N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THESE are two petitions filed u/s. 397 read with S. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the two orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Raichur-one u/ S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and the other u/s. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. and the other u/s. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) AT the time of hearing Sri Suresh S. Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions requested that he may kindly be permitted to convert both the petitions as Criminal Petitions as filed u/s. 482. Cr. P. C. The learned Advocate General appearing for the first respondent and also Sri G. S. Visveswara learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent did not object for such a request. Hence' the request was allowed and the learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions is permitted to convert the petitions as Criminal Petitions. Accordingly, the matters were heard. ( 3 ) BEFORE deciding the validity or other wise of the two orders under challenge in these two petitions, it is necessary to state a few facts which necessiated the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to initiate the proceedings and pass impugned orders. According to the Magistrate, there is a vacant site measuring 104' x 102' located on the Railway Station road adjoining Hanuman Temple and just behind the Buraniya Masjid at Raichur City. Both these institutions belong to people of different faith. Each of these institutions claim that the site in question belongs to them. A dispute in respect of the property gave birth to certain proceedings before Criminal Court and other authorities either between these two institutions or persons claiming under them. One such dispute is relating to the permission granted by the Municipality to Buraniya Masjid to proceed with the construction. The same was challenged before the Divisional Commissioner by the petitioner, who is the president of Hanuman Temple Trust, and it ended in its dismissal with an observation that the dispute between the parties is purely a disputed question of fact coupled with title to the property and the same may be agitated before the Civil Court and not before him. The said order came to be passed on 19-6-1990. The said order came to be passed on 19-6-1990. These facts have been taken from the facts mentioned in W. P. No. 15051/90 filed by the petitioner therein making the other parties including the Masjid as respondents challenging the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, which has been just now disposed of by me holding that the dispute has to be agitated and settled before the Civil Court and not before the authorities concerned. ( 4 ) IT appears, after the order of Divisional Commissioner, once again the dispute started between the parties in respect of the said property and resulted in over-acts on each side. Therefore, the concerned police submitted FIR on 25-6-1990 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate to the effect that there is a dispute likely to cause breach of peace in respect of the property in question and thus requested to take action u/s. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and if necessary, to take action also u/s. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. It is narrated in the order passed u/s. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. that the Magistrate has received the complaint on 15-6-1990. Another complaint came to be submitted to him on 9-8-90 stating that there is need to take immediate action in the matter as the first party, with the support of Vishwa Hindu Parishad and some other people, intending to perform Satyanarayana Pooja over the disputed property on 12-8-1990 at 4-00 p. m. enraging the communal feelings of both the communities. The Chairman of the Wakf Committee approached the police and complained to them that the action of the first party, namely the petitioner who is proposing to perform pooja on 12-8-1990, be viewed seriously as otherwise the same may lead to other problems. ( 5 ) AS there was disturbance of peace in the area, a Peace Committee was constituted, which did not yield any fruit. As a last resort the matter was entrusted to the President of the Municipality to settle the dispute between the parties amicably, which also ended in futility. In addition to this, 6 criminal cases filed against the members of both the sides are pending. As a last resort the matter was entrusted to the President of the Municipality to settle the dispute between the parties amicably, which also ended in futility. In addition to this, 6 criminal cases filed against the members of both the sides are pending. For these reasons the Magistrate passed the order u/s. 145 (1) on 10-8-1990 calling upon both the parties, namely the petitioner and the first respondent, to appear before him on 13-8-1990 at 11-00 a. m. in person or by pleader and put their written statements or objections, if any, in respect of their claims. ( 6 ) PURSUANT to the order, both the parties appeared before the Magistrate on 13-8-1990 as notified and it appears the petitioner filed certain documents to establish its case that the information, if any, received against him is not a correct one. On 18-8-1990 the Magistrate passed another order attaching the property in dispute, namely the site measuring 102'x104' located on the Railway Station road and behind the Buraniya Masjid and abutting the Hanuman Temple, directing that the same be held under the control of the Taluka Executive Magistrate until a decree or order of the competent Court determining the rights of the parties or the claim to possession is obtained. Consequently, on the same day he issued a warrant to the Taluk Executive Magistrate calling upon him to take necessary steps in the matter. According to the learned Magistrate, the reason for him to take action u/ S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is as follows : - "on perusal of these reports of the Police, I am satisfied that a grave situation exists concerning the disputed land and with the available information and based on the documents produced before me, I am unable to decide as to which of the two parties is in possession of the disputed land and as there exists a situation requiring emergent action, and in order to prevent the probable breach of peace, authorise and require the Taluk Executive Magistrate to attach the land measuring 102' x 104' located on the Railway Station Road and behind the Buraniya Masjid and abutting the Hanuman Temple, Raichur and held the same under attachment until the decree or order of a competent Court determining the rights of the parties or the claim to possession shall have been obtained. " aggrieved by the two orders, the petitioner, who was the first party before the learned Magistrate, has filed these two petitions with a request that both the orders be set aside on the following grounds : (1)That the Magistrate can take action u/s. 145 (1) only when the ingredients mentioned therein are attracted to the facts and circumstances and which are alleged to be accepted. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the petitioner, before taking action under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. the concerned Magistrate should (i) satisfy himself on the basis of the material made available before him, such as the FIR filed by the police or on the basis of the other material made available to him (ii) that there is a dispute which likely to cause breach of peace is existing; (iii) he shall make an order in writing and (iv) the grounds of his being satisfied must be mentioned in the order. ( 8 ) SRI. Suresh S Joshi for the petitioners submits that observance of all the above four ingredients, including forming of opinion on the material available are mandatory in nature. By taking me to both the orders dated 10-8-1990, and 18-8-1990, he submitted that both the orders are not orders in the eye of law According to him, (a) the material that was made available before the Magistrate was not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that he was satisfied that there exist a dispute which may result in breach of peace etc. ; (b) no doubt, there is a reference in the order to the report filed by the police but it is not disclosed whether in addition to F. I. R. the Sub-Inspector has sworn to the contents made in the F. I. R. (c) No doubt, the magistrate has relied upon other information made available to him but he should not have relied upon the same as the same has been produced by the Chairman of the Wakf Board who is interested in the second party; (d) There is nothing to show that the Magistrate has complied with the mandatory requirement of the provision, namely "the authority may order in writing" and while doing so there shall be application of mind on his part. The order shall be in his own handwriting or the same shall be dictated on the basis of the evidence adduced and (e) a reading of the orders make it clear that except quoting/narrating certain events in the preamble the learned Magistrate has not stated in any one of his orders the grounds which compelled him to arrive at a conclusion to initiate action under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. According to the learned counsel, mere reciting of certain events is not sufficient but the Magistrate must high-light the circumstances which resulted in causing breach of peace. In the absence of the same, he prays for quashing of the orders. In support of the contention Sri Suresh S. Joshi relied upon the earliest decision of this Court in the case of Thangamma v. Bheemappa, 1966 (1) Mys LJ 730. In the said decision, while interpreting the scope of S. 145 of the old Code, which was analogous to the new Code, this Court has held as follows : "where the Magistrate merely quoted what the petitioner had stated in his petition and did not state that he accepted or believed that as true, and had not given any finding that he was satisfied that there was likelihood of the breach of the peace, the order does not satisfy the requirements of S. 145. The decision as to the likelihood of the breach of the peace must be the Magistrate's and it should be a decision. " in another decision which he relied upon is the decision of this Court in Y. R. Puttaniah v. Y. R. Bhadrappa, 1967 (1) Mys LJ 212 wherein it is held as follows : "the Magistrate would be entitled to make an order under S. 145 (1) if he is satisfied from the police report that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists and states the grounds of his being so satisfied. A mere statement in the order by the Magistrate that he was satisfied from the police report is not enough, but he must state the grounds of his being so satisfied which alone entitles him to make the order. A mere statement in the order by the Magistrate that he was satisfied from the police report is not enough, but he must state the grounds of his being so satisfied which alone entitles him to make the order. " the other decision he relied upon is in the case of Bisse Gowda v. State of Mysore, 1968 (2) Mys LJ 521 : (1969 Cri LJ 1170) wherein it is held : "in the absence of the Magistrate placing on record the grounds on which he was satisfied that there was a likelihood of the breach of the peace, the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to make a preliminary order. Such an order being without jurisdiction, the fact that subsequently a final order has also been made, will not have the effect of rendering the proceedings valid, and the High Court is entitled to quash the entire proceedings. " ( 9 ) AS against the above contentions, the learned Advocate-General submitted that in view of the circumstances explained in the preamble of both the orders, the only alternative that was left open to the Magistrate in order to see that peace is maintained in the locality was to pass order under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. According to the learned Advocate-General, it is sufficient if the material is made available before the Magistrate to pass orders under S. 145 (1) or 146 (1) and it is not necessary to mention the grounds or reasons upon which the authority has passed such orders. No doubt, according to him, the word "satisfied" has been mentioned in S. 145, Cr. P. C but that word has to be understood as such a satisfaction is subjective one. Merely because the reasons are not disclosed or grounds not disclosed by the concerned authority to pass order in spite of presence of material, the same cannot be said in any way such orders are vitiated. P. C but that word has to be understood as such a satisfaction is subjective one. Merely because the reasons are not disclosed or grounds not disclosed by the concerned authority to pass order in spite of presence of material, the same cannot be said in any way such orders are vitiated. In support of this contention the learned Advocate-General relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 1985 (1) K LJ 217 wherein while interpreting the scope of S. 145 and making reference to the earlier decisions of this Court explaining the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in R. H. Buthani v. Mani, AIR 1968 SC 1444 : (1969 Cri LJ 13) and other decisions, has held that : "all that the Section requires is that the Magistrate must be satisfied before initiating proceedings that a dispute regarding an immovable property insists and that such dispute is liably to cause breach of peace. But once he is satisfied of these two conditions, the section, requires him to pass a preliminary order under sub-sec. (1) and thereafter to make an inquiry under sub-sec. (4) and pass a final order under sub-sec. (6 ). " on the question of satisfaction of the Magistrate it is further explained that : "the question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is, therefore, in his discretion which no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his satisfaction. The language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or 'from other information' which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the exercised of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate. " in addition to these, regarding the subjective satisfaction, the learned Advocate-General also relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1979 Cri L. J (NOC) Item No. 82. ( 10 ) SRI G. S. Visweswara, learned counsel for the first respondent argued on the same line as that of the learned Advocate-General. " in addition to these, regarding the subjective satisfaction, the learned Advocate-General also relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 1979 Cri L. J (NOC) Item No. 82. ( 10 ) SRI G. S. Visweswara, learned counsel for the first respondent argued on the same line as that of the learned Advocate-General. ( 11 ) ALTER hearing both the sides and going through the authorities cited on both the sides, the points to be considered are : 1. The satisfaction arrived at by the learned Magistrate is sufficient and reasonable one or it is a clear case of colourable exercise of power exercised by him? 2. Whether the events narrated in both the orders are sufficient and so proximate so as to attract the action under Ss. 145 (1)and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. ? 3. Even in the absence of mentioning the grounds whether can it be said that the orders are correct merely because material was there and finding as to satisfaction is existing in both the orders? ( 12 ) REGARDING the first contention as to satisfaction, in the case of Mohankumar stated supra, when once it is stated that the concerned authority has been satisfied by the material made available in a particular situation, giving reasons not sufficient. Regarding that aspect there is no quarrel by the petitioner. But, what the petitioner contends is whether the Magistrate has mentioned any grounds to pass orders under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. , will be considered at a later stage. The word "satisfied" has to be viewed in its proper perspective. Satisfaction of a authority, particularly when action to be initiated in a matter serious in nature, should be on the basis of sufficient material. Satisfaction to be arrived at on the basis of such material should be in a position to convince others that when confronted with such material they will have no other alternative but to take a similar decision as the one Alien by the authority in the instant cases. The satisfaction arrived at shall not only be reasonable but it must be an honest one. To know whether the satisfaction arrived at is the result of formation of honest opinion of the concerned authority or not, one has to go through the events narrated. The satisfaction arrived at shall not only be reasonable but it must be an honest one. To know whether the satisfaction arrived at is the result of formation of honest opinion of the concerned authority or not, one has to go through the events narrated. ( 13 ) IN the instant cases it is stated that the F. I. R. was filed on 25-6-1990. Raichur Bundh call was given on 10-7-1990, which was called off on 9-7-1990. The order of the Divisional Commissioner was passed on 19-6-1990. Efforts of the Peace Committee were under progress in the meanwhile. The efforts of the President of Municipality to settle the dispute between the parties did not yield any fruit. In this background of events one has to say whether the action under S. 145 (1) was warranted. ( 14 ) NO doubt, earlier there were some disputes over the property. Even now there is a dispute. But merely because there is a dispute in respect of a land property, it, does not mean that one has to straightway resort to action under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1),cr. P. C. In the instant case even the F. I. R. that was filed, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner, and the complaint of the District Wakf Committee Chairman were all too remote. Just prior to initiating the proceedings under S. 145 (1) no fresh material was made available before the Magistrate to arrive at a conclusion that unless action under S. 145 (1) is initiated and the property is not attached, there will be breach of peace. Hence, regarding the first point I am of the view that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not right in passing the order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. on the basis of the material that was placed long back. ( 15 ) REGARDING the second point, while dealing with the first point I have stated that the material made available was so remote and could not have convinced the Magistrate to initiate proceedings under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. Hence, point No. 2 also has to be held in favour of the petitioner. ( 16 ) REGARDING the third point, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General and also Sri G. S. Visveswara because it is one of the mandatory requirements of Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. Hence, point No. 2 also has to be held in favour of the petitioner. ( 16 ) REGARDING the third point, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General and also Sri G. S. Visveswara because it is one of the mandatory requirements of Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. , that the authority who passes the order shall mention the grounds. Mere quoting the incidents is not sufficient. He must apply his mind to the material made available and then arrive at a conclusion as to whether any ground/ s has been made out and action as requested should be initiated or not. In both the orders the learned Magistrate, except quoting the events, nowhere in the orders stated the ground which compelled him to arrive at the conclusion that there is breach of peace in respect of the dispute relating to the property. When such grounds are absent or non-exist, then it has to be held that the orders in question are not only the result of non-application of mind by the Magistrate to the requirements of Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. , but the same will attract contravention of principles laid down by this Court in various decisions cited by Sri Suresh S. Joshi, including the case of Chaluve Gowda v. State of Karnataka, 1978 (2) KLJ 246 : (1978 Cri LJ (NOC) 253) wherein interpreting the scope of Ss. 145 and 146, Cr. P. C. this Court has held that :"a mere statement in the impugned order that the Magistrate was satisfied from the police report about the existence of a dispute over the properties which would cause a breach of the peace by itself is not sufficient. To make the order complete and effective, he must also state the grounds on which he was so being satisfied. Failure to record the reasons provided under sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 of the Code, which empowers a Magistrate either to attach the subject of dispute or to appoint a receiver to the property attached, would, invalidate the appointment of the receiver to the subject of dispute. Failure to record the reasons provided under sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 of the Code, which empowers a Magistrate either to attach the subject of dispute or to appoint a receiver to the property attached, would, invalidate the appointment of the receiver to the subject of dispute. "in the case of Katanur Doddappa v. State of Karnataka, 1978 (2) KLJ 284 : (1978 Cri LJ (NOC) 272 it is held as follows : "as per Section 145 (2) of the Code, it is the duty of the Executive Magistrate to consider the report of a police officer or other information available to him and he satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace does exist concerning any land within his local jurisdiction, and thereafter state the grounds of his being so satisfied and require the parties concerned to appear before him either in person or through a lawyer on a specified date and time to put in written statement of their respective claims in regard to the facts of actual possession of the subject in dispute. Where the ingredients of S. 145 are not complied with, the order is not according to law. When it is not according to law, the Magistrate fails to get jurisdiction to hold an enquiry under S. 145 of the Code and as such will not have jurisdiction or power to pass an order under S. 146 (1) of the Code. " while interpretaing the scope of Ss. 145 and 146 as they appear in the new Code, this Court in Bomma Kom Narayan Naik v. Bomma Kom Narayan Naik, ILR 1985 Kant 4038 has held as follows : - "a close analysis of sub-sec. (1) of S. 146 in the light of the provisions contained in S. 145, shows that the Magistrate could attach the Subject of dispute in the case of emergency during the pendency of the enquiry before him after a Preliminary order under sub-sec. (1) of S. 145 was passed and before the enquiry is completed whereas attachment of the property under the second and third grounds could be made at the conclusion of the enquiry under S. 145. However, the fact remains that the power of the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute under S. 146 is subject to the existence of grounds stipulated in sub-sec. However, the fact remains that the power of the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute under S. 146 is subject to the existence of grounds stipulated in sub-sec. (1) and unless such ground exists he has no power to attach the subject of dispute. Necessarily it follows that the Magistrate shall state the ground for attachment of the subject of dispute, in his order. (Para 12 ). " ( 17 ) FROM the above it is clear that the orders under challenge suffer from non-application of mind because of non-mentioning of the grounds on which the Magistrate passed the same. As far as decision relied upon by the learned Advocate-General reported in 1985 (1) KLJ 217, is concerned, it has no application to the present cases as the main attack of the petitioner is not only in regard to the satisfaction arrived at by the Magistrate on the basis of the material but also on the ground that the grounds have not been mentioned in the impugned orders. ( 18 ) SO far as the order passed under S. 146 (1), Cr. P. C. is concerned, the same shall be construed as has been made in the interest of both the parties since the property will be in judicial custody and possession of the same will be given to that person who establish title to the property before the Civil Court, as held by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Komala Devi v. State of U. P. , 1988 (2) Crimes 724, wherein it is held as follows : "the power to attach the subject of dispute would mean the taking of property into actual or constructive possession of the judicial power. In other words the object of attachment is to keep the property in custodia legis so as to prevent the parties from creating breach of peace in their attempts to take actual possession of the property. After attachment the property remains in possession of Court but on behalf of the party or person found entitled by a competent Court. The legal possession being however, of true owner, the attachment does not operate as dispossession of true owner. It means that the property has to be attached in the very form it exists. After attachment the property remains in possession of Court but on behalf of the party or person found entitled by a competent Court. The legal possession being however, of true owner, the attachment does not operate as dispossession of true owner. It means that the property has to be attached in the very form it exists. If some article are inside the house they should remain intact, unless they are perishable goods, and not that they should be taken out or removed from the place where they were kept. From a perusal of the fard Kurki it does appear that the articles were taken out from the house and thereafter given under attachment. In case articles were taken from inside the house, this only leads to the conclusion that the person in whose possession the property has been dispossessed or deprived of the house and articles kept in the house. This was not the object of attachment under S. 146 (1) of the Code. (Para 11)" regarding this position, neither of the parties disputed. But the fact remains that merely because there is a dispute between the parties in respect of a property, can it be said that the authorities concerned can initiate action under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (2), Cr. P. C. arbitrary or they are required to adhere to the mandatory ingredients laid down therein. In my view, merely because there is a dispute or there is breach of peace in respect of a property are not the only circumstances which shall have to be taken into consideration to consider whether the orders under challenge are valid or not but other factors namely (1) satisfaction, (2) sufficient material made available and (3) the ground which compelled to take action which are mandatory requirements are to be considered. Since some of the ingredients are lacking in the orders passed by the Magistrate, I hold that the orders dated 10-8-1990 and 18-8-1990 passed under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. are arbitrary and illegal. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, the impugned orders are set aside. Since some of the ingredients are lacking in the orders passed by the Magistrate, I hold that the orders dated 10-8-1990 and 18-8-1990 passed under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. are arbitrary and illegal. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, the impugned orders are set aside. However, it is made clear that in view of the adament attitude of both the parties in respect of the property in question, once again if the authority feels that there exists any breach of peace in respect of the dispute relating to the property in question and such a situation is so emergent in nature and if the material made available before him so warrants, he is at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings afresh in accordance with law. ( 20 ) BEFORE parting with these cases, it is proper to appreciate the prompt action taken by Sri Jadhav, learned High Court Government Pleader, in informing the authorities to avert the untoward incidents that may happen. Sensing the situation as tense, stopping of performance of religious functions of Ganesha and Satyanarayana Poojas on the dates fixed may lead to communal disturbance in the area I felt that necessary direction be issued to the concerned authorities of the District to make proper bundhobust so that the concerned may perform poojas. Later Sri Jadhav informed the authorities of the District the feelings of the Court who in turn took prompt action to prevent any untoward incidents when the tension had mounted up. The sincere and honest approach of Sri Jadhav, learned High Court Government Pleader, is not only appreciated but the same is placed on record. ( 21 ) IT is needless to say that the interim order passed by me earlier has merged in this order. ( 22 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .