Judgment :- Appellants are the legal representatives of the deceased sole defendant (hereinafter called as defendant). He was sought to be evicted from a building standing in 14 cents, which itself is portion of the suit property measuring 3 acres 68 cents. Sree Ramakrishna Vilasam Tile Works is the owner of the property as provided in Ext. Al Udampady, to which plaintiff and defendant are parties. Under the Udampady, plaintiff was appointed as General Manager and the defendant as Manager of the factory. Out of the total ten shares, plaintiff is having 61/2 shares and the defendant 11/2 shares. Remaining two shares belong to strangers. As Manager of the factory, the defendant was permitted to use the building, so long as he continues as Manager, with liability to vacate when his office as Manager ceases. On 30-1-1967, defendant ceased to be Manager. He refused to vacate. Under the authority of Ext. Al, plaintiff filed the suit for eviction. 2. The factory itself is having only a tenancy right from the jenmi. Defendant contended that the tenancy in favour of the factory is only for 3 acres 54 cents and the j remaining 14 cents and the schedule building were obtained by him on oral lease directly from the jenmi. He denied the entrustment and liability to vacate. He also claimed fixity of tenure. 3. The claim of tenancy was referred to the Land Tribunal. The verdict was that the defendant is not a tenant. Thereafter, claiming to be the tenant of 68 cents of land and the building, including the 14 cents directly from the jenmi, the defendant filed an original application before the same Land Tribunal, without impleading the plaintiff or giving notice to him, and obtained an order and purchase certificate. The order was not produced. The purchase certificate is Ext. B 1. 4. Accepting Ext. B1in preference to the finding given by the Land Tribunal on reference, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the defendant is a tenant in possession of 68 cents, including the building, and as a co-owner also, he is not liable to be evicted.. In the written statement, the tenancy claim was only for 14 cents and the written statement was not amended even after the death of the defendant and after the appellants were impleaded. Appellate Judge reversed the decision and decreed the suit. In the written statement, the tenancy claim was only for 14 cents and the written statement was not amended even after the death of the defendant and after the appellants were impleaded. Appellate Judge reversed the decision and decreed the suit. That is how the second appeal was filed. 5. The main interesting questions to be decided are: (a) whether the trial court, which made the reference, could ignore the finding given by the Land Tribunal; and (b) whether the Land Tribunal, which rendered the verdict on reference by the civil court, can again entertain an application and give another decision. 6. Though the defendant and appellants pleaded fraud in the inclusion of the entire area in Ext. Al, that plea is not substantiated. Defendant admits execution of Ext. Al and all other provisions in it. He admitted that Ext. Al has taken effect and himself and the respondent were respectively the Manager and General Manager. He was only taking advantage of the description of the property in some documents as 3 acres 54 cents. The oral lease of 14 cents and building is not substantiated by any evidence at all and the defendant is bound by the terms of Ext. Al. 7. In a suit filed after 1-1-1970, the question of tenancy has to be referred to the Land Tribunal only because under S.125(1), the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted and exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Land Tribunal and further because such a reference is made necessary under S.125(3). That is only on the question regarding the rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran, including the question whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran. Under S.125(5), when the decision of the Land Tribunal on reference is received, the trial court has no other go but to accept the finding and decide the suit. So far as that finding is concerned, the trial court is only the receiving and accepting agency. That finding accepted by the trial court becomes, by fiction of law, a finding of the trial court subject to appeal just like any other finding. It is trite law that in such a case, if a finding on tenancy or kudikidappu is given without reference to the Land Tribunal, it is a matter affecting jurisdiction and is a nullity. That finding accepted by the trial court becomes, by fiction of law, a finding of the trial court subject to appeal just like any other finding. It is trite law that in such a case, if a finding on tenancy or kudikidappu is given without reference to the Land Tribunal, it is a matter affecting jurisdiction and is a nullity. If so, when a reference is made and a finding received, if the trial Court decides against that finding, it is exercise of jurisdiction not vested in the trial court and, therefore, is a nullity. The only court, which can sit in judgment over that finding and bound to do so, is the appellate court. If the trial court can ignore the finding of the Land Tribunal and decide the issue on other materials, even if they include another verdict of the Land Tribunal given in an independent proceeding, the provisions of sub-sections (1), (3), (5) & (6) of S.125 will become absurd and meaningless. 8. The Land Tribunal is also bound by the verdict given by it on reference just like any other decision rendered by it. The only difference is that if the verdict is an independent proceeding, the forum for appeal and revision is different. If it is on a reference, the forum of appeal or revision is as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether it be on reference or in an independent proceeding, the Land Tribunal, which gave the verdict, is bound by it. After giving a verdict on a reference made by the trial court, the Land Tribunal cannot go on entertaining subsequent applications and give conflicting decisions. Now, S.11 of the Code is directly made applicable to proceedings before the Land Tribunal under S.108-A Even before that, the general principles applied and now Explanation VIII to S.11 of the Code is also there. The Land Tribunal, which gave the verdict on reference, and the parties are also bound by it subject to the appellate decisions of the civil court. The only courts then competent to interfere with the decision are the appellate courts. 9. Even now, the claim is only for tenancy for 14 cents. But Ext. B1 shows that the purchase certificate is for 68 cents. The order of the Land Tribunal, which is the basis of Ext. B 1 purchase certificate, is not produced. The only courts then competent to interfere with the decision are the appellate courts. 9. Even now, the claim is only for tenancy for 14 cents. But Ext. B1 shows that the purchase certificate is for 68 cents. The order of the Land Tribunal, which is the basis of Ext. B 1 purchase certificate, is not produced. Even then, the trial court was prepared to accept it in preference to decision rendered on reference. Admittedly, the plaintiff was not a party to Ext. Bland no notice was given to him. The provision for appeal by persons, who are not parties, is only an enabling provision. Such an order cannot have the conclusiveness. Anyhow, none of these questions could arise for the simple reason that Ext. B 1 and the order, on which it is based, are without jurisdiction since they were rendered when the decision rendered on reference was pending consideration by the civil court. The Land Tribunal is bound by what the civil court decides on its finding made on reference. Ext. B 1 has only to be ignored. It is fortunate that the Appellate Judge corrected the error of the trial court. 10. Appellants are bound by Ext. Al. Their pre-decessor was not a tenant and he had the right to continue in occupation only so long as he was the Manager of the factory. He ceased to be Manager. Building is intended for the Manager. Decree for eviction is proper and valid. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.