N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are three different associations consisting of the employees of the respondent-1, university of agricultural sciences, g. k. v. k. campus, hebbal, Bangalore. They have filed this writ petition challenging an executive order issued by the vice-chancellor of university of agricultural sciences, Bangalore, communicated by the registrar at annexure-t, whereby the vice-chancellor ordered that the regulations regarding giving "weightage of 10 marks for children of uas employees for admission to under-graduate programmes in this university is kept in abeyance. " Attacking this order at annexure-t, the reliefs sought for by the petitioners read as follows: (a) issue a writ or certiorari and to quash the notification No. R/d/3, dated 3-7-1990 - annexure-t issued by the respondent; (b) issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to provide the benefit of weightage granted by the academic council under the regulation which was published in the gazette dated 14-12-1989, Annexure-A to the children of the employees of the university; (c) issue any other appropriate writ or direction or order as the case may be in the circumstances of the case in the interest of Justice and equity. " ( 2 ) THE reasons which compelled the petitioners to attack annexure-t and to seek the reliefs, as extracted above, are: (1) all the associations are formed by the employees of the university with a view to see that some concession is given to their children in seeking admission to various under-graduate programmes as given by other universities in the matter as mentioned at annexures-b to o (pages 18 to 30 of the writ petition ). A suggestion was made to the university to make necessary provision in the form of regulation keeping reservation for the children of employees of the university. By exercising the power conferred under Section 41 of the university of agricultural sciences Act, 1963, a notification came to be issued on 16-10-1989, gazetted in the Karnataka gazette, dated 14-12-1989, which reads as follows: office of the registrar, g. k. v. k. campus, Bangalore notification dated 16th october, 1989 sub: modification to regulations ref: minutes of the 89th meeting of the academic council. No. R/d/3 add the following new clause under regulations relating to 'mode of admission' for under-graduate programmes. No. R/d/3 add the following new clause under regulations relating to 'mode of admission' for under-graduate programmes. "add weightage of 10 marks over and above the percentage of marks obtained in part II of the qualifying examination in addition to other weightages to the natural children of all regular employees of university of agricultural ,, sciences, Bangalore, including monthly rated farm labours, either serving at present, retired or deceased while in service or after retirement. Daily wage employees, employees working on consolidated salary and those appointed under statutes 30 (4-a), 32 (d), those on contract employment, teaching fellows, research fellows, research associates and similarly placed employees are not eligible to avail this benefit. The above regulations will be effective from the academic year 1990-91 and onwards. " The said regulation came to be kept in abeyance by an order of the vice-chancel I or at annexure-t, according to the petitioners, the order at annexure-t is without jurisdiction for the reason that the vice-chancel lor was a party to the earlier resolution at annexure-a. Being a party to such resolution, he cannot take a decision to keep it in abeyance; (2) making such a provision of adding weigh tage of 10 marks is not at all discriminatory in nature. Such a precedent has been followed in other universities as explained above; (3) nowhere in the act either the vice-chancel lor or the registrar or even the academic council has authority to keep in abeyance an order or regulation once made. At best if the competent body feels a law made by way of regulation is bad, either it can abrogate or repeal but cannot keep it in abeyance. At best if the competent body feels a law made by way of regulation is bad, either it can abrogate or repeal but cannot keep it in abeyance. ( 3 ) AS against these contentions, Sri P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned counsel for the respondents, argues that under the act the authorities including the vice-chancel lor have wide powers to keep an order or a regulation in abeyance when it so warrants particularly when the situation is of emergency in nature; (2) the way in which the regulation has been framed makes it clear that it is the direct violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, as by virtue of making such a reservation for children of the employees of the university indirectly and intelligently an attempt has been made to other hundreds of thousands of students who are standing in the queue seeking admission for different faculties; (3) it is not sure how the order at annexure-t is unjust or without an authority of law. ( 4 ) IN order to arrive at a conclusion whether the stand taken by the petitioners is correct or the stand taken by the respondents correct, the relevant Provisions of the university of agricultural sciences Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') are to be examined. To decide the issue involved in this writ petition, it is not necessary to go through the entire Act, but suffice if a few sections are gone through which, in fact, both the parties relies upon in support of their case. ( 5 ) SECTION 13 of the act deals with the powers and duties of the vice-chancellor. Section 13 (4) of the act says the vice-chancellor shall ensure the faithful observance of the Provisions of the act and the statutes and regulations, and he shall possess all such powers as may be necessary in that behalf. Section 13 (6) of the act states the vice-chancellor may, subject to the control of the chancellor, take action on any emergency which in his opinion calls for immediate action. He shall in such a case, and as soon as may be thereafter, report his action to the authority which would ordinarily have dealt with the matter. ( 6 ) POWERS of the registrar are enumerated under Section 16 of the act Section 24 of the act deals about the authorities of the university. He shall in such a case, and as soon as may be thereafter, report his action to the authority which would ordinarily have dealt with the matter. ( 6 ) POWERS of the registrar are enumerated under Section 16 of the act Section 24 of the act deals about the authorities of the university. Section 24 (2) states the academic council. Section 24 (3), the board of studies. Section 25 deals about Constitution of the board. Section 26 deals with the powers and duties of the board, Section 26 (k) of the Act, which is relevant for the purpose, reads as follows: " (k) to regulate and determine all matters concerning the university in accordance with this act and the statutes, and to exercise such powers and to discharge such duties as may be conferred or imposed on it by this act and the statutes. " Then Section 27 deals with the academic council. Section 28 refers to powers of the academic council. It is relevant to state here Section 28 (2) (d) of the Act, though not cited by both the sides, which reads as follows: "to make regulations regarding the admission of students to the university. " Section 41 deals about the regulations, which reads as follows: "regulations. (1) the authorities of the university may, by notification in official gazette, make regulations consistent with this act and the statutes, (a) laying down the procedure to be observed at their meetings and the number of members required to form the quorum; (b) providing for the matters which by this act or the statutes have to be provided by regulations; (c) providing for any other matter solely concerning such authorities and not provided for by the statutes. (2) every authority of the university shall make regulations providing for the giving of notice to the members of such authority of the dates of meetings and of the business to be considered at meetings and for keeping of a record of the proceedings of the meetings. (3) the academic council may, subject to the Provisions of the statutes, make regulations providing for courses of study, system of examinations and degrees and diplomas of the university after receiving drafts of the same from the board of studies concerned. (3) the academic council may, subject to the Provisions of the statutes, make regulations providing for courses of study, system of examinations and degrees and diplomas of the university after receiving drafts of the same from the board of studies concerned. (4) the academic council may not alter a draft received from the board of studies, but may reject the draft or return it to the board of studies for further consideration together with the suggestions of the council. (5) the board may direct the amendment, in such manner as it may specify, of any regulation made under this Section of the annulment of any regulation made under sub-section (1) by any authority of the university. " Since, the respondents contend that the action at Annexure-A is in violation of Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution, it is proper to go through both the Articles in order to know whether actually there is any discrimination. Further the classification if any made by the university while making regulation at Annexure-A is a reasonable classification or arbitrary and preferring only to a particular class as against others. Articles 14 and 15 reads as follows : "article 14the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15 (1) the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, (2) no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and children. (3) nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and children. (4) nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes" (emphasis supplied) ( 7 ) KEEPING in mind to the Provisions of the 1963 act and Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution, now this court has to see whether the first relief be granted to the I petitioners. Secondly, whether the contention raised by the respondents that this court can also give its verdict on validity or otherwise of action at Annexure-A while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 8 ) NO doubt Sri Mohandas Hegde, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the present writ petition he has confined relief only to declare the order at annexure-t as illegal. In elaborating his contentions, Sri N. Mohandas hegde submits, when the university while exercising powers conferred under the act made a Rule or Regulation, it is not open for it subsequently to challenge its validity. If at all any person is aggrieved by such a notification or regulation definitely not the members who constituted the board including the vice-chancel lor, but the others. Merely because due to action at Annexure 'a' some disturbance has taken place at the university campus at the instance of some of the employees of the university who went on strike, it cannot be construed as a situation of emergency whereby the vice- chancellor could have resorted to an act as he has done in the instant case at annexure-t. Whether the weightage given to the children of the employees of the university is a reasonable one or not is not a question to be considered in this writ petition. Since, the petitioners have sought for the correctness of the act of the vice-chancellor in passing the order at annexure-t, this court without giving its finding on other aspects shall give its finding on order at annexure-t. According to him, the vice-chancellor when he was a party to the resolution, which resulted in bringing out a resolution, he estopped in taking subsequent view namely to keep such a resolution in abeyance. If for any reason either the authorities or the board came to the conclusion that such a resolution was incorrect, one should have taken steps to repeal the same or abrogate instead of keeping it in abeyance. In support of bis contention, Sri Mohandas N. Hegde relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of assistant commissioner of commercial taxes (asst.), Dharwad and others v dharmendra trading co. , Air 1988 SC 1247 . Paras 4 and 5 of the judgment read as follows: 'the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable in the present case because it was found by the government of Karnataka that the concessions granted under the said order dated 30th june, 1969 were being misused and undue advantage was being taken of the same. It was submitted by him that in view of this, it would not be proper to hold the government to the promises or the assurances it had given under the said order dated 30th june, 1969. We are afraid it is not possible to accept this submission. No counter affidavit was filed by the appellant before the trial court in the writ petition. Beyond the statement of counsel, there is nothing to show that any misuse was made of these concessions or undue advantage taken of the same. It is true that the preamble to the order dated 12th january, 1977 does recite that the concessions given by the earlier order had given room for many types of misuse but such a recital by itself cannot establish that the concessions were, in fact, misused. If that were so, it was the duty of the government and the concerned authorities to file a counter-affidavit and place the relevant facts establishing the misuse before the court. This they have totally failed to do. If that were so, it was the duty of the government and the concerned authorities to file a counter-affidavit and place the relevant facts establishing the misuse before the court. This they have totally failed to do. It is well settled that if the government wants to resile from a promise or an assurance given by it on the ground that undue advantage was being taken or misuse was being made of the concessions granted, the court may permit the government to do so but before allowing the government to resile from the promise or go back on the assurance the court would have to be satisfied that allegations by the government about misuse being made or undue advantage being taken of the concessions given by it were reasonably well established. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any such misuse was being made or undue advantage taken of the said concessions by the newly established industries. The government had, therefore, failed to establish the requisite ground or the basis of which it might be allowed to go back on its promise. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants must, therefore, fail, the next submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that the concessions granted by the said order dated 30th june, 1969 were of no legal effect as there is no statutory provision under which such concessions could be granted and the order of 30th june, 1969 was ultra vires and bad in law. We totally fail to see how an assistant commissioner or deputy commissioner of sales tax who are functionaries of a state can say that a concession granted by the state itself was beyond the powers of the state or how the state can say so either. Moreover, if the said argument of learned counsel is correct, the result would be that even the second order of 12th january, 1977 would be equally invalid as it also grants concessions by way of refunds, although in a more limited manner and that is not even the case of the appellants. " From this the petitioners' counsel tries to draw sustenance to his contention that being a party the vice-chancellor estopped from taking an action to keep the earlier regulation in abeyance. " From this the petitioners' counsel tries to draw sustenance to his contention that being a party the vice-chancellor estopped from taking an action to keep the earlier regulation in abeyance. ( 9 ) WHEREAS Sri P. V. Shelly, learned counsel for the university submits that when it is not in dispute the vice-chancellor has got powers under the Provisions of the act to take appropriate action to give effect to the orders of the board or the government, in the instant case in view of the circumstances explained by him at paras 4 and 5 of his objection statement he was right in passing an order at annexure-t. He submits that a perusal of regulation at Annexure-A makes one to believe that it is nothing but a clear case of showing favouritism to the children of the employees of the university ignoring the case of other students. For example, out of 1,500 to be admitted in an year, if weightage of 10 marks are given to the children of the employees of the university it may deprive of all the candidates who seek admission. He submits that when the regulation at Annexure-A is in clear violation of Articles 14 and 15, the vice-chancellor was justified in keeping the same in abeyance with a view to obey the dictate of Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution, that too, when emergency was warranted. ( 10 ) AFTER bearing both sides, the conclusi6n will be that on examining Provisions of the Act, it makes it clear that nowhere in the act a provision has been made for reservation to the children of the employees of the university of giving weightage of 10 marks. The only inference we can draw is from Section 28 (d) of the Act, which extracted above, at the cost of repetition reproduced as under: " (d) to make regulations regarding the admission of students to the university. " No doubt under Section 41 of the Act, the university has got powers to frame regulations. But no where it is said the board has powers to make regulations even in respect of reservation. When there is no provision under the act to make regulations regarding reservation for the children of the employees of the university, it will be very difficult to believe that the present regulation at Annexure-A is an out-come of the purpose of the act. When there is no provision under the act to make regulations regarding reservation for the children of the employees of the university, it will be very difficult to believe that the present regulation at Annexure-A is an out-come of the purpose of the act. In order to know the power of the university to make regulation at annexure-a and to justify the act of the vice-chancellor at annexure-t, we must examine the regulation in the light of the dictate of Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution. Time and again this court and the Supreme Court said that though there is a provision for reservation but such reservation shall be reasonable and shall not be arbitrary. No doubt, under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the constitution, the Constitution makers thought fit of making provision for reservation in the matter of admissions to the schools and colleges and of employment. In the present writ petition we are concerned only with the reservation in respect of admissions to schools and colleges. Merely because a provision for reservation is available in the matter of admission that does not mean the authority clothed with certain powers shall misuse such powers or can take arbitrary decision so as to say because it has got powers under Article 15 (4), it has made reservation. It is needless to say defence of reservation is nothing but encouraging those persons who are unable to compete with others because of various factors like social, economic, language, region etc. Hence, reason behind reservation shall be just and rational. ( 11 ) IN AIR 1988 SC 1247 , cited above, no doubt the Supreme Court has said that it is not open for an officer to challenge the act of state as unconstitutional or otherwise. But in the said decision it is not said even when an action is ultra vires or unconstitutional, its validity cannot be challenged. In addition to this even in the absence of such a challenge by a person, when such matters come to the notice of this court, when prima facie such rules or regulations are unconstitutional or ultra vires, definitely this court can take note of the same and pass appropriate orders and if necessary can grant relief in the best advantage of the society. The Supreme Court in the case of pathumma and others v State of Kerala and others, AIR 1978 SC 771 has held as follows:"before however taking up the other two points raised by counsel for the appellants which were pressed before us in this court it may be necessary to set out the approach which a court has to make and the principles by which it has to be guided in such matters. Courts interpret the constitutional Provisions against the social setting of the country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the nation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing the people which the legislature in its wisdom, through beneficial legislation seeks to solve. The judicial approach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather that rigid. " (emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) UNDER similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in the case of pj. Irani vstate of Madras and another, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1731 , has held as follows:". . . . . BUT any individual order of exemption passed by the government can be the subject of judicial review by the courts for finding out whether (a) it was discriminatory so as to offend Article 14 of the constitution, (b) the order was made on grounds which were germane or relevant to the policy and purpose of the Act, and (c) it was not otherwise mala fide. " ( 13 ) IN the case of budhan choudhry and others v The State of bihar, 1955 (1) SCR 1055 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of reasonable classiflcation has held as follows:"it is well-settled that while Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation; in Order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and, (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis; namely geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. The classification may be founded on different basis; namely geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act under consideration. Further Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The Constitution does not assure unanimity of decisions or immunity from merely erroneous action, whether by the courts or the executive agencies of a state. " (emphasis supplied) ( 14 ) IN view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decisions, I do not think the regulation made by the university giving weightage of 10 marks to the children of the employees of the university is a reasonable classification. According to me, it amounts to a class legislation, namely, the children of a particular class entitled to get a preferential treatment. Thus, the reservation made is illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution. Secondly, the regulation at Annexure-A is without an authority of law, in that, nowhere under the act there is a provision while making regulation one can make provision for reservation in the form of weightage as the university has now done at annexure-a. As far as the regulation at Annexure-A is concerned, it has to be held the university inflicted discrimination in the absence of legislative support altogether. It is nothing but a clear case of mala fides on the part of the authorities concerned just to favour some employees of the university. Thus it is actuated by hostile discrimination between the employees of the university and the children of other public of the state. When I came to the conclusion that Annexure-A is patently illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 15, hence, it has to be declared that Annexure-A as ultra vires. Another contention of Sri Mohandas Hegde is that the vice-chancellor was not right in keeping the regulation at Annexure-A in abeyance, that too, when he was a party to the decision taken which gave rise to this regulation. Another contention of Sri Mohandas Hegde is that the vice-chancellor was not right in keeping the regulation at Annexure-A in abeyance, that too, when he was a party to the decision taken which gave rise to this regulation. My answer to this question will be in view of the circumstances explained at paras 4 and 5 of the objection statement coupled with the emergency powers given to the vice-chancellor, he was justified that in keeping in abeyance the regulation at Annexure-A in order to see the injustice is not perpetuated and fate of other really eligible students seeking admission to the course not deprived of. Secondly, when it is not disputed by Sri Mohandas Hegde, that definitely the vice-chancellor has got powers either to repeal or abrogate the Rule or regulation made by the university, it is implied that such an authority will have power to keep such a Rule or regulation in abeyance. Because the authority who has got powers to make an act will also have power to keep it in abeyance under extraordinary circumstances. That is what the vice-chancellor has done in the instant case. As such, I do not see the act of vice-chancellor at annexure-t is an act of excess or abuse of powers conferred on him. all that he did was to avert the emergency that was prevailing. Even now if the law permits the petitioners or others who feel that the reservation made at Annexure-A as reasonable and be implemented may as well go to the vice-chancellor or the government and request for giving effect to regulation at annexure-a. ( 15 ) SINCE classification made in giving weightage of 10 marks to the children of the employees of the university in seeking admission for b. sc. Agriculture course in the state is ultra vires and unconstitutional, I do not think that the action of the vice-chancellor at annexure-t is bad. Otherwise if such a regulation is now held as bad, the immediate consequence will be that the university shall have to implement the regulation at Annexure-A which I have already held as illegal and unconstitutional. For the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. --- *** --- .