JUDGMENT : U. C. Srivastava. J. 1. This. reference to the Full Bench has been made by the Chief Justice in view of doubts and observations made by the Division Bench of this. Court in the special appeal filed by the opposite party is which it was held that the writ petition filed by the opposite party for enforcement of a contractual liability was not maintainable but the appeal was allowed so far as it related to the arrears of salary and the Government was directed to determine the pension and pay the same. The question was whether the judgment so pronounced will operate as res judicata. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that opposite party Madan Mohan Khanna was working in the office of sales tax department. He was dismissed from service. He filed a civil suit which was decreed. Against the said order, the State of U. P. filed a second appeal which too was dismissed vide order dated 13f-3-1970. During the pendency of appeal, opposite party no. 1 attained the age of superannuation on 1-9-1967. After dismissal of second appeal opposite party no. 1 filed a writ petition for ' payment of arrears of salary which was allowed but the officers of the sales tax department have failed to comply with the decree. . . The opposite party made several representations but without any result. The Sales Tax- Officer, Sahartmpur although admitted his claim but he has informed the opposite party that according, to the information .of Head Office the arrears of pay for the period from 27th January to l-SMl$f7 is barred by time and so the payment of the amount is not necessary. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this court and the learned single judge after hearing both the parties Allowed the writ petition and directed the Government to make payment of arrears of salary. Against tie, said Judgment special appeal was filed by the State Government. 11 is to be noticed that prior to filing of writ petition, opposite party had filed a suit for recovery of arrears of salary when the plea of limitation was raised, the opposite party withdrew the suit. 3. From the facts between the parties, it appears that the order Of withdrawal was challenged by the State Government and the order of withdrawal was set aside by this court and the suit thus become pending again. 3. From the facts between the parties, it appears that the order Of withdrawal was challenged by the State Government and the order of withdrawal was set aside by this court and the suit thus become pending again. The suit abated under u/Sec. 6 of Public Services Tribunals' Act and as such the case was referred to the Public Services Tribunal (here-in-after referred to as the Tribunal). The Tribunal vide its judgment and order, dated 10-11- 1981 allowed the claim of the petitioner and directed the State Government to pay him arrears of salary. Against the judgment passed by the Tribunal, the State Government has filed the instant writ petition in which this reference has been made to the Full Bench. 4. The Tribunal relied on the ease of Hariraj Singh v. Sanchatali Panchayatraj, 1968 SLR 851, in which it was observed that the Limitatidn Act applies only to suits, appeals and applications filed in a court but has no application outside these proceedings. Furthermore, the Government by issuing the G. O. of 1952 and framing rule 26 of the Government servants conduct Rules requiring its servants to exhaust their departmental remedies before seeking their remedies in court impliedly conceded that the law of limitation did not apply to a Government servant's claim on reinstatement to be paid his salary and all allowances. Therefore, through* Article 102 of the Limitation Act bars a Civil suit for the recovery of salary or wages due if it is filed beyond time, it has no application " when a competent Authority is considering what salary and allowances are payable to a Government servant after he is reinstated in service in pursuance of a decision, of the Court. If that authority rejects the claim of the Government servant of the ground that it is barred by limitation, its decision is based on an irrelevant or extraneous consideration and illegal. The first question for consideration is as to whether findings recorded by the Division Bench is special appeal would hold good When the Bench itself dismissed the writ petition on the ground that if was for enforcement Of contractual liability hence hot maintainable. It was in this background that the suit filed by the petitioner has been withdrawn. The suit was later on revived and it was abated and referred to the Tribunal by operation of law as indicated above. 5. It was in this background that the suit filed by the petitioner has been withdrawn. The suit was later on revived and it was abated and referred to the Tribunal by operation of law as indicated above. 5. Once the Bench held that the writ petition was for enforcement of contractual liability and was not maintainable, there was no occasion for the bench to decide any issue before it on merits. Any observation made by it, was in the nature of obiter dicta and could not stand in the way of suit. The finding in the writ petition on the point of limitation was not necessary and consequently the finding which was so recorded after holding the writ petition not maintainable could not operate as res judicata. The another question for consideration is as to whether the claim of the petitioner for the period from 27th January to 1-9-1967 i.e. the date of superannuation is barred by time. 6. On behalf of the State reliance was placed in the case of Maimoona Khatun v. State of U. P., AIR 1980 SC 1773 and two other cases relied on by the division bench. Before entering into this controversy, it will be seen that the Government servant is entitled to the salary of the post against which he was working. It is a statutory right, therefore, a Government servant has a right to claim salary for the post held by him. Even Article 23 of the Constitution of India which falls in Part IV, pertaining to Fundamental rights, prohibits Begar and other similar type of forced labour and extends protection of payment of wages and salary etc. Rule 9 (21) of Financial Hand Book defines the 'pay' : the amount drawn by a government servant as pay or salary to which he is entitled by reason of his position in a particular cadre. Similarly special pay has been defined in Rule 9 (28). The opposite party got a right to claim salary only when his dismissal order, was finally set aside and the matter became final after decision by this Court in the year 1970 before which he was already retired from service. Up to 8-7-1954 he was under suspension. Similarly special pay has been defined in Rule 9 (28). The opposite party got a right to claim salary only when his dismissal order, was finally set aside and the matter became final after decision by this Court in the year 1970 before which he was already retired from service. Up to 8-7-1954 he was under suspension. ,So long as dismissal order was not set aside, the opposite party who was continuing in service had no right or could not have claim any salary for any period during which he was out of service. 7. In the case of Jai Chand Sawhney v. Union of India, 1970 (3) SCR 222 It was held : "It is, therefore, manifest from a perusal of the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid case that the plaintiff's salary accrued only when the employee was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the order of suspension or dismissal." In Sakal Deep Sahai Srivastava v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 338 similar view was taken. IN the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 (2) SCC 288 , the above two cases were considered and the court distinguished these eases and held that cause of action for claiming arrears of salary for the plaintiff in this case will be the date on which he is reinstated in pursuance of the decree and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. IN this case it was further observed $- "Three features are to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiff's case from the point of view of limitation. First the plaintiff became entitled to salary for the period September 16, 1943 up to the date of reinstatement on December 12, 1953, only when pursuant to the decree dated August 30, 1953 there was actual reinstatement of the plaintiff on December 12, 1953...... First the plaintiff became entitled to salary for the period September 16, 1943 up to the date of reinstatement on December 12, 1953, only when pursuant to the decree dated August 30, 1953 there was actual reinstatement of the plaintiff on December 12, 1953...... On these facts two consequences arises in the present appeal, First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19 1,954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12, 1953- Second, during the period of suspension he was not entitled to salary under Fundamental Rule 53. Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on January 28, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54. Therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action for salary for the period of suspension did not accrue until he was reinstated on December 12, 1953- The plaintiff's salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and not of dismissal.........". The ruling of this court in Jai Chand Sawhney's case (supra) do not apply to the present case and, therefore, there will be no question of salary accruing so long order of suspension stands. In the case of Maimoona Khatun (supra) this aspect of the case was considered and it was held that a government servant would be entitled to salary from the date of dismissal, removal or suspension on the date when the impugned order is quashed by the court or competent authority. 8. In the instant case, the case of Maimoona Khatun (supra) will apply as the opposite party had no right to claim salary so long the matter was pending before the High Court. High Court finally decided the matter in the year 1970 and though he had retired in the meantime, he could not have claimed salary only thereafter. The suit was filed by him within time which was withdrawn and thereafter writ petition was filed which was earlier allowed and a direction was given that arrears will be paid to .him. High Court finally decided the matter in the year 1970 and though he had retired in the meantime, he could not have claimed salary only thereafter. The suit was filed by him within time which was withdrawn and thereafter writ petition was filed which was earlier allowed and a direction was given that arrears will be paid to .him. He again filed a suit in the year 1973 within a period of three years from the date of dismissal of second appeal as the cause of action for claiming arrears of salary accrued in the year 1973, the suit was within time and the opposite party was entitled to salary for the entire period during which he was illegally kept out of service and deprived of his salary. It is unfortunate that the State has been constantly trying to avoid payment of legitimate dues of its down employee even after dismissal of the second appeal by this Court, filed by the petitioner. The ground to resist the claim is limitation. What State is expected to do in such circumstances has been pointed out more than once by the Courts. It is not a dispute between an individual and another. 9. We are accordingly of the view that the Tribunal has rightly decided the claim filed by the opposite party and the writ petition filed by the State deserves to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.