by firing at him, no effort has been made to seize the gun. This appears to be unreasonable. Unless this non-applicant was arrested, it would not have been possible for the prosecution to seized the gun from him or find out where it was hidden. The charge-sheet indicated that the non-applicant was absconding. This appears to be unreasonable. Unless this non-applicant was arrested, it would not have been possible for the prosecution to seized the gun from him or find out where it was hidden. The charge-sheet indicated that the non-applicant was absconding. In the context of this conduct of the non-applicant No. 1, prosecution could not have been blamed for not seizing the weapon of offence. Second ground is based on the estimate of the Doctor conducting the post-mortem examination, about the death. According to the post-mortem report, the death had been caused between 12 to. 24 hours. The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination at 1. 40 p. m. on 13-11-1989and wasexaminedat2. 00 p. m. for the first time. The time when the post mortem was completed is not mentioned in the report. It is on the basis of this estimate that the learned A. S. J. assessed that the death might have been caused not before 2 a. m. There is no justification about such appreciation of evidence. Then the time mentioned is only an estimated time and unless the Doctor is examined to explain the discrepancy, it would not be possible to ignore the evidence of eye-witness on that account. Apparently, the learned A. S. J. has indulged in exercise which was beyond his jurisdiction. The third circumstance that other two accused persons were released on bail might have been relevant if the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan's bail application was being considered for the first time. This by itself is not enough to ignore that his earlier bail application has been dismissed on a clear finding on merits against him. Therefore, this case does not fit to the guidelines provided by the Supreme Court on the matter. ( 8 ) IT may therefore be considered if the facts of this case justify grant of anticipatory bail. As noticed earlier, the incident had taken place in early morning at about 6 a. m. The manner in which the non-applicant and his friends surrounded the victim and others and killed the deceased by firing indicates that the non-applicant is a date devil, having no regard to either the rule of law of precious life of others. Since the incident had happened in the context of previous enmity, inference is justified that the intention to kill was obvious. Since the incident had happened in the context of previous enmity, inference is justified that the intention to kill was obvious. Even otherwise, the manner in which the gun-shot has been fired would justify inference of intention to kill. Witness whose names have been noticed in Para 2 above, depose about these facts. This evidence prima facie indicates commission of an offence U/s 302, IPC in a ghostly manner. The non-applicant is therefore not entitled to bail in such a case not only as a matter of judicial policy but also because of prohibition u/s 437 (1), Cr. P. C. In this view of the matter, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan is not entitled to be released on bail, much-less given the benefit of anticipatory bail. This Court has therefore no hesitation in holding that the bail granted to him is illegal and unjustified. ( 9 ) FOR reasons aforesaid, the application succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 12-7-1990 passed by Shri L. N. Mishra, 4th A. S. J. Chhatarpur in Bail application No. 887190 directing released of the non-applicant No. 1 Chandra Bhushan on anticipatory bail is hereby set aside. Since the charge-sheet has already been filed, the non-applicant Chandra Bhushan is directed to surrender before the CJM Chhatarpur on or before. 14-12-1990 to be committed to judicial custody. In case the non-applicant No. 1 failed to surrender as aforesaid, the CJM will issue non-bailable warrant for his arrest and take necessary steps to commit the non-applicant to judicial custody pending trial of the accused. Petition allowed. .