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1990 DIGILAW 465 (ALL)

Ajmal Khan v. State Of U. P.

1990-05-02

S.H.A.RAZA, U.G.SRIVASTAVA

body1990
JUDGMENT : 1. These three writ petitions have been connected with each other as common question of law and fact generally arise in these petitions with slight variations. In writ petition No. 212 of 1990, the petitioners, who too, are operators have prayed for issue of writ of prohibition commanding the opposite parties to the petition not to consider any application for grant of stage carriage permit and not to issue permit Saharanpur Ghaziabad route or any route overlapping Saharanpur Shahdara route which is duly notified route under approved scheme. Prayer for certiorari for quashing permit of one Sumat Prasad and others on the route in question too has been made. 2. In Writ Petition No. 7735 of 1989 prayer for issue of writ of prohibition for not considering any application for grant of stage carriage permit or grant the same on the same route has been made. IN writ petition no. 10323 of 1989 prayer for issue of writ of certiorari for quashing order dated 27-9-1989 passed by State Transport Authority taking over the route Muzafarnagar-Gangoli via Butrara-Babri-Keri-Hind Thaha Bhawan-Jalalabad extended from Titro to Garhi Khan and grant of 16 stage carriage permits on the same day. Mandamus has also been prayed for requiring the opposite parties 5 to 18 to the writ petition not to ply their vehicles on the said route on the basis of permits granted by the State Transport Authority, U. P. So far as first two writ petitions are concerned which are in respect of same route, in respect of Delhi Saharanpur route a draft scheme and Section 66-C of the Motor Vehicles Act was published. The final scheme was published under section 69 D (3) on 29-9-1959 after undergoing the process of inviting objections and its disposal. Fifty permit holders out of one hundred filed writ petitions against the said scheme. The writ petition filed by 32 operators were allowed by single judge of the court on 31-10-61 while those of 18 operators was allowed on 7-2-1962. It was held that approved scheme is not enforceable against two groups of petitioners but it was left open for the State Government to enforce it against other persons who were not party to the petitions. The approved scheme was quashed so far these petitioners were concerned. 3. Thereafter few persons moved application for grant of stage carriage permit on the said route. The approved scheme was quashed so far these petitioners were concerned. 3. Thereafter few persons moved application for grant of stage carriage permit on the said route. The applications were rejected by the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. Writ Petition against same was dismissed and appeal against same was dismissed by the Supreme Court of India on 3-4-88. It was held that the High Court vide two judgments referred to above intended to prohibit the scheme as against the two groups of the petitioners whose writ petitions were allowed and the scheme in its entirety was not quashed. In view of these decisions no permits were granted to private operators on this route. 4. During the pendency of consideration of draft scheme which was still pending before the State Government, few persons filed writ petitions before the Supreme Court of India challenging, the proceedings before State Government for approval of scheme. The Supreme Court allowed these writ petitions on 23-8-1985. In re Sri Chand v. Government of U. P., Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 242 , it was held that in view of two judgments of this Court referred to above the approved scheme became final against all except existing fifty operators whose writ petitions were allowed. It was held that it has resulted in discrimination and the situation created by unreasonable delay in approval of the scheme has not merely resulted in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution but also of fundamental right of the other operators guaranteed under Article 19 (I) of the Constitution. Allowing the writ petition the Court quashed the scheme under section 68-C of the old Act published in 1959 and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereof. Thereafter review applications against the said judgment were filed by State of U. P. and the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation pleading an anamolous situation in view of differential treatment between 50 operators and the rest in respect of same scheme. The review applications were dismissed on 29-11-1985. 5. After this judgment the Corporation issued another draft scheme under section 68-C of the old Act which was published on 13-2-1986 for nationalising the Delhi Saharanpur and other routes including those included in these writ petitions and the proceedings in respect thereof are still pending. In the mean time the old Act was repealed by the New Motor Vehicles Act, lv88. In the mean time the old Act was repealed by the New Motor Vehicles Act, lv88. The Regional Transport Authority thereafter started granting permits on Delhi Saharanpur route or portion thereof. It was thereafter the first two writ petitions viz of Ajmal Khan and others and Ram Krishna Verma and others were filed in this Court. The questions raised in these writ petitions have been answered by this Court sitting at Allahabad in two writ petitions decided by it. One of the writ petition was filed by the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (Writ Petition No. 19869 of 1989). Vide its judgment dated 16th March, 1990 relying on its decision in Writ Petition No. 21773 of 1989 Santosh Kumar and others v. Regional Transport Authority and others decided by the same Bench on that very date. The writ petition filed by the Corporation was dismissed holding that draft scheme under section 68-C having been quashed in Sri Chand's case (supra) by the Supreme Court of India, there remains no valid basis for the approved scheme dated 29-9-59. The contention that draft scheme dated 13-2-86 was still in operation and no permit can be granted to private operators was also rejected. In Santosh Kumar's case (supra) it was observed: "It may be noticed that in the New Act there is no such provision like Sec 68-F (l-A)? No such prohibition on this basis against grant of new permit during the pendency of draft scheme can be implied. In view of the absence of provision like sub-section 1-D of Section 68-F of the Act in the New Act grant of permanent or temporary permits can not be said to be prohibited during pendency of these draft scheme." In this view, the law laid down in (sic v. State of U. P. and other cases referred to by the petitioners in the writ petition will not apply. We are in respectful agreement with the said decision. 6. The plea taken in Ram Krishna Verma's case is (Writ Petition No. 212 of 1990) of res-judicata in view of dismissal of writ petition no. 1147 of 1989 by, the Supreme Court of India filed by one Mahendra Kumar for a direction to consider the application for permit filed by him. The petition was dismissed by the Court vide a non-speaking order. 1147 of 1989 by, the Supreme Court of India filed by one Mahendra Kumar for a direction to consider the application for permit filed by him. The petition was dismissed by the Court vide a non-speaking order. The said writ petition was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the principle of res-judicata will not be attracted. In M/s. Tilok Chand Moti Chand v. H. B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898 , it was held that where the order of Court is a non-speafcing order, the principle of res-judicata are not applicable. In the said case the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed by a non-speaking order, it was held on same facts petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was not barred. 7. In Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 146 , it was held :- "The dismissal of a special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking order does not justify any reference that by necessary implication the contentions raised in the special leave petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by Supreme Court The effect of non-speaking order of dismissal of a special leave petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must. by Qjcissary implication, be taken to be that Supreme Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted." Accordingly the dismissal of writ petition filed by Mahendra Kumar will not operate as res-judicata and will not preclude the filing of fresh writ petition. 8. The plea that grant or issue of permits to Saharanpur-Shabdara- Delhi route or any other route covering or overlapping any route is against the mandatory provision of Section 100-sub-cIause (4) of Motor Vehicles Act and is without jurisdiction is also without any substance. By sub-section (4) absolute prohibition has been made in the official gazette but specific provision has been made regarding pending Scheme under section 217 (2-C) of that Act. The draft scheme was published on 13-6-86 and it elapsed on the date of enforcement because of absolute prohibition contained in Section 100 sub-clause (4) against continuation of any scheme after one year. The scheme in this view was to lapse on 8-7-89 when New Act was enforced. The question of presumption of date of the scheme will not arise. The draft scheme was published on 13-6-86 and it elapsed on the date of enforcement because of absolute prohibition contained in Section 100 sub-clause (4) against continuation of any scheme after one year. The scheme in this view was to lapse on 8-7-89 when New Act was enforced. The question of presumption of date of the scheme will not arise. The plea of grant of permit and application under section 100 sub-clause (4) of Motor vehicles Act thus fails. In view of what has been stated above, these two writ petitions fail and are dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy by way of revision which was available to the petitioners, or on the ground of necessary and proper parties having not been impleaded, more than 150 permits were granted, out of which fifty were issued to those who have been made parties, no order to their detriment can be passed. 9. SO far as third writ petition filed by Raj Kumar (writ petition No. 10323 of 1989) is concerned, the plea which has been agitated is that the route of the petitioner is inter-regional route and major portion of it lies within the jurisdiction of Regional Trausport Authority, Meerut and same with the Regional Transport Authority Dehradoon and in view of Section 45 Regional Transport Authority, Maerut is competent authority to entertain the application for grant of permit or for renewal yet in exercise of powers u/Sec 44 (3) (b) of Motor Vehicles Act this jurisdiction has been taken over by the State Transport Authority who has granted the permit. Said Section 44 (3) of the Act reads as under :- "44 (3) The State Transport Authority and every Regional Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under section 67 and the State Transport Authority shall, subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, exercise and discharge through out the State the following powers and functions, namely (a) to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and polices of the Regional Transport Authorities, if any, of the State; (b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no -such Authority and, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions; (c) to settle all disputes and decide all matters on which differences of opinion arise between Regional Transport Authorities; and (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed." Thus Section 44 (3) confers power on the State Transport Authority to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority and if it thinks fit or is so required by a Regional Transport Authority. 10. IT is true that there must be subjective satisfaction in exercise of of its power u/Sec. 44 (3), but in view of the legal petition stated above/including Section 100 sub-clause (4) of Motor Vehicles Act and the fate of. The Scheme of 1986, if State Transport Authority considers it fit to assume the jurisdiction in this conflicting and contradictory position of Regional Transport Authority, to put to an end in the interest of general public, it has exercised, jurisdiction vested in it with certain object and not arbitrarily. The exercise' of the jurisdiction in the circumstances is perfectly valid and covered by Section 44 (3). See State of Rajasthan v. Noor Mohammad, 1972 (2) SCGj 454. Once a jurisdiction is validly taken, obviously the power to grant permit cannot be denied. As there was good ground for the State Transport Authority to assume jurisdiction after coming into force of the New Act, the plea raised by the petitioner has got no force. The writ petition is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed, In view of what has been stated above, all the three writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders are discharged. The writ petition is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed, In view of what has been stated above, all the three writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders are discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.